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NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR GLOBAL ORDER

Kevin Rowlands

PhD in War Studies

2015

ABSTRACT

Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of the threat or use of force in the pursuit of policy since the dawn of strategic thought, the utility of seapower beyond warfighting is poorly understood and articulated. The classical theorists who have investigated seapower in peacetime have invariably done so through the lens of hard power effects such as coercion and deterrence; commentaries on engagement, interoperability and the use of maritime forces to forge friendships are largely conspicuous by their absence. The central question of this research is how naval diplomacy, a subset of general diplomacy and a means of communication by maritime actors in pursuit of their national interest, can be better understood for use in the 21st century.

This thesis defines diplomacy from the sea and investigates its use before, during and after the Cold War. Existing theoretical frameworks are deduced from the works of leading naval theorists, critically analysed and found wanting. The most widely known model, described in Sir James Cable's seminal book *Gunboat Diplomacy*, provides a good benchmark, but even the most recent edition ends its period of analysis in 1991; huge geopolitical changes have since taken place.

A qualitative and quantitative review of over 500 incidents from 1991 to 2010 is undertaken and the thesis draws on this empirical evidence to determine that the common understanding of naval diplomacy does not fit with contemporary reality. An alternative foundational model, drawing on basic communication and stakeholder theories, is offered and subsequently tested. The implications of the research can be addressed in three broad and overlapping categories: its contribution to theoretical debate, including its potential to 'update' Cable; its meaning for policy makers in their consideration of national and international security; and, finally, its utility for practitioners, including state, semi-state and non-state actors.

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If the Navy set the conditions, my supervisors set the pace and standard. I would not have been able to complete the work without the patience and help of Dr Tim Benbow and Professor Andrew Lambert of King's College London. They saw the ideas grow and the chapters mature and kept me from meandering into potentially interesting but, to this topic, irrelevant sidings.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2AD	Anti-Access / Area Denial
AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
ADIZ	Air Defence Identification Zone
AGI	Auxiliary General Intelligence (spy ship)
ALTBMD	Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System
APS	Africa Partnership Station
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASUW	Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
AU	African Union
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CAN	US Center for Naval Analyses
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CVN	Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach to BMD
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FN	French Navy
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
FS	French Ship
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFS	Global Fleet Station
HADR/HADRO	Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief / Operations
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HMCS	Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
HMNZS	Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship
HMS	Her Majesty's Ship
HSV	High Speed Vessel
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Authority
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
INS	Indian Naval Ship
INTERFRET	International Force East Timor
IR	International Relations
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba (group behind 2008 Mumbai terror attacks)
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (or 'Tamil Tigers')
MCM	Mine Counter Measures
MCMV	Mine Counter Measures Vessel
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MEU	US Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIOPS	Maritime Interdiction Operations
MSO	Maritime Security Operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
PLAN	Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (sometimes PLA(N))
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RFA	Royal Fleet Auxiliary
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific (US-led Maritime Exercise)
RN	Royal Navy
RNLN	Royal Netherlands Navy
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
RoC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RSN	Republic of Singapore Navy
SADC	South African Defence Community
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
SLNS	Sri Lanka Naval Ship
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communication
SSBN	Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Firing Submarine
SSGN	Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Firing Submarine
SSN	Nuclear Powered Submarine
STANAVFORLANT	NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic
STANAVFORMED	NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean

TAGOS	Tactical Auxiliary General Ocean Surveillance
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USN	United States Navy
USNS	United States Naval Ship
USS	United States Ship
WEU	Western European Union

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Following the end of the Cold War the purely military, war-fighting role of navies, particularly Western, 'post-modern' navies,¹ has arguably diminished as their principal focus. With no peer competitors the combined fleets of the West effectively exercise command and control of the oceans with few regional powers capable of contesting the seas even locally. A logical deduction would be that in the absence of a credible threat the role of great navies has shifted along the spectrum of conflict from major combat operations to constabulary and diplomatic tasks.² However, this shift in emphasis may be more nuanced than initial conjecture implies and is not necessarily a new phenomenon; it could be considered a return to the historical place of navies as peacetime policy instruments of the state and the tools of grand strategy, as well as the fighters of wars at sea. Oliver Cromwell famously declared that 'a man-o-war is the best ambassador'; a twenty-first century equivalent shows the United States Navy depicted in posters and on t-shirts as an aircraft carrier over the caption '90,000 tons of diplomacy.' The images may be different but the message is the same.

Naval diplomacy may be a recognisable term but it has no universally accepted definition. Indeed, is it *naval* (of ships) or *maritime* (of the sea)? Is it *diplomacy* in the

¹ Till alludes to the characteristics of post-modern 'maritime services', discussing their pre-occupation with sea control, expeditionary operations, humanitarian assistance, good order at sea and co-operative naval diplomacy. See Till, G. *Seapower, 3rd Ed.* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p35.

² Booth suggests a 'trinity' of naval roles – military, policing and diplomatic. This model has since been adopted by numerous Western navies and incorporated into doctrine. See Booth, Ken. *Navies and Foreign Policy.* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p15.

sense of codified discourse between recognised states, or is it part of a wider wielding of influence from the sea by both state and non-state actors? Is it coercion or deterrence in the nineteenth century sense of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, or is it the co-operation and assistance increasingly common in the globalised, interdependent world of the twenty-first century? This thesis will argue that naval diplomacy is, of course, all of the above, and more.

A Theoretical Starting Point

The topic certainly deserves attention. Though mentioned (if not explicitly, then implicitly) by many naval commentators, there has been little serious in-depth academic study of this important aspect of seapower. The ‘classical’ writers such as Mahan, Corbett and Richmond who did much to shape naval theory tended to do so through analyses of warfare, but they did also acknowledge the requirement for effective peacetime strategies for naval forces, including being vehicles of national prestige, co-operation and statecraft.³

Naval diplomacy did come under scrutiny in the 1970s in both East and West when it was openly acknowledged as a role of military navies. Amongst others the Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov explored it in *The Sea Power of the State*, writing about the ambassadorial and coercive functions of navies whilst also highlighting how allies could be ‘held in check’ by the leading maritime powers.⁴ Edward Luttwak offered a more

³ See, for instance: Mahan, Alfred, T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1987), p22. First published Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1890; and McLennan, Bruce. “The Historical Lessons and Intellectual Rigour of Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond.” *Australian Defence Force Journal* 168 (2005), p23. Greater detail is given in Chapters 2 and 3.

⁴ Gorshkov, Sergei. *The Sea Power of the State*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p2.

specific description in his naval 'suasion' discourse in *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, identifying deterrent, supportive and coercive modes of both 'active' and 'latent' deployment of forces,⁵ but it was Sir James Cable's seminal work,⁶ *Gunboat Diplomacy*, which arguably became the standard.

Cable gave four classifications of force (the *definitive, purposeful, catalytic* and *expressive*) whilst resolutely dismissing routine 'showing the flag' deployments and 'good will' visits from his analysis of the topic.⁷ More recent works, such as Geoffrey Till's categorisation of coercive (incorporating deterrence and compellence), picture building and coalition building roles of naval 'presence',⁸ or Christian Le Mièrè's coercive, co-operative and persuasive elements of maritime diplomacy,⁹ have gone some way to redress the balance, but despite their contribution the gap in post-Cold War analysis is stark. Malcolm Murfett's comments in 1999 that whilst Cable's work was 'convincing', other theorists had 'modified but not overturned' his ideas,¹⁰ perhaps remains valid today.

⁵ Luttwak, Edward, N. *The Political Uses of Sea Power*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p7.

⁶ Eric Grove pointed out the importance of this book. It was, he stated "a landmark, one of the most significant works on maritime power of the twentieth century." See Grove, Eric. "Cable, Sir James Eric Sydney Skelton (1920–2001)." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. (2005). <http://www.oxforddnb.com/index/76/101076361> (accessed 26 March 2011)

⁷ Themes developed throughout the book. See: Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed.

⁸ Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower*, 2nd Ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p257.

⁹ Le Mièrè, Christian. *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 7-15.

¹⁰ Murfett, M. "Gunboat Diplomacy: Outmoded or Back in Vogue?" in *The Changing Face of Maritime Power*, ed. Dorman, Andrew, M., Smith, Mike Lawrence & Uttley, Matthew R.H. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p81.

In the post-Cold War era the increasing number of littoral states with some form of maritime capability, be that naval, coast guard or commercial, and the growing number of non-state actors in the maritime domain, both legitimate and otherwise, result in a complex mix of stakeholders with a multitude of interactions. Faced with this picture the existing understanding of naval diplomacy needs to be challenged to incorporate activity beyond that of traditional inter-state relations.

The Period In Question

An understanding of the Cold War itself is important because it defines the period which followed.¹¹ There is no academic certainty about when the Cold War ended, or even began. Ken Booth gives an excellent account of competing definitions from the thematic to the chronological. He states that the *historical* view, for instance, puts the Cold War as just one stage in the adversarial relationship between the West and the Russian power on the Eurasian landmass. The *long* view is more ideological than geographical and encompasses the clash between communism and capitalism from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 until the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991. Conversely, the *short* view is that the Cold War really only lasted from 1947 until 1953 and was characterised by the global rivalry of Joseph Stalin and Harry S Truman. Alternatively, there is the *first* Cold War which lasted from the *effective* defeat of the Nazis in 1944 and the subsequent manoeuvre for primacy amongst the 'big three' until the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962; following that reasoning the *second* Cold War ran from the end of détente through the convergence of the 'fundamentalist' Reagan and Brezhnev

¹¹ However, it should be noted that the Cold War here is treated as a period of time which was characterised by East-West confrontation but also included many other geopolitical happenings. The post-Cold War period followed, but the phenomena which occurred then were not necessarily *caused* by the end of the Cold War.

premierships until the period of glasnost and perestroika began in 1987. Finally, Booth describes the *systemic* Cold War, which he states has 'probably the widest usage' and lasted from the defeat of Hitler passing through various stages of confrontation and easing of tensions, ending with the winding up of the USSR in 1991.¹²

Raymond Garthoff, a retired US ambassador, scholar and writer offered a slightly different perspective. He stated that 'there is a general consensus that it [the Cold War] began in 1946-7 and ended in 1989-90.'¹³ However, he also notes that 'a more precise illustrative landmark' would be 'from Winston Churchill's address at Fulton College on 5 March 1946.... to the breaching of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.'¹⁴ Garthoff's definition is clearly precise and certainly symbolic but, for the purposes of this thesis, Booth's *systemic* designation will be used. The definition is broadly accepted and, importantly for the analysis of naval diplomacy, it corresponds with the end of Cable's period of study in what is currently the most influential book on the topic. The *post*-Cold War era under investigation here, therefore, will be assumed to be the twenty year period from 1991 to 2010, inclusive.

Was that period any different to the one which went before? To some, the end of the Cold War meant an increased interest in intervention and human rights, increased nationalism, a rise in the number of nation states and a refinement of the institutions

¹² Booth, Ken. "Cold War States of Mind." In Booth, Ken (Ed). *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp30-31.

¹³ Garthoff, Raymond. "Who is to Blame for the Cold War?." In Booth, *Statecraft and Security*, p56.

¹⁴ Ibid.

making up the international system.¹⁵ The 'rise' of interventionism may well be a Western-centric view – a rise in the number of interventions by those powers previously hamstrung by their direct involvement in the Cold War. To others, however, the implications of the end of the Cold War have been overstated. Nicholas Wheeler and Justin Morris, for example, dispute the claim of a rise in humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s, countering the conventional wisdom with examples of similar numbers of cases in the 1970s.¹⁶ Similarly, writing in 2011 and using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Andrew Mack pointed out that by 2008 there were a third fewer conflicts than in 1992; preventive diplomacy, he stated, was often talked about but little practised.¹⁷ Arguably, both viewpoints could be correct; the rush to make sense of the new world order in the first decade after the Soviet collapse did not allow sufficient time for the geopolitical reality to become clear. It may not even be so in 2015; the increasing tension between the West (represented variously by the United States, NATO and the EU) and Russia could mean that the quarter of a century following the end of the Soviet Union was nothing more than an interlude in a much longer confrontation.

The incidence of military intervention is clearly a topic which merits further research beyond the scope of this thesis, but what is apparent is that 'as the various conflicts which have occurred since the end of the Cold War have testified, the role of force

¹⁵ Fawn, Rick & Larkins, Jeremy, "Introduction." In Fawn, Rick & Larkins, Jeremy (Eds). *International Society after the Cold War*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp9-21.

¹⁶ Wheeler, Nicholas and Morris, Justin, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of The Cold War." In Fawn, Rick & Larkins, Jeremy (Eds). *International Society after the Cold War*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p142.

¹⁷ Mack, Andrew. "A More Secure World?" <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/07/andrew-mack/more-secure-world> (accessed 30 November 2014).

remains a significant feature of domestic and world politics.¹⁸ Surprisingly, however, the use or threat of force and 'normal' diplomacy are not always considered complementary means of policy implementation. Discussing the changes at the end of the Cold War, for example, Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins drew a clear distinction between warfare and diplomacy,¹⁹ a distinction which this thesis disputes. If force is an instrument of policy and if the threat of force is a means of communication, then it follows that naval diplomacy can be valid policy tool for a maritime state to adopt in the pursuit of its national interests.

Diplomacy

If naval diplomacy is little understood, it is perhaps because it is a subset of a broader topic which, despite a long history and great study, remains remarkably ill-defined. The common perception of diplomacy is one of formal state-to-state communication. That is certainly the meaning given in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations²⁰. Indeed, Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan echo many in the field of International Relations when they state that diplomacy is 'the entire process through which states conduct their foreign relations'²¹; but what then, exactly, is meant by foreign relations? The same authors talk of diplomacy as 'the means for allies to co-operate and for

¹⁸ Baylis, "The Continuing Relevance of Strategic Studies in the Post-Cold War Era", p1.

¹⁹ Fawn & Larkins, *International Society after the Cold War*, pp7-8.

²⁰ United Nations. 'The Vienna Contention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.'
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.
(accessed 6 March 2011).

²¹ Griffiths, Martin & O'Callaghan, Terry (Eds). *International Relations: The Key Concepts*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), pp79-81.

adversaries to resolve conflicts without force'²² which does go some way to answering the question, but such an explanation rather limits the scope of what diplomacy is and what it has to offer. It is not simply codified discourse.

A broader view situates diplomacy at the very heart of international relations and the theorists John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens offer what at first reading appears to be a reasonable contemporary definition:

In foreign policy it refers to the use of diplomacy as a policy instrument possibly in association with other instruments such as economic or military force to enable an international actor to achieve its policy objectives. Diplomacy in world politics refers to a communications process between international actors that seeks through negotiation to resolve conflict short of war. This process has been refined, institutionalised, and professionalized over time.²³

Baylis, Smith and Owens are careful not to limit diplomacy to recognised states and they place it alongside 'other instruments' of policy though, interestingly, they see it as separate and discrete. Yet, like Griffiths and O'Callaghan, they narrow the field again by connecting it directly to conflict resolution. International actors may indeed rely on diplomatic means to resolve conflict but this is just one part of the whole. Similarly, the assertion that diplomacy operates 'short of war' needs to be challenged. Paul Sharp, a leading figure in the study of diplomatic theory, neatly counters this: 'When force is resorted to, diplomacy need not necessarily come to an end... In the age of total war

²² Ibid., pp79-81.

²³ Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, Owens, Patricia, *Globalization of World Politics*, 4th Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p579.

diplomacy continued, with even the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki having their communicative components spelled out by unofficial and third party contacts.²⁴

Relating diplomacy to the exercise of power is one way to potentially clarify its role and purpose. If Joseph Nye's description of power as 'the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants'²⁵ is accepted, then perhaps a more accurate assessment would be to refer to diplomacy not in terms of conflict resolution, but as a *communications process that seeks to further the interests of an international actor*, whatever those interests or whoever that actor might be.

Baylis *et al* do acknowledge that diplomacy has grown to become a 'profession' and, by extrapolation, a *profession* requires *professionals*; these we call *diplomats*. Paul Sharp states that 'we can find an uneasy consensus around the idea that diplomacy is whatever diplomats do, but it quickly falls apart again around the question of who are the diplomats.'²⁶ He investigates the notion of diplomacy and diplomats in the formal sense, that is, as international actors on the world stage. He looks at the topic through the perspective of the major IR theories, particularly the English school,²⁷ and contends

²⁴ Sharp. Paul. *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p186.

²⁵ Nye, Joseph, S. *Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p2.

²⁶ Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory*, p75.

²⁷ The English School is a school of thought within international relations suggesting that there is a 'society of states' or an 'international society' between pure state-to-state relations. For further research and details on the English School see Buzan, Barry. *The English School: A Bibliography (Version 7 August 2010)*. <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/es-bibl-10.pdf>. (Accessed 6 March 2011).

that quite what diplomacy is remains a mystery.²⁸ However, he does acknowledge that at a practical level diplomacy consists merely of people doing the normal things of human interaction such as bargaining, representing, lobbying and, of course, communicating that we find in all walks of life.²⁹ In this informal sense we are all diplomats.

Niche Diplomacy

Viewed this way, diplomacy can be exercised in a near-infinite number of ways, adapted as required to best suit the circumstances of the case. Some actors, be they individuals, organisations or states, by virtue of their particular strengths, weaknesses, interests and culture may favour one or more methods over another and the can develop a methodology to serve their particular purpose.

Andrew Cooper coined the term 'niche diplomacy' in the mid-1990s and, at state level, he discussed a range of 'middle powers' and how they differ in their diplomatic approach to international relations. For example, he explained how Canada tends to apply low-key institution building policies³⁰ whilst Argentina forges economic ties with its neighbours to gain influence³¹ and Turkey emphasises its strategic geographical position.³² Of non-state actors Cooper has more to say: 'a wide range of NGOs,

²⁸ Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory*, p1.

²⁹ Ibid., p3.

³⁰ Cooper, Andrew, F. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p10.

³¹ Ibid., p18.

³² Ibid., p19.

especially those with an interest in issues such as human rights and the environment, such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, have worked to secure their own niches in international relations..... Greenpeace has a greater influence on world policy than, say, the government of Austria.³³

Cooper's thesis is compelling. Diplomacy need not be limited to recognised states; international bodies such as the European Union and United Nations certainly participate in diplomacy, as do *de facto* administrations such as Hezbollah or Hamas which, whilst not universally recognised as legitimate governments, effectively control territory and have a part to play on the world stage. Whether Greenpeace and Amnesty International fall into a similar category is debateable but the fact that they have global strategies, operate across state boundaries and influence events is not.

For the purposes of this research diplomacy will be assumed to be a communications instrument used in power relationships to further the interests of the international actors involved. Actors with particular relative strengths will seek to use them; it would be counter-intuitive to think otherwise. It is a logical deduction, therefore, that military force may be a niche which some actors will seek to exploit for diplomatic purposes.

The Diplomatic Use of Military Force

Though the *raison d'être* of military forces, *warfighting* is just one extreme manifestation of their utility. Joseph Nye describes a 'spectrum of behaviour' in international relations along which sit different types of power. Under 'hard power', within which he tends to

³³ Ibid., p20.

place military action, comes coercion and inducement, whilst under 'soft power', which he defines as 'getting others to *want* the outcomes you want',³⁴ comes agenda setting and attraction. Initially, a reader may assume that military forces are absent in the exercise of soft power. However, Nye is sufficiently astute to note that there is overlap.³⁵ Addressing the role military forces in particular, he states that:

The military can also play an important role in the creation of soft power. In addition to the aura of power that is generated by its hard power capabilities, the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime.³⁶

Alongside Nye's 'spectrum of behaviour', and closely associated with the widely accepted wisdom of the 'spectrum of conflict',³⁷ there is a corresponding spectrum along which military force can be used to support political objectives, a classically Clausewitzian premise.³⁸ In operations other than war this spectrum includes such activities as coercion, deterrence, reassurance, humanitarian relief, stabilisation, peace support and what in the United Kingdom has come to be termed 'defence diplomacy'. In the absence of warfighting, whether in total or more limited conflicts, it is the activities along this spectrum which generally provide effective day-to-day employment for the

³⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, p5.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp7-8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p116.

³⁷ The spectrum of conflict is a widely accepted term, used throughout western doctrine, meaning a full range of military activity from humanitarian assistance and peace support to counter insurgency and major combat operations in war. See, for example, Daniel Moran, 'The View from Afloat' in Wirtz, James & Larsen, Jeffrey (eds). *Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations: Stability from the Sea*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p14.

³⁸ Clausewitz, C. von. *On War*. Edited and Translated by Howard, M. & Paret, P. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

world's armed forces. The American scholar Robert Art captures the essence of this situation, particularly the 'hard' end, well:

Military power can be wielded not only forcefully but also 'peacefully.' [.....] To use military power forcefully is to wage war; to use it peacefully is to threaten war. Only when diplomacy has failed is war generally waged. Mainly in the hope that war can be avoided are threats usually made. For any given state, war is the exception, not the rule, in its relations with other countries, because most of the time a given state is at peace, not war. Consequently, states use their military power more frequently in the peaceful than the forceful mode.³⁹

Coercive Diplomacy: Deterrence, Coercion and Compellence

Notwithstanding Nye's soft power thesis, Art directly links the peaceful role of military power with the use of threat. From Sun Tzu through Machiavelli to the present day much has been written on the utility of threatened force and it is important to distinguish between the positive and negative variants of this: coercion and deterrence. The difference is perhaps summed up best by Gordon Craig and Alexander George:

Whereas deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that he has not yet initiated, coercive diplomacy attempts to reverse actions which have already been undertaken by the adversary.⁴⁰

³⁹ Art, Robert. 'The Fungibility of Force.' In Art, Robert & Waltz, Kenneth (Eds). *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th Ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp3-4.

⁴⁰ Craig, Gordon, A & George, Alexander, L. *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd Ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p196.

Both coercion and deterrence are methods by which interests may be pursued without resort to all-out conflict. *British Defence Doctrine* adopts very similar definitions for the terms and emphasises their positive and negative connotations by connecting coercion with the word *persuade* and deterrence with the word *dissuade*.⁴¹ However, some commentators use *coercion* as an umbrella term to cover both *deterrence* (the negative) and *compellence* (the positive) variants⁴² and thus coercion and compellence can sometimes be read to mean the same thing. Whether coercion is the opposite of deterrence, or whether it describes both deterrence and compellence is debateable, but the academic pursuit of any difference between them inevitably results in a concentration on the ends rather than the ways and means of conflict resolution in an international relationship. At the military level, the threat or use of force may be enacted in exactly the same way, for example by the forward positioning of troops, whether it is meant to coerce/compel or deter.

The main body of contemporary academic literature on coercion, deterrence and compellence stems from the bi-polar world of the last century with deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, most often coming to the fore. An influential work of the period is *Deterrence and Strategy* by the French soldier-scholar Andre Beaufre. Beaufre discusses the 'laws of deterrence' and defines the concept quite simply: 'The object of deterrence is to prevent an enemy power taking the decision to use armed force.'⁴³ The effect Beaufre describes must be psychological, requiring the recipient of

⁴¹ United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *British Defence Doctrine*. (London: MOD, 1996), G.3 / G.5.

⁴² Schelling, Thomas, C. *Arms and Influence (2008 Edition)*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp70-71. First published New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Also, Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (2nd Ed)*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp265-275.

⁴³ Beaufre, Andre. *Deterrence and Strategy*. (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), p24.

the 'threat' to calculate risk, determine that the likelihood of escalation is so high and the impact so unacceptable that the decision to use armed force is never taken. Given the nuclear backdrop at the time of his writing, it is unsurprising that Beaufre talks of 'fear' being engendered through deterrence.⁴⁴ Deterrence theory dominated politico-military strategy and major power diplomacy for almost half a century through successive arms races, the presumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and arms limitations talks.⁴⁵ The theory is important and well documented but, for the purposes of this research, deterrence will be considered alongside coercion / compellence and the term *coercive diplomacy* will be used to cover all.

Sir Lawrence Freedman has written that 'the study of coercion in international relations remains dominated by work undertaken in the United States in the Cold War period and distorted through the preoccupation with deterrence.'⁴⁶ If coercion and deterrence are actually near-identical in means then that criticism of distortion could be a moot point. However, Freedman does offer his own definition of coercion as 'the deliberate and purposeful use of overt threat to influence another's strategic choice.'⁴⁷ Freedman's definition is significant because, like Beaufre's deterrence, it identifies coercion as a cognitive tool. As such it need not necessarily threaten 'war' as Robert Art suggests, rather, it is about influencing another's choice. Logically, then, coercion need not even be the 'overt' act that Freedman contends; subtlety in international relations can be a

⁴⁴ Ibid., p25.

⁴⁵ Brown, Neville. *The Geography of Human Conflict*. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), pp207-219.

⁴⁶ Freedman, Lawrence (Ed). *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p3.

powerful alternative methodology. Furthermore, a threat need not be kept below the threshold of force; limited physical action leaving the recipient with the understanding that there could be 'more to come' can be a very effective strategy. A less pithy but potentially more accurate definition of coercion, which can be extended to encompass deterrence and which will be used in this research, is provided by Yezid Sayigh: it is 'the threat or actual use of punitive capability to mould behaviour.'⁴⁸

The work which 'laid the foundation' of the Cold War study of coercive diplomacy was Thomas Schelling's 1966 book *Arms and Influence*.⁴⁹ A political economist inspired by game theory, Schelling laid down five theoretical conditions if a coercive strategy was to succeed. He said the conflict must be zero-sum; the threat made must be potent and convince the adversary that non-compliance would be too costly; the threat must be credible (ie through a convincing combination of will and capability); the coercer must assure the adversary that non-compliance will not simply result in more demands; and, importantly, the adversary must have time to comply.⁵⁰

Schelling's conceptual theory was further developed by Alexander George who has been called 'the foremost analyst of coercive diplomacy'.⁵¹ According to George the practical difficulty is that 'the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy assumes pure rationality on the part of the opponent – an ability to receive all relevant information,

⁴⁸ Sayigh, Yezid. 'A Non-State Actor as Coercer and Coerced: The PLO in Lebanon 1969-1976.' In Freedman, Lawrence (Ed). *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p213.

⁴⁹ Jakobson, Peter Viggo. 'The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities.' In Freedman, Lawrence (Ed). *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), pp64-65.

⁵⁰ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp3-5.

⁵¹ Jakobson, 'The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy', p63.

evaluate it correctly, make proper judgements as to the credibility and potency of the threat, and see that it is in his interest to accede to the demand made on him.'⁵² Such a rational actor does not exist in reality, of course, which makes predicting the outcome of coercive diplomacy a most inaccurate science.

George used the term 'complex interdependence' to describe the modern world⁵³ and it is this myriad of linkages and relationships, in concert with fickle human behaviour, which precludes any degree of certainty in advance of an action. George, along with Gordon Craig, attempted to build on Schelling's factors by identifying particular conditions required for the success of coercive diplomacy. To them, the coercing power must create in the opponent's mind a sense of urgency for compliance with a demand, plus a belief that the coercer is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demand than the coerced is to oppose it. Finally, there must be a fear of unacceptable escalation if the demand is not accepted.⁵⁴ Additionally, in his book *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, written in conjunction with William Simons, George gives fourteen factors to be considered when judging likely success: the global strategic environment; the type of provocation; image of war; whether the action is unilateral or part of a coalition; the isolation of the adversary; the clarity of objective; the strength of motivation; the

⁵² George, Alexander, L. 'The Coercive Diplomacy.' In Art, Robert & Waltz, Kenneth (Eds). *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th Ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p70.

⁵³ Craig, Gordon, A & George, Alexander, L. *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd Ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 290. The term 'interdependence' has become common in the past decade; the UK's first National Security Strategy, for example, adopts it in its title. United Kingdom. Cabinet Office. *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, (London: The Stationery Office, 2008).

⁵⁴ Craig & George, *Force and Statecraft*, p197.

asymmetry of motivation; a sense of urgency; strong leadership; domestic support; international support; any fear of escalation; and the clarity of terms offered.⁵⁵

That there are fourteen factors is indicative of the complexity involved. By analysing these factors it can be seen that few are outwith the control of at least one of the actors involved, either the *coercer* or *coerced*, and that the initiative generally lies with the actor making the demand. According to realist tradition relative strength is the paramount consideration in an inter-state relationship and, in military terms, this can be quite accurately determined. Art again:

It is more desirable to be militarily powerful than militarily weak. Militarily strong states have greater clout in world politics than militarily weak ones. Militarily strong states are less subject to the influence of other states than militarily weak ones. Militarily powerful states can better offer protection to other states, or more seriously threaten them, in order to influence their behaviour than can militarily weak ones.⁵⁶

The message is clear. At the 'hard' end of the spectrum strong military forces can be used as a means of influence to further the interests of an actor on the world stage.

Preventive Diplomacy: The Military Contribution

But what of the 'soft' end? Therein lies the phenomenon known as 'defence diplomacy'. In essence, preventive defence diplomacy professes to further national interests not through threat or the limited use of force but through outreach, international

⁵⁵ Jakobson, 'The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy', p68.

⁵⁶ Art, 'The Fungibility of Force', p7.

engagement and conflict prevention. It is achieved by the exchange of attachés and other military personnel, by education and training and it became a formal UK Military Task after the Strategic Defence Review of 1998.⁵⁷ George Robertson, the British Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the SDR neatly, if somewhat flippantly, summed up the task: 'Defence diplomacy is about the middle aged drinking together instead of the young fighting each other.'⁵⁸

Defence diplomacy, however, is not merely social exchange. It requires resource and planning, strategy and policy. It involves building relationships with an eye to the future, building capacity in allies and friends and building on the influence wrought through other instruments of policy. However, it can also be preventive, assuring security for the user by attempting to shape the future behaviour of the recipient. Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan have stated that the main focus of this type of discourse, preventive diplomacy, is to identify and respond to brewing conflicts in order to prevent the outbreak of violence. They go on to say that it may take many forms 'such as verbal diplomatic protests and denunciations, imposing sanctions, active monitoring and verification of agreements, peacekeeping, providing good offices and other forms of third party mediation.'⁵⁹ However, defence diplomacy is also about prevention at the very earliest stages; it is about making friends, not just dealing with enemies. For a militarily powerful state with a military employed predominantly in the 'peaceful' role, defence diplomacy has the potential to overtake more formal diplomacy and become

⁵⁷ United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World*. CM 3999. (London: MOD, 1998), pp20-22.

⁵⁸ Quote attributed to George Robertson, quoted in: Powell, R.L. *The Maritime Contribution to Defence Diplomacy*. Master's Thesis. Joint Services Command and Staff College, Bracknell, 2000. The thesis was written as a response to the SDR of 1998 and the introduction of Defence Diplomacy as a UK Military Task.

⁵⁹ Griffiths & O'Callaghan, *International Relations*, pp255-257.

the principal form of international relations in some areas. Joseph Nye makes this point well:

Indeed, some observers worry that America's five military regional commanders sometimes have more resources and better access in their regions than the American ambassadors in those countries.⁶⁰

This form of *informal* diplomacy is, of course, nothing new,⁶¹ but its *formal* adoption into policy as a means to achieve ends is certainly a product of post-Cold War thinking.

Defence diplomacy can be seen as an attempt to synergise preventive diplomacy and military capability into a more powerful and potent weapon to achieve 'the ultimate end-state – security in the widest sense'.⁶²

The Particular Advantage of Naval Forces in Diplomacy

Robert Art correctly identifies that in general military forces are used more frequently in the peaceful mode than the forceful, but he offers no quality judgement as to their value as political instruments. The same is not true of naval strategists who tend to be quick to point out the particular advantage of naval forces in diplomacy; to some it is the prime example of their utility. In the classic Cold War text *The Sea in Modern Strategy*, for example, L.W. Martin stated that:

⁶⁰ Nye, *Soft Power*, p116.

⁶¹ Brent, R.P. *Defence Diplomacy: Sound Bite or Sustainable Mission?* (Master's Thesis. Joint Services Command and Staff College, Bracknell, 1999), p20.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p2.

The essential quality of a military navy is obviously its ultimate capacity to engage and fight an enemy. Yet, for the greater portion of its existence, a navy is not engaged in combat. During this time of peace, however, a navy by no means fails to exert an influence upon international affairs. This effectiveness short of war is difficult to characterise but is nevertheless pervasive and may well comprise the most significant benefit a nation derives from its naval instruments.⁶³

Conventional wisdom ascribes a number of enduring 'attributes' to naval forces which help to explain their lead over land and air forces as diplomatic instruments. These attributes are reflected strongly and consistently in the academic literature⁶⁴ and expressed in similar ways in the naval doctrine of numerous maritime states.⁶⁵ They include such factors as flexibility of use, presence without commitment and independence, all of which afford political leverage to the employing power. Air forces may have the advantage of speed of reaction within a given radius, assuming the availability of bases but, navalists argue, they lack persistence. Land forces can provide a 'human face' but their time-consuming and burdensome deployment inevitably carries significant political risk on both the domestic and international stage. Naval forces, however, can poise indefinitely, do not necessarily require access, basing or overflight rights, can be either overt or 'over the horizon' and, importantly, can arrive

⁶³ Martin, L.W. *The Sea in Modern Strategy*. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p133.

⁶⁴ For example, in Till, *Seapower*, pp33-34; and, Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, pp33-35.

⁶⁵ UK doctrine, for example, lists access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, poise, resilience and leverage as attributes: United Kingdom. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. *British Maritime Doctrine 4th Edition*. JDP 0-10. (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2011), p2-1 to 2-6; For other examples see: Australia. Royal Australian Navy. *Australian Maritime Doctrine 2010*. Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2010; United States. Department of the Navy. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Washington, DC: DoN, 2007; Canada. National Defence Headquarters. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. Ottawa: NDHQ, 2001. India. Ministry of Defence. *Freedom to use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy*. New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2007.

with a fanfare and depart in silence or vice versa. The high seas, the global commons, provide a manoeuvre space that has traditionally been thought unavailable in other physical environments. They offer respective governments a range of options across the spectrum of activity and are arguably the easiest and best *military* means of 'soft' influence through port visits, bilateral exercises and humanitarian assistance.

Remarkably however, these enduring attributes of navies have gone largely unchallenged in the mainstream academic literature for several decades and their relevance to the post-Cold War global order is therefore worthy of consideration: a point returned to in Chapter 5. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the conventional wisdom attributing certain enduring characteristics to naval forces will be accepted, particularly for the period 1991-2010.

In short, the maritime domain offers international actors rich pickings for their communicative endeavours. Maritime, or naval, diplomacy is therefore a niche that many choose to exploit. It follows, then, that a reasonable definition of naval diplomacy is that it is a subset of general diplomacy and a means of communication by maritime actors, both state and non-state, in pursuit of their interests.

Explanation of research questions

A series of research questions has been identified which, when answered, will address the primary issue of the place of naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War global order, and the secondary questions of how emerging global concerns from terrorism to climate change, financial instability to ungoverned spaces are subject to influence from the sea. Interagency cooperation and multi-national coalitions and alliances are features of

contemporary maritime strategy and these too must be taken into consideration when trying to make sense of the political uses of seapower today. The research questions are:

- (1) What is naval diplomacy? How does it differ from or build upon other forms of military / defence diplomacy?
- (2) What are the traditional models of naval diplomacy? Who conducts it, how, with what aim and against whom?
- (3) What, if anything, is new in the post-Cold War era? Have 'globalisation' and the perceived increasing importance of non-state actors affected naval diplomacy? Has the incidence of naval diplomacy changed over time?
- (4) Are the existing models for naval diplomacy still valid? To what extent do they require revision? Do they appropriately encompass likely target audiences (potential adversaries, potential allies and domestic audiences)?
- (5) Can a new model be constructed? If so, what should be its key tenets? What perspectives or bodies of literature should be used?

The working hypotheses

In attempting to answer the questions a series of hypotheses have been framed which are implicitly tested and refined through the course of the research. The hypotheses relate to the nature of naval diplomacy itself and its correlation to the exercise of power in international relations.

The first proposition of this research is that naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and not simply a 'free good' of military capability. Of course, there is a direct

relationship between capability and credibility and this must be acknowledged. As explained above, diplomacy is the formal and informal means of communication between international actors on the world stage. Communication can be carried out in innumerable ways and actors will seek to communicate via the means which they have at their disposal. Maritime states with naval forces will, therefore, engage in naval diplomacy.

Hypothesis: *naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and will be used as a means of communication by maritime states in pursuit of their national interest.*

Since most states experience varying degrees of peace more frequently than all-out war then, logically, armed forces are more often used in peaceful modes than for fighting a belligerent. Ken Booth's widely accepted 'trinity' of naval roles (military, policing and diplomatic)⁶⁶ is a useful theoretical model for the understanding of naval power but it can be misinterpreted. The roles are not equally balanced, nor are they mutually exclusive. The prime reason to create and maintain a navy (as opposed to a coast guard) is for its military role. However, a navy may rarely or even never exercise its *military* role in full. The use of limited force and policing or constabulary responsibilities to maintain 'good order at sea'⁶⁷ therefore become a navy's day-to-day, year-to-year employment; employment which inevitably has a communicative dimension. Nevertheless, for understandable reasons, the warfighting role is the focus of most historical and theoretical writing on sea power.

Hypothesis: *the diplomatic role of naval forces is more prevalent than the literature suggests.*

⁶⁶ Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, pp15-16.

⁶⁷ Till, *Seapower*, 2nd Ed., p286.

To many, naval diplomacy is synonymous with coercive 'gunboat diplomacy.'⁶⁸

Coercion is certainly a possible use of naval power short of war but it is not the whole.

Joseph Nye's 'spectrum of behaviour' between international actors in which power is classified from 'hard' to 'soft',⁶⁹ offers a simple framework for situating naval diplomacy.

At the 'hard' end naval forces can be used inflict punitive damage on an actor in order to secure behavioural changes. At the 'soft' end they can make friendly port calls and open their doors to visitors to impress, educate and influence, to foster relationships with partners and to build their capacity. In between are countless possibilities for interaction which, in some way, further the interests of their state.

Hypothesis: *naval diplomacy spans a broad spectrum from hard to soft power.*

Few, if any, dedicated studies of naval diplomacy were undertaken until the 1970s when the study of limited war and military influence became of interest to both East and West. The works published in that decade became a privileged discourse on naval diplomacy and, in the main, complemented each other. However, they were written by academics and practitioners living with the political realities of the day and should be viewed with that in mind.

Hypothesis: *existing models of naval diplomacy were conceived in the Cold War and are products of their time.*

⁶⁸ James Cable, for example, limits his study to incidents of coercion. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p3. Ian Speller, however, suggests that naval diplomacy is a wider concept, inclusive of more 'benign applications.' Speller, Ian. *Understanding Naval Warfare*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p 76.

⁶⁹ Nye, Joseph, S. *Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p5.

The existing models of naval diplomacy assume bilateral, mechanistic relationships; that is, one party carries out an action against another party in order to produce a reaction which it calculates will be favourable to its own interests. This action-reaction model, described by Cable in terms of an 'assailant' and 'victim', need not be limited to coercion and is applicable across the spectrum of naval diplomacy. However, it is limited. The reality of international relations is far more complex; multiple audiences and stakeholders exist within every communicative relationship.

Hypothesis: *existing models of naval diplomacy are limited by generally assuming a bilateral, mechanistic relationship between the actors involved.*

Different levels of communication in naval diplomacy can be explained by use of a sporting analogy. If Team 'A' were playing against Team 'B' then the two teams are clearly the primary constituents of the game. The approach of previous theorists to the sporting analogy would examine the action of 'A', the reaction of 'B' and declare one a winner, one a loser or an equal draw. There are, however, many more interested parties all of whom are stakeholders in the wider competition. Both teams will have supporters and, potentially, sponsors. There will be other teams not involved in that particular fixture but who are competing in the same league; they will be interested in the game, as will their supporters and sponsors; the game could affect their own standing. Relative positioning and context is important, as a draw for one team may mean the maintenance of its place in the league, whilst for the other a draw may result in relegation. Importantly, the result for either team may determine who they play next. Returning to the military dimension, one side can win a battle but lose the war.

Hypothesis: *a revised model of naval diplomacy should not be solely event based but take into account different levels of communication and the multitude of stakeholders involved.*

Acknowledging that naval diplomacy, though not the *raison d'être* of navies, is a fundamental role has implications for politicians, planners and practitioners. Force structures, capabilities, deployments and training could be adapted to maximise the potential benefits to be gained. The requirements for naval platforms to perform constabulary tasks is well understood and is fuelling debate as the words of the former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates demonstrate: 'You don't necessarily need a billion dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK47s and rocket propelled grenades.'⁷⁰ A similar level of debate on the subject of naval diplomacy is needed.

Hypothesis: *an understanding of contemporary naval diplomacy can aid the development of appropriate force structures and capabilities of maritime states.*

Methodology and Research Design

Research has been conducted by a logical progression of methods. Firstly, an extensive literature review was undertaken in order to gain an appreciation of naval diplomacy within the context of wider political, military and maritime strategy. Primary sources included government documents and official doctrinal publications; secondary sources included books, monographs, papers, theses, academic journals and online resources. In particular, the literature review highlighted the use of international diplomacy as a means of political discourse and introduced the concept of the diplomatic use of military force. It situates key terms such as diplomacy, deterrence,

⁷⁰ Gates, Robert. "Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates." *US Naval War College Review* 63, No 4 (2010): p14.

coercion and compellence, as well as the contemporary theories on hard, soft and smart power.

The second stage of the literature review unravelled the works of each of the major theorists in order to produce practical 'models' of naval diplomacy. Models are simple 'representations of reality' which, Clarke and Primo have written, can then be used to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, to generate comparative statics and to understand the conditions under which certain outcomes might be expected.⁷¹

Modelling notions of naval diplomacy from the existing literature, therefore, is a significant element of this research. Clarke and Primo identify four types of model which can serve different roles – foundational, organizational, exploratory and predictive.⁷² The type of modelling used in this thesis is 'foundational'; that is, it takes disparate generalisations of known facts under a single framework and provides an overall insight into the topic.⁷³ It can serve as a basis for further model building and provide a framework 'flexible enough to be adapted to answer different kinds of questions.'⁷⁴ Though the words and terminology used differ from writer to writer and from era to era, a careful interpretation of their works can find threads of similar meaning throughout the body of naval and strategic thought over the past century and a half. As might be expected, the development of ideas has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary and certain enduring themes can therefore be identified. These

⁷¹ Clarke, Kevin & Primo, David. "Modernizing Political Science: A Model Based Approach." *Perspectives on Politics* 5, No 4 (2007): pp741-742.

⁷² Clarke, Kevin & Primo, David. *A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of Representation*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p83.

⁷³ Clarke & Primo, "Modernizing Political Science: A Model Based Approach", pp742-743.

⁷⁴ Clarke & Primo, *A Model Discipline*, pp83-84.

themes, or traits, are collated in order to produce 'composite' classifications of types of naval diplomacy.

Next, a quantitative analysis was undertaken. An empirical survey of naval diplomacy between 1991 and 2010 was conducted and over 500 incidents catalogued. In part, the thesis survey provides an extension of the chronological survey published in the three editions of Cable's *Gunboat Diplomacy*, but it also applies the composite classification criteria, derived from legacy writings, to contemporary data. In doing so it seeks to determine whether reality corresponds to theory and whether there are types or variations of naval diplomacy during the period in question which are not adequately reflected in existing literature. When constructing the survey primary sources were used wherever possible; examples of naval activity fitting the thesis definition were taken from the official publications of eight significant maritime states – the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Russia, China, India and Japan.⁷⁵ If those countries deemed an example of their navy's employment worthy of mention in operations databases, White Papers and reports to their respective legislatures then they are included in the survey. These states were chosen because their records are openly published and accessible, they are geographically dispersed and they field naval forces at differing scales, but all harbour regional or global ambition. It is entirely probable that by extending the review to include other states' official publications more examples would be uncovered; this is another area for potential research in future. Finally, secondary sources including books, academic journal articles, specialist and

⁷⁵ The navies of these states would be classified as major / medium global and medium regional force projection navies under Eric Grove's typology. 'Lesser' navies, ie those classified as purely adjacent force projection, offshore and inshore territorial defence, constabulary and 'token' have not been studied individually in depth, though they may offer opportunities for further research. See Grove, Eric. *The Future of Sea Power*. (London: Routledge, 1990), pp236-40.

generalist open media reporting and online resources were used to corroborate the 'official' version of an incident and to provide additional examples not revealed elsewhere. The thesis does not aim to be the definitive word on every example of naval diplomacy cited. Instead, it seeks patterns and assesses that patterns *are* discernible in the incidents included.

In order to determine whether the immediate post-Cold War era really was different to the Cold War itself, two 'control' periods were included to provide a suitable benchmark. Therefore, whilst the main part of the empirical research provides a survey of the years from 1991 to 2010, a further section contains over 100 incidents of naval diplomacy which took place from 1960 to 1964, and from 1980 to 1984. Though this thesis accepts the *systemic* definition of the Cold War, these control years were selected because they represent, respectively, the culmination of the *first* Cold War around the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and the period of heightened tensions during the Reagan-Brezhnev *second* Cold War following the end of detente.⁷⁶ They are also separated by time and, when set against the main survey, offer periods for analysis at twenty year intervals. Selection criteria for the 'control' and main surveys were identical.

From the quantitative analysis a number of case studies were then selected for more detailed investigation. George and Bennett state that specific cases should be chosen not simply because they are easily researched; rather, they should form an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well defined objectives.⁷⁷ The cases used in this research, therefore, were selected to represent a range of actors and methods and to

⁷⁶ Booth, *Statecraft and Security*, pp30-31.

⁷⁷ George, Alexander, L. & Bennett, Andrew. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p83.

illustrate the period and macro-trend which they embody. This approach could potentially leave the research open to a criticism of selection bias. However, it is justified on the grounds that the case studies employ variables of theoretical interest (time, place, actor, purpose, method),⁷⁸ and that the relatively large number of examples used reduces the risk of over-generalisation of results which might be inherent in single case research.⁷⁹

Within and between the case studies, comparative analysis was conducted using 'most similar research design' in order to determine shared features and trends.⁸⁰ This controlled comparison satisfies George and Bennett's requirement for structure and focus.⁸¹ The case studies are 'structured' because they reflect the research objectives and are comparable; they are 'focused' because they deal in detail with only certain aspects of the historical evidence, ie those relating to naval diplomacy. Baxter and Jack, drawing on the work of other qualitative researchers, categorised case studies as explanatory, exploratory, descriptive, intrinsic, instrumental or collective.⁸² Following their categorisation, the cases used in this research are deemed to be both descriptive and instrumental; that is, they describe phenomena and the real-life context in which they occurred, and they provide insight into an issue in order to help to refine a theory.⁸³

⁷⁸ Ibid., p69.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p80.

⁸⁰ Burnham, P., Lutz, K., Grant, W. & Layton-Henry, Z. *Research Methods in Politics*. 2nd Ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp72-75.

⁸¹ George & Bennett, *Case Studies*, p67.

⁸² Baxter, Pamela & Jack, Susan. "Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers." *The Qualitative Report* 13, No 4 (2008): pp548-549.

⁸³ Ibid.

The results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses were combined in order to update and revise the models derived from the existing literature. Combining methods in this way is termed 'triangulation' and can increase validity because one method serves as a 'check' on another.⁸⁴ A new foundational model, asking questions of *who?*, *what?*, *how?* and *why?*, was then proposed against which to test the research findings. Using the same evidence to both create and test a theory is an invalid approach in research design – it exacerbates the risk of confirmation bias.⁸⁵ Therefore, the cases chosen to test the new model were not the ones cited in the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Instead, the theoretical framework was tested against further examples of naval diplomacy from earlier and later periods. A renowned case study of naval diplomacy from the height of the Cold War was chosen, as were a further three examples from the period 2011-2015, representing state-on-state confrontation, the involvement of non-state actors, and trans-national concerns respectively. These cases were selected for their diversity rather than their resemblance to any 'typical' example of naval diplomacy of the past century. Each test case was divided into two brief sections: the first provides historical and geopolitical context by outlining key events; the second provides a short analysis based on the proposed model.

Thesis Structure

The thesis comprises themed chapters based on the methodological approach outlined above. The Introduction sets the scene, placing naval diplomacy in the context of

⁸⁴ Read, Melvyn and Marsh, David. "Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods." In Marsh, David & Stoker, Gerry (Eds). *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. 2nd Edition. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p237.

⁸⁵ George & Bennett, *Case Studies*, p111.

political action, military power and grand strategy. The major writers on the topic are introduced, the timeframe under investigation explained, key terms are defined and the research questions outlined. Thereafter, a brief synopsis of the hypothesis is given, along with an explanation of the methodology used in the research, the thesis structure and an indication of broad findings and conclusions made.

Chapter 2 forms the bulk of the topic's literature review. The historiography of naval diplomacy is approached in three broad phases: pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War; Western, Eastern and non-aligned writings are evaluated, as are the more recent contributions of contemporary commentators. A qualitative comparative analysis of existing models of naval diplomacy, deduced from academic writing and the published maritime doctrine of major state actors around the world, is presented and key common themes (and differences) are identified; these are subsequently applied in the latter part of the chapter, which concentrates on change, particularly the change in the international system which led to the re-evaluation of the place of naval diplomacy. The meaning and effects of globalisation, the relative rise of non-state actors in the global system, particularly at sea, and the likely 'targets' for diplomacy at sea are also investigated.

A chronological index of the empirical survey of post-Cold War naval diplomacy (and the two Cold War 'control' periods) and a thematic analysis are presented in Chapter 3. Findings discussed include the forging of amity and enmity, the role of international engagement and disengagement, prestige and symbolism and the numerical incidence of naval diplomatic events in the period studied. A discussion of continuity and change links the survey back to previous theorists, including to Cable's work of the 1970s, '80s and '90s.

Chapter 4 expands on the evidence provided in the empirical survey by drawing on a series of case studies of incidents of naval diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. Each example considers a different aspect of naval diplomacy during a time in which the global order underwent drastic and rapid change. Fragmentation and the uncertain security situation, nationalism and opportunism, *Pax Americana* and resistance to US hegemony, and the return of great power rivalry are all considered. It also includes examples of the political use of the sea by non-state actors to further their own agenda.

Chapter 5 critically assesses the relevance of the models discussed in Chapter 2 in light of the changes explained in Chapter 3 and the case studies discussed in Chapter 4. It concludes that existing 'assailant-victim' models are not appropriate to the twenty-first century and an alternative based on an interdisciplinary application of communication and stakeholder theories is proposed. This new 'foundational' model is then tested against a series of case studies drawn from the Cold and post-Cold War periods.

Chapter 6, the Conclusion, builds on the previous analysis and reports the thesis' findings. It provides answers to the research questions outlined above, comments on the hypotheses and discusses potential implications for theory, policy and practice. Finally, the chapter highlights some areas worthy of further research.

Findings

The main findings and conclusions of the research may be broken down into six key areas. Firstly, it defines naval diplomacy as the use of naval and maritime assets as

communicative instruments in international power relationships to further the interests of the actors involved.

Secondly, it reports that only around a quarter of the incidents of naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War period could be described as indicative of enmity between the parties involved. Conversely, some 90 per cent have some degree of amity, or friendship forging, in their purpose. The sum is more the whole because the two are not mutually exclusive and purposes are rarely binary; in complex relationships signals of enmity and amity can be, and are, made concurrently.

Thirdly, there are varying degrees of engagement and disengagement within naval diplomacy and the state of a relationship can often be assessed by the type of activity practised. At the lowest end of the scale goodwill visits can be means of ongoing 'relationship maintenance' between established allies or symbolic first forays for those with a more adversarial relationship. Complexity and interoperability progressively increase until only the very closest allies are capable of fully integrated operations in difficult scenarios.

Fourthly, the thesis identifies that the incidence of non-state actors making use of the seas to exert influence is increasing. Fifthly, and closely linked, the incidence of naval forces being used for humanitarian assistance is also on the rise. These two findings in particular offer confirmatory evidence to support assumptions that have become widely held since the end of the Cold War.

Finally, the research concludes that existing models and frameworks for naval diplomacy are, essentially, event-based approximations of state actors' use of the

'spare capacity' inherent in military navies when not at war to influence other state actors. They are therefore insufficient for the twenty-first century.

CHAPTER 2

APPROACHES TO NAVAL DIPLOMACY

Chapter 1 led to the definition of naval diplomacy as a subset of general diplomacy and a means of communication by maritime actors, both state and non-state, in pursuit of their interests. This chapter builds on that definition with a comparative analysis of the works of key strategists and writers. Though the analysis is based on the works of individual authors, it is categorised here according to three broad but unequal eras delineated by the Cold War. In choosing to analyse the pre-Cold War era the aim is not to summarise the whole of naval history before the mid-1940s. Rather, because the overriding feature of the world order before the Cold War was multi-polarity, habitually with one dominant power or hegemon, the period is sufficiently dissimilar from the bi-polar world of 1946-1991 to be worthy of separate consideration. It might also give clues to the nature of international relations and naval diplomacy to the third era, the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some of the authors considered (for example, James Cable, Edward Luttwak, Ken Booth, Geoffrey Till and Christian Le Mière) provide models or frameworks which neatly define their interpretation of the topic; others do not and their conceptual understanding must be deduced from published works which may or may not unequivocally label ideas as naval diplomacy. As Chapter 1 explained, models can be useful analytical tools, simple 'representations of reality,' which Clarke and Primo have written can be used to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, to generate comparative statics and to understand the conditions under which certain outcomes might be expected.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to take the existing literature and construct a series of models which represent the age in which it was written. The type of modelling used is 'foundational'; that is, it takes disparate generalisations of known facts under a single framework and provides an overall insight into the topic.¹ Thus, the thesis suggests a 'classical' pre-Cold War model born out of the writings of Mahan, Corbett and Richmond. The seminal work by Cable stands alone to provide a 'standard' model against which others may be compared. Cable's near contemporaries (Turner, Luttwak, Booth and Gorshkov) collectively provide a broader 'Cold War' model, whilst the later, post-Cold War theories of Till, Mullen, Widen, Le Mièrre and Nye offer a 'post-modern' representation of naval diplomacy. As might be expected, the development of ideas has been evolutionary; hard power concepts such as coercion and deterrence feature heavily throughout the literature, but it is the later writers who place the greatest emphasis on the soft power concepts of cooperation, assistance and persuasion. However, all tend to fall into the twin traps of state-centrism and the assumption of two party 'action-reaction' relationships.

The chapter finishes with a short analysis of common 'threads', organising them as enduring themes. It concludes that the models can be viewed according to construct and content and that there are striking commonalities between them all, with shifting balances between hard and soft power effects as time progresses. Distilled to its raw elements, naval diplomacy has generally been viewed from a realist, state-centric position, assuming a mechanistic relationship between the parties involved. There is clearly scope for an alternative perspective.

¹ Clarke & Primo, 'Modernizing Political Science: A Model Based Approach', p742.

THE 'CLASSICAL' MODEL: NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE PRE-COLD WAR PERIOD

The classic naval texts of and about the era are essentially Western and Atlanticist in nature, reflecting the concentration of maritime power firstly in Europe and then in North America. Nonetheless, they offer generic principles which are applicable globally. Perhaps the most influential naval writer, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, focused his thesis in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* primarily on navies at war, particularly the most powerful navies of England, France and Holland in the age of sail, and he did not specifically mention naval diplomacy. However, peppered throughout his work are examples and comments on the utility of threat and limited force by navies. In fact, pre-empting Martin's point made over half a century later, he acknowledged the importance of navies in peacetime, observing that the requirement for naval strategy differs from a land-centric military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as it is in war.²

Like Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett's focus was predominantly on war. Indeed, in a 2012 assessment of his work, J.J. Widen wrote: 'Corbett's theory applies mainly to military and naval matters in times of war, almost completely ignoring the ends and means in times of peace. Consequently, operations concerned with naval diplomacy, deterrence, policing and naval presence are rarely if ever dealt with.'³

However, it is possible to identify strands of thought related to naval diplomacy in his works and he was certainly cognisant of the diplomatic role of naval power: 'the first

² Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*, p22.

³ Widen, J.J. *Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought*. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p156.

function of the fleet is to support or disrupt diplomatic effort.⁴ His concept of 'limited war', borrowed from Clausewitz,⁵ was not confined to physical action but could be applied to either the 'contingent' or the 'object';⁶ it could thus be germane to scenarios in which the belligerents were not at 'war' in the conventional sense. Indeed, Corbett's concept of 'war' was quite broad; he paraphrases Clausewitz in his description of the spectrum of operations in the land environment, drawing parallels to the maritime:

So he [Clausewitz] concludes there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of extermination down to the use of an army of observation. So also in the naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade.⁷

It can be argued, therefore, that Corbett's theories on blockade, both naval and commercial, and on the strategies of fleet-in-being and demonstration could be applied at different points on the spectrum of naval operations, and hence be used as part of a diplomatic mission.

Detailed examination of Mahan's work for reference to naval diplomacy reveals two broad themes. In the contemporary language of hard and soft power discussed earlier, Mahan could arguably be said to view navies both as instruments of coercive diplomacy and as agents of national reputation or status. In the early sections of his major work,

⁴ Corbett, quoted in Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower (2nd Ed)*, p253.

⁵ Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, p38.

⁶ By 'contingent' Corbett meant the composition of the naval force; by 'object' the objective of the war or the 'intervention'. Ibid., p39.

⁷ Ibid.

for instance, Mahan talks of ancient Rome during the time of the Carthaginian wars, discussing how the Roman Fleet was positioned to 'check' Macedonia, an ally of Hannibal, and was so successful that 'not a soldier of the phalanx ever set foot in Italy.'⁸ The principle employed by this threatening naval force was one of prevention and deterrence.

In a collection of articles published at the turn of the twentieth century, Mahan applied his own thesis to contemporary events. The Boxer Rebellion against Western imperialism in China, for example, threatened free trade and risked 'the interest of the commercial nations and of maritime powers.'⁹ Without resorting to total war, force was used extensively and an eight nation alliance mounted naval policing and stabilisation expeditions along the Chinese coast and inland into the major river systems, particularly the Yangtze, to quash the uprising.¹⁰ Of course, one 'positive' aspect of this form of naval diplomacy, alliance and coalition building, which was seen on the coasts and waterways of China did not last in this instance. The eight nations were at war less than a decade and a half later.

Nonetheless, Mahan did espouse the political benefits of the 'prestige' that a government might gain from having a powerful navy capable of worldwide, expeditionary operations. This, of course, was at a time when navies were the most

⁸ Ibid., p16.

⁹ Mahan, Alfred. T. *Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations Naval and Political*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1903), pp32-33.

¹⁰ The eight nation alliance comprised Great Britain, Russia, the United States, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Japan. See Dugdale-Pointon, TDP. (19 September 2004), 'The Boxer Rebellion, 1900' http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_boxer.html (accessed 3 February 2011).

powerful military forces in the world. He was a favourite of Roosevelt, himself a navalist, and undoubtedly influenced the decision to sail the Great White Fleet in 1907.¹¹

Mahan's 'prestige', or the power of 'attraction' in the more recent words of Joseph Nye, is about image and perception, not truth. Mahan again:

The decline of prestige may involve as much illusion as its growth; therefore its value, whilst not to be denied, may be easily exaggerated. Prestige then does not necessarily correspond with fact.¹²

For Mahan, if naval 'prestige' was to be perceived to be of political utility to government it needed not only to be widely recognised but also carefully targeted by timely geographical presence. Though outlining his thesis in the context of the colonial powers of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe there is unambiguous read across to other ages, including our own. His point is that national security in peacetime can be aided by a 'decided preponderance at sea.'¹³

A near contemporary and 'disciple' of Corbett was British Admiral and theorist Sir Herbert Richmond.¹⁴ 'Sea power, in its full expression,' he wrote, 'is a form of national strength capable of giving weight to national policy.'¹⁵ Like his antecedents,

¹¹ For an account of the Great White Fleet and Mahan's influence see, for example, Wimmel, Kenneth. *Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Sea Power Come of Age*. (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998) or Hendrix, *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy*.

¹² Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect*, p58.

¹³ Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*, p82.

¹⁴ Lambert, Andrew. 'Preface to Gregg Revivals Edition' in Richmond, Sir H.W. *National Policy and Naval Strength and other essays*. (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1993), pxviii. First published London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1928.

¹⁵ Richmond, Sir H.W. *Sea Power in the Modern World*. (London: Bell & Sons, 1934), p17.

Richmond's focus on war dominates his work, but his thoughts on the peacetime utility of naval force can be found in the pages of his publications. He attributed the expansion of the British Empire to naval power and saw it as a means to national greatness and, ultimately, peace:

All the greater naval nations assure the world that a great navy is the surest guarantee of peace; that it gives security against war, and is therefore a highly beneficial institution.¹⁶

Unlike Mahan and Corbett, Richmond also alerted his readers to other, non-military, naval roles such as humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation and peace enforcement, albeit under different terms,¹⁷ which fit the broad continuum of naval diplomacy. It has been argued that Richmond's greatest contribution to naval strategy was his 'methodology for intellectual thought'; he taught about the relation of force to diplomacy and the ways that navies could be used as 'instruments of statecraft'.¹⁸

It is evident that the writers of the classic naval texts understood the utility of naval forces in non-war situations, even if they did not always shine the torch of their attention there. Terminology may have changed but 'flying the flag' and 'prestige', 'gunboat diplomacy' and 'demonstration' equate to soft and hard power, defence and coercive diplomacy respectively. Writing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, however, neither Mahan nor Corbett could possibly place their work

¹⁶ Ibid., p189.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp193-194.

¹⁸ McLennan, Bruce. 'The Historical Lessons and Intellectual Rigour of Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond.' *Australian Defence Force Journal* 168 (2005), p23.

in the context of a pre-Cold War world; as far as they were concerned they were recording for posterity the enduring principles of maritime strategy. With the benefit of hindsight later historians added a different perspective but the views of Mahan and Corbett generally stood the test of time.

However, one aspect of 'peacetime' naval operations strikingly absent from the classic texts is their use beyond inter-state power relationships. Internal, domestic conflict could also be potentially resolved by coercion from the sea. Richard Hill gave a good example of this in his *War at Sea in the Ironclad Age* in which he describes how British ships were repositioned from South America in 1857 and contributed greatly to the suppression of the Indian Mutiny.¹⁹ Flexibility of response and demonstration of intent, of course, are not uniquely maritime traits and armies have long been used to keep in check their fellow subjects, including during the Indian Mutiny. Nonetheless, Hill's point is a good one – navies are not always targeted at other states.

Multi-polarity in global affairs was often not as anarchic as might at first be assumed; it was generally accompanied by one dominant power. From the eighteenth century until at least the early twentieth that dominant power was Britain and the Royal Navy effectively enjoyed command of the sea. Robert Keohane coined the term 'hegemonic stability theory' to describe the situation in which a wider peace is the result of the diplomacy, coercion and persuasion of the leading power;²⁰ during the period of Britain's dominance this was commonly referred to as the *Pax Britannica*.

¹⁹ Hill, Richard. *War at Sea in the Ironclad Age*. (London: Cassell, 2000), pp148-149.

²⁰ Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp32-39.

Jeremy Black acknowledged the role the naval forces of a hegemonic power could play in maintaining the world order: 'throughout much of the nineteenth century, foreign expectations and fears about British power allowed Britain to get grudging unofficial recognition of the *Pax Britannica*, the doctrine of the Royal Navy keeping the peace of the sea for all to benefit'.²¹ Some writers have labelled the British use of seapower during the *Pax Britannica* as 'altruistic'²² but this rather misses the point. Britain maintained her leading position in the world through economic strength supported by military, predominantly naval, might. The use of British seapower during the period was very much directed in the national interest and thus as an instrument of state power; it was all the more effective for rarely having to resort to force. It communicated strength.

However, Britain's naval supremacy did not go unchallenged. The pre-First World War naval arms race with Germany has already been alluded to and is well documented, with both sides resorting to use their fleets for geopolitical gain; in Germany Tirpitz's vision of maritime ascendancy inspired the national leadership²³ and Kaiser Wilhelm gave an 'imperial performance' to mark Germany's intent to be a world power whilst at Tangier during a Mediterranean cruise in 1905.²⁴ In the United Kingdom the 'Navy Scare' of 1909 (the news of the acceleration of German naval build programme) was used to justify huge increases in Royal Navy Dreadnought numbers.²⁵ At the same

²¹ Black, Jeremy. *Naval Power: A History of Warfare and The Sea From 1500*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009), p118.

²² Hore, Peter. *The Habit of Victory: The Story of the Royal Navy 1545-1945*. (London: Pan Books, 2006), p243.

²³ Berghahn, V.R. *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (2nd Edition). (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p56.

²⁴ Herrmann, David G. *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p38.

²⁵ Massie, Robert K. *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War*. (London: Pimlico, 1991), pp609-625.

time the United States also sought to claim its place as a first-rank power largely through the expansion of its own navy. Henry Hendrix documented the rise of this aspiring power in his book *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy* which uses a series of case studies to demonstrate the utility of the naval forces available to the government. Many are coercive in nature, such as the defence of the Panamanian Revolution in 1903 when the province was attempting to gain independence from Colombia,²⁶ and the heavy-handed deployment of a squadron to Tangier after the kidnapping of an American citizen in Morocco in the same year.²⁷ In Mahanian terms these examples show the character of a young state increasingly willing to act in an 'expeditionary' manner but, in themselves, they cannot achieve Roosevelt's aim. The crowning glory of the US Navy at the time and the balanced counter to its 'negative' coercion was its 'positive' defence diplomacy in the sailing of 'The Great White Fleet.' A combination of hard and soft power is the most effective means of achieving a grand strategic aim.

The Cold War was not born out of a long peace and naval diplomacy continued through the two world wars of the twentieth century. Detailed analysis of the instances of naval diplomacy in those conflicts is beyond the remit of this research, but it is worth mentioning one case which has become a classic of its type. The *Altmark* incident took place in early 1940 when British naval forces under Captain Vian in HMS *Cossack* intercepted a German auxiliary, the *Altmark*, in Norwegian territorial waters. The case is interesting because of the complexities of the tripartite situation. Britain and Germany were at war but, at the time, Norway remained neutral. Britain did not want to

²⁶ Hendrix, Henry, J. *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The US Navy and the Birth of the American Century*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp54-81.

²⁷ Ibid., pp82-103.

antagonise a neutral state, especially one of such strategic importance, but had limited time to liberate the prisoners if they were not to be lost for the remainder of the war. Germany likewise professed to observe Norwegian neutrality yet were in breach of it by transporting prisoners of war through territorial waters. The eventual outcome, after protests from Norway and the presence of Norwegian warships, was that *Cossack* used limited force against *Altmark* and the prisoners were recovered. The norms of naval diplomacy were well expressed in the orders to Vian from Winston Churchill: 'Suggest to Norwegian destroyer that honour is served by submitting to superior force.'²⁸

Churchill's words, quoted in James Cable's seminal work *Gunboat Diplomacy*, are significant. The act of naval diplomacy was not the limited force used between the British and German protagonists, but the leverage exerted on the Norwegians to ensure non-interference, and it was the result of a power relationship. Churchill, it could be surmised, would have been very comfortable with Cable's assertion that 'gunboat diplomacy is traditionally a weapon employed by the strong against the weak.'²⁹

Connecting the ideas of pre-Cold War naval theorists, it is possible to build a generic 'classical' model of naval diplomacy. Grouping the whole under Mahan's banner of 'navies in peacetime' offers a convenient starting point, though 'peacetime' should probably be defined by what it is not (traditional warfighting) rather than what it is (the range of actions up to and including the use of 'limited' force). This thesis argues that the use of the term 'navies in peacetime' would be acceptable to Corbett, Richmond

²⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p19.

²⁹ Ibid., p25.

and others as a recognisable alternative for 'limited war' and 'statecraft'; beneath this banner can be found three major constituents of classical naval diplomacy.

Mahan's 'check' can be directly equated with Corbett's 'demonstration' and Richmond's 'guarantor of peace'. Each term or phrase suggests a situation in which a naval force, whether concentrated together to achieve a particular result or dispersed more widely to provide latent effect, supports grand strategy by preventing total war. Similarly, the military strategic benefits brought by a 'fleet-in-being', that existential force which limits an adversary's freedom of action and decision making, can be considered in the same way. Taken together, therefore, the first constituent part of classical naval diplomacy is deterrence; one reason why a government might choose to maintain a navy is to deter.

Mahan talked of 'prestige' and 'flying the flag' whilst Richmond promoted the importance of navies in displaying 'national greatness'. At the time the classical writers shaped their theories warships were the most complex pieces of machinery on earth and truly effective navies were a tool only available to those who could afford the expense. Like the ventures into space or the nuclear weapons 'club' to follow, active participants in a naval 'race' were signalling their economic strength and national prowess for the world to see. The second reason for a government to invest in a powerful navy, therefore, was to claim status or rank amongst competitor states.

Support to allies, the building of relationships, coalitions, partnerships and the spread of goodwill are also significant factors in the established employment of navies in peacetime. Mahan wrote at length about 'co-operation', emphasising state-to-state benefits; less well known but equally valid, the non-military roles described by Richmond could be argued to be agencies of intervention which influence perception

and which therefore affect a government's wider national interests. The third constituent of naval diplomacy, then, is the naval force's ability to deliver harmony amongst states; this could be termed 'amity'.

Of course, not all of the classicists' points fall naturally into one of the three categories identified and the generic model proposed below is certainly a simplification. Corbett's 'blockade' for example, might be considered a form of acute deterrence or coercion but the link is more tenuous than the other constituent parts. However, this thesis argues that there are sufficient commonalities to construct a generic, 'classical' model of naval diplomacy.

However, these three pillars, deterrence, status and amity, need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, they could be seen operating almost as a virtuous circle. By building alliances, aggression might be deterred. By being perceived as strong in battle, friendships, whether real or of convenience, might be won. By balancing popularity and fear a certain status might be achieved. By occupying high rank in the pecking order of states, the more aggression is deterred and the more partnerships may be attracted. It might be more appropriate, therefore, to acknowledge this interdependency and display the classical model differently. However it is displayed, the pre-Cold War naval thinkers readily admitted that there is a place for naval power in international relations when not at war.




Figure 2.1: Inter-dependent Classical Naval Diplomacy

INTO THE COLD WAR: THE 'STANDARD' MODEL

The political climate of the Cold War perhaps placed more stringent limits on the use of force, certainly between the major blocs, as the strategic focus turned to nuclear deterrence. Though greater utility was attached to the non-forceful role of the military instrument little academic attention was directed that way; one exception to this was the work of Sir James Cable.³⁰ Cable was instrumental in moving the understanding of naval diplomacy forward but he was, essentially, a Cold War writer. Although the period of his analysis, reported over three editions of his book, ran from the end of the First World War to the early 1990s, it was inevitably viewed through a prism of binary state-to-state relations. Coercive by definition, gunboat diplomacy was always 'done' by one side to another. It is telling that Cable chronicled each of the incidents through the seven decades of his study in terms of an 'assailant' and a 'victim'. Yet, as the *Altmark* case demonstrates, the reality can be more complex; the forces of three states were directly involved, the rest of the world was watching and there were domestic audiences on all sides eager for good news in the progress of the war. Binary, it was not.

However, it must be borne in mind that the scrutiny given to naval diplomacy during the Cold war was set in the context of a global politico-military atmosphere of strategic deterrence. Emphasis was invariably on the coercive element, not the 'mere flag waving' at the softer end of the spectrum that Cable dismissed, and the focus tended to be limited to the state actors involved. Again in the words of Cable, 'gunboat diplomacy

³⁰ Rowlands, Kevin. 'Decided Preponderance at Sea: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought.' *US Naval War College Review* 65, No 4 (2012): p94.

is something that governments do to foreigners',³¹ not all of which had to be abroad.

His definition sets the tone:

Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.³²

The robust language used by Cable, a professional diplomat, is an enduring characteristic of his work. He believed that coercion was implicit in most aspects of international relations and that if a government was willing to 'reward friends and to punish enemies its wishes will at least receive careful consideration.'³³ This realist approach reflects the dominant thinking of the latter half of the Cold War and echoes Schelling's wider theories.

To be coercive a threat must be more than a generalised prediction of disastrous consequences, however plausible, in the immediate future. It must express readiness to do something injurious to the interest of another government unless that government either takes, or desists from or refrains from some indicated course of action.³⁴

The realist tradition also provided a framework for Cable's explanation of coercion at sea. To Cable, gunboat diplomacy could be categorised into four modes which he

³¹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p7.

³² Ibid., p14.

³³ Cable, James. *Diplomacy at Sea*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), p3.

³⁴ Ibid., p17.

discussed in descending order of effectiveness. *Definitive force* he explained as the act or threat of force which possessed a definitive purpose apparent to both sides. The intent of the employing force must be recognised as being limited and must be considered tolerable by the recipient. A tolerable result, he explained, would be one which in the eyes of the 'victim' is more desirable than resort to war:³⁵

A government embarking on an act of genuinely limited force should thus have a reasonable expectation that force initially employed will be sufficient to achieve the specific purpose originally envisaged without regard to the reactions of the victim, whose options are thus confined to acquiescence, ineffectual resistance or a retaliation that can only follow, and not prevent, the achievement of the desired result. In such cases, the use of force is not merely limited but is also definitive: it creates a *fait accompli*.³⁶

Cable offered the *Altmark* incident as one example of definitive force; for another he discussed the USS *Pueblo* incident of 1968.³⁷ *Pueblo* was a surveillance vessel operating off the coast of North Korea. She was approached and eventually fired on by North Korean warships and, being unarmed, gave way and was escorted into port. The ship's company was held captive for eleven months before being released. The use of force by North Korea was limited and definitive in that it had a readily identifiable goal of 'humiliating' the United States and putting an end to 'spying' on its coasts. Against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam the assailant's calculation that the outcome was

³⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, pp20-21.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp21-22.

³⁷ The USS *Pueblo* incident is discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.

preferable to further escalation and therefore tolerable in the eyes of the US was proved correct.³⁸

Purposeful force, according to Cable, is less direct and less reliable than *definitive*.³⁹

He explained it as limited naval force applied in order to change the policy or character of a foreign government. In itself, he wrote, the force does not *do* anything, it acts to induce the recipient to take a decision that would not otherwise have been taken.⁴⁰ One example he used for purposeful force was that of the actions of the superpowers in the Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973. Israel was a 'client' state of the US whilst Egypt and Syria looked to the Soviet Union for support. Following a Soviet threat to intervene on the Arab side the US Sixth Fleet was reinforced and concentrated to the south of Crete on high alert. The Soviets responded with a series of provocative anti-carrier exercises which included the training of weapons on the American ships but, ultimately, they did not resort to combative intervention and the war ended.⁴¹

Catalytic force was described by Cable as when limited naval power 'lends a hand' to act as a catalyst in a situation the direction of which has yet to be determined.⁴² Cable is rather ambiguous about the use of catalytic force and labels few of the incidents in his chronological appendix as such. In essence, he explained it as an act undertaken

³⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, pp25-29.

³⁹ Ibid., p33.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp42-46, p200.

⁴² Ibid., p47.

when there is an underlying feeling that ‘something is going to happen’.⁴³ Less effective than either *definitive* or *purposeful* force, it is more likely to result in failure. The bombardment of targets in Beirut by USS *New Jersey* in 1983 when peacekeeping forces were under threat ashore is cited as an example,⁴⁴ though this, and other cases, could be just as easily be placed in one or other of Cable’s categories.

The final mode of Cable’s gunboat diplomacy, where warships are employed to emphasize attitudes or to make a point, is *expressive force* which Cable readily dismissed as ‘the last and least of the uses of limited naval force’ with vague and uncertain results.⁴⁵ Cable explained how the *purposeful* can descend into the *expressive*, such as in the Beira patrol of the 1960s when the British attempted to prevent the import of oil to Rhodesia,⁴⁶ or it can be discrete and standalone. As an example of the latter he recounted how, after newspaper reports that Spain was no longer pressing its claims to Gibraltar, a Spanish aircraft carrier and twelve escorts anchored in the Bay of Algerciras, supposedly as an expression of their government’s continued determination.⁴⁷ Cable’s justification for including *expressive* force as a category in his analysis was simply because it was commonly employed, affording governments the visual manifestation of their position with little political commitment. Effectively, his justification underlined the particular advantages of naval forces as communicative tools.

⁴³ Ibid., p46.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p208.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p62.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p63.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p63, p197.

The first edition of *Gunboat Diplomacy* was published in 1971 and was met with positive praise which was still alive thirty-five years later. Richard Hill, for instance, opined that Cable's work 'sharpened to a point the theory and experience of 'effectiveness short of war' and reminded navies of what they had been *doing* rather than what they had been *training for*.⁴⁸

'Setting the Standard'

Cable's work on naval diplomacy is certainly seminal. Eric Grove stated that it was 'a landmark, one of the most significant works on maritime power of the twentieth century',⁴⁹ and Malcolm Murfett wrote that it had been 'modified but not overturned',⁵⁰ by later theorists. However, the extent to which it influenced others in the study of the diplomacy at sea is perhaps best summed up in the words written in his obituary in the *Daily Telegraph* in 2001:

Post-Cold War naval thinking, especially in Britain and America, is replete with implicit and explicit references to Cable's ideas about the political influence of naval force.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Hill, Richard, 'Naval Thinking in the Nuclear Age', in Till, Geoffrey (Ed). *The Development of British Naval Thinking*. (London: Routledge, 2006), p167.

⁴⁹ Grove, Eric. 'Cable, Sir James Eric Sydney Skelton (1920–2001).' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. (2005).
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/index/76/101076361>
(accessed 26 March 2011)

⁵⁰ Murfett, 'Gunboat Diplomacy', p81.

⁵¹ Daily Telegraph. 'Sir James Cable.' Obituaries 13 October 2001.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1359279/Sir-James-Cable.html>
(accessed 11 February 2012).

A review of the current doctrinal publications of maritime powers shows this claim to be accurate. Cable clearly had an impact in his native United Kingdom; so close were his ties with the naval establishment that the Foreword to the Third Edition of *Gunboat Diplomacy* was written by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald, who had retired as the First Sea Lord and professional head of the Royal Navy just the year before its publication.⁵² The most recent (fourth) iteration of the official publication *British Maritime Doctrine*⁵³ has no direct attribution to Cable, though his influence is discernible,⁵⁴ but its antecedents all did. For instance, the third edition of the doctrine, published in 2004, includes a discussion of naval diplomacy in which Cable's work is of notable influence;⁵⁵ it also includes a bibliographical essay on doctrine and the development of British naval strategic thought which references Cable extensively and recommends his works to practitioners for further professional reading.⁵⁶

The Royal Australian Navy similarly produces a professional reading list and that, too, includes two of Cable's books (*Gunboat Diplomacy* and *Diplomacy at Sea*).⁵⁷ *Australian*

⁵² Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p ix-xiv.

⁵³ United Kingdom. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. *British Maritime Doctrine*. 4th Ed. JDP 0-10. Shrivenham: DCDC, 2011.

⁵⁴ When questioned, the co-ordinating author of the *British Maritime Doctrine* 4th Edition, Captain Jonathan White Royal Navy (Assistant Head Maritime at DCDC), stated that direct reference to Cable was dropped from the publication not for doctrinal reasons but simply because he 'had no wish to include a reading list since I believe that our doctrine is to encourage freedom of thought and discovery.' White, Jonathan. Captain Royal Navy, email to author, 10 April 2012.

⁵⁵ United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *British Maritime Doctrine* 3rd Edition. BR 1806. (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2004), pp74-77.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp219-224.

⁵⁷ Australia. Royal Australian Navy. *Royal Australian Navy Reading List*. (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2006), p15.

Maritime Doctrine also acknowledges Cable in its treatment of operations short of war.⁵⁸

Canadian doctrine attempts to distance itself from 'gunboat diplomacy' which it calls a 'pejorative' term, preferring instead the more modern term naval diplomacy which it believes to be comprised of preventive deployments, coercion, presence and symbolic use of naval power.⁵⁹ The terminology used in Canada may not be Cable's but many of the ideas are and, again, he is formally acknowledged in the publication.⁶⁰ It is not only the Western navies which owe a debt to Sir James Cable for doctrinal development; his work can also be seen in, for instance, contemporary Indian maritime strategy, which states that the 'main business of major navies is to use warships in support of foreign policy,'⁶¹ and which mentions Cable in the bibliography.⁶²

However, as the *Daily Telegraph* obituary stated, Cable's work was especially important in the United States. The American maritime vision paper, *A Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, does not contain a direct reference to Cable but it does discuss the concepts of deterrence at sea and forward presence with which he would have been very familiar. Indeed, when the US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) published a historiography of 'capstone' documents and books which shaped the development of

⁵⁸ Australia. Royal Australian Navy. *Australian Maritime Doctrine 2010*. (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2010), p210.

⁵⁹ Canada. National Defence Headquarters. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. (Ottawa: NDHQ, 2001), pp36-39.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p36, p173.

⁶¹ India. Ministry of Defence. *Freedom to use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy*. (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2007), p83.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p144.

strategic thought it expressly listed Cable's work as important in both the development of naval missions and as an influence on policy in the 1970s.⁶³

The CNA took Cable's work seriously from the very start; one of its analysts produced a review of the first edition of *Gunboat Diplomacy* as a 'Professional Paper' in 1973.

Acknowledging the paucity of attention paid to the topic at the time the analyst stated that 'even to consider gunboat diplomacy for a book length treatment is rather daring.'⁶⁴

The review went on to add that Cable's work can be traced back to limited war theory and that Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, was 'attracted' by gunboat diplomacy.⁶⁵ The review ends on a precautionary note, stating that 'critics of the defense [sic] budget will find grist for their mills in his [Cable's] criticism of large expensive general purpose force navies.'⁶⁶ It was the first time that Cable's work was cited as a potential influence on the debate on naval force structures.

Clearly present in official doctrine, Cable's influence can also be traced in academia, from the Cold War period when his ideas were first published through to the present day. He is referenced in Edward Luttwak's *The Political Uses of Sea Power* written in 1974,⁶⁷ in the 1995 book *Navies and Global Defense*,⁶⁸ and he can be found in the

⁶³ United States. Center for Naval Analyses. Swartz, P.M & Duggan, K. *US Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009)*. D0019819.A1. (Arlington, Va: CNA, 2009), p224, p148.

⁶⁴ United States. Center for Naval Analyses. Schick, J.M. *A Review of James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*. Professional Paper 104. (Arlington, Va: CNA, 1973), p1.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p4.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p5.

⁶⁷ Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, p3, p19.

⁶⁸ Neilson, Keith & Errington, Elizabeth, J. (Eds). *Navies and Global Defense: Theories and Strategy*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), p221.

more recent (2010) generalist text book *Strategy in the Contemporary World*,⁶⁹ amongst many other acknowledgements. Geoffrey Till's *Seapower*, a more specialist guide for the student of maritime and naval operations, discusses Cable's taxonomy of gunboat diplomacy,⁷⁰ and he is mentioned several times in a chapter dedicated to naval diplomacy.⁷¹ Similarly, Ian Speller, contributing the chapter 'Naval Warfare' in the 2008 book *Understanding Modern Warfare* reminds the reader of Cable's categories when describing the diplomatic role as one of the 'functions of navies',⁷² and again in his 2014 book *Understanding Naval Warfare*.⁷³

That Cable's work can be traced through such wide and varied publications with direct influence on naval tactics, operations and strategy is of signal importance. The model, this thesis argues, manifestly set the standard and, though it carries some shortcomings,⁷⁴ regularly provides the starting point for consideration of naval diplomacy. Later theorists may not have adopted all of Cable's concepts, in particular his classification of the various 'modes', but they have generally been consistent with

⁶⁹ A text box discussing 'Gunboat Diplomacy' does not reference Cable by name, but does describe familiar themes and advises Geoffrey Till for further reading which, in turn, does reference Cable. See Moran, Daniel. 'Geography and Strategy.' In Baylis, John, Wirtz, James & Gray, Colin. *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p132.

⁷⁰ Till, *Seapower*, 2nd Ed., p255.

⁷¹ Ibid., p260, p267.

⁷² Speller, Ian. 'Naval Warfare.' In Jordan, David, Kiras, James, D., Lonsdale, David, J., Speller, Ian, Tuck, Christopher, & Walton, C. Dale. *Understanding Modern Warfare*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p170.

⁷³ Speller, Ian. *Understanding Naval Warfare*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp78-80.

⁷⁴ It has, for example, been described as being more useful for descriptive than for analytical purposes. See: Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, p79.

his approach to gunboat diplomacy as an action taken by one state-centric actor against another.

Cable's Model as a Hierarchical Framework

The model is, by Cable's own admission, hierarchical. The categories of political influence which he identified (Definitive, Purposeful, Catalytic and Expressive) are discussed in *Gunboat Diplomacy* in a descending order of efficacy, from the '*fait accompli*' of *definitive* force,⁷⁵ to the 'last and least' of *expressive*.⁷⁶ Important to the understanding of the model is the realisation that Cable chose to classify his categories as adjectives; the instigating party would be attempting to achieve a *definitive* or *purposeful* result, would look to change the situation by the use of a *catalytic* naval force, or merely communicate its wishes by *expressive* means. By classifying the categories in this way Cable unintentionally (or perhaps, intentionally) bounded his model to the original objective of the assailant with respect to the victim and not necessarily with any regard to wider stakeholders or thought for multi-layered messages.

Displaying this hierarchy diagrammatically would result in a simple tiering based on effectiveness. Cable, however, does acknowledge that an action or incident of naval/gunboat diplomacy may fall into two or more categories,⁷⁷ and that changing

⁷⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed. p22. This presumption is supported by Robert Mandel's study of 133 incidents of gunboat diplomacy ranging from 1946 to 1978. Mandel's evidence suggests that the most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim. See: Mandel, Robert. "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy." *International Studies Quarterly* 30, No 1 (1986): p59.

⁷⁶ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed. p62.

circumstances may mean that an action initially designed to fit one category could migrate to another.⁷⁸ The tiers in the diagram, therefore, are not discrete but show the possibility of movement up and down through the various modes.

Finally, whilst Cable's model does not span the full continuum of international relations and is situated very much at the coercive, *harder* end of the spectrum of behaviour, dismissing as it does the more benign applications of naval influence in preventive diplomacy, such as friendly port visits, the categories can be positioned relative to each other on an axis from 'soft' to 'hard' power. From this, it may be deduced that, in modern parlance, Cable's model suggests that the application of hard naval power is more effective than soft.

⁷⁷ A number of the examples in Cable's chronological appendix are categorized in more than one mode. See, for example, the case of Britain and Italy in September 1935 during the Abyssinia crisis (expressive *or* purposeful) and the deployment of a US task force to the Sea of Japan in April 1969 after North Korea had shot down a US aircraft (expressive *and* purposeful). The distinction between 'and' and 'or' in the categorisation is not made clear. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed. p70,p197.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p63.




Figure 2.2: Diagrammatic representation of Cable's four mode model.

Cable was adamant that *Gunboat Diplomacy's* chronological appendix should not be used for mathematical or geographical analysis; he pointed out that the incidents he chose merely illustrated the range and did not represent an accurate cross-section of gunboat diplomacy.⁷⁹ However, to accept such a rebuttal of one form of critical analysis of his work without question is perhaps short-sighted. Cable based his arguments and his theories on the very examples he chose and therefore this thesis argues that an examination of those examples is a valid technique in assessing his work. Moreover, Cable did so himself, identifying peaks and troughs in the frequency of his cases and stating that 'for seventy years there has been no clear trend of change governing the

⁷⁹ Ibid., p158.

use of limited naval force or in the relative incidence of success or failure in its employment.⁸⁰

What the examples do show the reader is that, in broad order, Cable chose to document relatively few incidents of naval diplomacy in the first two decades of the period of his study (though he did state that the number of incidents in China in the 1920s was far larger than those shown⁸¹), fewer still in the Second World War and an increasing number as the Cold War progressed. Of those Cold War incidents that he did record almost forty percent involved a state from one or other of the major blocs operating against a Third World or lesser developed state,⁸² perhaps informing his earlier assertion that gunboat diplomacy is carried out by the strong against the weak.⁸³ Even though Cable made a claim that *definitive* force, which he viewed as the most effective mode of naval diplomacy, is the 'rarest form',⁸⁴ this is not borne out by his own choice of examples. He chose to record only half as many incidents of *definitive* force as he did *purposeful*, but *expressive* force has fewer still and *catalytic* least of all.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp65-66.

⁸¹ Ibid., p158.

⁸² Cable's Chronological Appendix shows the following totals: 35 incidents in the decade 1919-29; 28 in the period 1930-39; 25 in the period 1940-49; 39 in the period 1950-59; 41 in the period 1960-69; 54 in the period 1970-79; 46 in the (longer) period 1980-91. Of the 193 documented incidents from 1946 onwards, 76 could be described as being 'by' a NATO or Warsaw Pact state against a lesser developed state. See Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, pp159-213.

⁸³ Ibid., p25

⁸⁴ Ibid., p90.

⁸⁵ By mode, Cable's examples are broken down as: Incidents of Definitive Force – 61; Purposeful – 129; Catalytic – 34; Expressive – 43. See Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, pp159-213.

The conclusion drawn from this brief quantitative assessment, with the caveat that it is somewhat limited precisely because of Cable's insistence that his examples were illustrative not exhaustive, is that Cable's views on the relative effectiveness of his categories of gunboat diplomacy and on the nature of the actors involved reinforced his choice of example and vice versa. That more were drawn from a period and a conflict in which he was most familiar and actively involved as a British diplomat is also telling. Cable's model, though seminal, is still a product of the Cold War.

Change and Trends

In the third and final edition of *Gunboat Diplomacy* written in the aftermath of the Cold War Cable himself questioned the validity of the concepts he devised in the 1970s and 1980s.⁸⁶ Though he did not doubt that there would be a future for coercive diplomacy which 'navies will usually find it easier than armies or air forces' to practice,⁸⁷ he did dare to offer some early 'impressions' for the years to come. Acknowledging the imprudence of such conjecture, he suggested that:

... more governments use gunboat diplomacy today than occurred a century ago; that the roles of victim and assailant are now more equally shared between the great powers and lesser states; that warships must increasingly be used and not merely moved; that prestige in the 1980s had lost the potency it still possessed in the 1920s. These are, however, essentially impressions. They could be challenged on a different interpretation of history: they could be destroyed by the events of the coming decade.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp140-157.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p146.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p66.

In his analysis of change (which he termed *The Altered Environment*) Cable discussed both historical and political factors, but devoted a substantial number of pages to technology as a driver for change. Clearly there are certain technological advances which fundamentally alter the military dimension of international relations; the development of nuclear weapons after the Second World War and the evolution of deterrence as a primary strategy being a pertinent example. Cable discussed nuclear deterrence and its potential to lessen the use of limited naval force, but concluded that the two need not be mutually exclusive.⁸⁹

However, an aspect of technological progress which Cable did expect to reduce the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy was the improvement in 'detection' capabilities. Fixed defences, comprehensive picture building and early warning systems '*may* [Cable's italics] operate to the detriment of gunboat diplomacy,'⁹⁰ he wrote, presumably by limiting offshore manoeuvre and removing the element of surprise; this, if proven to be correct, would challenge the navalist's faith in such enduring attributes as poise (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).

It is perhaps surprising given Cable's views on the importance of detection that he placed such low stock in the use of the submarine in gunboat diplomacy.⁹¹ This position was challenged in a US Naval Postgraduate School master's thesis by Brent Ditzler,

⁸⁹ Ibid., p70.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p72.

⁹¹ Cable describes the submarine as 'ill-adapted to most forms of gunboat diplomacy'. See Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p71. In the earliest edition of his work he explained that he believed submarines unable to either convey coercive threats unless making its presence known, and unable to engage in the use of proportionate force without having a gun fitted. See Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, p134.

who came to the reasonable conclusion that the submarine is, in fact, a credible and well used tool of naval diplomacy, able to be used for 'strategic signalling', as when the American SSBN *USS Abraham Lincoln* put to sea within 15 hours of Soviet missiles being found in Cuba during the 1962 crisis,⁹² and subsequently when Soviet boats paid a series of highly visible visits to the island in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁹³

Success and Failure

If it is accepted that naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and that diplomacy is a means of communication between international actors, then Cable's criteria for assessing the efficacy of action fits neatly into Schelling's and George's conceptual theories on coercive strategies discussed in Chapter 1. Accordingly, Cable's model bases its judgement of success against the original objective of the instigating party.⁹⁴ As a rational actor the 'assailant' chooses to influence behaviour using naval force and the 'victim' responds in either the predicted manner, or if the calculation is wrong, does not. Cable's views, therefore, on the greater effectiveness of actions with clearly defined objectives, is a logical progression of his argument. Vague or even long term incrementally-approached objectives are, almost by definition, more difficult to measure and are hence more likely to be viewed as failures, or at least not clear successes. As a result of this perspective the measurement of success or failure of an action on, for example, third parties, allies, the international community, or

⁹² Ditzler, Brent Alan. *Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: A Study of the Coercive Use of Submarines Short of War*. Master's Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, (Monterey, California, 1989), pp75-76.

⁹³ Ibid., p79.

⁹⁴ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, p158.

domestic audiences does not feature in Cable's work. As has been argued earlier, his approach is binary.

To illustrate the point it is worth considering one of Cable's own examples. Though of course conceding that the end result was 'war and defeat', *Gunboat Diplomacy's* chronological appendix judges the original Argentinean seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1982 as a success of limited naval force.⁹⁵ The action is deemed *definitive*,

Argentina is judged the 'assailant' and Britain is categorised as the 'victim'. Clearly, considered against an original objective assumed to be sovereignty of the islands held in Argentinean rather than British hands, the immediate result was successful.

However, this in itself then poses the question of timescale on measures of effectiveness: is the result to be judged without delay, after a month, a year, or following a 'permanent' change of situation?

Applying Cable Today

Does Cable's model work in the twentieth-first century? Michael Codner of RUSI has written that 'it does not stand up to the test of strategic analysis and is not particularly useful for military practitioners.'⁹⁶ However, this thesis argues that although changes have undoubtedly taken place on the world stage since *Gunboat Diplomacy* was last updated, the strengths and limitations of the model remain extant. It could certainly be applied to contemporary incidents of naval diplomacy. For example, the deployment of

⁹⁵ Ibid., p207.

⁹⁶ Codner, Michael. *Defining 'Deterrence': Framing Deterrence in the 21st Century*. Pre-Conference Note. (London. Royal United Services Institute, 2009), p2.

US carrier battle groups during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 could be described as use of *expressive* force⁹⁷, and Royal Navy operations off Sierra Leone against a non-state actor during that country's civil war in 2000 could be judged to be either *definitive* or *purposeful*;⁹⁸ both would almost certainly be deemed successful against initial intent. However, the second example also demonstrates the limitations of the Cable model and narrowness of his definitions – that the 'victim' was not a state actor but a revolutionary movement does not fit the 'standard'.

This thesis argues that Cable was a useful starting point for the study of naval diplomacy in the Cold War era, but that even then it insufficiently captured the complexities and possibilities of coercive naval force; that it largely ignores the application of naval 'soft power' also limits its appeal for planners and practitioners in the twenty-first century.

⁹⁷ Discussed further in Chapter 5. For details of the crisis see, for example: Ross, 'The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation', pp87-123.

⁹⁸ Discussed further in Chapter 5. For details of the Sierra Leone conflict see, for example: Dorman, Andrew. *Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*. London: Ashgate, 2009.

THE 'POST-CABLE COLD WAR' MODEL

In the years following publication of the first edition of *Gunboat Diplomacy* scholars from both East and West responded with works of their own on the topic. The most influential writings, those of Turner, Luttwak, Booth and Gorshkov, together shape what might be called the 'Cold War' model of naval diplomacy.

In an influential article in 1974 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner USN explained what he saw as the US Navy's four missions – strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of power ashore and naval presence, which he claimed were the products of an evolutionary process.⁹⁹ Though a reader might question Turner's historical analysis (he asserted that 'the first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control', and that 'warning and coercion .. [and] demonstrations of goodwill effectively began in the nineteenth century'¹⁰⁰), the codification of naval presence as a core role was a seminal step in the development of theory. The role, however, was akin to 'gunboat diplomacy',¹⁰¹ and consisted of either deterrent or coercive elements, which could be accomplished by *preventive* (a show of strength in peacetime) or *reactive* (responding to a crisis) deployments. The targets were to be the Soviet Union or its allies or unaligned third states.¹⁰² The potential for naval forces to contribute to alliance or capacity building, assistance or cooperation was not mentioned by Turner.

⁹⁹ Turner, Stansfield. 'Missions of the US Navy.' *US Naval War College Review* 26, No 5 (1974): p3.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p4.

¹⁰¹ Turner uses the term 'gunboat diplomacy' some three years after publication of Cable's work but does not reference him – or any other writer – in his article.

¹⁰² Turner, 'Missions of the US Navy.' p14-15.

Many commentators cite Turner's 1974 article when considering the development of naval diplomacy,¹⁰³ but few discuss the genesis of his ideas. In 1970, on assuming the appointment of US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt initiated *Project 60*, a plan of action for his tenure which aimed to put the US Navy at the highest feasible combat readiness in the face of the Soviet threat.¹⁰⁴ It was in *Project 60* (admittedly drafted by Turner) that the naval mission of 'overseas presence in peacetime' was first revealed and its rationale was directly linked to the 'emergence of a strong, worldwide deployed Soviet Navy.'¹⁰⁵

Today the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is as great as ours; 10 years ago it was negligible. We devote fewer than 800 ship days a year to limited parts of the Indian Ocean; the Soviets' reach over that area has gone from zero ship days to 2400 in the past 3 years.¹⁰⁶

And:

All of a nation's maritime capabilities bear on its influence around the world and its ability to establish a peacetime presence at a point of choice. We need not look hard to see how the Soviets have translated their naval presence into diplomatic leverage. Their strength in the Arab world today is not entirely attributable to the build up of their

¹⁰³ See, for example: Till, *Seapower*, p222; Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, pp81-82; Le Miere, *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*, p21.

¹⁰⁴ Zumwalt, Elmo. *Memorandum for all Flag Officers (And Marine General Officers)*. Op-00 Memo 00334-70, *Project 60*, dated 16 September 1970. Reproduced in Hattendorf, John (Ed). *US Naval Strategy in the 1970s*. Newport Paper 30. (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp3-30.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p4.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p6.

Mediterranean fleet, but it was surely an important factor. The Soviets have, in a sense, successfully turned NATO's southern flank.¹⁰⁷

Crucially, however, the espousal of naval presence was not simply as a counter to a perceived threat. *Project 60* was also set against the realities of 1970s financial constraints, an unpopular war in Vietnam and a desire for allies to shoulder more of the burden. For the latter the paper pointed out that 'the commitment of even our closest friends will depend on their assessment of our naval power, compared with the Soviets.'¹⁰⁸ American naval diplomacy of the 1970s, then, was to varying degrees a reaction to an adversary, a means to encourage allies and an attempt to keep budgets under control.

Stansfield Turner provided a diagram to show how the four 'interdependent naval missions' were configured (see Figure 3.3, below). Strategic deterrence was clearly the bedrock of his vision and was based, as would be expected of the dominant theory of the time, on the concept of nuclear deterrence and, in particular, on the ability to maintain an 'assured second strike' capability.¹⁰⁹ This deterrence evidently had a strong communicative base and could itself be placed under the naval diplomatic umbrella as defined in this research. However, it is the naval presence mission, which Turner defined as 'the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives,'¹¹⁰ which demands the greatest analysis.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p14.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p29.

¹⁰⁹ Turner, 'Missions of the US Navy', p5.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p2.




Figure 2.3: Independent Naval Missions (from Turner)¹¹¹

Turner framed his approach to naval presence on three levels. Firstly, he offered the opinion that its use would be to achieve one of two broad 'objectives': it could 'deter actions inimical to the interests of the United States or its allies'; or, it could 'encourage actions that are in the interests of the United States or its allies.'¹¹² The latter objective could equally be termed coercion or compellence.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p14.

¹¹² Ibid.

Secondly, Turner explained the ‘tactics’ by which these objectives might be accomplished. ‘Preventive deployments’ were those peacetime global dispositions which would be relevant to, and presumably targeted at, the areas in which ‘problems might arise’, they should not involve forces which were ‘markedly inferior to some other naval force in the neighborhood [sic],’ and they should be able to be reinforced if necessary.¹¹³ Turner did not explicitly provide examples of where preventive deployments might be targeted but, given his work’s origins in *Project 60*, it could be deduced that the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean would be priority regions. ‘Reactive deployments’ were described by Turner as those made in response to a crisis and which would need to possess ‘an immediately credible threat and be prepared to have its bluff called.’¹¹⁴ Preventive and reactive deployment can be directly aligned with Luttwak’s latent and active suasion discussed below. Of note, they do not specifically include deployments designed to build amity or friendship amongst states.

Thirdly, Turner outlined five basic ‘actions’ by and through which a naval presence force could achieve its aim: amphibious assault, air attack, bombardment, blockade, and exposure through reconnaissance.¹¹⁵ This *objective-tactic-action* approach can be criticised for not including the fleet-in-being concept, protection of trade, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and for not acknowledging the potential of submarines.¹¹⁶ However, it did break new ground by providing the first framework to describe what

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Center for Naval Analyses, *US Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009)*, p27.

naval diplomacy *might* do, rather than what had *been* done in the past (that is, through historical analysis).

Turner's naval presence mission can be represented diagrammatically as:




Figure 2.4: Turner's Naval Presence Mission

Edward Luttwak, an American military strategist, published *The Political Uses of Sea Power* in 1974. The book, though short, ranges widely and debates the use of armed forces in general before settling on naval power. Rather than be constrained by concepts such as coercion and deterrence, Luttwak coined the term 'suasion' to frame

his arguments. Suasion, he wrote, is a 'conveniently neutral term [...] whose meaning suggests the indirectness of any political application of naval force.'¹¹⁷

It could be argued that the 'political application of naval force' need not be 'indirect' as Luttwak states,¹¹⁸ but his point is accepted; 'naval suasion' is a more subtle phrase than 'gunboat diplomacy', implying a degree of non-forceful influence rather than physical action. In this respect it is perhaps more sophisticated than Turner's hard power description of the naval presence mission. However, the phrase is not universally accepted. Michael Codner, in an adaptation of Luttwak's typology written in 2009, substituted the word 'inducement' for 'suasion' because, he argued, it was 'a word not widely used except amongst scholars.'¹¹⁹ However, this thesis argues that though 'suasion' may not be instinctively understood by the casual reader, Codner missed the point; it better captures the concept which Luttwak was attempting to describe than does 'inducement', or any other words of similar meaning to be found in the thesaurus. Additionally, 'suasion' has a distinct advantage as a means of describing the cognitive effects and outcomes desired of naval diplomacy: the word is impartial and helpfully imprecise. Indeed, the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines suasion in a 'moral' sense, particularly useful in the peacetime application of naval diplomacy; it is 'persuasion as opposed to force'.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, p3.

¹¹⁸ Those instances of naval diplomacy which Cable categorised as 'definitive', for instance, might be considered 'direct'.

¹¹⁹ Codner, *Defining 'Deterrence'*, p3.

¹²⁰ Sykes, J.B. (Ed). *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 7th Edition*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p1060.

Acknowledging the imprecision of the term when applied to sea power, Luttwak explained that suasion pertains to 'other's reactions, and not the actions, or intent, of the deploying party,'¹²¹ a notable departure from Cable's and Turner's, approach. The assumption of rationality in the cognitive decision making process of all parties, articulated well in Alexander George's works on coercive diplomacy,¹²² is also acknowledged: 'Because suasion can only operate through the filters of others' perceptions, the exercise of suasion is inherently unpredictable in its results.'¹²³

Under the umbrella of naval suasion Luttwak placed a spectrum of operations from routine deployments to deliberate action. At what might be called the 'softer' end, where he situated routine deployments, navies could deliver local deterrent (with a small 'd') or supportive functions. Luttwak labelled this end of the spectrum 'latent suasion' and it correlates well with Cable's *expressive* force; later commentators might also subsume it into wider preventive and 'defence diplomacy'. Deliberate action, the 'active' side of Luttwak's spectrum corresponding to *definitive* or *purposeful* force in Cable's terminology, was further broken down into the positive and negative elements of coercive diplomacy.

Luttwak's work was very much a product of the Cold War, quite obviously influenced by Cable and Schelling (both are acknowledged), but it is perhaps less politically impartial than either of the earlier writers. Luttwak discussed differences in perceptions of military strength between the western and eastern blocs and US 'self-denigration',¹²⁴ he

¹²¹ Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, p6.

¹²² George, 'The Coercive Diplomacy', p70.

¹²³ Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, p6.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp44-45.

criticised 'declining ' American influence in the Middle East,¹²⁵ and he identified increasing multi-polarity during 1970s détente,¹²⁶ a conclusion which seems prescient if somewhat premature when read four decades later.

Luttwak did not enjoy the same success amongst practitioners as Cable and Booth, whose work fed directly into the maritime doctrines of western navies, perhaps because the basis of his theory of 'suasion' was, in practice, its main limitation. He robustly emphasised prestige, the importance of image and perception over capability, dedicating a whole chapter to 'visibility and viability' and arguing, for instance, that 'to frighten South Yemen or encourage the Sheik of Abu Dhabi one does not need a powerful sonar under the hull or a digital data system in the superstructure.'¹²⁷ The proposition had merit but did not necessarily fit into the political narrative of the time. It also falls into the trap of underestimating the target audience. Critics have dismissed his simplistic assertions with relative ease, pointing to a range of examples of perceived weaker navies who have succeeded over stronger maritime powers; a case in point was the success of the Icelandic Navy against Britain during the 'Cod Wars'.¹²⁸

The reader of *The Political Uses of Sea Power* is assisted in understanding the concept by Luttwak's own diagrammatic representation:

¹²⁵ Ibid., p63.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p68.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p47.

¹²⁸ Murfett, Malcolm, 'Gunboat Diplomacy: Outmoded or Back in Vogue', in Dorman, Andrew, M., Smith, Mike Lawrence & Uttley, Matthew R.H. (Eds). *The Changing Face of Maritime Power*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 82.




Figure 2.5: Luttwak's Typology of Naval Suasion¹²⁹

As can be seen, Luttwak divided naval suasion into two broad fields, active and latent. The former, he contended, existed when the deliberate exercise of naval suasion was intended to elicit a given reaction from a specified party.¹³⁰ This action-reaction relationship between parties, mechanistic but not as prescriptive as Cable's 'assailant' and 'victim' thesis, has the benefit of acknowledging the existence of wider stakeholders, a concept returned to in Chapter 5:

The *exercise* of 'active' suasion is defined as any deliberate attempt to evoke a specific reaction on the part of others, whether allies, enemies, or neutrals.¹³¹

The second category, latent suasion, is perhaps more interesting, constituting 'the undirected, and hence possibly unintended, reactions evoked by naval deployments

¹²⁹ Ibid., p7.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p11.

¹³¹ Ibid., p17. The italics and quotation marks are Luttwak's.

maintained on a routine basis.¹³² It is also a reasonable approximation of the effects desired of Turner's preventive deployment tactic. Simplified, active suasion is the deployment of naval forces with a specific outcome in mind, whereas latent suasion is defined by the expected and unexpected outcomes gained from routine, day-to-day activity.

A potential limitation of Luttwak's model is that it discusses the political application of naval force in a qualitative manner and does not adequately capture the quantitative nature of practical sea power. On initial reading the categories and subsets of naval suasion appear to be given equal weighting. Luttwak does address this in a passing reference, stating that latent suasion is 'the most general (in terms of intensity) and geographically the most widespread form of deterrence'¹³³ but he does not weigh supportive suasion against coercive, nor the basics of latent against active. The Luttwak model, then, despite his attempts in the final chapter of *The Political Uses of Sea Power* to relate his thoughts to naval tactics,¹³⁴ is essentially a theoretical construct, as opposed to a discussion of practical experiences.

Ken Booth's *Navies and Foreign Policy*, published in 1977, drew on Luttwak's ideas, which he acknowledged as 'useful'¹³⁵ but went further in the development of the topic. Booth became the architect of the best-known theoretical construct for the use of navies; his trinity of functions found its way into the official doctrine of navies,

¹³² Ibid., p11.

¹³³ Ibid., p13.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp71-73.

¹³⁵ Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, p45.

particularly large navies, worldwide.¹³⁶ In its simplest form the trinity explains how navies make use of the sea in military, policing and diplomatic roles:




Figure 2.6: The Functions of Navies (from Booth)¹³⁷

The military and policing functions are not discussed at length in this thesis, but it is worthy of note that there is a degree of overlap between the categories. Booth's military role, for instance, can be divided into both peacetime and wartime activities including those under the heading of a 'balance of power' function, which Booth considered to be geopolitical or diplomatic tasks. Likewise, his policing role includes a 'nation-building' function which, though Booth chose to restrict 'mainly' to territorial

¹³⁶ Booth's trinity can be traced in British, American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand naval doctrine, amongst others. For a useful précis of Western doctrinal development see: Australia. Aaron P Jackson. *Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Countries: A Comparative Perspective*. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No 33. Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2010.

¹³⁷ Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, p16.

waters, can stretch onto the high seas and be used to further national interest.¹³⁸ This aspect of seapower was particularly important to Booth as he claimed that for 'over one-third of the world's navies, coastguard and nation-building responsibilities represent the extent of their functions (and ambitions).'¹³⁹ In essence, Booth was acknowledging a different type of naval power, one which grew bottom-up from the smaller navies, as opposed to the more common top-down perspectives of other writers which concentrated almost entirely on the most powerful navies.

However, concentrating on Booth's diplomatic role it can be seen that in its simplest form the author considered naval diplomacy to have three elements. The first, negotiation from strength, was, he wrote, the 'political demonstration of naval force' which required 'presence', including an ability to operate in the air and to project military power ashore, as well as mastering the traditional naval environment, the sea.¹⁴⁰ Booth's negotiation from strength entailed a number of subsidiary objectives such as the reassurance of allies, the improvement of bargaining positions and the ability to affect the course of diplomatic negotiations.¹⁴¹ It fits neatly with Luttwak's 'supportive' function which spanned both active and latent suasion and can also be considered an element in each of the three categories of the 'classical' model of naval diplomacy.

Manipulation, the second of Booth's diplomatic elements, may be considered a straightforward extension of the influence tactics of the first. Booth himself

¹³⁸ Booth cites the UK/Icelandic 'Cod Wars' as an example of a small navy (Iceland) using a nation-building technique to press a point on the international stage. Ibid., p18.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p19.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp18-19.

acknowledged the difficulties in making a 'clear distinction between the exercise of naval power and the exercise of naval influence' because of the 'subtlety of the stages through which a warship can be transformed from a platform for a dance-band and cavorting local dignitaries, to a haven of refuge for nationals in distress, to a gun-platform for shore bombardment.'¹⁴² However, this 'subtlety' can be navigated.

Whereas Booth's concept of power and negotiation from strength tends toward the 'status' and 'amity' pillars of classical thought, this thesis contends that manipulation is more concerned with coercion; it is the demonstration of naval power, management of bargaining positions within an alliance and the gaining of access to new countries.¹⁴³

The third element of Booth's diplomatic role is prestige. Whilst prestige may initially be considered a concept less prominent in the modern era than it was in the days of imperialism, Booth is convincing of its relevance and devotes a whole chapter of *Navies and Foreign Policy* to its discussion, describing it crudely as 'the sex appeal of politics'.¹⁴⁴ In this approach he is clearly influenced by the classic work of international relations, *Politics Among Nations*, by Hans Morgenthau, who Booth quoted when offering a definition of prestige as 'reputation for power';¹⁴⁵ it is interesting that Morgenthau similarly devotes a considerable portion of his most famous work to prestige, stating that 'military strength is the obvious measure of a nation's power'.¹⁴⁶ Importantly in the context of naval diplomacy, Booth considered prestige as a factor

¹⁴² Ibid., p27.

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp19-20.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p50.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p50.

¹⁴⁶ Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1948), p54.

both on the world stage, in common with the classical model derived from Mahan, Corbett and Richmond, and also domestically, as a means of garnering support from the general public and for 'oiling the wheels of intra-governmental bargaining'.¹⁴⁷ However, the management of self-image can have 'pitfalls' as Booth is at pains to point out: sex appeal can create 'false expectations',¹⁴⁸ and returning to the pejorative, 'one man's goodwill visit may well be another man's gunboat diplomacy'.¹⁴⁹ Nonetheless, Booth did identify a 'prestige race' as taking place during the Cold War and stated that 'prestige may be sufficient justification for expenditure of resources'.¹⁵⁰ Effectively, he claimed that the seeking of prestige could be a rational strategy.

Booth's points were not lost on the architect of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. Before his classic book *The Sea Power of the State* was published, Gorshkov exposed his thoughts through a series of articles, originally released in the Soviet journal *Morskoi Sbornik* in 1972-3 and later translated and reproduced in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* magazine throughout 1974. The *Proceedings* articles, running to eleven in total in consecutive issues from January to November of that year, were each accompanied by a commentary by a US Navy flag officer, including such luminaries as Arleigh Burke and Stansfield Turner. The column inches that the American publication gave to the Russian's thoughts over almost an entire year, and the degree of parallel analysis, is recognition of the importance of his writing to the geopolitical situation of the time. As Rear Admiral Miller wrote following the first instalment:

¹⁴⁷ Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, p74.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p50.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p80.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p52.

His [Gorshkov's] writings should be studied as assiduously as European statesmen studied Alfred Thayer Mahan's works during the years preceding World War I. They are of considerable importance in determining the nature and scope of the big-power competition to be expected in the years to come.¹⁵¹

The articles also formed the backdrop to a seminar on Soviet naval development in Canada in 1974, which left the participants (one of whom was Ken Booth) with the clear impression that Gorshkov was concerned 'to demonstrate the continuing and increasing importance of navies as instruments of state policy in peace and war.'¹⁵² Gorshkov, obviously, was required reading in that particular period of the Cold War.

Gorshkov suggested that Soviet naval growth after 1945 was managed in direct response to American naval advances and not simply designed for the furtherance of Soviet foreign policy.¹⁵³ However, he did use his knowledge of western maritime strategy to introduce a forward presence mission to a fleet which had traditionally concentrated on coastal defensive tactics. He intuitively understood that the Navy could be extremely useful in operations other than war:

¹⁵¹ Miller, George, H. 'Commentary' following Gorshkov, Sergei, G. 'Navies in War and Peace.' *USNI Proceedings* 100, no 1 (1974): p27.

¹⁵² McGwire, Michael, Booth, Ken & McDonell, John (Eds). *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints*. (New York: Praeger, 1975), pv.

¹⁵³ Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, pp178-212

Demonstrative actions by the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle..... The navy has always been an instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.¹⁵⁴

However, unlike Cable and Turner, Gorshkov's notion of naval diplomacy was not entirely adversary-centred. In addition to its coercive potential he saw a role of sea power as being a means of 'holding in check' allies in order to manage or maintain power relationships,¹⁵⁵ a concept clearly reminiscent of Mahan's work. He was particularly intrigued by the UK-US relationship and thought it 'interesting' that the United States achieved its position of relative maritime pre-eminence in the twentieth century through close partnership with Britain, a position which Germany had failed to reach through confrontation.¹⁵⁶

Equally, he was interested in amity and robustly promoted an 'ambassadorial' role for the Soviet Navy,¹⁵⁷ particularly for spreading influence in the Third World and amongst existing 'client' states and non-aligned countries.

And, mirroring pre-Cold War naval thinkers, he associated maritime strength with national prestige:

¹⁵⁴ Quoted in Till, *Seapower*, p254.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p2.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p249.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp251-252.

The strength of the fleets was one of the factors helping states to move into the category of great powers. Moreover, history shows that states not possessing naval forces were unable for a long time to occupy the position of a great power.¹⁵⁸

What is clear from Gorshkov's work is that it was written primarily for a domestic Russian audience. Indeed, John Hibbits wrote in a critique that three major objectives were apparent: Gorshkov was attempting to justify the importance of a navy to great power status, he was enlisting Communist Party support for the Navy, and he was explaining his theory to Soviet sailors.¹⁵⁹ However, what is also apparent is that his vision was largely reactive and followed developments in the West. He saw NATO as 'an alliance of maritime states, with powerful naval forces occupying advantageous strategic positions in the World Ocean',¹⁶⁰ and he used strong rhetoric to illustrate the threat he perceived:

For over a century, American imperialism used the navy as the main instrument of its aggressive foreign policy in line with prevailing tradition and was impressed by the concept of sea power which was presented as an irreplaceable means of achieving world dominance.¹⁶¹

The true intention of western sea power in peacetime, he wrote, was 'gun diplomacy.'¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, p59.

¹⁵⁹ Hibbits, John. 'Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Twenty Years of Naval Thought.' In Murphy, Paul (Ed). *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*. (Washington, DC: US Air Force, 1978), p2.

¹⁶⁰ Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, p159.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p162.

¹⁶² Ibid., p6.

Gorshkov used the term 'local wars of imperialism' to describe his interpretations of western strategy and offered the opinion that naval forces were the most suitable instruments of state military power because of their mobility, persistence, independence ability to be deployed or withdrawn at will.¹⁶³ The attributes are clearly recognizable and though Gorshkov used them in his analysis of NATO strategy they are universal and equally applicable to his own forces. 'Local wars of imperialism' was obviously a politically charged term but the sense was familiar; the meaning can be directly equated to the 'limited wars' or 'limited use of naval power' of *Gunboat Diplomacy*.

Emphasising the soft power potential of naval diplomacy, Gorshkov built up a fleet which not only comprised a credible fighting force, but one which deployed to non-traditional operating areas with a forthright agenda to extend communist influence:

The Soviet navy is also used in foreign policy measure by our state. But the aims of this use radically differ from those of the imperialist powers. The Soviet navy is an instrument for a peace-loving policy and friendship of the peoples, for a policy of cutting short the aggressive endeavours of imperialism, restraining military adventurism and decisively countering threats to the safety of the peoples from the imperialist powers. [...] Soviet naval seamen [...] feel themselves ambassadors for our country. [...] Friendly visits by Soviet seamen offer the opportunity to the peoples of the countries visited to see for themselves the creativity of socialist principles in our country, the genuine parity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and their high cultural level. In our ships they see the achievements of Soviet science, technology and industry.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ Ibid., p235.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., pp251-252.

Significantly, a contemporary US analysis of Gorshkov's original Russian articles (perhaps not coincidentally published as an article in same issue of the *US Naval War College Review* as Stansfield Turner's piece), concludes that Soviet naval strategy was defensive and deterrent, based on sea denial rather than control and reactive to the West.¹⁶⁵ That analysis may be correct, but it focuses on hard power to the detriment of the wider elements of sea power which Gorshkov espoused. If the Soviet Admiral was indeed reacting to US and Western naval supremacy then his asymmetric approach involving non-naval means such as research ships, fishing vessels and the merchant marine,¹⁶⁶ communicated a significant challenge to his adversaries, edging the 'fight' from an area of known weakness to one closer to parity.

At the end of the 1970s Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell of the US Center for Naval Analyses published a study entitled *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*. Though Gorshkov had clearly been influenced by NATO practices, there was predictably little open source material emanating from the East for western researchers to examine. 'While researchers have produced a number of papers and monographs on various aspects of the Soviet Union's use of its navy in a political role,' Dismukes and McConnell stated, 'no comprehensive discussion of Soviet naval diplomacy is available.'¹⁶⁷ They attempted to remedy the situation, plotting trends in 'showing the flag', coercive diplomacy and superpower confrontation; on the whole, they asserted, the Soviet naval diplomacy of the period was successful and played a greater relative role in overall

¹⁶⁵ Smith, 'The Meaning and Significance of the Gorshkov Articles.' pp18-37.

¹⁶⁶ Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, pp27-46.

¹⁶⁷ Dismukes, Bradford & McConnell, James (Eds). *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pxiv.

strategy than did the American equivalent.¹⁶⁸ Gorshkov had watched, learned and improved upon what he saw.

The language used by the strategists chosen to represent the Cold War perspective may be very different, indeed at times may appear obscure, but when read together their treatises on 'suasion', 'naval influence politics' and 'wars of imperialism' tell a common story. It should not be surprising that this is the case, for each was influenced by the work of the others and there is significant cross-referencing in their books.¹⁶⁹ The exception is *The Sea Power of the State*, the major work of Gorshkov, seemingly the latest chronologically and which is notable for its extensive discussion of Western naval history but with an almost complete lack of acknowledgement of Western naval theorists.¹⁷⁰ However, on closer consideration, it is apparent that Gorshkov's work, appearing in a Russian language publication in 1972-3 and *USNI Proceedings* in 1974 before receiving its book-length treatment, actually pre-dated the key writings of both Luttwak and Booth, though it did follow Zumwalt's and Turner's *Project 60* work, of which he would undoubtedly have been aware. The Westerners' views on the West, therefore, are in part shaped by an Eastern protagonist's politically biased perspective on the subject.

The most obvious thread common to each work is the signal importance of coercion. It is explicit in Luttwak's active suasion, can be seen clearly in Booth's discussion on

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p3.

¹⁶⁹ See, for example, Booth's acknowledgement of Luttwak's 'useful' work: Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, pp41-42 and his mention of Gorshkov in his Index.

¹⁷⁰ Even in a discussion of the 'fleets of the western countries in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries', Mahan, the acknowledged seminal writer on the period, is mentioned only in passing in a footnote, whilst Marx and Lenin are referenced extensively: Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, p65.

naval power and is effectively at the root of Gorshkov's wars of imperialism and Turner's naval presence mission. In any generic Cold War model of naval diplomacy, therefore, coercion must be evident. Its counter, non-coercive influence, is also universally mentioned; this 'softer' form of power is described variously as reassurance, support to allies or 'clients' and an ambassadorial function of navies. It should therefore form the second factor in the generic model. The ability of navies to build and support strategic alliances, a concept familiar to the classical writers, was key to Gorshkov's understanding of naval utility and is implicit in Luttwak and Booth. Turner's article is the lesser for not fully addressing it. In the context of the times the two major alliance blocs were the mainstays of the bipolar world and the role of navies in supporting and maintaining grand strategy was self-evident.

A simple construct for a Cold War model, therefore, might have three pillars of naval diplomacy:




Figure 2.7: Naval Diplomacy in the Cold War: an initial model

However, this model is perhaps too rudimentary to accurately reflect the complexities of the height of the Cold War, but it can be developed. If the three categories identified were assumed to be naval capabilities as opposed to specific naval missions, ie the

ability to coerce, to influence and to maintain alliances, and they were assumed to be inter-related, then the model could be displayed differently. Arguably, in the context of the bipolar competition for dominance at the time, the central outcome of the combined capabilities could be judged to be prestige or status.

Though few governments of the modern age would consciously admit to national greatness being a goal, it would perhaps be irrational to dismiss it outright. Booth's discourse on prestige is convincing because it is based in credible, accepted theory and deserves a place in the generic model. With hindsight, a 'prestige race' between East and West in the Cold War is plain to see.¹⁷¹ An alternative model could then be as shown below:




Figure 3.8: Prestige-focused Naval Diplomacy in the Cold War

¹⁷¹ Booth discusses what he considered the various sources of prestige through the ages, concluding that in the 1970s the military element was of greatest significance. (See Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, pp55-56). Following the end of the Cold War, however, other factors, such as economic strength, may be considered to have overtaken the military when determining relative status between states.

NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: THE 'POST-MODERN' MODEL

The immediate post-Cold War period, from 1991 to 2010, was one of transformation and uncertainty in geopolitics, as the analysis in Chapter 4 expands upon. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union were arguably the catalysts for change but there were other key milestones in social, political, economic and cultural spheres. The inexorable rise of China and India, the financial crisis in the West, the embracing of democratic peace theory¹⁷² and subsequent backlash of nationalist movements, insurgency and anti-western terrorism all played their part, as did the ever increasing commercial interactions, linkages and interdependencies known as globalisation.¹⁷³

In an era which has been characterised variously as *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilisations* there has been no shortage of comment and conjecture.¹⁷⁴

If Cold War naval diplomacy was understood by practitioners and commentators as a means to maintain bi-polar balance through coercion, reassurance and image management, then its immediate post-Cold War expression was not quite so definitive. It was a period of change and for a time in the 1990s one of the major blocs, the former

¹⁷² Democratic peace theory proposes that democracies are unlikely to fight one another. The furtherance of democracy, therefore, should logically result in a reduction in conflict. See Rasler, Karen & Thompson, William. *Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics and the Transformation of World Politics*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp3-4.

¹⁷³ Baylis *et al*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 4th Ed., p8.

¹⁷⁴ Amongst the most influential texts of the post-Cold War era are: Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992), and Huntington, Samuel. 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*. Summer (1993): pp22-49.

Soviet Union, all but ceased naval activity on grounds of affordability, whilst the other sailed the world's oceans unopposed.¹⁷⁵ As the remaining established navies continued to conduct 'business as usual',¹⁷⁶ their professional leadership and academia debated their place in the new world order. In a reinvestigation of coercive diplomacy, Peter Viggo Jakobson applied the framework developed earlier by George and Simons to the conflicts in Kuwait and Yugoslavia as examples of immediate post-Cold War outcomes; he concluded that although in generic terms the model stood it needed refinement, particularly in acknowledging the use of 'carrots' as well as 'sticks'.¹⁷⁷ This sentiment can easily be transposed into the naval sphere: it was no longer about gunboat diplomacy, but also about promoting ties and cooperation between like-minded actors.

However, some commentators were quick to go further. Michael Pugh, for instance, stated that 'navies are no longer accurate measures of national power,' and that 'power, even symbolically, can no longer be solely equated with the barrel of a gunboat'.¹⁷⁸ In the United States the Naval War College published a series of papers looking specifically at US naval strategy through the transitional periods of the 1970s, '80s and '90s. The latter decade stands out because of the scale and pace of development in

¹⁷⁵ Hattendorf, John (Ed). *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s*. Newport Paper 27. (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2007), p1.

¹⁷⁶ Thomas Otte reminded us that intervention 'has been and probably remains a well established feature of international affairs and instrument of statecraft.' Otte, Thomas, G. 'On Intervention: Some Introductory Remarks,' in Dorman, Andrew, M. & Otte, Thomas, G. (Eds). *Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention*. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), p4.

¹⁷⁷ Jakobson, Peter Viggo. 'The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities.' In Freedman, Lawrence (Ed). *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p84.

¹⁷⁸ Pugh, Michael. 'Is Mahan Still Alive? State Naval Power in the International System.' *Journal of Conflict Studies* XVI, no 2 (1996): p111.

strategic thought.¹⁷⁹ Throughout, naval diplomacy was an acknowledged feature of American strategy and much discussed, though often under the banner of ‘forward presence’:

Forward deployed naval forces help preserve US influence overseas, even in places where we have no bases or political access. They enhance our ability to deter aggression, promote regional stability, strengthen diplomatic relations abroad and respond quickly to crisis. Naval forces provide policy-makers with unique flexibility. We can quickly reposition a powerful fighting force off the coast of a country, out of sight to influence subtly or within sight to make a strong statement.¹⁸⁰

Similar reassessments took place elsewhere and in the United Kingdom the Royal Navy formally published its doctrine for the first time in the 1990s, including an acknowledgement of naval diplomacy. Eric Grove, discussing his part in writing the first edition of British Maritime Doctrine stated, ‘We were not completely satisfied with Sir James Cable’s taxonomy of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ for the purposes of doctrine and instead adopted ‘presence’, ‘symbolic use’, ‘coercion’, and ‘preventive, precautionary and pre-emptive naval diplomacy’.¹⁸¹ Indeed, language is key and Canada similarly attempted to distance its doctrine from ‘gunboat’ diplomacy, which it called a ‘pejorative’

¹⁷⁹ During the first ten years from the end of the Cold War the US Navy subjected itself to almost continuous reassessment. Its outlook and vision was published in ‘The Way Ahead’ (1991), ‘The Naval Policy Book’ (1992), ‘...From The Sea’ (1992), ‘Naval Warfare’ (1994), ‘Forward...from the Sea’ (1994), ‘The Navy Operational Concept’ (1997), ‘Anytime, Anywhere’ (1997), and ‘Navy Strategic Planning Guidance’ (2000). For a precis and critical evaluation of each see Hattendorf, John (Ed). *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s*. Newport Paper 27. (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2007).

¹⁸⁰ Hattendorf, *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s*, p70.

¹⁸¹ Grove, Eric, ‘The Discovery of Doctrine’, in Till, *The Development of British Naval Thinking*, p187.

term, preferring instead 'preventive deployments, coercion, presence and symbolic use.'¹⁸²

The argument for naval diplomacy and forward presence appeared compelling in the age of liberal intervention but it was limited by offerings which focused on the naval forces of the West. Like other aspects of international relations thought, it suffered from the problem of Western or Euro-centricity.¹⁸³ In the early days of the aftermath of the Cold War virtually no attention was given to the navies of the rising powers, a shortfall that has since begun to be, though not yet fully, addressed. The navies and coast guards of small, not yet ascendant powers remain largely ignored.

In 2007 the Indian navy deployed a squadron of warships to Singapore, Yokosuka, Qingdao, Vladivostok, Manila and Ho Chi Minh City. The deployment was a departure from previous Indian operating norms which, Geoffrey Till stated, bore 'more than a passing resemblance to the famous cruise of Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet before the First World War.' The deployment delivered little in terms of specific exercises but was conducted 'for general purposes of greatness'. Specifically, there was undoubted rivalry between India and China in the region and the deployment was the clear staking of a claim of regional primacy by the Indians.¹⁸⁴

Whether the Indian deployment was in reality any different to the naval activity of the superpowers during the Cold War and a return to an older *modus operandi* is uncertain.

¹⁸² Canada. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, p36, p173.

¹⁸³ Sharp. *Diplomatic Theory*, p149.

¹⁸⁴ Till, *Seapower (2nd Ed)*, p343.

What is evident, however, is that naval diplomacy was alive and well at the turn of the twenty-first century, and not just by the global hegemon. Malcolm Murfett, one of a generation of commentators beginning to question the significance of naval diplomacy came to the same conclusion:

One of the reasons why it still has relevance in the modern world is because it can be used on a wide variety of occasions to achieve certain tangible results.¹⁸⁵

China achieved such a 'tangible result' in 2008 when it dispatched two destroyers and a support ship to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations. The deployment, though small by Western standards, demonstrated China's ability to operate credibly and self-sustain over a prolonged period which had previously been assumed to be beyond its capability. The People's Liberation Army (Navy) 'compelled Western observers to revise their once-mocking estimate of Chinese aptitude for naval expeditionary operations.'¹⁸⁶ When Western analysts turned their attention to the East, particularly in the newly formed China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, they found that there had been a surge of maritime interest in China and in the theories of Mahan which, when viewed in concert with Indian and other Asian maritime expansion programmes, could result in a 'reconfiguration of maritime power' in the region and, by extension, globally.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Murfett, Malcolm, 'Gunboat Diplomacy', pp85-86.

¹⁸⁶ Yoshihara, Toshi & Holmes, James. *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p149.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p14.

The period of globalisation and rapid geopolitical transformation from a bi-polar through uni-polar to multi-polar world saw a significant change in the number and type of maritime actors. Roger Barnett, a proponent of naval power, noted the change at state level and reported an increase in the number of navies by 'about two-thirds... in the past 50 years. The count is somewhat imprecise because many states maintain forces with maritime functions such as policing, customs enforcement, and a broad array of coast guard operations that are not organised as navies.'¹⁸⁸ On their varying utility as instruments of power, he added that offshore presence may no longer be 'visible' but that it was certainly still 'tangible':

A coastal state might not be able to see ships cruising off its coasts, but it will 'feel' them. A widely dispersed presence mission by an ocean going navy can serve as a warning to adversaries, an indication of support to allies, and a demonstration of resolve that cannot be ignored by neutrals.¹⁸⁹

Non-state actors engaging in communicative action at sea in order to elicit responses from other parties have already been mentioned. Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley drew attention what they termed 'the contested commons' in a 2009 *US Naval Institute Proceedings* article, highlighting Hezbollah's and Al Qaeda's maritime tactics and stating that 'there is a consensus that rising states and non-state powers, combined with continued globalization, will put great pressure on the international system as a whole.'¹⁹⁰ The 'international system' that they discussed, it could be argued, is made up

¹⁸⁸ Barnett, Roger. *Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), p33.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Flournoy, Michele & Brimley, Shawn. 'The Contested Commons.' *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 137, no 7 (2009): p20.

of vested interests concerned with the maintenance of the *status quo*. Another writer, Michael Quigley, turned attention back to those vested interests in the same issue of *Proceedings*:

In May 2008 the Navy re-established the US Fourth Fleet which had been dormant for nearly sixty years, thereby raising the profile of naval operations in the Caribbean and Latin America. [...] This high profile way to assert US naval authority and underscore the strategic, diplomatic and political importance of Latin America. [...] The signal is being sent not only to Venezuela's Hugo Chavez but also to other leaders in the region who are hostile to the US.¹⁹¹

The reference to the 'signal being sent' reaffirms the role of naval diplomacy as a means of communication.

An article in *Diplomacy and Statecraft* in 2011 by J.J. Widen attempted to reignite a debate about naval diplomacy by deconstructing the issues surrounding the non-belligerent and political uses of naval forces and reframing them in theory. 'Naval Diplomacy – A Theoretical Approach' considered the basic components of the theory to be political aim, naval means, diplomatic method and geopolitical context, with the strategic value of naval forces described in terms of defence, coercion, support and symbolism.¹⁹² Widen's article was timely, coming as it did after a decade or more of liberal interventionism operating at the blurred edges between peace and war, and it challenged Cable's dominance of the topic, describing his contribution as 'over-rated'.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Quigley, Michael, J. 'Ships of State.' *USNI Proceedings* 137, no 7 (2009): p57.

¹⁹² Widen, 'Naval Diplomacy,' pp715-733.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p723.

However, despite early comments on twenty-first century naval conflict in between North and South Korea,¹⁹⁴ and passing references to contemporary, generalist considerations of seapower,¹⁹⁵ much of Widen's analysis remains rooted in the pre- and Cold War concepts discussed earlier.

The 'post-modern' world, according to Till, instead requires post-modern navies, which he defines as those belonging to states moulded for the information economy rather than the industrial and who embrace a cooperative world system of openness and mutual dependence.¹⁹⁶ Till argues that in a world very different to the bi-polar system of the Cold War, post-modern navies would, by necessity, require different strategies and he presents them with four key missions: sea control, expeditionary operations, good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. The first two, he claims, are adaptations of traditional roles, the latter two are new.¹⁹⁷

It could be logically supposed from Till's reinterpretation of the maritime military environment,¹⁹⁸ that naval diplomacy would receive a similar re-evaluation. Very much in keeping with Western strategic thought in the immediate post-Cold War period,¹⁹⁹ naval diplomacy to Till effectively required presence. Presence, he stated, is more than

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp715-716, p730.

¹⁹⁵ For example, references to Till. Ibid., p723.

¹⁹⁶ Till, *Seapower*, 2nd Ed, p1.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p3.

¹⁹⁸ Till's proposal of four core missions for the post-modern navy effectively offers an alternative to the theory of the trinity of naval roles (military, policing, diplomatic) which Booth presented and which has been widely accepted for over thirty years.

¹⁹⁹ Hattendorf, *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s*, p70.

merely a navy in existence, or a fleet-in-being, it is a strategy of having vessels forward deployed 'and handy for whatever may turn up in areas of concern.'²⁰⁰ This fundamental requirement in Till's model, presence, may also be its main weakness. If it is to be based on anything more than the pure luck of being in the right place at the right time, presence in the way that he defines it requires quantity and is therefore effectively limited to those larger post-modern navies able to field a quantity of platforms if it is to be exercised on a global, or even multi-regional, scale.

From presence, with its implications for force composition, readiness and deployment routines, came three 'components' of naval diplomacy. When Till published an early version of his seapower theory in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* in 1994, the components he identified were coercion, alliance or coalition building and international maritime assistance;²⁰¹ collectively, they were not dissimilar to the 'Cold War' model. Interestingly, however, a decade later he had changed his position and the 'international maritime assistance' component had been removed, its place being taken by 'picture building'.²⁰²

The original 1994 journal article discussed 'assistance' at some length, in particular describing the growing prevalence of 'naval humanitarianism' and issuing a warning that it was likely to be increasingly important in the future.²⁰³ Missions and tasks falling under the assistance component included peacekeeping, the enforcement of embargoes, humanitarian and disaster relief and the rescue of threatened citizens. In

²⁰⁰ Till, *Seapower*, 2nd Ed, p258.

²⁰¹ Till, Geoffrey. 'Seapower Theory and Practice.' *Journal of Strategic Studies* 17, No 1 (1994): p180.

²⁰² Till, *Seapower*, 2nd Ed, p257.

²⁰³ Till, 'Seapower Theory and Practice', p193.

many respects Till's view of international maritime assistance was similar to Richmond's 'non-military roles' set out over sixty years before. However, by 2004 when the first edition of *Seapower* was published, Till had moved the assistance component from naval diplomacy and had instead included it under the banner of 'humanitarian operations', where it sat as a postscript to 'expeditionary operations', a separate entity straddling the boundaries of war-fighting (the military role) and the maintenance of good order at sea (in essence, the policing role). By the time the second edition was published in 2009 it was an integral pillar of expeditionary operations.²⁰⁴

Despite Cable's judgements on 'detection capabilities' in his view of the 'altered environment', picture building is arguably not an instinctively recognizable role of naval diplomacy under the definition offered by this thesis. Till justified its inclusion because he saw it as an essential activity in anticipating emerging risks and threats and by reminding the reader that it was something traditionally carried out by foreign service officers, ambassadors and the intelligence services.²⁰⁵ Indeed, intelligence collection does have a long pedigree in international diplomacy and features as one of the core roles of the profession in Hedley Bull's *The Functions of Diplomacy*,²⁰⁶ and it does correspond to one of the 'three main functions' in general diplomacy described by Griffiths and O'Callaghan.²⁰⁷ However, this thesis argues that despite its usefulness in

²⁰⁴ Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 269-270. Till, *Seapower*, 2nd Ed, pp250-252.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p264.

²⁰⁶ Bull, Hedley. 'The Functions of Diplomacy.' In Williams, Phil, Goldstein, Donald & Shafritz, Jay. *Classic Reading of International Relations*. (Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth, 1994), p221.

²⁰⁷ Griffiths, Martin & O'Callaghan, Terry (Eds). *International Relations: The Key Concepts*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), pp79-81.

crisis prevention and early response, information collection itself cannot have a direct cognitive effect on a potential adversary or ally until it is further exploited in some way.

Till's work has made him one of the key figures of early twenty-first century naval thought. One writer remarked in 2008 that he was 'prescient with regard to the USN's new pre-occupation with building maritime security networks, leaving one to ponder the influence of Till's work within the USN hierarchy.'²⁰⁸ That observation was penned as part of a critique of Admiral Mike Mullen's concept, the '1000-ship navy'.

Mullen, who went on to become the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was Chief of Naval Operations when he launched the idea of the 1000-ship navy in a speech at the US Naval War College in 2005. In the speech Mullen told his audience that changes in the world meant that there was a need for 'a new image of seapower' for which he drew a picture of a partnership, not just between navies, but with 'the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], or the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], or the Customs and Border Control agencies of any number of other nations, not just our own.'²⁰⁹ Mullen was effectively calling for collaboration amongst maritime stakeholders in order to better combat the uncertainties of the age. Chris Rahman, in his critique of the concept, stated that:

²⁰⁸ Australia. Chris Rahman. *The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy*. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No 24. (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2008), 59. However, Professor Till refutes the claim of 'influence' over the USN hierarchy, stating that the two parties arrived at the same conclusions independently (Till, Geoffrey. Discussion with author, 25 June 2012).

²⁰⁹ Mullen, Mike. 'Speech delivered to US Naval War College 31 August 2005.'
<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/mullen050831.txt>
(accessed 25 June 2012).

In some respects, it represents little more than a continuation of post-Cold War proposals by many policy makers, naval operators and commentators... [making it] ... an evolutionary approach to maritime security.²¹⁰

Indeed, the evolutionist basis of Mullen's ideas was apparent in the words he used in his speech, when he drew on his own experience of Operation *Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean and quoting the work of the exponent of fourth generation warfare, Thomas Hammes, adapting it to the maritime environment.²¹¹ However, Mullen's speech may not have been an expression of pure conceptual thought; contemporary global, national and inter-service politics may well have had some role to play in both its drafting and timing. Rahman again:

A cynic might suggest that the 1000 ship navy concept and the new maritime strategy are ways to make the navy seem more relevant to the war on terrorism, thus safeguarding service funding at a time of great budget stress due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.²¹²

The cynical view, of course, might also be a sensible view; a leading navy would undoubtedly be subject to harsh criticism if it did not consider the contemporary environment when setting out its stall. The importance of the global war on terrorism in the forging of Mullen's concept is plain to see in an article published just two months after his speech was delivered. Writing in the *USNI Proceedings* John Morgan and

²¹⁰ Australia. Chris Rahman. *The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy*. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No 24. (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2008), p7.

²¹¹ Mullen, 'Speech – 31 August 2005.'

²¹² Rahman, *The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative*, p11.

Charles Martoglio, two USN flag officers and Mullen acolytes, reminded readers of the challenges faced after the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 and called for a 'combination of national, international and private-industry cooperation' at sea.²¹³ The article is not coincidental: it applauds Mullen's speech and clearly aims to take the debate to the next level. Importantly for this research, in it can be found the roots of a 'Mullen model' for naval diplomacy. The authors identify two 'objectives' within the 'overarching goal of the 1000-ship navy': 'increasing maritime domain awareness' and 'posturing assets to respond to crises or emergencies'.²¹⁴ The first, which they describe as gaining the 'knowledge of anything at sea that affects a nation's security, safety, economics or its environment',²¹⁵ can be equated with Till's 'picture building'. The second, posturing, may just as accurately be termed 'naval presence'.

The Mullen model, then, may use familiar concepts but it situates them in an unfamiliar configuration. Where Till places 'presence' at the pinnacle of his hierarchy of naval diplomacy with coalition building as a supporting pillar, Morgan and Martoglio (for Mullen) reverse the arrangement. The model also places greatest emphasis on the 'softer' end of the power spectrum, perhaps in an attempt to attract support from less 'aggressive' stakeholders, and ignores the harder effects of coercion and war fighting. Paradoxically, this was the obverse of the position of the US Navy thirty years earlier as articulated by Stansfield Turner.

²¹³ Morgan, John, G. & Martoglio, Charles, W. 'The 1000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network.' *USNI Proceedings* 131, No 11 (2005): p15.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p16.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

The concepts of hard, soft and smart power devised by Joseph Nye in the aftermath of the Cold War have been subject to continued debate since. Some commentators have equated ‘soft’ with non-military power and ‘hard’ with military alone, making the two effectively mutually exclusive. Ogoura Kazuo has written that the original meaning of soft power, which Nye defined as ‘getting others to *want* the outcomes you want,’²¹⁶ has ‘been distorted, misused and – in extreme cases – abused.’²¹⁷ Clearly, this was not Nye’s intent and since the initial publication of his ideas in 2004 he has unambiguously stated that not only can military resources contribute to soft power,²¹⁸ they are most effective when used under a smart power construct.²¹⁹

Nye portrayed power as the ability to realise ‘behavioural outcomes’ in others and identified three means by which any desired end could be reached: coercion, reward and attraction.²²⁰ From these three basic modes he derived a ‘spectrum of behaviours’ which stretched from the ‘tangibles’ of hard power, such as money and force, to the intangibles of ideas, values and culture which constitute soft power.




Figure 2.9: Nye’s Spectrum of Power Behaviours²²¹

²¹⁶ Nye, *Soft Power*, p5.

²¹⁷ Kazuo, Ogoura. ‘The Limits of Soft Power.’ *Japan Echo* 33, No 5 (2006): p48.

²¹⁸ Nye, *The Future of Power*, p86.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p10. Smart power refers to the strategies which combine hard and soft power.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.* p21.

By examining Nye's spectrum, the contribution of militaries can begin to be understood. They are obviously vital at the hard end of the spectrum where their war fighting capabilities are brought to bear, but they offer more. Nye explained that even under an objectionable dictatorship military prowess and 'myths of invincibility' might 'attract others to join the bandwagon.'²²² In other words, hard power can be attractive. Of note, Nye used a naval example to make his point that a single element of power need not be limited in application to a single point on the spectrum:

Naval forces can be used to win battles (hard power) or win hearts and minds (soft power) depending on what the target and what the issues are.²²³

Nye's ideas have certainly resonated amongst the defence and security community and the role of the military in soft and smart power has received significant attention since the concepts were published, both amongst politicians and practitioners.

When Nye turned his attention specifically to the military in *The Future of Power* he questioned whether the utility of force had declined since the collapse of the bipolar world. He concluded that nuclear weapons have achieved a degree of deterrence, certainly against unlimited war, that conflict is increasingly costly, that growing interdependence and globalisation mean that issues are less likely to be resolved by force and, finally, that there has been an increasing sense of anti-militarism, particularly amongst the democracies.²²⁴ Extrapolating, it can be concluded that military forces,

²²² Ibid., p86.

²²³ Ibid., p21.

²²⁴ Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp30-31.

therefore, are more likely to be used towards the middle and softer end of the spectrum than at the hard end, a philosophy shared with Robert Art and discussed more fully in Chapter 1.²²⁵

Nye identified four 'modalities' of military power in *The Future of Power* but only one, fighting, fits into the realm of pure hard power. The other three, coercive diplomacy, the protection afforded by alliances, and the assistance offered by aid and training,²²⁶ tend towards the 'soft'. Again, to illustrate his point, Nye used naval examples. He described the deployment of ships as a 'classic example of coercive diplomacy',²²⁷ he highlights the dispatch of a US warship to the Baltic during a major Russian exercise in 2009 as a case of support and assistance to a nervous ally (Latvia),²²⁸ and he applauded the publication of the US *Co-operative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Sea Power* for its forthright message of international partnering and mutual trust.²²⁹ In short, the smart power concept which Nye produced calls for substantial military and naval involvement.

More recently Christian Le Mièrè took another step towards updating the concept of naval diplomacy with his book *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. In it he acknowledges the rather limited 'gunboat' or coercive methods beloved by previous

²²⁵ Art, Robert. 'The Fungibility of Force.' In Art, Robert & Waltz, Kenneth (Eds). *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th Ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp3-4.

²²⁶ Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp41-42.

²²⁷ Ibid., p45.

²²⁸ Ibid., p46.

²²⁹ Ibid., p47.

writers, and then introduces two additional classifications of his subject: *co-operative* and *persuasive* maritime diplomacy.²³⁰ The first, as the name suggests, requires willing participants on all sides and covers such missions and tasks as joint exercises and operations, goodwill visits and even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The second, *persuasive*, is something rather more nebulous, covering presence and prestige but falling short of out-and-out threatening behaviour. Together coercion, co-operation and persuasion make the whole and the whole, Le Mière asserts, is the use of maritime assets in the management of international relations.²³¹

Maritime Diplomacy is an important contribution to the debate on sea power in operations other than war but it too perhaps relies on an assumption of state-centrism and two party 'action-reaction' relationships. Indeed, Le Mière leans heavily on game theory to illustrate his points, where player A and player B do things to achieve the best outcome for themselves. The reality, as the author tries to point out, is much more complex with a potential stakeholder mix of military, paramilitary, commercial and NGO actors on the stage.²³²

Le Mière is undoubtedly correct in his assertion that the wielding of the diplomatic tool at and from the sea goes beyond formal 'military' navies, and he refers to the importance of actions by maritime constabulary and para-military actors. However, these grouping still tend to be representatives of state or *de facto* state organizations; he does not delve fully into the world of true non-state actors such as pressure groups,

²³⁰ Le Mière, *Maritime Diplomacy*, pp7-15.

²³¹ Ibid., p66.

²³² For a more detailed analysis of *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century* see: Rowlands, Kevin. Book Review of 'Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century.' *RUSI Journal* 159, No 5 (2014): pp98-99.

multinational corporations or communities of local fishermen or others engage in sea-based trade.

In addition to his three category framework for maritime diplomacy, Le Mière identified a series of constituent properties which would allow for 'clearer analysis of any particular event.' These properties or characteristics, he stated, exist on a spectrum and relate to the dynamics of the powers involved and the level of tension driving the activity. An event or incident could therefore be assessed according to its kinetic or non-kinetic effect, whether or not it was explicitly telegraphed, implied or simply unaccompanied by language, whether it was sustained or abbreviated, pre-emptive or reactive, and whether its execution was symmetrical or asymmetrical.²³³

Le Mière aids the reader by showing these properties as pentagons in a series of diagrams referring to specific incidents in his analysis. The efficacy of the properties can be plotted against a subjective scale. Figure 3.9 below shows a non-specific example of an event assessed as highly pre-emptive, broadly symmetrical, non-kinetic, and possibly vague but sustainable.

²³³ Ibid., p59.




Figure 2.10: Le Mière's 'Properties of Maritime Diplomacy Visualised'²³⁴

The 'properties' diagram could be a valuable tool for post-event analysis. There are clearly subjective assessments to be made about Le Mière's choice of property (he does not include context, legitimacy or cost, for example) but the diagram could be adapted for the particular requirements of the analyst or circumstances of the case and it would be particularly useful for comparative studies. However, the principal shortcoming of the tool is its inability to display degrees of success or failure – highly kinetic, explicit, sustainable, pre-emptive, and symmetrical applications of maritime diplomacy are arguably no more likely to succeed in their instigator's aim than those which display the opposite qualities. It is therefore of less use for planning or prediction of outcome.

²³⁴ Ibid., p61.

When comparing the ‘post-modern’ naval literature, a question is raised of whether the Till model really applies to those states still reliant on industrial economies and not yet fully embracing of globalisation or whether Le Mière’s model would provide a better fit. The logical assumption would be that the post-Cold War world is undergoing a period of transition and that ‘modern’ (as opposed to ‘post-modern’) navies should adhere to the older, Cold War model as the best approximation of their circumstance. The result could be a hybrid maritime military environment in which modern and post-modern navies co-exist and in which they, by necessity, operate in both contexts. The alternative would be to adopt, on a global scale, Mullen’s concept of the 1000-ship navy and thereby gain presence of numbers not as a single navy but as a networked partnership of likeminded states and non-state actors. Till and Mullen, therefore, might offer mutually supportive world views.

This thesis argues that a post-Cold War model of naval diplomacy can be determined by applying those post-modern interests of building maritime situational awareness, building coalitions and alliances and engendering attraction to the sliding scale of Nye’s smart power concept. It is shown graphically below:




Figure 2.11: Post-modern Model of Naval Diplomacy

THE CONTINUING FACE OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY

Comparative analysis of the 'models' of naval diplomacy identifies a number of enduring themes which, for the purposes of this research, can be divided into two categories: *construct*, that is, how the model is framed within the context of international relations; and *content*, or the outcomes and effects desired by the proponent's strategy.

With the exception of those provided by Luttwak, Booth, Till, Nye and Le Mière,²³⁵ it must be pointed out that the various models of naval diplomacy described above were developed in the course of this research and, as such, are not the pure product of the writers or era to which they are accredited. Any discussion of construct, therefore, is a secondary argument and must be considered with that in mind. However, if that point is accepted then this thesis argues that each of the existing models is based on four underpinning principles.

Firstly, each model is based in the *realist* theoretical tradition of international relations. Realism, widely regarded as the most influential school of IR thought attempts to explain the world 'as it is', rather than 'how we might like it to be',²³⁶ and focuses on power relationships. Classical naval writers such as Mahan and Corbett would have seen their advocacy of seapower, including the use of force, in peacetime as a means to further the interests of the user at the expense of the recipient if necessary. Similarly, the Cold War protagonists, including Sir James Cable with his 'strong and

²³⁵ The model accredited to Nye is a reproduction of his 'spectrum of behaviours' diagram; the original was not specifically about naval diplomacy. See Nye, *The Future of Power*, p21.

²³⁶ Burchill, S., Devetak, R., Linklater, A., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C. & True, J. *Theories of International Relations*. 2nd Ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p70.

weak', 'assailant and victim' themes, speak directly to realism. The exceptions are the post-Cold War, post-modern works of Geoffrey Till and Joseph Nye, which situate their ideas more broadly in the globalised era; the latter is most commonly associated with interdependence and the neo-liberal school.²³⁷ However, Nye has himself attempted to 'transcend the classical dialectic' between the major IR traditions,²³⁸ and this thesis contends that the military dimension of his smart power still sits comfortably with realist thought.²³⁹

Secondly, and closely linked to the realist tradition, each model is essentially *state-centric*. Baylis *et al* voice the widely held opinion that 'strategists are so pre-occupied by threats to the interests of states that they ignore security issues within the state.'²⁴⁰ Naval strategists are no different; each writer in the 'classical' and Cold War periods undoubtedly had his own state's interests at heart.²⁴¹ Though the later post-modern commentators certainly placed less overt emphasis on the state, couching their words in globalism and cooperative approaches to seapower, the state remained the basic unit of discourse. Mike Mullen, for instance, did not propose the global maritime

²³⁷ Lamy, Steven, L. 'Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism.' In Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, Owens, Patricia. *Globalization of World Politics*, 5th Ed. Oxford: (Oxford University Press, 2011), p121.

²³⁸ Nye, Joseph. 'Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism.' *World Politics* 40, No 2 (1988): p251.

²³⁹ In email correspondence with the author, Joseph Nye stated that 'too much naval thinking was limited to a narrowly realist perspective' but that 'a broad sense of realism, however, would incorporate all forms of power.' Nye, Joseph. Email to author, 26 June 2012.

²⁴⁰ Baylis *et al*, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 3rd Ed., p12.

²⁴¹ Consider, for example, the place of the nation-state in Mahan's major work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* and the aggressive pursuit of Soviet aims in Gorshkov's book *The Sea Power of the State*.

partnership for altruistic reasons and ended his 2005 speech with a plea aimed directly at the United States: 'we need to be a team player, a leader, for that 1000-ship navy.'²⁴²

Thirdly, each model is based on a mechanistic methodology in which one 'side' does something and the 'other side' reacts. That the models rely on this action-reaction process between the (primarily) state actors involved means that they are in essence *binary* in nature. Fundamentally, the current understanding of naval diplomacy is that it is an action requiring a response (even if that response is a conscious decision to do nothing), whereas this thesis contends that it is a means of communication.

Fourthly, and following on from the previous three principles, the realist, state-centric, binary models of naval diplomacy are all outcome based and thus demand that decisions be made. In *Political Psychology* David Houghton likens decision making in international relations to a Russian doll,

... in which opening one structure gives rise to a smaller one. When we open up the international system, we find states. When we open up the state, we find bureaucracies. Opening up bureaucracies, we find groups, another situational level. It is only when we consider the contents of groups that we confront individuals...²⁴³

The decision, therefore, must ultimately be taken by an individual or a group of individuals. In Cable's terminology the decisions are those, conscious or subconscious, of the 'assailant' and of the 'victim'. In Schelling's theory of arms and influence, success

²⁴² Mullen, 'Speech delivered to US Naval War College 31 August 2005.'

²⁴³ Houghton, David, P. *Political Psychology: Situations, Individuals and Cases*. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p219.

depends on the individual's assumption of rationality and on the individual's accuracy of prediction of outcomes.²⁴⁴ In other words, the models are based on attempts to manipulate the *cognitive* process: 'actions are chosen for both their immediate effect and for the effect they have on the other player's choice.'²⁴⁵ Luttwak's term 'suasion' may be vague but, in this context at least, it is insightful.

This thesis contends that these four principles form the bedrock of the existing models of naval diplomacy, but that they are not discrete. Shown diagrammatically, they would not constitute four equally sized pillars on which outcome-based naval diplomacy sits. Rather, they are best viewed as inter-related and hierarchical and, perhaps, as akin to another 'Russian doll'. Existing models of naval diplomacy have:




Figure 2.12: The Basic Principles Underpinning Existing Models of Naval Diplomacy

²⁴⁴ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp3-5.

²⁴⁵ Morrow, James, D. 'A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict.' In Geva, Nehemia & Mintz, Alex (Eds). *Decision Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive Rational Debate*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p26.

If a common *construct* of naval diplomacy can be determined, then so too can a shared set of *content*, which shifts in emphasis from era to era. Though the words and terminology used differ from writer to writer, a careful interpretation of their works can find threads of similar meaning throughout the body of naval and strategic thought over the past century and a half. As might be expected, the development of ideas has been iterative and evolutionary.

Through the use of the models, seven major traits of naval diplomacy can be identified: coercion, deterrence, picture building, prestige, co-operation, reassurance, attraction and assistance. Taking the writers and models in broadly chronological order, it can be demonstrated that the traits most indicative of hard power, such as coercion and deterrence, are commonly cited, whereas it is the later writers who place the greatest emphasis on the soft power effects of assistance and attraction.

The literature also shows that naval diplomacy has been used since man first put to sea in ships and that its history can be traced through the centuries. However, until the middle of the twentieth century naval writing tended to focus on *military* capability at sea but the political benefits of the threat of force, the use of limited force and 'showing the flag' were known and understood. Naval diplomacy before the Second World War was largely the bailiwick of those maritime states with global ambitions and used to coerce, to reassure and to promote the image of its practitioners. The bipolarity of the Cold War did little to change the purpose and tactics of naval diplomacy but its use became largely restricted to the major seafaring states in both the Western and Eastern blocs. Strategic thought developed from superpower confrontation and the interest in naval diplomacy as a separate topic, particularly in the 1970s, grew within that context. The aftermath of the Cold War saw a transformation in world politics and a reassessment of

the utility of force in general, but naval diplomacy continued; indeed, its use expanded with the increase in maritime stakeholders. The future may start to see new aspects of an old role; ballistic missile defence at sea, theatre security co-operation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the enforcement of no-fly zones, forward presence and global fleet stations are all forms of post-modern naval diplomacy. In sum, the differing approaches to naval diplomacy does not necessarily present competing narratives. Instead, they build progressively and reflect the period in which they were written.

The contemporary applicability of the various models of naval diplomacy is discussed further in Chapter 5 after consideration of a series of post-Cold War case studies. However, it is worth highlighting some of the characteristics of the twenty-first century global order which may affect their relevance. This is done by returning to the 'Russian doll' construct of the underlying principles of the existing models provided earlier.

Realist theory has been increasingly criticised since the end of the Cold War, particularly given the seemingly greater occurrence of intra- compared to inter-state conflict.²⁴⁶ Though realism has generally maintained its dominant position in IR, competing theories, such as liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, post-structuralism and post-colonialism, have gained traction at its expense and become influential alternative world views.²⁴⁷ A challenge to the existing models of naval diplomacy, therefore, would be to test their validity in scenarios which do not fit the accepted realist framework. Baylis *et al* identify a range of such issues in modern world politics, including human

²⁴⁶ Dunne & Schmidt, 'Realism', in Baylis *et al*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 5th Ed., pp88-89.

²⁴⁷ Baylis, *et al*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 5th Ed., pp3-6.

security, human rights and nationalism,²⁴⁸ as opposed to 'state-ism', which transcend the realist perspective and perhaps confront commonly held notions about what militaries, and hence navies, can do in the pursuit of international influence. This will be returned to in Chapter 5 when testing the proposed new foundational model of naval diplomacy.

The complex multitude of stakeholders may mean that event or outcome based models which assume a binary, action-reaction relationship are no longer appropriate. In a discussion of the interconnected world Anthony McGrew characterised globalization by not only the scale and number of actors involved, but also by the pace and intensity, or 'depth of enmeshment', of interactions.²⁴⁹ The challenge to politicians, diplomats and military practitioners may be to establish second, third and fourth order consequences to the decisions they choose to take.

Finally, in such a world, can a truly rational actor exist or does an alternative model need to be adopted? The next two chapters will explore this question by quantitatively and qualitatively investigating a range of examples of post-Cold War incidents of naval diplomacy. Collectively, they will seek to determine whether reality corresponds to theory and whether there are types or variations of and within incidents of naval diplomacy which are not adequately reflected in existing literature.

²⁴⁸ Issues featured throughout Baylis, *et al*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 5th Ed.

²⁴⁹ McGrew, Anthony. 'Globalization and Global Politics.' In Baylis, *et al.*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 5th Ed., p18.

CHAPTER 3

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY 1991-2010

Overview

The aim of this Chapter is to present and provide insight into an empirical survey of naval diplomacy between 1991 and 2010. It is not intended to be a comprehensive compendium (arguably, such a complete history would be impossible to compile) but it does capture in a single place over 500 examples of the use of seapower for political purposes over that particular twenty year period. It is, in part, an extension of the chronological survey published in the three editions of *Gunboat Diplomacy*. However, by contrast, Sir James Cable's seminal work catalogued barely half that number in an analysis which covered seven decades.¹ That is not to claim that this research is more thorough than Cable's, merely that Cable was, perhaps, more discriminating in his choice of incidents and quicker to dismiss potential case studies when forming his opinions and arguments. Importantly, he concentrated on the coercive element of naval diplomacy and largely ignored the day-to-day, year-to-year ambassadorial roles which this survey does include.

The criteria used for inclusion in the survey are straightforward yet inherently subjective. At the outset, a definition of naval diplomacy was required. The suggestion put forward in Chapter 1, that naval diplomacy is a niche communications process seeking to further the interests of an international actor, was adopted and applied as the litmus test

¹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, pp159-213. Cable discusses an average of less than five incidents per year; this study examines an average of 25 incidents per year.

against reported maritime activity; put simply, if an example qualified under that definition it was included, if it did not then it was discarded. Like Cable, this survey does not include naval action during war (except that which involved neutral or third parties) but it does include that which may have taken place between belligerents prior to the start or after the end of a major conflict. For example, the coercive coalition posturing before the Gulf War of 1991 and the long period of containment of Iraq from 1991 until 2003 are included, but the use of force by navies during the actual liberation of Kuwait is not.

Similarly, examples of multi-national acquisition which could potentially reflect a political discourse between the actors involved are generally not included, though this does represent a topic worthy of further research – much can be read into the interdependence of relationships in the global economy. Conversely, examples of ‘gifting’ of naval assets, such as Australia’s award of patrol vessels to Fiji in July 1992 following the normalisation of relations after the latter’s coup of 1987, are included. These represent clear attempts to build amity between actors rather than to seek immediate commercial profit. In addition, some examples of significant changes to the global naval picture are listed, such as the launch of the first vessel of the newly formed fleet of an independent Croatia in May 1992 and China’s purchase of a second-hand aircraft carrier in 1998; arguably, these moments in time were matters of great prestige for the actors involved and thus means of communicating their ‘message’ to the international community in a way that the ‘routine’ procurement activities of established, leading navies are not.

When constructing the survey primary sources were used wherever possible; examples of naval activity fitting the thesis definition were taken from the official publications of

eight major maritime states – the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Russia, China, India and Japan. These navies would be classified as major or medium global and medium regional force projection navies under Eric Grove's typology.² If those countries deemed an example of their navy's employment worthy of mention in operations databases, White Papers and reports to their respective legislatures then they are included here. These states were chosen because their records are openly published and accessible, they are geographically dispersed and they field naval forces at differing scales. It is entirely probable that by extending the review to include other states' official publications more examples would be uncovered; this is another area for potential research in future, particularly the activities of the smaller coastal navies and coast guards which Grove classifies as purely adjacent force projection, offshore and inshore territorial defence, constabulary and 'token'.³ Finally, secondary sources including books, academic journal articles, specialist and generalist open media reporting and online resources were used to corroborate the 'official' version of an incident and to provide additional examples not revealed elsewhere. Jane's Defence Weekly and Jane's Navy International were particularly rich resources. The thesis does not aim to be the definitive word on every example of naval diplomacy cited. Instead, it seeks patterns and it is assessed that patterns are discernible in the incidents included.

It is worth highlighting that even these broad selection criteria may have resulted in many otherwise pertinent examples of naval diplomacy being overlooked. For example, the 'routine' day-to-day business of the major global navies such as port visits and low-level bilateral exercises may not be deemed worthy of reporting even by the navy

² Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, pp236-40.

³ Ibid.

involved, whereas any departure from the norm by a small, traditionally coastal navy, such as a long, out of area 'blue-water' deployment, is. Similarly, picture building, that constituent part of any diplomatic activity, would more often than not be conducted clandestinely and may only be reported when discovered. Therefore, whilst an initial glance at the survey may elicit the conclusion that it is skewed in favour of the activity of the major, established navies, under-reporting may mean that in reality the reverse is the case.

In common with Cable's analysis and many of the sources cited, the dates used in the survey are accurate to the month. When describing an example which spanned a longer period of time, the start and end months are given. It must also be borne in mind that, in common with other forms of international diplomacy and communication, much naval diplomacy is enduring, such as the Royal Navy's persistent presence mission in the Persian Gulf from 1979 onwards or the US Navy's basing of forces in Japan, whilst other occurrences are contingent. It is perhaps inevitable in a work of this kind to find a structural bias toward reporting the contingent at the expense of the enduring.

The description given for each example is a very short summary which aims to distil at times complex scenarios into a sentence or two. To aid brevity, it has been assumed that the reader will have some general knowledge of world events, such as the fragmentation of the Soviet 'empire', the rise of the BRICS and the first and second Gulf Wars. The description of the incident used in the survey is, in the majority of cases, a précis of the source material and therefore does not redress any potential misrepresentation or bias in the original account; it is for the reader to determine whether the report is entirely accurate. However, each incident is accompanied by a reference which, generally, will give a fuller account; many are cross-referenced and

contrasting interpretations seen. Importantly, for the purposes of this research, the fact that an incident did occur, that at least some of the participants can be identified and that it can be classified according to previously determined criteria is sufficient justification for inclusion and a basis for analysis. Some of the examples which represent the key events and themes of the period are expanded upon greater detail as case studies in Chapter 4.

The actors named in each example tend to be the principal active participant(s) and principal target audiences. They are not listed in any order of importance and they are not classified as 'assailant' or 'victim' as they are in Cable's work. Often, the term 'Int[ernational] Community' is used to highlight occasions when an incident of naval diplomacy is judged to have been conscious and obvious messaging to the world at large, rather than to just a single polity. An example is that of France in February 2003, when the FS Charles de Gaulle carrier task group sailed for the eastern Mediterranean after the French government had declared its opposition to military intervention in Iraq; the move signalled to both sides of the conflict that France could mobilise if necessary, and to the world in general that France was an independent player on the stage.⁴ Occasionally the terms Dom[estic] or Regional Community are used when the messaging is deemed to be more geographically focussed and less 'scatter gun'; examples of this type include the Royal Australian Navy's outreach to its country's remote aboriginal communities in March 1993,⁵ or French peace support exercises with eastern and southern African countries in February 2002.⁶

⁴ Jane's Defence Weekly 39, No 6 (2003): p4.

⁵ Australia. Royal Australian Navy. *Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005*. Working Paper No. 18. Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2005.

⁶ JDW 37, No 10 (2002): p16.

The column entitled 'Cable classification' is an attempt to categorise the examples according to the criteria which James Cable used in *Gunboat Diplomacy*. The letter used indicates whether an incident would have been deemed *definitive*, *purposeful*, *catalytic* or *expressive*. Cable's third volume, which took his survey to the end of 1991, included only two entries for that year – a US non-combatant evacuation operation from Somalia in January and a British 'reassurance' mission to Grenada in July; both are included in this summary and both show the same classification that Cable gave. The 'Cable classifications' of the remaining incidents are supposition but they are consistent with his approach; for instance, non-combatant evacuation operations are judged to be *purposeful* and major representational deployments and visits are *expressive*.

A few other examples, such as those in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) / Sri Lankan government conflict which ran throughout much of the period, or naval agreements or public announcements on maritime matters, such the signing of a Maritime Consultative Agreement by the United States and China in January 1998, are marked '-'. This indicates that they do not sit naturally into any of Cable's categories; they are included in this survey because they fit the definition of naval diplomacy used here. In the case of the Tamil Tigers' use of maritime demonstration and force at sea, further justification for inclusion rests in their examination in other works on the topic, such as Christian Le Miere's *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*.⁷

In the final column, 'Composite classification', the incidents are categorised according to those major traits of naval diplomacy identified in Chapter 2: *coercion*, *deterrence*,

⁷ Le Miere, *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*, p16.

co-operation, prestige, reassurance, picture building, attraction and assistance. These are a construct determined from the writings of Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Gorshkov, Turner, Luttwak, Booth, Till, Mullen, Nye and Le Miere. As has previously been stated, the words and terminology used differ from writer to writer and from era to era, but a careful interpretation of their works can find threads of similar meaning throughout the body of naval and strategic thought over the past century and a half. In common with 'Cable classification', their application is subjective and based on analysis of the source material. In contrast to Cable, however, they are rarely exclusive; that is, the majority of incidents have a 'composite classification' of two or more traits. Categorising naval diplomacy according to a single effect or outcome is evidently easier said than done.

Finally, to determine whether the immediate post-Cold War era really was different to the Cold War itself, two 'control' periods have been included to provide a suitable benchmark. Therefore, whilst the second part of this Chapter provides a survey of the years from 1991 to 2010, the third part contains incidents of naval diplomacy from 1960 to 1964, and from 1980 to 1984. Though the thesis accepts the *systemic* definition of the Cold War discussed in Chapter 1, these control years were selected because they represent, respectively, the culmination of the *first* Cold War around the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and the period of heightened tensions during the Reagan-Brezhnev *second* Cold War following the end of detente.⁸ They are also separated by time and, when set against the main survey, offer periods for analysis at twenty year intervals. The criteria used for the inclusion of incidents in Parts 2 and 3 are identical.

⁸ Booth, 'Cold War States of Mind', pp30-31.

THEMATIC ANALYSIS

The Actors

The survey shows that incidents of naval diplomacy are seldom limited to just two parties. In a significant number of cases three or more actors are involved and, often, there is also a plain intent to send a message to the domestic, regional or international community. A case in point is the November 1994 interaction between the United States, Thailand, North Korea and China. The US wished to pre-position its ships in Thai territorial waters as a deterrent to North Korean posturing against South Korea, but Thailand refused permission for the move because it did not want to offend North Korea's only ally, China.⁹ The example shows the complexity of international relations and the corresponding intricacy of naval diplomacy. Any attempt to describe the incident in bilateral terms between the US and North Korea, the US and Thailand, the US and China or even China and North Korea would be unsophisticated and erroneous.

Chapter 2 explained that during the Cold War approximately 40 per cent of reported naval diplomatic incidents involved the major players of either the Eastern or Western blocs interacting with third parties¹⁰ - an analysis supported by the 1960-64 and 1980-84 surveys in Part 3 of this Chapter. It might be reasonably surmised that with the end of the bipolar order other actors would be less constrained and therefore increase their influence activity at and from the sea. Indeed, this was one of the hypotheses proposed

⁹ JDW 22, No 19 (1994): 11.

¹⁰ Of the 193 documented incidents from 1946 onwards, 76 could be described as being 'by' a NATO or Warsaw Pact state against a lesser developed state. See Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, pp159-213.

in Chapter 1. However, the survey shows that in the immediate post-Cold War era the reverse was true; the overwhelming majority of incidents involved NATO members. In effect, the early 1990s saw a Western dominated naval scene with the US and her allies sailing unchallenged in the Mediterranean and Middle East, attempting to forge new relationships with former adversaries and exercising with previously non-aligned states. Interestingly, NATO members' dominance of naval diplomatic action did not diminish as the Cold War receded into 'history'; by 2009/2010 they were still players in approximately 40 per cent of reported incidents.

In contrast, the former Warsaw Pact countries disappeared from the seas virtually overnight. Russia alone, with the dominant Warsaw Pact navy during the Cold War, attempted several times to reassert her position as a major maritime power including submarine forays into Swedish waters in June 1992 and a surface ship deployment to the Mediterranean, UK and US in May and June 1993, but these were isolated occasions, at least until the late 2000s. Interestingly, however, the former Soviet Union did make use of its Navy in August 1991 during the attempted coup to oust President Gorbachev; ships blockaded the port of Tallinn,¹¹ and part of the Pacific Fleet poised in port in Vietnam.¹² Navies, evidently, can play a part in influencing internal affairs as well as international crises.

The first Gulf War of 1991 was an important milestone for naval diplomacy. Not only did it see the first major post-Cold War use of military force, it also afforded an opportunity for previously undemonstrative actors to begin to make their mark. Germany and

¹¹ JDW 16, No 8 (1991): p297.

¹² JDW 16, No 12 (1991): p500.

Japan both deployed vessels in the aftermath and the Middle East became a focal point for naval grandstanding; states with a maritime agenda wanted to be there and be seen to be there. Kuwait, a country not normally considered a leading naval actor, took centre stage for a number of years after its conflict with Iraq. The US and UK exercised independently with Kuwait in early 1992 and even Russia, a state whose prestige (as the USSR) had suffered in the Arab world as a result of its occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s,¹³ conducted a naval exercise with Kuwait in December 1993.¹⁴

If Kuwait was a participant in naval diplomacy by virtue of its unwanted circumstances, other states were participants through calculation. Libya, for instance, may be judged to have been 'rewarded' with naval visits for its less confrontational posture as the new century grew; Indian warships visited Libyan ports in June 2006 and were followed by a visit by a US Coast Guard vessel in June 2009. It was the first American military visit to the country since President Ghadaffi seized power in a coup in 1969.

After the initial domination of the West in the early 1990s, the new rising powers did begin to increase their presence at sea. India, for example, announced plans for more exercises with the established blue water navies in March 1992 and by August 2008 was showing signs of considerable maritime maturity by contributing to the multi-national counter-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa. Similar development can be tracked throughout the survey by China and, to a lesser extent, by Brazil and South Africa. This will be explored further in Chapter 4.

¹³ Hughes, Geraint. *From the Jebel to the Palace: British Military Involvement in the Persian Gulf, 1957-201*. Corbett Paper 10. (Shrivenham: The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London, 2012),p6.

¹⁴ JDW 20, No 25 (1993):p9.

Though state actors dominate the survey, it is clear that not all participants are states. Insurgent or terrorist organisations and pressure groups all appear; examples include Hezbollah's use of force against Israel in July 2006, Israel's use of force against the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in May 2010, Greenpeace's campaigning in the North Sea in mid-1996 and the complex situation developing between various parties in the Niger Delta region from the mid-2000s onwards. It is apparent that naval diplomacy remains an activity primarily but not exclusively carried out by states. Further analysis of the role of non-state actors in naval or, rather, 'at sea' diplomacy is warranted.

History and Geography

Historical legacy clearly plays a part in determining the dynamics of many incidents. Portugal's interaction with Guinea-Bissau in July 1998 and the UK's involvement in Sierra Leone in 2000 may be seen as manifestations of former colonial 'responsibility.' More often, though, geography is the driver. There are more regional than global navies and the survey clearly shows that the majority of interactions are by neighbouring actors in their adjacent seas. The many entries throughout the period of Asian states in and around the South China Sea are perhaps the most apparent examples of the point but others, such as Argentinean / Chilean engagement from 1998 until 2007, are similarly identifiable. Interestingly, this contrasts sharply with the reported activity during the Cold War shown in Part 3; then, the major Western and Eastern navies tended to interact with third parties at range. Of the 105 incidents described in Part 3, some 58 (55%) could be described as extra-regional; there is no discernible difference between the control periods 1960-64 and 1980-84.

Enmity or Amity?

Naval diplomacy is not synonymous with gunboat diplomacy, as even a cursory review of the type of platform used will show. Chapter 2, which provided a review of the literature relating to the use of sea power for political ends, showed that writers and theorists tended to focus their work on the use of naval and military forces to influence adversaries, either through coercion or deterrence or both. Historically, relatively little attention has been paid to the soft power of navies, particularly their utility in forging friendships. Quantitatively, the survey shows that only a quarter of the catalogued incidents in the post-Cold War period could be described as indicative of enmity between the parties involved. Conversely, some 90 per cent have some degree of amity in their purpose.¹⁵ (The sum is more than 100 per cent because the two are not mutually exclusive and purposes are rarely binary.) Activities which may be deemed to be aimed at an actual or potential adversary can also involve an element of reassurance or support to allies or own populations. It is striking that in the 'composite classification' column the 'negative' effect of *deterrence* is invariably paired with the 'positive' effect of *reassurance*. In complex relationships signals of enmity and amity can be, and are, made concurrently. For example, Australian port visits to Indonesia in 1991 were in part aimed to balance contemporary actions being taken by the RAN to limit illegal fishing by Indonesian vessels.¹⁶ Overlapping or multiple outcomes from naval diplomacy are not exceptional, they are the norm.

¹⁵ Of the 528 incidents catalogued only 135 (25%) were categorised as coercion, deterrence or picture building under the 'composite classification' column. 470 (90%) were categorised as co-operation, prestige, reassurance, attraction or assistance.

¹⁶ Australia. RAN. *Operations Database*.




Figure 4.1: The 'Negative' / 'Positive' Balance in Naval Diplomacy

However, when the Cold War 'control' periods are analysed a very different picture emerges. The incidents catalogued in Part 3 are almost evenly split between amity and enmity. This could, of course, be attributed to the existence of established blocs and proxies during the Cold War or to any one of a number of other factors, not least the tendency to under report 'good news'.¹⁷

Degrees of Engagement

As actors seek to extend their influence they do so by a variety of means. The survey provides evidence to support the view that there are degrees of engagement within naval diplomacy and that the state of a relationship can often be assessed by the type of engagement practised. In short, engagement can be weighted. At the lowest end of

¹⁷ Of the 105 incidents in Part 3, 60 can be deemed to have some degree of enmity and 57 some degree of amity in their purpose.

the scale are goodwill visits which can be means of ongoing ‘relationship maintenance’ for established allies, symbolic first forays into amity for those with a more adversarial association, or even rewards for ‘good behaviour’. When navies begin to exercise together they usually engage in non-war-fighting training such as search and rescue. Complexity and interoperability in exercises progressively increase until the very closest of allies are capable of fully integrated operations in difficult and dangerous scenarios. Clearly, the former are more commonly found than the latter. Figure 4.2 shows a diagrammatic representation of various levels of engagement identified in the survey with supporting examples.




Figure 4.2: Degrees of Engagement in ‘Soft’ Naval Diplomacy¹⁸

¹⁸ Figure 4.2 is the work of the author, but is adapted from a format used to describe US-Chinese maritime co-operation: See Collins, Gabriel. ‘China’s Dependence on the Global

Disengagement

One aspect of naval diplomacy which does not directly fit either the Cable or composite classifications but is readily apparent from the survey is the communicative impact of *not* doing something. Cancelled port visits, such as Australia's suspension of its Navy's visits to French Pacific territories in January 1995 in protest at France's nuclear testing programme, can send as powerful a diplomatic message as an inaugural visit after a long period of animosity. Likewise, the cancellation of planned exercises such as the annual US-South Korean *Team Spirit*, deferred for several years in a row in the 1990s as an incentive to North Korea to halt its nuclear development, can be used to make or reinforce a position. Disengagement, then, can be a potent communicative tool.

However, disengagement can also result in unintended consequences. In December 1992, for example, the United States redeployed an aircraft carrier from the Persian Gulf to Somalia for Operation *Restore Hope*, and Iraq exploited its absence to escalate pressure on visiting UN weapons inspectors and to violate the southern no-fly-zone which the carrier had helped to enforce.¹⁹ A similar exploitation of a gap was seen in October 1994 when, during another USN aircraft carrier absence, Iraq moved 80,000 troops towards its border with Kuwait. The situation was only reversed when a substantial Western coalition naval presence was resumed.²⁰

Maritime Commons.' In Erickson, Andrew & Goldstein, Lyle, & Li, Nan (Eds). *China, The United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p33.

¹⁹ United States. Center for Naval Analyses. Siegel, Adam. *To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises: The Role of US Naval Forces*. CRM 94-193. (Alexandria, Va: CNA, 1995), p28.

²⁰ Ibid., p3; UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

Symbolism and Tokenism

As might be expected from historic precedent, the post-Cold War world saw a continued symbolic role for naval forces. Warships were used as backdrops for political announcements and as independent sovereign territory when the situation dictated. For example, Romania's declaration of its intention to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was made during USS *Tortuga*'s visit to the country in August 1994,²¹ and HMNZS *Te Kaha* was employed as a venue for inter-party peace talks in the Solomon Islands in August 2000.²² However, some states resorted to deploying naval forces in a manner more akin to campaigning pressure groups than to military forces. One such case was New Zealand's dispatch of HMNZS *Tui* to the Mururoa Atoll in September 1995, where it demonstrated against French nuclear testing alongside a civilian 'protest flotilla.'²³ This is perhaps an example of the blurring of lines between traditional state and non-state roles in global politics.

Symbolism can take other forms and Iran's contribution to counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa in 2009 was, arguably, an attempt by that country to present itself as a responsible member of the international community;²⁴ the stakes were low and the message simple. The Seychelles' contribution to the same task at the same time was similarly a matter of prestige for a small state acting on the issue of the day, not a military or economic necessity.²⁵

²¹ JDW 22, No 8 (1994): p4.

²² JDW 34, No 8 (2000): p18.

²³ JDW 24, No 9 (1995): p4.

²⁴ JDW 46, No 22 (2009): p18.

²⁵ JDW 46, No 19 (2009): p19.

There have been occasions in naval diplomacy which can best be described as examples of tokenism. When Russia decided not to join the PfP in February 1994 it softened its position by immediately sending a warship to conduct a search and rescue exercise,²⁶ that most basic of building blocks, with NATO forces. As has been previously argued, the ease and rapidity with which naval forces can be visibly (or invisibly) put to work to give demonstrable support to their government's position is a particular strength in international relations.

Continuity or Change? Cable in the Twenty-First Century

It has already been stated that this survey includes more examples than Cable chose to catalogue in his work. It must be assumed, therefore, that if he had lived to produce a fourth volume of his *Gunboat Diplomacy* then many, perhaps the majority, of the examples cited here would not have been used. Nonetheless, the bulk do fit into one or more of his categories and a very significant proportion are deemed *expressive*, the 'last and least' mode of limited naval force which Cable so readily dismissed.²⁷ Given the numerical differences and the non-availability of equivalent source material from each period, therefore, a direct comparative analysis is not possible.

However, an indirect approach can be adopted. If *expressive* examples of naval diplomacy are omitted from both this survey and Cable's chronological index, a remarkable truth can be observed. Whilst acknowledging Cable's warning about the

²⁶ JDW 21, No 7 (1994): p8.

²⁷ Of a total of 528 examples, 285 (54%) are classified as *expressive*.

use of his data for numerical purposes, a simple statistical review shows that there is little discernible difference in the relative ratios of *definitive*, *purposeful* and *catalytic* incidents in the pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War eras. In each period just over half of non-*expressive* incidents are deemed *purposeful*, approximately a quarter are *definitive* and less than a fifth are *catalytic*. In Cable's terms, it can be argued that the desired outcomes of naval diplomacy do not change significantly over time. The diagrams below show the approximate ratios (pre-Cold War incidents are taken from Cable's work; Cold War incidents are Cable's plus the thesis survey; post-Cold War data is from the survey alone).





Figure 4.3: Ratios of Types of Gunboat Diplomacy according to Cable's Classification (*Expressive* removed).

However, in non-Cable terms a different trend can be seen. It has already been stated that the engagements involving 'amity' became more prevalent than those involving 'enmity' after the Cold War as Figure 4.4 shows. By comparing 'composite classifications' between the primary survey (ie 1991-2010) and the control periods

(1960-64 and 1980-84), the relative incidence of each form of engagement can be seen.

The occurrence of *assistance* operations, be they navies providing disaster relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, gifting patrol vessels or providing hydrographic surveys in areas beyond the capabilities of the sovereign state, has increased over time. The ability to 'lend a hand' in times of need has perhaps become a matter of importance on the world stage, and altruism a sign of international responsibility, to an extent not seen during the Cold War. Similarly, *co-operation* in the form of bilateral or multi-lateral exercising has quantitatively increased. Interestingly, as coercion and deterrence have reduced in relative terms, reassurance (often the other side of the same coin), has not; again, it is perhaps an indication of the increasing recognition of the positives of naval diplomacy, and not merely the negatives.






Figure 4.4: Ratios of Survey Results using Composite Classifications (1991-2010 and Control Periods)

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The survey provides a useful but inevitably incomplete overview of naval diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. The themes which can be drawn from it suggest both continuity and change and are certainly worthy of further qualitative analysis. It shows that naval diplomacy is primarily but not exclusively carried out by states and that the appetite of non-state actors to become involved in international communication on the global seas might be increasing. It shows that seapower is numerically used more for purposes of amity than for enmity, though at the 'harder' end of the spectrum of operations there is little difference in the desired outcomes either before, during or after the Cold War. Cable's model, seen as seminal at the height of the superpower stand-off, was incomplete when he devised it and requires significant refinement if it is to be relevant to the contemporary environment. At the 'softer' end of the scale there are degrees of engagement which, when considered objectively, can be used to judge the health of any particular international relationship. However, the impact of disengagement, or actively *not* doing something, should not be underestimated. Navies are, and have always been, used for symbolic purposes and that symbolism perhaps approached a new zenith in the post-Cold War era with an international doctrine of humanitarianism and friendly co-operation.

The next Chapter will build on these themes and example to investigate further the macro-trends and micro-actions of naval diplomacy since the end of the Cold War.

TABLE 3.1 INCIDENTS OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY 1991-2010

Key

CABLE CLASSIFICATION

D:	Definitive:	the act or threat of force which possessed a definitive purpose apparent to both sides
P:	Purposeful:	less direct; limited naval force applied in order to change the policy or character of a foreign government
C:	Catalytic:	'lends a hand' to act as a catalyst in a situation the direction of which has yet to be determined
E:	Expressive:	where warships are employed to emphasize attitudes or to make a point
-:	No entry	incidents which Cable would not have categorised as Gunboat Diplomacy and would not have listed in his index

COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION

The major outcomes specified by existing models of naval diplomacy, shown in Chapter 2:

Coercion, Deterrence, Co-operation, Prestige, Reassurance, Picture Building, Attraction, Assistance.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASIFICATION
1991				
January	US Somalia	USS <i>Guam</i> and <i>Trenton</i> conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Somalia, taking 281 people of 30 nationalities to a place of safety ¹	D	Assistance
January	UK Libya US Iraq	Britain deploys HMS <i>Ark Royal</i> to the Mediterranean to poise off Libya, freeing US aircraft carriers to deploy to the Gulf ²	P	Co-operation/Deterrence
January	US Iraq	US CVN conducts air strikes against Iraqi forces, as part of the commencement of <i>Desert Storm</i> hostilities following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 ³	D	Coercion
January-February	Australia US UK Iraq	The Australian Defence Force contribution to Op <i>Desert Storm</i> includes incorporating HMAS <i>Brisbane</i> and <i>Sydney</i> into a USN battle group. A medical team also serve in the US Hospital Ship <i>Comfort</i> ⁴	E	Co-operation

¹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 3rd Ed, p213; Jane's Defence Weekly (JDW) 15, No 2 (1991): p40.

² Benbow, Tim. *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: 1945-2010*. Corbett Paper 9. (Shrivenham: The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London, 2012), p40.

³ US. Congressional Research Service. Grimmett, R. *Instances of Use of US armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010*. RL41677. (Washington DC: CRS, 2011), p15; JDW15, No 4 (1991): p101.

⁴ Australia. Royal Australian Navy. *Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005*. Working Paper No. 18. Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2005; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p40.

February	US Iraq	Following <i>Desert Storm</i> the US poises amphibious shipping in the Arabian Gulf with 18,000 Marines afloat ⁵	P	Coercion
February	Italy Libya	Italy stations its corvette <i>Danaide</i> off Libya during Exercise <i>Mare Aperto</i> ⁶	E	Coercion
February	US UK Saudi Arabia Iraq	Iraqi naval threat to Western and regional interests rendered ineffective by US, UK and Saudi air strikes ⁷	D	Coercion
February	Australia Greece	RAN deploys HMAS <i>Perth</i> to the Mediterranean in support of the 50 th anniversary of the WWII campaigns in Greece and Crete ⁸	E	Reassurance/Prestige
March	USSR NATO	Soviet forces continue to withdraw from Eastern Europe and streamline structures, but Soviet Navy continue to update capabilities, exempt from defence wide cuts ⁹	-	Prestige
March	US Iraq Int Community	Ships and aircraft from USN carriers begin to enforce sanctions and a no-fly zone over southern Iraq ¹⁰	-	Deterrence/Reassurance
March	Australia Indonesia	RAN conducts its largest ever fisheries surveillance operation in its northern waters and apprehends 35	P	Deterrence

⁵ JDW15, No 7 (1991): p207.

⁶ Ibid., p214

⁷ JDW15, No 6 (1991): p168.

⁸ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

⁹ JDW 15, No 13 (1991): p467.

¹⁰ US. Center for Naval Analyses. Siegel, Adam. *To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises: The Role of US Naval Forces*. CRM 94-193. (Alexandria, Va: CNA, 1995), p19.

		Indonesian vessels fishing illegally ¹¹		
April	Germany Iraq	Germany commits 5 MCMVs and 2 support ships to the Gulf in its first out-of-area NATO deployment ¹²	E	Co-operation/Prestige
April	Australia Indonesia	HMAS <i>Launceston</i> and Wollongong pay good will visit to Ambon in Indonesia for an ANZAC Day service ¹³	E	Attraction/Prestige
April	Japan Iraq Int Community	Japanese Security Council and Cabinet make decision to send minesweepers to Gulf; six depart at the end of the month and return in October ¹⁴	E	Prestige/Co-operation
May	Australia Solomon Islands Tonga Philippines	An Australian vessel visits Honiara to host a sea day for local VIPs and media from the Solomon Islands and Tonga. Separately, a ship visits the Philippines for another sea day ¹⁵	E	Prestige/Co-operation
May to June	UK Bangladesh	RFA <i>Fort George</i> and Royal Marine units conduct Op <i>Manna</i> , providing flood relief in Bangladesh following a cyclone ¹⁶	-	Assistance
June	Iran US	Two Iranian speed boats exercising in central Gulf fire on USS <i>La Salle</i> ¹⁷	P	Coercion
July	UK	HMS <i>Ambuscade</i> is diverted to Grenada to reassure	P	Reassurance

¹¹ Australia. Australian Fisheries Management Agency. <http://www.afma.gov.au/managing-our-fisheries/compliance-activities/illegal-foreign-fishing/> (accessed 15 August 2013).

¹² *JDW* 15, No 16 (1991): p631.

¹³ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹⁴ Japan. "Defense of Japan." Japanese Defense White Paper 2011. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html (accessed 23 May 2013).

¹⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹⁶ UK. Royal Navy. *Royal Navy Operations 1970-2013*. Portsmouth: Naval Historical Branch, 2013.

¹⁷ *JDW* 15, No 22 (1991): p903.

	Grenada	the island's Prime Minister, who feared civil unrest ¹⁸		
July	USSR Germany NATO	The Soviet Union withdraws its final warships from former East German bases ¹⁹	C/E	-
August	USSR	Warships blockade Tallinn in Estonia during a coup attempt to overthrow President Gorbachev ²⁰	C	Coercion
August	USSR Vietnam	Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean temporarily relocate to Vietnam before coup attempt in Moscow ²¹	C	Coercion/Reassurance
September	Australia Philippines	Following volcanic eruptions in the Philippines, HMAS <i>Swan</i> and <i>Westralia</i> visit and carry out repair work ²²	-	Assistance
September	USSR Finland	An unidentified submarine violates Finnish territorial waters ²³	E	Picture Building
September	NATO USSR	NATO conducts a series of naval exercises in the North Atlantic (<i>Vendetta</i> , <i>Strong Nut</i> , <i>North Star</i>) ²⁴	C/E	Deterrence/Prestige
September	UK France	The UK and France look to collaborate on a new nuclear submarine project ²⁵	-	Cooperation
September	NATO	NATO considers establishment of standing naval force in the Mediterranean ²⁶	C/E	Attraction/Prestige /Co-operation

¹⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 3rd Ed, p213

¹⁹ *JDW* 16, No 4 (1991): p131.

²⁰ *JDW* 16, No 8 (1991): p297.

²¹ *JDW* 16, No 12 (1991): p500.

²² Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

²³ *JDW* 16, No 10 (1991): p395.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p396.

²⁵ *JDW* 16, No 11 (1991):p 449.

October	USSR Int Community	Soviet Union announces that half of its Pacific Fleet submarines will be scrapped, then redeploys 2 SSGNs from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific ²⁷	E	-
October	France China Taiwan	China protests after France sells 6 frigates to Taiwan ²⁸	-	Deterrence/Co-operation
October	UK Egypt	UK and Egypt conduct a week-long bilateral naval exercise and port visit; only the third such exercise since the 1956 Suez Crisis ²⁹	E	Co-operation
October to March 1992	UK Haiti	HMS <i>Amazon</i> stands ready off Haiti to conduct NEO after military coup ³⁰	P	Assistance
November	South Korea North Korea Int Community	The first global deployment of the Republic of Korea Navy. Two frigates visit Portsmouth ³¹	E	Prestige
November	UK Yugoslavia	The UK stations a warship in the Adriatic to assist with problems arising from the Yugoslav civil war ³²	C/E	Picture Building/Reassurance
December	USSR Int Community	The Russian aircraft carrier <i>Kuznetsov</i> passes through the Turkish Straits for trials in the Mediterranean ³³	E	Prestige

²⁶ JDW 16, No 13 (1991):p 558.

²⁷ JDW 16, No 14 (1991): p586.

²⁸ JDW 16, No 16 (1991): p705.

²⁹ JDW 16, No 17 (1991): p747.

³⁰ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

³¹ JDW 16, No 21 (1991): p1003.

³² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

³³ JDW 16, No 23 (1991): p1081.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1992				
January	US South Korea North Korea	The US and South Korea announce the cancellation of Exercise <i>Team Spirit</i> 92 on condition that North Korea honours its pledge to allow inspection of nuclear facilities; the inspections were completed by the IAEA ³⁴	P/C	Co-operation/Coercion
March	US Kuwait Iraq	An amphibious exercise, <i>Eager Mace</i> 92, is held in Kuwait, timed to coincide with the deployment and unloading of strategic pre-positioning ships (<i>Active Fury</i> 92) based in Diego Garcia. The exercises become annual events ³⁵	E	Deterrence/Reassurance
March	CIS Int Community	CIS Black Sea Fleet deploys to the Mediterranean for the first time since the end of the USSR ³⁶	E	Prestige
March	India US UK France	India announces its plans for more naval exercises with the established blue water navies of US, UK and France ³⁷	-	Co-operation/Prestige
April	NATO	STANAVFORMED officially formed, providing a permanent NATO naval presence in the Mediterranean ³⁸	E	Picture Building /Co-operation/Prestige
May	UK	UK amphibious exercises involving HMS <i>Beaver</i> and	E	Reassurance/Deterrence

³⁴ JDW 17, No 3 (1992): p71.

³⁵ Global Security. "Native Fury." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/native-fury.htm>. (accessed 15 August 2013); JDW 17, No 10 (1992): p375.

³⁶ JDW 17, No 13 (1992): p503.

³⁷ Ibid., p513.

³⁸ JDW 17, No 17 (1992): p686.

	Kuwait	40 Cdo RM in Kuwait; the first UK/Kuwait exercise since the Gulf War ³⁹		
May	Croatia Int Community	The first independent Croatian warship is launched ⁴⁰	-	Prestige
May	CIS NATO	The CIS intelligence gathering ship, <i>Ekvator</i> , shadows STANAVFORMED; the first CIS AGI activity since the end of the USSR ⁴¹	E	Picture Building
May to November	UK Int Community	The RN deploys the <i>Orient</i> 92 task group, led by HMS <i>Invincible</i> . It visits numerous European, Middle and Far East ports and exercises with other navies in an attempt to demonstrate Britain's ability to operate at range for a prolonged period ⁴²	E	Prestige/Co-operation/Attraction
June	Taiwan South Africa	Three Taiwanese ships (2 destroyers and a tanker) visit South Africa ⁴³	E	Co-operation/Prestige
June	CIS Sweden	Sweden complains that 2 CIS submarines have violated its territorial waters; the USSR had a long history of incursions into Swedish waters which they claimed were US and UK submarines conducting 'tests' ⁴⁴	E	Picture building/Coercion

³⁹ JDW 17, No 19 (1992): p791.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p796.

⁴¹ JDW 17, No 21 (1992): p882.

⁴² Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p41.

⁴³ JDW 17, No 24 (1992): p1011.

⁴⁴ JDW 17, No 26 (1992): p1123.

June	WEU NATO Yugoslavia	The WEU and NATO commence operations in the Adriatic to monitor the movement of shipping in the Yugoslav civil war ⁴⁵	C/E	Picture building/Reassurance
July	UK France	The fishery protection vessel HMS <i>Brecon</i> is dispatched to protect British fishing vessels off the Isles of Scilly following a clash with a French trawler ⁴⁶	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
July	France Germany	Franco-German ties 'deepen' following bilateral naval exercise FAUVES 92 in the Mediterranean ⁴⁷	E	Co-operation
July	US Yugoslavia	USN ships and aircraft from US carriers begin to contribute to the enforcement of sanctions against Yugoslavia ⁴⁸	C/E	Picture building/Reassurance
July	South Africa Kenya Int Community	Two South African Navy fast attack craft visit Mombasa; it is a rare example of a apartheid era SAN visit to a 'black African' country and follows the visit of the Kenyan President to South Africa in June ⁴⁹	E	Attraction
July	Australia Fiji	Australia gifts 2 patrol boats to Fiji following the normalisation of relations, which were severed after the 1987 coup ⁵⁰	C/E	Co-operation/Attraction
July	Georgia Int Community	Georgian President Edvard Shevardnadze calls for 'limit and quota' to the number of warships in the Black	-	-

⁴⁵ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ *JDW* 18, No 1 (1992): p12.

⁴⁸ Siegel, *To Deter, Compel and Reassure*, p20.

⁴⁹ *JDW* 18, No 2 (1992): p11.

⁵⁰ *JDW* 18, No 3 (1992):p 7.

	Black Sea Co-operation project	Sea; the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet had been divided between Russia and Ukraine ⁵¹		
July	South Africa Angola Int Community	South Africa deploys its support ship <i>Tafelberg</i> to Luanda to assist in UN election monitoring in Angola ⁵²	C	Assistance
August	India Int Community	The Indian Navy conducts its 'biggest ever' exercise in the Bay of Bengal, involving 15 ships ⁵³	E	Prestige
August	Russia Ukraine	Russian and Ukrainian Presidents agree to joint control of the former Black Sea Fleet ⁵⁴	E	Co-operation
August	UK West Indies	HMS Cardiff and Campbeltown conduct relief operations in the West Indies after Hurricane Andrew ⁵⁵	-	Assistance
August	NATO WEU Yugoslavia	Western naval forces start to concentrate in the Adriatic as the former Yugoslavia disintegrates ⁵⁶	C	Deterrence/Reassurance
August	China Taiwan	Taiwanese trawlers report a number of boardings by unmarked patrol craft of Chinese design. One trawler is fired upon. Taiwan denounced the patrol craft as 'pirates' and China denied responsibility ⁵⁷	P	Coercion

⁵¹ Ibid., p14.

⁵² *JDW* 18, No 4 (1992): p7.

⁵³ *JDW* 18, No 7 (1992): p16.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p19.

⁵⁵ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013.*

⁵⁶ *JDW* 18, No 9 (1992): p6.

⁵⁷ *JDW* 18, No 10 (1992): p34.

September	Sweden Russia	Sweden attacks an unidentified submarine contact in its territorial waters during a naval exercise; the submarine is believed not to have been hit ⁵⁸	D	Picture Building/Deterrence
October	Russia Iran Int Community	Three Russian Kilo Class submarines leave Latvia for Iran. The sale resulted in protests from the US, UK and other Western states ⁵⁹	-	Co-operation/Attraction
October	US Russia	A Russian Helix helicopter lands on a US warship in the Gulf during interoperability exercises ⁶⁰	E	Co-operation
October	India ASEAN	In an attempt to 'calm nerves' over its regional expansion, India invites ASEAN countries to join a naval exercise for the first time. ASEAN had traditionally been an economic not a security agreement. Only Singapore responded positively ⁶¹	C/E	Co-operation/Attraction
November	US Bahrain Russia Iran	The US sends the submarine Topeka to Bahrain, for the first routine maintenance in the Gulf. Understood to be messaging to Russia and Iran following the sale of the Kilo class submarines ⁶²	E	Co-operation/ Reassurance/Deterrence
December	US Pakistan	The US threatens not to renew leases on 8 frigates unless Pakistan fulfils its non-proliferation 'Pressler amendment' ⁶³	E	Coercion
December	US Iraq	The US redeploys its Gulf carrier to Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE. In its absence Iraq	-	-

⁵⁸ JDW 18, No 13 (1992): p6.

⁵⁹ JDW 18, No 14 (1992): p12.

⁶⁰ JDW 18, No 17 (1992): p8.

⁶¹ JDW 18, No 18 (1992): p6.

⁶² JDW 18, No 19 (1992): p5.

⁶³ JDW 18, No 24 (1992):p 5.

		escalates pressure on UN weapons inspectors and begins violations of the southern no fly zone ⁶⁴		
December to June 1993	Australia Somalia US Int Community	The RAN provide strategic sea lift, logistic, communication, intelligence and air support in Somalia as part of the US-led Op RESTORE HOPE ⁶⁵	C	Co-operation/Picture building

⁶⁴ Siegel, *To Deter, Compel and Reassure*, p28.

⁶⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1993				
January	Sri Lanka LTTE	The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE – ‘Tamil Tigers’) claim to have built ‘suicide submarines’ for attacks against Sri Lankan government forces ⁶⁶	-	Prestige/Coercion
January	France UK WEU Yugoslavia	The Adriatic deployment is strengthened and stands at 14 ships ⁶⁷	P/E	Co-operation/ Picture building/ Reassurance
March	Australia ASEAN	Australia invites ASEAN countries to join the naval exercise <i>Kakadu</i> ; Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand send ships. Indonesia sends observers ⁶⁸	E	Co-operation/Attraction
March	Australia Dom Community	HMAS <i>Geelong</i> pays a series of visits to Aboriginal communities in the Tiwi Islands and Arnhem Land as part of a Customs and Navy awareness campaign ⁶⁹	-	Reassurance
March	UK France	During a dispute over fishing rights off Guernsey a French vessel is arrested. Later, HMS <i>Blazer</i> , a university RN unit, is boarded by French fishermen in Cherbourg in protest at UK action ⁷⁰	P	Coercion
March	Australia Fiji	HMAS <i>Derwent</i> becomes first RAN ship to visit Fiji since coup of 1987 ⁷¹	-	Attraction

⁶⁶ JDW 19, No 3 (1993): p12.

⁶⁷ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p41;

⁶⁸ JDW 19, No 13 (1993): p11.

⁶⁹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

⁷⁰ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁷¹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

May	Iran Int Community	Iran conducts a naval exercise involving more than 100 vessels including, for the first time, a Kilo class submarine ⁷²	E	Prestige/Deterrence
May to June	Russia US UK Int Community	Russia deploys numerous vessels in a 'show of presence'. Three Krivak class to the Mediterranean; one Krivak to Norway; one Sovremenny to New York; one Sovremenny to the UK ⁷³	E	Prestige
June	US Iraq	The USN fires Tomahawk missiles at Iraqi intelligence service HQ from its ships in the Gulf and Red Sea. The use of force is in retaliation for a plot to assassinate former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait in April ⁷⁴	D	Coercion
July	Russia China	Russia deploys a flotilla from its Pacific Fleet to the East China Sea following PLAN arrests and harassment of Russian cargo ships in disputed waters ⁷⁵	P	Coercion/Reassurance
September	Poland Denmark Germany Russia	Plans are announced for a joint Polish, Danish and German naval exercise in the Baltic. Poland wishes to join NATO but Russia objects ⁷⁶	C/E	Co-operation/ Attraction/Coercion
September to	UN UK	UN maritime interdiction operations commence off Haiti following the removal of President Aristide in 1991 ⁷⁷	D/P	Coercion

⁷² JDW 19, No 19 (1993): p11.

⁷³ Russia. "Chronology of the Three Centuries of the Russian Fleet." <http://rusnavy.com/history/kron.htm> (accessed 5 November 2013); JDW 19, No 25 (1993): p17.

⁷⁴ Grimmett, *Use of US Armed Forces Abroad*, pp16-17.

⁷⁵ Kin, Taeho. "Korean Perspectives on PLA Modernization and the Future East Asian Security Environment." In Pollack, Jonathan & Yang, Richard (Eds). *In China's Shadow*. (Westport, CT: Rand, 1998), p54.

⁷⁶ JDW 20, No 12 (1993): p15.

⁷⁷ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

December	US Haiti			
October	US Somalia	The US announces its decision to send the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and other ships to Somalia ⁷⁸	P	Prestige/Coercion
October	US Haiti	Following unrest, the US President orders USN to enforce a blockade of Haiti. By the following April 712 vessels had been boarded ⁷⁹	D	Coercion
December	Russia Kuwait	Russia and Kuwait hold their first joint naval exercise; up until this point Russia had only exercised with Western navies in the Gulf ⁸⁰	E	Attraction/Co-operation
December	Australia Malaysia	HMAS Canberra and Perth visit Langkawi island in Malaysia for an international maritime and space exhibition; defence and trade ministers attend. Diving teams then assist Royal Malaysian Police in search and recovery of body of missing crewman who had fallen overboard from a ship ⁸¹	-	Co-operation/Attraction

⁷⁸ *JDW* 20, No 16 (1993): p6.

⁷⁹ Grimmett, *Use of US Armed Forces Abroad*, pp16-17.

⁸⁰ *JDW* 20, No 25 (1993): p9.

⁸¹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1994				
January	Australia Kiribati Pacific Islands	Australia hands a patrol boat to Kiribati as part of an ongoing co-operation programme with small Pacific Ocean island states. No weapons are included but the gift is made to help patrol EEZs ⁸²	-	Co-operation/Attraction
February	Poland Netherlands	Poland and the Netherlands sign an agreement for joint exercises, personnel and technology exchanges and hydrographic collaboration ⁸³	-	Co-operation
February	Russia NATO	Russia decides not to join the PfP but allocates the frigate <i>Pomara</i> to a NATO SAR exercise ⁸⁴	E	Co-operation
March	US South Korea North Korea	The US and South Korea agree to suspend the <i>Team Spirit</i> 94 exercise after North Korea agrees to IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities ⁸⁵	P/C	Coercion/Co-operation
April to May	NATO Int Community	Around 100 NATO vessels take part in Exercise <i>Resolute Response</i> to practice defence of sea lines of communication in the Atlantic ⁸⁶	E	Prestige/Deterrence
May	Yugoslavia NATO WEU	Yugoslav Navy ships interfere with an action by NATO/WEU warships conducting Operation <i>Sharp Guard</i> in the Adriatic; the NATO/WEU ships were	D/P	Coercion

⁸² JDW 21, No 3 (1994): p11.

⁸³ JDW 21, No 7 (1994): p14.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p8.

⁸⁵ JDW 21, No 10 (1994): p4.

⁸⁶ JDW 21, No 18 (1994): p5.

		attempting to board a vessel suspected of violating the embargo ⁸⁷		
May	US North Korea	The US announces that its aircraft carrier <i>Independence</i> will be kept within one week's sailing time of North Korea, to respond to any crisis if necessary ⁸⁸	P/C	Deterrence/Reassurance
June	UK Russia	The Russian Kilo class submarine No 431 visits Portsmouth ⁸⁹	E	Prestige/Reassurance
June	UK South Africa	The South African warship <i>Drakensburg</i> joins the Joint Maritime Course off Scotland. It is the first time the RN and SAN have exercised together since 1974 ⁹⁰	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	Indonesia Dom Community	Indonesia sends a ship to strengthen its patrols around East Timor ⁹¹	D	Coercion
June	NATO PfP Russia	Exercise <i>Baltops</i> 94 takes place involving 35 ships from 15 countries, including Russia ⁹²	E	Co-operation
June	Russia Int Community	The Russian cruiser <i>Kerch</i> becomes the first to pass through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean since 1991 ⁹³	E	Prestige

⁸⁷ JDW 21, No 19 (1994): p8.

⁸⁸ JDW 21, No 21 (1994): p1.

⁸⁹ JDW 21, No 22 (1994): p6.

⁹⁰ JDW 21, No 24 (1994): p11.

⁹¹ JDW 21, No 25 (1994): p4.

⁹² Ibid., p13.

⁹³ JDW 21, No 26 (1994): p5.

June	Russia North Korea US	The Russian and US navies conduct a joint exercise near Vladivostok, just 70 km from North Korea ⁹⁴	E	Co-operation/Coercion
June	Australia Indonesia	HMAS Swan and Torrens visit Indonesia for Australia Day and to support Indonesian trade initiative ⁹⁵	-	Prestige
July	US North Korea	The USN deploys two mine countermeasures vessels to the Western Pacific to enhance its capabilities against North Korea ⁹⁶	E	Deterrence/Reassurance
July	US Haiti	The USS <i>Inchon</i> amphibious ready group deploys to Haiti, to be ready to evacuate entitled personnel if necessary ⁹⁷	P	Assistance
July	Colombia Venezuela	Colombia and Venezuela agree to co-ordinate naval effort to counter drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining ⁹⁸	-	Co-operation
August	Australia Indonesia	The Australian and Indonesian navies jointly exercise their surveillance procedures ⁹⁹	E	Co-operation/Picture building
August	US Romania	The Romanian Defence Minister announces his country's intention to join the PfP during USS <i>Tortuga's</i> visit ¹⁰⁰	E	Attraction/Co-operation
August	UK	The Argentinean sail training ship <i>Libertad</i> visits	E	Reassurance/Co-

⁹⁴ Ibid., p10.

⁹⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

⁹⁶ *JDW* 22, No 1 (1994): p6.

⁹⁷ *JDW* 22, No 2 (1994): p4.

⁹⁸ *JDW* 22, No 2 (1994): p12.

⁹⁹ *JDW* 22, No 7 (1994): p6.

¹⁰⁰ *JDW* 22, No 8 (1994): p4.

	Argentina	Dartmouth at the UK's invitation ¹⁰¹		operation
September	Japan Russia	Negotiations take place for the first ever Russian/Japanese exercise; it will be maritime SAR ¹⁰²	-	Co-operation
September	US South Korea North Korea	The US and South Korea declare that in the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula the headquarters of the USN 7 th Fleet will move from Hawaii to South Korea ¹⁰³	-	Reassurance/Deterrence
September	Sri Lanka LTTE	The Tamil Tigers destroy the Sri Lankan navy's largest ship, <i>Sagarawardene</i> , by ramming it with small boats filled with explosives ¹⁰⁴	-	Coercion
September	Australia Solomon Islands	RAN provides a secure environment for the conduct of the Bougainville Peace Conference ¹⁰⁵	C	Reassurance
October	Germany	The German Navy transfers its fast attack craft flotilla from Schleswig Holstein to Warnemunde in the former East Germany ¹⁰⁶	-	Reassurance
October	US Iraq	In the absence of a USN aircraft carrier in the Gulf, Iraq moves 80,000 troops towards Kuwait. A sizeable US naval force including the aircraft carrier George Washington, the amphibious ship Tripoli and the 18 th MEU, then reposition into the Gulf and poise off Iraq. The RN stations its <i>Armilla</i> Patrol in the Northern Gulf. Iraq backs down ¹⁰⁷	P	Deterrence/Reassurance

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p5.

¹⁰² JDW 22, No 9 (1994): p6.

¹⁰³ Global Security. "7th Fleet." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/c7f.htm> (accessed 15 August 2013).

¹⁰⁴ JDW 22, No 13 (1994): p12.

¹⁰⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹⁰⁶ JDW 22, No 14 (1994): p2.

¹⁰⁷ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*; Siegel, *To Deter, Compel and Reassure*, p28; JDW 22, No 15 (1994): p3.

October	Turkey US Greece Italy Romania Russia Ukraine	Exercise <i>Maritime Partner</i> takes place in the Black Sea ¹⁰⁸	E	Co-operation/Attraction
October	China Taiwan	The PLAN rehearse an amphibious assault off Taiwan at a time when diplomatic relations seem possible ¹⁰⁹	P/C	Coercion
November	Thailand US North Korea China	Thailand turns down a US request to pre-position ships in Thai territorial waters; the pre-positioning was aimed at North Korea but Thailand does not want to offend China ¹¹⁰	-	-
November	US South Africa	USS <i>Gettysburg</i> and USS <i>Halyburton</i> become the first USN ships to visit South Africa since 1967 ¹¹¹	E	Co-operation/Attraction

¹⁰⁸ *JDW* 22, No 17 (1994): p5.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p19.

¹¹⁰ *JDW* 22, No 19 (1994): p11.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p12.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1995				
January	Canada Spain	Canadian Navy commences Operation <i>Ocean Vigilance</i> , monitoring fishing activity off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The operation would last for 2 years during the turbot fishing dispute with Spain ¹¹²	P	Deterrence/Reassurance/Picture Building
January	China Philippines	China seizes the disputed Mischief Reef 130 miles from the Philippines ¹¹³	D	-
January	Norway Latvia Estonia Lithuania	Norway donates three <i>Storm</i> class fast patrol vessels; one each to the Baltic republics ¹¹⁴	-	Attraction/Co-operation
January	Australia France	Australia suspends RAN visits to French Pacific territories following French nuclear testing programme ¹¹⁵	-	Coercion
February	UK Sierra Leone	HMS <i>Marlborough</i> stands by off Sierra Leone to conduct NEO if required after internal rebellion ¹¹⁶	P/C	Deterrence/Reassurance
February	US Int Community	An international naval force of 26 ships from 6 countries poises off Mogadishu during	P	Deterrence/Reassurance

¹¹² Canada. Royal Canadian Navy. *Background Summaries: Recent Operations Overview*. http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?id=460 (accessed 3 June 2013).

¹¹³ Lanteigne, Marc. *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*. 2nd Edition. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p136.

¹¹⁴ *JDW* 23, No 2 (1995): p9.

¹¹⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹¹⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

	Somalia	withdrawal of US ground troops (Op <i>United Shield</i>) ¹¹⁷		
February	US Albania	The first US-Albanian exercise takes place, a SAR exercise involving USS <i>Ponce</i> ¹¹⁸	E	Co-operation
March	Australia Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand	A naval exercise, <i>Kakadu II</i> , takes place in the Timor and Arafura Seas as part of Australia's outreach to the countries of south-east Asia ¹¹⁹	E	Attraction/Prestige/Co-operation
March	Australia Papua New Guinea	HMAS <i>Flinders</i> conducts survey of Rabaul Harbour to determine impact of volcanic eruptions and establish safe navigation routes ¹²⁰	-	Assistance/ Attraction
March	Israel Mauritania Morocco Algeria Tunisia Oman Egypt Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Bahrain	A ground-breaking Israeli-Arab naval exercise planned to take place off Tunisia as part of the Middle East peace process. It involves SAR and 'incidents at sea' exercises ¹²¹	E	Co-operation

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ *JDW* 23, No 5 (1995): p5.

¹¹⁹ *JDW* 23, No 9 (1995): p12.

¹²⁰ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹²¹ *JDW* 23, No 9 (1995): p15.

	Kuwait			
March	US China	USS <i>Bunker Hill</i> visits China. It is the first USN visit to the country since the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1989 ¹²²	E	Attraction
April	Sri Lanka LTTE	The Tamil Tigers sink two warships, SLNS <i>Sooraya</i> and <i>Ranasura</i> , at the <i>Trimcomalee</i> naval base, hours after the failure of peace negotiations ¹²³	-	Coercion
April	UK West Indies Haiti	HMS <i>Monmouth</i> patrols near the Turks and Caicos to intercept and deter illegal Haitian immigration ¹²⁴	P	Deterrence/Picture building
May	Russia Australia	HMAS <i>Sydney</i> visits Vladivostok; the first Australian warship to visit Russia ¹²⁵	E	Attraction
June	NATO Bulgaria Romania	NATO's STANAVFORMED conducts a SAR exercise with Bulgarian and Romanian navies, within their territorial waters ¹²⁶	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	US India	Exercise <i>Malabar II</i> takes place in an attempt to strengthen Indo-US relations ¹²⁷	E	Co-operation
July to October	Netherlands Int Community	The RNLN promotes Dutch industry during its <i>Fairwind 95</i> deployment, visiting Egypt, the	-	Prestige

¹²² JDW 23, No 11 (1995): p6.

¹²³ JDW 23, No 17 (1995): p6.

¹²⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

¹²⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹²⁶ JDW 23, No 23 (1995): p6.

¹²⁷ JDW 23, No 24 (1995): p16.

		UAE, Singapore, Indonesia, China and South Africa ¹²⁸		
July	US Int Community	The USN reactivates its 5 th Fleet in Bahrain to command naval operations in the Gulf region; it had been disbanded in 1947 ¹²⁹	-	Prestige/Reassurance
July	South Africa Angola Botswana Malawi Mozambique Namibia Swaziland Zimbabwe Zambia Lesotho Tanzania	The Southern Africa Development Community form a Maritime Standing Committee under South African Chairmanship, with the aim of increasing naval and maritime co-operation in the region. South African ships visit Mozambique and Tanzania ¹³⁰	-	Co-operation
August	Australia Indonesia	A flotilla of six Australian warships visits Jakarta to celebrate the 50 th anniversary of Indonesian independence ¹³¹	E	Attraction
August	UK Montserrat	HMS <i>Southampton</i> stands by and then provides assistance to Montserrat during and after volcanic eruption ¹³²	-	Assistance/Reassurance
August	China Taiwan	China conducts air and maritime exercises in the East China Sea following a heightening of	P/E	Coercion

¹²⁸ JDW 24, No 1 (1995): p13.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p15.

¹³⁰ JDW 24, No 6 (1995): p23.

¹³¹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹³² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

		tensions with Taiwan ¹³³		
September	New Zealand France Int Community	HMNZS <i>Tui</i> is deployed to the Mururoa Atoll to demonstrate against French nuclear testing in the Pacific and to support the 'Protest Flotilla' which had sailed from New Zealand ¹³⁴	E	-
October	Thailand US	The US trains Thai Navy pilots in preparation for Thailand's acquisition of Harrier aircraft from Spain ¹³⁵	-	Attraction/Co-operation
October	Iran Int Community	Iran conducts an amphibious exercise, <i>Great Khaibar</i> , near the Strait of Hormuz ¹³⁶	E	Coercion/Prestige
October to November	China Taiwan	China conducts further air and maritime exercises in the East China Sea, signalling its displeasure at Taiwanese posturing. In addition, an amphibious landing exercise is conducted on Dungshan Island, south of the Taiwan Strait and with similar geography to Taiwan itself ¹³⁷	P/E	Coercion
December	France South Africa	The French Navy make a goodwill visit to Durban, South Africa ¹³⁸	E	Attraction
December	India UAE	The Indian Navy and UAE conduct a naval exercise in the Gulf; the Indian ships then visit the UAE ¹³⁹	E	Co-operation/Attraction

¹³³ Porch, Douglas. "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the US Navy." *US Naval War College Review* 52, no 3 (1999): p18.

¹³⁴ *JDW* 24, No 9 (1995): p4.

¹³⁵ *JDW* 24, No 14 (1995): p18.

¹³⁶ *JDW* 24, No 14 (1995): p22.

¹³⁷ Porch, The Taiwan Strait Crisis, p18.

¹³⁸ *JDW* 24, No 22 (1995): p18.

December	US China Taiwan	The USS <i>Nimitz</i> carrier battle group makes passage through the Taiwan Strait, the first to do so since 1979 ¹⁴⁰	P/E	Coercion/Deterrence/Reassurance
December to January	Russia US	A Russian Akula class nuclear submarine operates off the north-western US, tracking Trident class submarines. The US assessment is that the Russian Navy is reasserting its capabilities after a lengthy period of budget constraints ¹⁴¹	E	Prestige/Picture building

¹³⁹ Jane's Navy International (*JNI*) 101, No 1 (1996): p5.

¹⁴⁰ Porch, *The Taiwan Strait Crisis*, p18.

¹⁴¹ *JDW* 25, No 1 (1996): 6.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1996				
January	Russia Int Community	The Russian aircraft carrier <i>Kuznetsov</i> and its battle group enters the Mediterranean in the first major out-of-area deployment since 1991 ¹⁴²	E	Prestige
January	US UAE	A naval and marine exercise, <i>Iron Magic Iron Siren 96</i> , takes place in the Gulf ¹⁴³	E	Co-operation/Reassurance
February	UK Argentina	HMS <i>Northumberland</i> conducts presence and deterrence operations against illegal fishing by Patagonian vessels off South Georgia ¹⁴⁴	P	Deterrence/Picture building/Reassurance
February	Netherlands Belgium	The Dutch and Belgian fleets join under a single operational command, 'Admiral Benelux'(ABNL) ¹⁴⁵	-	Co-operation
February	Greece Turkey US	Greek Navy commandos raise a flag on an uninhabited island 4 nm from the Turkish coast (in Greek: Imia; in Turkish: Kardak). Turkey responds by deploying three frigates, one destroyer and three attack craft. Greece then counters with two frigates, one destroyer and three attack craft. Both sides raise their alert states on the island of Cyprus. The three day confrontation ends following US diplomatic pressure – Greece removes its flag and Turkish forces withdraw ¹⁴⁶	D	Coercion

¹⁴² JDW 25, No 2 (1996): p3.

¹⁴³ JDW 25, No 3 (1996): p14.

¹⁴⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

¹⁴⁵ JDW 25, No 6 (1996): p5.

¹⁴⁶ Arapoglou, Stergios. *Dispute in the Aegean Sea The Imia/Kardak Crisis*. Master's Thesis. (US Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell, 2002), p17.

February	Sweden Singapore	Sweden enters an agreement to train Singapore submariners ¹⁴⁷	-	Attraction
February	US South Korea North Korea	The US and South Korea cancel their annual <i>Team Spirit</i> exercise for the third consecutive year, but they do conduct a naval exercise, <i>Valiant Usher</i> , in the Yellow Sea ¹⁴⁸	C/E	Coercion
March	India Singapore	India and Singapore conduct a series of naval exercises ¹⁴⁹	E	Co-operation
April	US UK Liberia	US warships and UK auxiliary poise off Liberia to conduct NEO if required ¹⁵⁰	P	Assistance/Reassurance
May	UK US Russia	The RN hosts Russo-UK-US naval exercises which culminate in a boarding exercise off Portsmouth ¹⁵¹	E	Co-operation
May	US Philippines China	The US and Philippines hold a naval exercise. It had been postponed from 1995 because of tensions caused by Chinese missile tests near Taiwan ¹⁵²	E	Co-operation
June	Turkey Israel	Turkey and Israel announce plans for naval exercises ¹⁵³	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June to	UK	RN warships monitor confrontation between Danish	-	Picture

¹⁴⁷ *JDW* 25, No 8 (1996): p3.

¹⁴⁸ *JDW* 25, No 9 (1996): p13.

¹⁴⁹ *JDW* 25, No 13 (1996): p13.

¹⁵⁰ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

¹⁵¹ *JDW* 25, No 19 (1996): p4.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p17.

¹⁵³ *JDW* 25, No 24 (1996): p23.

July	Denmark Greenpeace	fishing vessels and Greenpeace in the North Sea ¹⁵⁴		building/Deterrence
July	Greece Israel	Greece and Israel announce plans for naval exercises; Greece also aims to 'dampen' its criticism of Israeli co-operation with Turkey ¹⁵⁵	E	Co-operation/Attraction
July	Japan Russia	The first visit by Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force ships to Russia, to celebrate the 300 th anniversary of the Russian Navy at Vladivostok ¹⁵⁶	E	Attraction
September	Japan South Korea	The Japanese training ships Kashima and Sawayuki visit South Korea. It is the first visit by the JMSDF to Korea since the end of WWII ¹⁵⁷	E	Attraction
September	Egypt Saudi Arabia	The Egyptian and Saudi navies exercise together in the Red Sea. Tensions between the two countries had been high but recently improved ¹⁵⁸	E	Co-operation/Reassurance
September	North Korea South Korea	A North Korean mini-submarine runs aground off South Korea during a suspected attempt to infiltrate a reconnaissance team; the crew are all found dead with shots to the head ¹⁵⁹	P	Picture building
September	China Japan	Hong Kong protest vessels invade seas near Senkaku/Diaoyu islands after the Japanese proclamation of an EEZ. Several protesters are	P	Coercion

¹⁵⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

¹⁵⁵ *JDW* 26, No 1 (1996):p 21.

¹⁵⁶ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ *JDW* 26, No 11 (1996): p23.

¹⁵⁹ *JDW* 26, No 13 (1996): p3; JN1 101, No 8: p5.

		blocked by Japanese patrol vessels and jump into the sea; one is drowned ¹⁶⁰		
October	Taiwan China	Taiwan conducts a one day amphibious landing exercise involving 80 ships and 13,000 personnel ¹⁶¹	P/E	Deterrence
October	UK Croatia NATO	HMS Nottingham patrols the coast of Croatia in support of the NATO operation ¹⁶²	P	Picture building/Deterrence

¹⁶⁰ Global Security. "Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm>, (accessed 17 June 2013); Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

¹⁶¹ *JDW* 26, No 18 (1996): p17.

¹⁶² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1997				
January	US Syria	US cruisers position in the Mediterranean to monitor Syrian Scud missile firings ¹⁶³	P	Picture building/Deterrence/Reassurance
January	UK Int Community	RN commences <i>Ocean Wave</i> deployment, sending 17 ships and submarines to Middle East and Asia-Pacific in support of UK political interests by demonstrating continuing ability to deploy an effective force for a significant period ¹⁶⁴	E	Prestige/Attraction
January	Australia Japan	Australia announces that the RAN would seize Japanese vessels caught fishing in Australian EEZ after failure to reach agreement on quotas ¹⁶⁵	-	Coercion
March	Bangladesh India Maldives Saudi Arabia	India, the Maldives and Saudi Arabia are visited by Bangladeshi ships ¹⁶⁶	E	Attraction
March	UK Albania	HMS <i>Birmingham</i> and <i>Exeter</i> stand by off Albanian port of Durres to conduct NEO during internal unrest ¹⁶⁷	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
March to	South Africa	South Africa hosts <i>Atlasur</i> naval exercises with	E	Co-operation/Attraction

¹⁶³ JDW 27, No 2 (1997): p3.

¹⁶⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p44.

¹⁶⁵ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹⁶⁶ JDW 27, No 9 (1997): p13.

¹⁶⁷ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

April	Brazil Argentina Uruguay	South American countries ¹⁶⁸		
April	Russia Ukraine	Russia and Ukraine hold their first exercises together since the division of the Black Sea Fleet ¹⁶⁹	E	Co-operation
April to June	China Int Community	Three Chinese navy ships deploy across the Pacific and visit various ports in North and South America ¹⁷⁰	E	Attraction/Prestige
May	Canada Brunei	HMCS <i>Huron</i> becomes the first Canadian ship to visit Brunei ¹⁷¹	E	Attraction
May	UK Malaysia FPDA	During the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) Exercise <i>Flying Fish</i> in the South China Sea, Capt Bopal of the Royal Malaysian Navy embarks in HMS <i>Illustrious</i> and assumes command of the maritime forces. It is the first time that a foreign maritime component commander has commanded from RN ship ¹⁷²	-	Co-operation/Attraction
May	Indonesia Singapore	Indonesia and Singapore conduct co-ordinated anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca and Singapore Straits ¹⁷³	P/E	Co-operation
May	France	Fish poaching becomes a problem and France	P/E	Co-operation/Attraction

¹⁶⁸ JDW 27, No 10 (1997): p6.

¹⁶⁹ JDW 27, No 16 (1997): p13.

¹⁷⁰ JDW 27, No 18 (1997): p13.

¹⁷¹ JDW 27, No 18 (1997): 15.

¹⁷² JDW 27, No 19 (1997): 18.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

	South Africa	offers to help to patrol the waters around Prince Edward Islands, beyond the endurance of South African patrol boats ¹⁷⁴		
June	Sri Lanka LTTE	The Sri Lankan navy attacks and sinks a number of Tamil Tiger boats ¹⁷⁵	-	Coercion
June	UK Sierra Leone	UK auxiliary poises off Sierra Leone during internal unrest ¹⁷⁶	P	Reassurance/Assistance
June	UK China Int Community	HM Yacht <i>Britannia</i> , patrol vessels and frigate in Hong Kong for handover to China. <i>Ocean Wave</i> task group poises over the horizon ¹⁷⁷	E	Prestige/Reassurance
August	Sri Lanka LTTE	Sri Lanka sinks two and damages twelve Tamil Tiger boats in an engagement ¹⁷⁸	-	Coercion
September	UK Int Community	The British <i>Ocean Wave</i> deployment and returns to the UK after eight months away and visits to 20 countries ¹⁷⁹	E	Prestige
September	South Africa Namibia	Two South African warships operate from Namibia as part of a memorandum of understanding on maritime co-operation in the region ¹⁸⁰	-	Co-operation

¹⁷⁴ JDW 27, No 20 (1997): p13.

¹⁷⁵ JDW 27, No 22 (1997): p13.

¹⁷⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ JDW 28, No 5 (1997): p14.

¹⁷⁹ JDW 28, No 9 (1997): p20.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p30.

September	Australia China	HMAS <i>Perth</i> and <i>Newcastle</i> visit China in order to strengthen military ties between the two countries ¹⁸¹	E	Attraction
October	Iran US	Iran conducts a ten day naval exercise in the Gulf in response to the announcement of USS <i>Nimitz</i> deployment to the region (the deployment was, in turn, a response to an Iranian cross border raid into Iraq) ¹⁸²	P	Coercion/Deterrence
October	Turkey Greece	The Greek minesweeper <i>Avra</i> steams over the 'narrowly submerged' Turkish submarine, <i>Yildiray</i> , in international waters in the Aegean Sea. The submarine was visible with masts protruding the surface. Turkey calls the incident a 'hostile act' ¹⁸³	P/E	Coercion
October	France South Africa	A South African task group in the Indian Ocean conducts a SAR exercise with French forces on the island of Reunion ¹⁸⁴	E	Co-operation
October	UK Ukraine Poland	HMS <i>Campbeltown</i> acts as host ship in Odessa for UK Secretary of State for Defence to conduct trilateral defence talks with Ukraine and Poland ¹⁸⁵	E	Prestige/Attraction

¹⁸¹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

¹⁸² *JDW* 28, No 15 (1997): p3.

¹⁸³ *JDW* 28, No 17 (1997): p5.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p17.

¹⁸⁵ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

October	UK Congo	HMS <i>Monmouth</i> and RFA <i>Orangeleaf</i> stand by off Congo during deteriorating political situation in the country ¹⁸⁶	P/C	Assistance/Deterrence
November	Indonesia Australia Germany	Naval exercise takes place between Indonesian, Australian and German warships in the Java Sea. The German ships then pay a goodwill visit to Indonesia ¹⁸⁷	E	Co-operation/Attraction
November	Malaysia Philippines	Malaysia and the Philippines conduct a nine day long anti-piracy exercise called <i>Sea Malphi</i> ¹⁸⁸	E	Co-operation
November	New Zealand Papua New Guinea	The RNZN leads a Truce Monitoring Group in Bougainville. It is the largest multi-national deployment in the South Pacific since WWII ¹⁸⁹	P/E	Co-operation/Reassurance
December	Sweden Singapore	Six Singapore sailors take part in a Swedish mine countermeasures exercise ¹⁹⁰	-	Co-operation

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ *JDW* 28, No 19 (1997): p27.

¹⁸⁸ *JDW* 28, No 20 (1997): p14.

¹⁸⁹ *JDW* 28, No 21 (1997): p23.

¹⁹⁰ *JDW* 28, No 22 (1997): p14.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1998				
January	China US	China and the US sign a Maritime Consultative Agreement aimed at preventing incidents at sea ¹⁹¹	-	Co-operation
January	US Kuwait Iraq	US amphibious forces complete a month long exercise with Kuwait, <i>Eager Mace 98</i> ¹⁹²	E	Deterrence/Reassurance
January	Israel Turkey US	Israel, Turkey and the US hold a one day exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean called <i>Reliant Mermaid</i> . The exercise is SAR based and is viewed as an attempt to deepen the relationship between the region's two non-Arab states. The Egyptian Foreign Minister warned of a 'counter-balance' to the relationship ¹⁹³	C/E	Co-operation/Reassurance
January	Greece Georgia	Greece transfers a coast guard vessel to Georgia after a co-operation agreement. It is followed by a visit by the Georgian Foreign Minister to Greece; Georgia's first ever to a NATO country ¹⁹⁴	-	Attraction
January	US UK	The US deploys USS <i>Independence</i> and the UK deploys HMS <i>Invincible</i> , both aircraft	P	Coercion/Reassurance

¹⁹¹ *JDW* 29, No 1 (1998): p13.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p17.

¹⁹³ *JDW* 29, No 2 (1998): p5.

¹⁹⁴ *JDW* 29, No 3 (1998): 13.

	Iraq	carriers, to the Gulf because of the growing Iraq crisis ¹⁹⁵		
February	Sri Lanka LTTE	The Tamil Tigers sink two Sri Lankan naval vessels off the Jaffna peninsula	-	Coercion
March	Sierra Leone UK	HMS <i>Monmouth</i> , followed by HMS <i>Cornwall</i> , visit Sierra Leone in a show of support for the restored democratic government ¹⁹⁶	P/E	Reassurance
March	Fiji Australia France	France and Australia help Fiji to monitor its EEZ after spending cuts forced its Navy to end patrols for the rest of the year ¹⁹⁷	-	Attraction
March	China Ukraine Int Community	The uncompleted aircraft carrier <i>Varyag</i> is bought from Ukraine by an unknown company based in Macau; it is suspected that the Chinese government is behind the deal ¹⁹⁸	-	Prestige
April	US UK Saudi Arabia Pakistan Iran	A four country, four day MCM exercise takes place off Qatar, simulating the clearance of a mined Strait of Hormuz ¹⁹⁹	E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance
April	US UK	An anti-submarine warfare exercise, USWEX 98, is conducted in the Gulf by four	E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance

¹⁹⁵ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p45; *JDW* 29, No 4 (1998):p4.

¹⁹⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

¹⁹⁷ *JDW* 29, No 9 (1998): p14.

¹⁹⁸ *JDW* 29, No 12 (1998): p4.

¹⁹⁹ *JDW* 29, No 14 (1998): p20

	Canada Netherlands Iran	Western powers; aimed at demonstrating capability to Iran ²⁰⁰		
April	Russia Ukraine	Russia and Ukraine hold joint exercises in the Black Sea off the Crimean peninsula ²⁰¹	E	Co-operation
April	Iran Int Community	Iran holds its first exercises with its new Kilo Class submarines. Ex <i>Ettihad</i> (Unity) takes place from Bander Abbas and through the Strait of Hormuz to Chah Bahar. It aims to demonstrate Iranian maritime power to neighbouring countries ²⁰²	E	Prestige
May	Argentina Chile	Argentina and Chile announce naval exercises to be conducted later in the year. It is a significant development in military ties following years of high level distrust ²⁰³	-	Co-operation
May	India Bangladesh Indonesia Singapore Sri Lanka	Ex <i>Madat</i> 98 (meaning 'Help'), a five day SAR exercise, takes place ²⁰⁴	E	Co-operation
May	France NATO	France joins the annual <i>Baltops</i> exercise/deployment to the Baltic Sea for the first time in its 26 year history ²⁰⁵	E	Co-operation/Attraction

²⁰⁰ *JDW* 29, No 15 (1998): p23.

²⁰¹ *JDW* 29, No 16 (1998): p14.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p21.

²⁰³ *JDW* 29, No 19 (1998): p6.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p12.

²⁰⁵ *JDW* 29, No 20 (1998): p6.

May	Australia India Pakistan	Australia announces suspension of RAN visits to, and exercises with, India and Pakistan following series of nuclear tests on Indian sub-continent ²⁰⁶	-	Coercion
June	China Int Community	China deploys its first 'air capable' ship (<i>Shichang</i>) to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. ²⁰⁷	E	Prestige
June	UK Guinea Bissau	HMS <i>Cornwall</i> is withdrawn from an exercise with the South African Navy to stand by for a NEO off Guinea Bissau if fighting in the country intensifies ²⁰⁸	P	Reassurance/Deterrence/Assistance
June	NATO Bulgaria Romania Georgia Ukraine	Ex <i>Co-Operative Partner</i> 98, a PfP exercise, takes place in the Black Sea ²⁰⁹	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	US Croatia	Joint US-Croatian exercises take place following the visit of USS <i>Kauffman</i> to Dubrovnik ²¹⁰	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	India Iran Kuwait Saudi Arabia Oman	India attempts to counter Pakistani and American influence in the Gulf by holding its first exercises with Iran and Kuwait and a one day exercise with Saudi Arabia and Oman. It is seen as an assertion of Indian	C/E	Prestige/Attraction/Co-operation

²⁰⁶ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

²⁰⁷ *JDW* 29, No 23 (1998): p13.

²⁰⁸ *JDW* 29, No 24 (1998): p5.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p6.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p11.

	Pakistan US	foreign policy independence after US attempts to isolate Tehran ²¹¹		
June	Australia Indonesia	RAN deliver food and medical supplies to drought affected areas of Irian Jaya ²¹²	-	Assistance
June	North Korea South Korea	A North Korean submarine violates South Korean waters and is arrested ²¹³	P	Picture building/Deterrence
July	Portugal Guinea Bissau	The Portuguese ship <i>Vasco da Gama</i> evacuates diplomatic staff from its former colony ²¹⁴	D	Assistance
July	Portugal Angola Guinea Bissau	The foreign ministers of Portugal and Angola meet Guinea Bissau rebels on board <i>Vasco da Gama</i> ; government officials are invited but fail to turn up ²¹⁵	C/E	Prestige/Reassurance
July	Russia Japan	Russia and Japan hold their first joint naval exercise (SAR). The Japanese destroyers <i>Kurama</i> and <i>Hamagiri</i> then visit Vladivostok ²¹⁶	E	Co-operation/Attraction
July	UK Syria	HMS <i>Marlborough</i> and RFA <i>Fort Victoria</i> visit the Syrian port of Latakia; it is the first contact between the armed forces of the two countries since 1986 ²¹⁷	E	Attraction/Co-operation

²¹¹ Ibid., p14.

²¹² Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

²¹³ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

²¹⁴ *JDW* 29, No 26 (1998): p19.

²¹⁵ *JDW* 30, No 1 (1998): p6.

²¹⁶ *JDW* 30, No 4 (1998): p5.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p18.

August	Argentina Chile	Argentina and Chile conduct a joint naval exercise off Isla de los Estados; it is salvage based ²¹⁸	E	Co-operation
August	US China	US warships <i>John S McCain</i> and <i>Blue Ridge</i> visit Qingdao, two years after tensions over Taiwan ²¹⁹	E	Attraction
August	US Sudan Afghanistan Al Qaida	USN warships launch cruise missile attacks against Khost in Afghanistan and Al Shifa in Sudan; the former was believed to be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden, the latter was a pharmaceutical factory allegedly being used to manufacture chemical weapons. Both bombings were in response to the AQ attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania earlier in the year ²²⁰	D	Coercion
August to February 2000	Australia Indonesia	Various RAN units support UN sanctioned peace enforcement operation in East Timor, under the banner of Op <i>Stabilise/Warden</i> ²²¹	P	Deterrence
September	UK Albania	The UK stations a warship off Albania for NEO if required ²²²	P	Assistance/Reassurance
September	China	Chinese protesters land on the disputed	P	Coercion

²¹⁸ Ibid., p10.

²¹⁹ *JDW* 30, No 5 (1998): p6.

²²⁰ Ghosh, P.K. "Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy: An Instrument of Threat or Use of Limited Naval Force." *Strategic Analysis* 26, No 11 (2001): p2014; US. Congressional Research Service. Ploch, L. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. RL34003. (Washington DC: CRS, 2011), p34.

²²¹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

²²² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

	Japan	island of Senkaku/Diaoyu and clash with Japanese Coast Guard ²²³		
September	UK West Indies	RN conducts disaster relief in St Kitts and Montserrat in wake of Hurricane <i>Georges</i> ²²⁴	-	Assistance
October	NATO Greece Turkey	Greece and Turkey exercise together as part of the NATO exercise <i>Dynamic Mix</i> , the first time the two countries have done so for 13 years ²²⁵	E	Co-operation
October	NATO Serbia	NATO's STANAVFORMED conducts presence operations in the Adriatic as demonstration of resolve against Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The force is stood down after diplomatic protests ²²⁶	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
October	South Korea Russia	South Korean ships <i>Seoul</i> and <i>Taejon</i> visit Vladivostok on a good will port call ²²⁷	E	Attraction
October to November	UK Estonia Russia	UK mine hunter conducts clearance of WWI and WWII mines off Estonia ²²⁸	P/E	Assistance/Attraction
November	France UK	France proposes co-operation over aircraft carrier development plans ²²⁹	-	Co-operation

²²³ Global Security. "Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands."

²²⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²²⁵ *JDW* 30, No 15 (1998): p13.

²²⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²²⁷ *JDW* 30, No 17 (1998): p10.

²²⁸ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²²⁹ *JDW* 30, No 18 (1998): p3.

November	US Iraq	The US stations two carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups in the Gulf as a signal to Iraq to permit access to weapon inspectors ²³⁰	P	Coercion
November	US UK Netherlands France Canada Honduras Nicaragua	Major multi-national relief operations in and off coast of Honduras and Nicaragua after Hurricane <i>Mitch</i> ²³¹	-	Assistance
December	Iran Oman	Omani officers accept an invitation to watch Iranian naval exercises. Iran had been trying to conduct joint exercises with US-Gulf allies for a decade ²³²	-	Co-operation/Attraction
December	US UK Iraq Int Community	Operation <i>Desert Fox</i> takes place. It includes the most punishing air strikes against Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. There are significant diplomatic protests worldwide ²³³	D	Coercion
December	North Korea South Korea	A North Korean submarine violates South Korean waters and is sunk by the ROK Navy ²³⁴	D	Picture building/Deterrence

²³⁰ JDW 30, No 20 (1998): p3.

²³¹ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²³² JDW 30, No 23 (1998): p18.

²³³ Grimmett, *Use of US Armed Forces Abroad*, p20.

²³⁴ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1999				
January to March	UK Sierra Leone	UK stations warship off Sierra Leone to support government in fight against rebels ²³⁵	P/C	Reassurance
January to April	UK Iraq Serbia	HMS <i>Invincible</i> deploys to the Gulf following 'diplomatic difficulties' with Iraq. It conducts maritime interdiction, air surveillance and enforcement of the no-fly zone. On returning to the UK it is diverted to the Ionian Sea to participate in Operation <i>Allied Force</i> against Serbia ²³⁶	D	Coercion
February	Sri Lanka LTTE	Tamil Tigers capture a Sri Lankan Navy patrol craft ²³⁷	-	Coercion
February	US Albania	The US donates 5 patrol vessels to the Albanian coast guard under a PfP effort to counter drug trafficking ²³⁸	-	Attraction
February	France Fiji	France assists Fiji by conducting maritime surveillance flights over its EEZ, using its naval aircraft based in New Caledonia ²³⁹	E	Assistance/Attraction
March	India Int community	India deploys the aircraft carrier <i>Viraat</i> to the Gulf for the first time as part of its diplomatic plan to increase its influence in the region ²⁴⁰	E	Prestige/Attraction

²³⁵ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²³⁶ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p47.

²³⁷ *JDW* 31, No 9 (1999): p16.

²³⁸ *JDW* 31, No 10 (1999): p21.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p29.

²⁴⁰ India. *MOD Annual Report 1999-2000*, p31 .

March	India Thailand Sri Lanka Bangladesh Indonesia Singapore Maldives Mauritius UAE Oman	In an ambitious series of exercises (<i>Milan</i>), India strives for 'professional interaction' with neighbouring states. The Western Fleet exercises off the Kochi coast with the Maldives, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, the UAE and Oman, whilst the Eastern Fleet operates in the Bay of Bengal with Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Singapore ²⁴¹	E	Co-operation/Attraction/Prestige
March	India Sri Lanka LTTE	The Indian Navy and Coast Guard intercept an supply ship transporting arms to the Tamil Tigers ²⁴²	D	Co-operation/Coercion
March	GCC Iran	The Gulf Co-operation Council states voice concern over Iranian naval exercises; they stage their own week-long naval exercise in response ²⁴³	-	Co-operation/Deterrence
March	North Korea South Korea	South Korea recovers a North Korean infiltration craft which sank after a gun battle in December 1998 ²⁴⁴	-	Picture building/Deterrence/Coercion
March	NATO Serbia	Operation <i>Allied Force</i> is launched, consisting of air and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strikes on Serbia ²⁴⁵	D	Coercion
March	Japan	Discovery of a 'spy ship' off the Noto Peninsula ²⁴⁶	E	Picture building

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid., p28

²⁴³ *JDW* 31, No 10 (1999): p37.

²⁴⁴ *JDW* 31, No 12 (1999): p14.

²⁴⁵ *JDW* 31, No 13 (1999): p3.

²⁴⁶ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

	China			
April	India South African Development Community	The Indian Navy participates in <i>Blue Crane</i> , a peace-keeping exercise for the South African Development Community (no other non-SADC state is involved) ²⁴⁷	E	Co-operation/Attraction
April	Australia Vietnam	HMAS <i>Perth</i> and <i>Arunta</i> become the first Australian ships to visit Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam war, becoming a symbol of improving relationships and agents of furthering commercial ties ²⁴⁸	E	Attraction
May	NATO Serbia	NATO's STANAVFORLANT prepares to deploy for embargo operations in the Adriatic, similar to <i>Sharp Guard</i> from 1993 to 1996. The force poises off Gibraltar ²⁴⁹	P	Deterrence
May	New Zealand South Korea	New Zealand and South Korea conduct a joint anti-submarine exercise ²⁵⁰	E	Co-operation
May	India Pakistan Dom Community	In the wake of the Kargil crisis, when Pakistani forces crossed the Line of Control in the disputed territory, India put its Navy on alert and altered the operations deployment plans for its Eastern and Western Fleets. This sent a signal that any 'misadventure' would be firmly dealt with. India claimed that its naval response had a definitive effect on the outcome of the crisis ²⁵¹	D	Deterrence

²⁴⁷ India. *MOD Annual Report 1999-2000*, p29.

²⁴⁸ Stevens, David. *The Royal Australian Navy, Vol III*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p281.

²⁴⁹ *JDW* 31, No 18 (1999):p 5.

²⁵⁰ *JDW* 31, No 19 (1999): p6.

²⁵¹ Global Security. "1999 Kargil Conflict." Global Security.<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm> (accessed 14 June 2013); India. *MOD Annual Report 1999-2000*, p28.

May to August	Australia Solomon Islands	HMAS <i>Tobruk</i> contributes to the evacuation of foreign nationals from Solomon Islands ²⁵²	D	Assistance
June	China US	China bans USN ships from Hong Kong as part of a suspension of military contact following the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade ²⁵³	-	- Coercion
June	North Korea South Korea	Shots are exchanged between North and South Korean Coast Guard ships after North Korean vessel crosses the Northern Limit Line; in September North Korea announces that the Line is invalid ²⁵⁴	D	Coercion/Deterrence
June	US North Korea South Korea	The US deploys the USS <i>Constellation</i> carrier battle group and the USS <i>Peleliu</i> amphibious ready group to the Western Pacific in response to tensions between North and South Korea ²⁵⁵	P/E	Deterrence/Reassurance
July	Philippines China	The Philippine Navy sink a Chinese fishing boat off the Spratley Islands following a collision; they express regret ²⁵⁶	D/E	-
August	India Pakistan Dom Community	The Indian fleet poises off Karachi and India claims its presence hastens the end of the recent Kashmir border dispute ²⁵⁷	P	Deterrence

²⁵² Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

²⁵³ *JDW* 31, No 22 (1999): p15.

²⁵⁴ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

²⁵⁵ *JDW* 31, No 26 (1999): p3.

²⁵⁶ *JDW* 32, No 4 (1999): p12.

²⁵⁷ *JDW* 32, No 6 (1999): p13.

August	South Korea North Korea Japan	Pyongyang protests when South Korea and Japan hold a joint SAR exercise in South Korean waters ²⁵⁸	-	Co-operation/Deterrence
August	US Japan North Korea	The US sends two missile tracking ships to Japan following reports of North Korean ballistic missile tests ²⁵⁹	-	Reassurance/Deterrence
August	Georgia US	Georgian and US Coast Guard vessels hold a joint assault exercise in the Black Sea ²⁶⁰	E	Co-operation/Attraction
August	China US	China allows the first visit by USN ships to Hong Kong since the bombing of its Belgrade Embassy ²⁶¹	E	Attraction
October	US Canada Indonesia East Timor	The US deploys USS <i>Belleau Wood</i> and Canada deploys HMCS <i>Protecur</i> to East Timor to help restore peace after much infrastructure is destroyed following vote to become independent from Indonesia ²⁶²	P/E	Assistance/Reassurance
October	India Int Community Dom Community	The Indian Navy conducts high profile anti-poaching and anti-illegal immigration operations in and near the Nicobar Islands ²⁶³	-	Deterrence
November	South Korea Vietnam	Three South Korean warships visit Vietnam for the first time ²⁶⁴	E	Attraction

²⁵⁸ JDW 32, No 4 (1999): p13.

²⁵⁹ JDW 32, No 7 (1999): p15.

²⁶⁰ JDW 32, No 8 (1999): p10.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p15.

²⁶² Grimmett, *Instances of Use of US Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010*, p 21; Canada, *Background Summaries*.

²⁶³ India, *MOD Annual Report 1999-2000*, p29 .

	North Korea			
November	UK Turkey	HMS <i>Ocean</i> provides assistance to Turkey following an earthquake ²⁶⁵	-	Assistance
November	Russia Int Community	The Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, announces that the Russian Navy will resume global deployments ²⁶⁶	-	Prestige

²⁶⁴ *JDW* 32, No 18 (1999): p14.

²⁶⁵ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p48.

²⁶⁶ *JDW* 32, No 22 (1999): p5.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2000				
February	France Argentina	The first French/Argentinean naval exercise takes place between the Mar Del Plata and Cape Horn. It involves the French helicopter carrier <i>Jeanne d'Arc</i> , the destroyer <i>Georges Leygues</i> and the Argentinean submarine <i>Salta</i> and frigate <i>Espora</i> ²⁶⁷	E	Co-operation/Attraction
February	France India	A French/Indian naval exercise in the Arabian Sea is the first Indian military exercise with a western power since its nuclear tests in 1998 ²⁶⁸	E	Co-operation/Attraction
February	US China	USS <i>John C Stennis</i> carrier battle group visits Hong Kong. It is seen as a sign of improving relations between the two countries ²⁶⁹	E	Attraction
February	UK France	HMS <i>Victorious</i> becomes the first UK ballistic nuclear deterrent submarine to visit France; it spends five days in Brest ²⁷⁰	E	Attraction/Co-operation
February	France Gulf States	French naval, air and ground forces conduct Ex <i>Pearl Of The West</i> 2000, the largest exercise for France in the Gulf since the 1991 war ²⁷¹	E	Co-operation/Attraction/Prestige

²⁶⁷ JDW 33, No 6 (2000): p9.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p15.

²⁶⁹ JDW 33, No 7 (2000): p24.

²⁷⁰ JDW 33, No 8 (2000): p6.

²⁷¹ JDW 33, No 9 (2000): p8.

February-March	Iran Int Community	Iran conducts Ex <i>Vahdat</i> 78 (Unity 78), a naval exercise in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz ²⁷²	E	Prestige/Deterrence
March	UK Mozambique	The UK deploys an auxiliary vessel and Royal Marines to Mozambique to conduct humanitarian assistance following floods, under the banner of Op <i>Barwood</i> ²⁷³	-	Assistance
March	China Japan	Chinese naval vessels train in the vicinity of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Island ²⁷⁴	P/E	Deterrence
March-April	Fiji Tonga France	Following a military co-operation agreement earlier in the month, France rapidly plans and executes joint naval exercises with the Pacific countries ²⁷⁵	E	Co-operation/Attraction
March-April	UK US Canada Netherlands Colombia Venezuela	Six states conduct naval exercises together in the Caribbean ²⁷⁶	E	Co-operation
March-September	Singapore Int Community	Singapore conducts its first round the world deployment to showcase its new LST, RSS <i>Endurance</i> . Port visits include New York,	E	Prestige

²⁷² *JDW* 33, No 10 (2000): p23.

²⁷³ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²⁷⁴ Global Security. "Senkaku/Diaoyatai Islands."

²⁷⁵ *JDW* 33, No 12 (2000): p14.

²⁷⁶ *JDW* 33, No 13 (2000): p8.

		Hawaii, Mexico, Panama, Canada, the UK, France, Egypt and Saudi Arabia ²⁷⁷		
April	India Thailand	Two Indian warships visit Bangkok and exercise with the Thai Navy; it is part of the Navy's theme for 2000 – "Building Bridges of Friendship" ²⁷⁸	E	Attraction
May	Pakistan Saudi Arabia	Pakistan and Saudi Arabia conduct Ex <i>Naseem Al-Bahr</i> (Wind of the Sea) in the Arabian Sea. It is aimed at improving co-operation. Pakistani ships then visit Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Iran and Qatar ²⁷⁹	E	Co-operation/Attraction
May	India Sri Lanka LTTE	India and Sri Lanka conduct a joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal. There is speculation that there could be joint patrols and Indian assistance to prevent the Tamil Tigers trafficking arms by sea ²⁸⁰	E	Co-operation
May	India Sri Lanka LTTE	The Indian Navy's Eastern Command is put on a war footing under Op <i>Jalinkas</i> as a signal of deterrence after the Tamil Tigers advance in Jaffna ²⁸¹	P/E	Deterrence/Reassurance
May	US Sierra Leone	The USN deploys a patrol craft to Sierra Leone to conduct a NEO if required ²⁸²	P	Reassurance

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p19.

²⁷⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2000-2001*, p33 .

²⁷⁹ *JDW* 33, No 19 (2000): p15.

²⁸⁰ *JDW* 33, No 21 (2000): p3.

²⁸¹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2000-2001*, p33 .

²⁸² Ploch, *Africa Command*, p35.

May to June	UK Sierra Leone UN	Op <i>Palliser</i> , a UK operation in support of the government of Sierra Leone when the capital, Freetown, was under attack from rebels. HMS <i>Illustrious</i> , <i>Ocean</i> , supporting frigates and auxiliaries are deployed ²⁸³	D/P	Reassurance/Deterrence/Coercion
June	Australia New Zealand Solomon Islands	Australia and New Zealand dispatch ships to conduct a NEO following a coup in the Solomon Islands ²⁸⁴	P	Assistance/Reassurance
June	Sri Lanka LTTE	Tamil Tigers sink two Sri Lankan fast attack craft off Vadamarachchi ²⁸⁵	-	Coercion
August	Russia UK Norway	The Russian submarine <i>Kursk</i> sinks with the loss of all lives. The UK and Norway each send specialists to assist ²⁸⁶	-	Co-operation/Assistance/Attraction
August	US China	USS <i>Chancellerville</i> pays a port visit to Qingdao as part of a resumption of US-Chinese military relations ²⁸⁷	E	Attraction
August	China South Africa	The Chinese warship <i>Shenzen</i> and its auxiliary <i>Nancang</i> visit Simons Town ²⁸⁸	E	Attraction
August	New Zealand	New Zealand deploys HMNZS <i>Te Kaha</i> to the	C	Attraction/Prestige

²⁸³ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, pp48-49.

²⁸⁴ *JDW* 33, No 24 (2000): p12.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *JDW* 34, No 8 (2000): p4.

²⁸⁷ *JDW* 34, No 5 (2000): p4.

²⁸⁸ *JDW* 34, No 8 (2000): p5.

	Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands after a request for a 'secure, neutral venue for peace talks' ²⁸⁹		
September	US South Africa	USS <i>George Washington</i> visits Cape Town. It is the first visit by a USN carrier to South Africa since the 1960s; a possible response to the Chinese visit a month earlier ²⁹⁰	E	Attraction/Prestige
September	US Italy Turkey Russia Int Community	A joint submarine rescue exercise involving Turkey, Italy and the US takes place off Mersin Bay in Turkey; it follows the Russian submarine <i>Kursk</i> disaster in August ²⁹¹	E	Co-operation
September	Australia Fed States of Micronesia	Various RAN units provide surveillance support to the Federated States of Micronesia ²⁹²	E	Co-operation/Picture building/Attraction
October	US Yemen Int Community	USS <i>Cole</i> suffers a terrorist attack in Yemeni port of Aden ²⁹³	D	Coercion
October	UK Belize	HMS <i>Cardiff</i> is dispatched to Belize to provide support after Hurricane <i>Keith</i> ²⁹⁴	-	Assistance
October	India China	An Indian naval task group pay good will visits to China, Vietnam and Indonesia ²⁹⁵	E	Prestige/Attraction

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p18.

²⁹⁰ JDW 34, No 6 (2000): p19.

²⁹¹ JDW 34, No 11 (2000): p5.

²⁹² Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

²⁹³ Grimmett, *Instances of Use of US Armed Forces Abroad*, p22.

²⁹⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

²⁹⁵ India. *MOD Annual Report 2000-2001*, p34 .

	Vietnam Indonesia			
November to December	UK Sierra Leone Int Community	In Operation <i>Silkman</i> , an RN amphibious task group conducts a show of strength and beach landing near Freetown; the timing coincided with the end of a 30 day cease fire and was aimed to deter rebels from outbreaks of violence ²⁹⁶	P/E	Reassurance/Deterrence

²⁹⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p49.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2001				
January	US Israel Turkey	The US, Israel and Turkey conduct a joint SAR exercise in the Mediterranean ²⁹⁷	E	Co-operation/Attraction
January	Russia Int Community	Russia announces one of its navy's longest deployments since Soviet break-up. The warship <i>Vinogradov</i> and support vessel <i>Panteleyev</i> will spend two months in the Indian and Pacific Oceans ²⁹⁸	-	Prestige
February	US Algeria	USS <i>Mitscher</i> participates in an anti-submarine warfare exercise with Algeria ²⁹⁹	E	Co-operation/Attraction
February	US Taiwan China Marshall Islands	The US vetoes a visit by the Taiwanese 'friendship fleet' to the Marshall Islands under the Compact of Free Association. The Marshall Islands had established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1998 ³⁰⁰	-	Coercion
March	India Singapore	The Indian and Singaporean navies conduct a bilateral anti-submarine exercise ³⁰¹	E	Co-operation

²⁹⁷ JDW 35, No 2 (2001): p3.

²⁹⁸ Strategy Page. "February 6, 2001". StrategyWorld.com.

<http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/russia/articles/20010206.aspx>

(accessed 15 August 2013).

²⁹⁹ JDW 35, No 7 (2001): p16.

³⁰⁰ JDW 35, No 9 (2001): p5.

³⁰¹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2001-2002*, p6 .

April	Turkey Bulgaria Georgia Romania Russia Ukraine	An agreement is signed to establish BLACKSEAFOR, a naval force of the Black Sea countries to be used for SAR, environmental protection, mine countermeasures and good will visits ³⁰²	-	Co-operation/Attraction
April	North Korea South Korea	A North Korean patrol boat violates South Korean territorial waters. South Korean ships intercept the vessel and escort it out. North Korea does not recognise the border or territorial waters of the South ³⁰³	P	Coercion
April	China Australia Taiwan Int Community	PLAN vessels challenge Australian warships transiting the Taiwan Strait ³⁰⁴	P	Coercion
April to May	India Indonesia	In a 'new chapter of cooperation' the Indian Navy assists Indonesia with a survey of Sabang ³⁰⁵	E	Attraction/Assistance
April to June	Australia Vanuatu	HMAS <i>Kanimbla</i> conducts disaster relief operations in Vanuatu following volcanic eruption on island of Lopevi ³⁰⁶	-	Assistance
May	Taiwan China	The Taiwanese 'friendship fleet' returns to Taiwan after a 95 day deployment, visiting eight countries in the	E	Prestige/Attraction

³⁰² *JDW* 35, No 15 (2001): p9.

³⁰³ *JDW* 35, No 16 (2001): p18.

³⁰⁴ *JDW* 35, No 19 (2001): p5.

³⁰⁵ India. *MOD Annual Report 2001-2002*, p28 .

³⁰⁶ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

	Int Community	Pacific, Central and South America, all of which recognise Taiwan diplomatically ³⁰⁷		
June	Singapore Asia-Pacific Community	Singapore hosts a mine countermeasures exercise, reinforcing its leading role in promoting multi-lateral military activity in the Asia-Pacific region. Participants include Australia, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, the US, Vietnam, New Zealand and Canada ³⁰⁸	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	Australia Indonesia	HMAS <i>Hawkesbury</i> and <i>Huon</i> becomes first RAN ships to visit major Indonesian port since operations in East Timor began ³⁰⁹	E	Attraction
August	UK Oman Int community	Largest RN task group since Falklands conflict in 1982 sails for Ex <i>Saif Sareea II</i>	E	Attraction
August	China India	Reciprocating the Indian visit of the previous year, two Chinese warships visit Mumbai ³¹⁰	E	Attraction
August	India Bangladesh	India and Bangladesh conduct a SAR exercise ³¹¹	E	Co-operation
September	US Int Community Dom	On the day of the terrorist attacks (9/11) in New York, the aircraft carrier USS <i>Enterprise</i> deploys to the Northern Arabian Gulf as a contingency force ³¹²	C/P	Deterrence/Reassurance

³⁰⁷ JDW 35, No 21 (2001): p14.

³⁰⁸ JDW 35, No 26 (2001): p13.

³⁰⁹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

³¹⁰ India. *MOD Annual Report 2001-2002*, p35 .

³¹¹ Ibid., p38.

³¹² Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p50.

	Community			
September	South Africa US	South Africa refuses permission for the visit of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, USS <i>Enterprise</i> , to Cape Town ³¹³	-	-
September	China Int Community	China increases its patrols of the South China Sea and Spratley Islands with three new patrol boats. The vessels belong to the PLAN but are marked as 'customs' to downplay their role ³¹⁴	E	Picture building
October	UK Oman Int Community	Ex <i>Saif Sareea II</i> becomes a symbol of the global war on terror. An Omani Navy Commodore becomes the Maritime Component Commander in a UK Type 22 frigate ³¹⁵	E	Attraction/Co-operation
October	Australia Int Community	HMAS <i>Warramunga</i> turns back illegal immigrants at Ashmore Reef. HMAS <i>Adelaide</i> fires warning shots across the bow of another vessel carrying illegal immigrants ³¹⁶	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
October	South Korea China North Korea	South Korea pays its first naval good will visit to mainland China, led by the destroyer <i>Euljimundok</i> ; there had been a previous visit to Hong Kong in 1998 ³¹⁷	E	Attraction
November	US UK	The US and UK lead a coalition assault into Afghanistan from ships in the Indian Ocean ³¹⁸	D	Coercion/Co-operation/Reassurance

³¹³ JDW 36, No 12 (2001): p24.

³¹⁴ JDW 36, No 13 (2001): p11.

³¹⁵ JDW 36, No 17 (2001): p4.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p14.

³¹⁷ JDW 36, No 18 (2001): p30.

³¹⁸ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p50. Whilst this incident may be interpreted as a prelude to war, it is included here as an example of *limited* naval force.

	Afghanistan Int Community			
November	Japan Int Community	A Japanese warship is deployed to the Indian Ocean for 'data gathering'; other destroyers and mine countermeasures support vessels deploy for 'co-operation and support activities' ³¹⁹	P/E	Co-operation/Picture building
December	Nigeria South Africa	Nigeria and South Africa conduct joint anti-piracy patrols off the west coast of Africa ³²⁰	P/E	Co-operation

³¹⁹ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

³²⁰ *JDW* 36, No 23 (2001): p17.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2002				
January	US Algeria	The US and Algeria conduct their fourth joint exercise in the Mediterranean ³²¹	E	Co-operation/Attraction
February	France Tanzania Regional Community	France and Tanzania co-host a peace support exercise in Tanzania's Tanga Bay. France provides its amphibious ship <i>Sirocco</i> . Other states participating are Kenya, South Africa, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Mauritius ³²²	E	Co-operation/Attraction
April	India US Int Community	Under the banner Op <i>Sagittarius</i> , the Indian Navy escort High Value Vessels through the Strait of Malacca choke point as part of the US-led Op <i>Enduring Freedom</i> (the war on terror following the attacks of 11 September 2001) ³²³	P/E	Co-operation/Prestige
May	Germany Int Community	Germany assumes command of the international naval Task Force 150, operating around the Horn of Africa as part of the global war on terror ³²⁴	-	Prestige/Co-operation
May	India Mexico	At Mexican request, the Indian Navy escorts a sail training ship through the Strait of Malacca ³²⁵	P/E	Co-operation/Prestige
May	Taiwan China	Taiwan tests its first anti-ship missile, the Hsiung-Feng 2, with a reported range of 150 km ³²⁶	-	Deterrence

³²¹ JDW 37, No 4 (2002): p15.

³²² JDW 37, No 10 (2002): p16.

³²³ India. *MOD Annual Report 2002-2003*, p26 .

³²⁴ JDW 37, No 21 (2002): p5.

³²⁵ India. *MOD Annual Report 2002-2003*, p27 .

³²⁶ JDW 37, No 22 (2002): p14.

May	India France	A joint Indian/French naval exercise is conducted in the Arabian Sea. The Indian Defence Minister visits the French flag ship, <i>Charles de Gaulle</i> ³²⁷	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	North Korea South Korea	Shots exchanged as North Korean patrol boats cross the Northern Limit Line and are intercepted by the South Korean Navy ³²⁸	D	Coercion/Deterrence
July	New Zealand Vietnam	RNZN ships <i>Te Mana</i> and <i>Endeavour</i> pay a good will visit to Ho Chi Minh City ³²⁹	E	Attraction
July	Germany India	The German and Indian Navies conduct a Passex off Kochi ³³⁰	E	Co-operation
August	Russia Int Community	Russia conducts the largest naval exercise in the Caspian Sea since the end of the Soviet Union; it involves 60 ships and 10,000 men ³³¹	E	Prestige
August	Russia Int Community	Russia is forced to cancel a Black Sea Fleet exercise, reportedly because of fuel shortages. It was due to exercise with the French navy and pay visits to France and Italy ³³²	-	-
September	India Indonesia	India and Indonesia commence joint patrols of the Malacca Strait ³³³	P/E	Co-operation
October	Japan	Japan's first post-WWII international fleet review is held in	E	Attraction/Prestige

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

³²⁹ *JDW* 38, No 2 (2002): p14.

³³⁰ India. *MOD Annual Report 2002-2003*, p28 .

³³¹ *JDW* 38, No 7 (2002): p9.

³³² *JDW* 38, No 9 (2002): p9.

³³³ *JDW* 39, No 23 (2003): p12.

	Int Community	Tokyo Bay ³³⁴		
October	India Kuwait Oman Int Community	The Indian Navy's training squadron visit Kuwait and Oman ³³⁵	E	Attraction
November	China Myanmar India	China commences building a major naval signals intelligence facility on Myanmar's Great Coco Island, near India's strategically important Andaman and Nicobar Islands ³³⁶	-	Picture building
December	US Yemen North Korea Spain	A Spanish warship, acting as part of Task Force 150, intercepts a ship carrying Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen. However, after protests from Yemen the ship is allowed to proceed. The US Secretary of State then announces that Yemen had agreed not to pass the missiles to a third party ³³⁷	P	-

³³⁴ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

³³⁵ India. *MOD Annual Report 2002-2003*, p26 .

³³⁶ *JDW* 39, No 1 (2003): p12.

³³⁷ *JDW* 38, No 25 (2002): 2.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2003				
January	India Sri Lanka LTTE	The Indian government announces that its Navy will provide logistical support to Sri Lanka in the fight against the Tamil Tigers at sea ³³⁸	P	Co-operation/Attraction
January	US UK Iraq Int Community	US and UK naval assets begin to mass in the Arabian Gulf following Iraqi refusal to allow weapons inspectors access to sites required ³³⁹	D	Coercion
February	France Int Community	The French carrier <i>Charles de Gaulle</i> and its task group of three frigates, one nuclear submarine and replenishment vessel sail for the eastern Mediterranean. The French political leadership had formally declared their opposition to military intervention in Iraq but the deployment is viewed as a signal of quiet preparations for involvement ³⁴⁰	E	Prestige/Coercion
March	Iran India	Iran and India conduct joint naval exercises off Mumbai in an attempt to increase bilateral cooperation ³⁴¹	E	Co-operation/Attraction
March	US	The invasion of Iraq begins with an assault	D	Coercion

³³⁸ JDW 39, No 3 (2003): p13.

³³⁹ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p52.

³⁴⁰ JDW 39, No 6 (2003): p4.

³⁴¹ The Times of India. "Indo-Iranian Naval Exercises to Begin Today." 9 March 2003. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-03-09/india/27267982_1_exercises_warships_bilateral_ties (accessed 15 August 2013).

	UK Iraq Int Community	from the sea ³⁴²		
March	UK Sierra Leone	The UK deploys HMS <i>Iron Duke</i> plus an auxiliary with Royal Marines embarked to Sierra Leone in support of the government when civil unrest was feared ³⁴³	P/C	Reassurance/Deterrence
April	Russia Int Community	Russia commences a long-planned naval deployment to the Indian Ocean. The Defence Ministry claim that it is not connected with the US-led invasion of Iraq. It is the largest Russian deployment in a decade ³⁴⁴	C/E	Prestige
April	Brunei Philippines	Brunei and the Philippines hold their first bilateral naval exercise, <i>Seagull</i> 01-03 ³⁴⁵	E	Co-operation
April	Russia Ukraine NATO	Russia and Ukraine conduct joint naval exercises, <i>Peace Fairway</i> , in the Black Sea. This follows a NATO announcement of a PfP exercise with Ukraine and involvement of STANAVFORMED planned for later in the year ³⁴⁶	E	Co-operation/Attraction

³⁴² Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p52; Ploch, *Africa Command*, p35.

³⁴³ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p54.

³⁴⁴ *JDW* 39, No 15 (2003):p6.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p16.

³⁴⁶ *JDW* 39, No 17 (2003): p3.

May	Australia Solomon Islands	RAN delivers medical aid to Solomon Islands ³⁴⁷	-	Assistance
May	India Sri Lanka	Indian Navy provides flood relief for Sri Lanka ³⁴⁸	-	Assistance
May	India Russia	Indian and Russian navies conduct the first bilateral exercise between the two countries (Ex <i>Indra 03</i>) ³⁴⁹	E	Co-operation
May	Canada Int Community	Canada reduces its naval footprint in the Persian Gulf, withdrawing one of its frigates after 3 months of a planned 6 month deployment ³⁵⁰	-	-
June	India African Union	The Indian Navy considers a request to provide maritime security for the African Union (AU) summit in Mozambique ³⁵¹	-	Attraction/Co-operation
June	Chile UK France Canada US	Ex <i>Teamwork South 2003</i> takes place off the coast of Northern Chile. It aims to improve interoperability between the participating forces, particularly when working under a UN mandate ³⁵²	E	Co-operation

³⁴⁷ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

³⁴⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2003-2004*, p45.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p45.

³⁵⁰ *JDW* 39, No 21 (2003): p9.

³⁵¹ *JDW* 39, No 22 (2003): p14.

³⁵² *JDW* 40, No 4 (2003): p8.

June to July	US ASEAN	A series of joint US-ASEAN naval exercises, <i>Carat 03</i> , takes place, aiming to improve interoperability ³⁵³	E	Co-operation
July	US India Regional Community	The US and India conduct a SAR exercise off Chennai; there are observers from Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Mauritius and the Maldives ³⁵⁴	E	Co-operation/Attraction
July	Greece Tunisia	The Greek and Tunisian navies conduct their first joint exercise, <i>Poseidon</i> ³⁵⁵	E	Co-operation
July	US Fiji	USS <i>O'Kane</i> becomes the first USN warship to visit Fiji in 3 years following the overthrow of the government there in May 2000 ³⁵⁶	E	Attraction
July	India Mozambique AU Int Community	INS <i>Ranjit</i> and <i>Suvarna</i> deploy to Mozambique to provide maritime security for the AU summit in Maputo. Medicine was also delivered ³⁵⁷	P/E	Deterrence/Attraction/Reassurance
August	Japan Russia	Japanese and Russian warships conduct bilateral anti-terrorism exercises in the Okhotsk Sea; the exercises are a departure from the normal SAR and are an attempt to strengthen ties ³⁵⁸	E	Co-operation

³⁵³ JDW 40, No 1 (2003): p17.

³⁵⁴ India. *MOD Annual Report 2003-2004*, p43.

³⁵⁵ JDW 40, No 4 (2003): p12.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p15.

³⁵⁷ India. *MOD Annual Report 2003-2004*, p40.

³⁵⁸ JDW 40, No 6 (2003): p15.

August	US Liberia	In response to deteriorating conditions in Liberia, the US President authorises deployment into the country's territorial waters to support UN and West African states to restore order and to provide humanitarian assistance ³⁵⁹	C	Reassurance/Deterrence/Assistance
September	Taiwan China	Taiwan conducts large live-fire exercise involving ships, aircraft, troops and vehicles in an anti-amphibious scenario. However, the exercise suffered a series of mishaps including missed targets; Taiwan publicly blamed the presence of an unspecified third party 'spy ship' and a Chinese electronic warfare monitoring aircraft for the problems	P/E	Coercion/Deterrence
September	India Iran	The Indian and Iranian navies conduct a Passex off Bandar Abbas ³⁶⁰	E	Co-operation
October	Greece NATO	Greece withdraws the Hellenic Navy from participation in Op <i>Enduring Freedom</i> , citing costs and commitment in home waters ³⁶¹	-	-
November	US South Africa Int Community	The USN deploys its experimental catamaran HSV-2 <i>Swift</i> to South Africa; visits to West African ports will follow ³⁶²	E	Attraction/Assistance/Co-operation
November	US Vietnam	USS <i>Vandergrift</i> becomes the first USN warship to visit Vietnam since the fall of Saigon in 1975; the visit follows a visit to Washington the previous week by the	E	Attraction

³⁵⁹ Ploch, *Africa Command*, p35.

³⁶⁰ India. *MOD Annual Report 2003-2004*, p49; *JDW* 40, No 11 (2003):p4.

³⁶¹ *JDW* 40, No 15 (2003): p11.

³⁶² *JDW* 40, No 20 (2003): p19.

		Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister for talks aimed at launching bilateral military relations ³⁶³		
November	India China	Following a port visit to Shanghai, the Indian and Chinese navies conduct a joint SAR exercise ³⁶⁴	E	Co-operation
November to December	India Seychelles	An Indian Navy survey vessel, INS <i>Nirdeshak</i> , conducts survey operations around the Seychelles ³⁶⁵	E	Assistance/Attraction
December	China Pakistan	The Chinese and Pakistani navies conduct their first ever bilateral exercise ³⁶⁶	E	Co-operation/Attraction

³⁶³ *JDW* 40, No 21 (2003): p18.

³⁶⁴ India. *MOD Annual Report 2003-2004*, p45.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p42.

³⁶⁶ China. "China's National Defense in 2010." Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 31 March 2011.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2004				
January	China Japan	Japanese patrol vessels allegedly attack Chinese fishing vessels in the vicinity of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ³⁶⁷	P	Coercion/deterrence
March	US Japan North Korea South Korea	The US announces that it will deploy an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the Sea of Japan to bolster ballistic missile defences ³⁶⁸	P/E	Deterrence/Reassurance
May to July	India Mozambique Int Community	INS <i>Savitri</i> and <i>Sujata</i> deploy to Mozambique to provide maritime security (Op <i>Farishta</i> 04) during a World Economic Forum meeting and a Afro-Pacific-Caribbean Heads of State meeting at Maputo. Simultaneously, medical treatment is given to 450 patients and naval training is given to the Mozambique Navy ³⁶⁹	P/E	Co-operation/Assistance/Attraction
June	US Argentina	During its commissioning voyage from Norfolk, Va to San Diego, Ca, USS <i>Ronald Reagan</i> conducts exercises with South American navies. Of note, it includes 'touch and go' exercises with Argentinean Super Etendard aircraft, which have not been to sea since the scrapping of the Argentinean aircraft carrier <i>Veinticinco de Mayo</i> in 1997 ³⁷⁰	E	Prestige/Co-operation

³⁶⁷ Global Security. "Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands."

³⁶⁸ JDW 41, No 13 (2004): p18.

³⁶⁹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2004-2005*, p46.

³⁷⁰ JDW 41, No 26 (2004): p11.

June	US Brunei Singapore	The US, Brunei and Singapore conduct a Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (<i>Carat</i>) exercise in SE Asia ³⁷¹	E	Co-operation
June	Iran UK	Iranian Navy seizes British sailors and marines in Royal Navy rigid inflatable boats in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, claiming they had entered Iranian territorial waters. They are released after two days ³⁷²	D/P	Coercion
July	Singapore Malaysia Indonesia	Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia commence joint patrols of the Strait of Malacca ³⁷³	P/E	Co-operation
July	Russia Int Community	The ballistic submarine <i>Delta-IV</i> launches a satellite. ³⁷⁴	-	Prestige
July	China Japan	A Chinese naval survey vessel and marine research ship operate within the Japanese EEZ off Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ³⁷⁵	P/E	Coercion
August	Russia Georgia Ukraine Bulgaria Romania Turkey	Georgia leads the BLACKSEAFOR for the first time, during a month long cruise around the Black Sea ³⁷⁶	-	Co-operation

³⁷¹ Ibid., p15.

³⁷² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

³⁷³ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

³⁷⁴ Russia. "Chronology of the Russian Fleet."

³⁷⁵ Global Security. "Senkaku/Diaoyatai Islands."

³⁷⁶ *JDW* 41, No 32 (2004): p11.

September	UK Grenada Grand Cayman	HMS <i>Richmond</i> and RFA <i>Wave Ruler</i> divert to Grenada and Grand Cayman to provide disaster relief after Hurricane Ivan ³⁷⁷	-	Assistance
September	Brazil Namibia	Brazil gifts patrol vessel to Namibia ³⁷⁸	-	Assistance/Attraction
October	Australia Russia	HMAS <i>Arunta</i> visits Vladivostok to support navy-to-navy talks and further diplomatic relations between two countries ³⁷⁹	E	Attraction/Co-operation
October	Russia US Norway	Russia and the US conduct a bilateral naval exercise off the Norwegian coast and pay port visit to Stavanger ³⁸⁰	E	Co-operation/Attraction
October	South Korea US North Korea	The US alerts South Korea to the presence of two suspected North Korean submarines in its waters. Later, in an incident reported to be unrelated, a South Korean naval vessel sinks in bad weather ³⁸¹	P	Reassurance/Deterrence
November	Brazil Argentina Uruguay US Spain	Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, the US and Spain participate in the <i>Unitas</i> naval exercise in Uruguayan waters; SAR based ³⁸²	E	Co-operation
November	Australia	RAN conducts mission to destroy or remove	-	Assistance/Attraction

³⁷⁷ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

³⁷⁸ *JDW* 41, No 39 (2004): p28.

³⁷⁹ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

³⁸⁰ *JDW* 41, No 40 (2004): p14.

³⁸¹ *JDW* 41, No 43 (2004): p16.

³⁸² *JDW* 41, No 46 (2004): p10.

	Kiribati	thousands of pieces of WWII ordnance from island of Tarawa in Kiribati ³⁸³		
November	China Japan	A submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine violates Japanese territorial waters. China later apologises, blaming a 'technical error' ³⁸⁴	P/E	-
December	Indonesia Int Community	Numerous navies engage in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in response to earthquake and tsunami on Sumatra ³⁸⁵	-	Assistance

³⁸³ Australia, *RAN Operations Database*.

³⁸⁴ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011; *JDW* 41, No 47 (2004): p15.

³⁸⁵ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*; *JDW* 42, No 2 (2005): pp3-4.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2005				
January	UK Int Community	RN deploys HMS <i>Invincible</i> and her task group on a three month <i>Marstrike</i> 05 deployment to the Mediterranean and Gulf; the aim is to demonstrate the operational capability of the UK's maritime strike task group ³⁸⁶	E	Prestige
January	China Vietnam	In a dispute over economic rights in the South China Sea, the PLAN seizes Vietnamese fishing vessels and detains their crews. This tactic continues for at least the next 5 years ³⁸⁷	P/E	Deterrence
January	India Myanmar	INS <i>Sukanya</i> pays a good will visit to Rangoon ³⁸⁸	E	Attraction
February	India Seychelles	India gifts fast attack craft to the Seychelles ³⁸⁹	-	Attraction
May	US Azerbaijan Kazakhstan	US provides \$100 million for the <i>Caspian Guard</i> initiative, helping the Caspian Sea littoral states to improve maritime surveillance and security in a strategically important region; it gives US business a foothold ³⁹⁰	-	Attraction

³⁸⁶ JDW 42, No 4 (2005): p11.

³⁸⁷ McVadon, Eric A. "China's Navy Today: Looking Toward Blue Water." In Erickson, Andrew & Goldstein, Lyle, & Lord, Charles (Eds). *China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009),p388; Wong, Edward. "Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave off China's Reach." New York Times, 4 February 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/asia/05hanoi.html?_r=0, (accessed 17 June 2013).

³⁸⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2005-2006*, p34 .

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p39 .

³⁹⁰ JDW 42, No 21 (2005): p12.

July	Russia NATO	Russian ships <i>Moskva</i> and <i>Rytiviy</i> make port call to Naples whilst the commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet meets with NATO commanders to discuss potential Russian co-operation with Op <i>Active Endeavour</i> in the Mediterranean ³⁹¹	E	Attraction
July to August	Israel Palestinian Auth Dom Community Int Community	Following the Disengagement Plan, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the Israeli Navy deploy patrol vessels off the Gaza coastline to provide maritime protection for the withdrawing forces ³⁹²	P	Reassurance/Deterrence
August	China Russia	China and Russia hold a joint tri-Service exercise, <i>Peace Mission 2005</i> , near Vladivostok in the Russian Far East, in Shandong Province and afloat ³⁹³	E	Co-operation
August	China Int Community	Speculation mounts about China's aircraft carrier ambitions. The ex-Russian carrier <i>Varyag</i> is under repair in China and is seen being painted in Chinese military markings ³⁹⁴	-	Prestige
August	Russia Japan	A JMSDF vessel is deployed to assist following an accident involving a Russian submarine off the Kamchatka peninsula ³⁹⁵	-	Assistance
September	China Japan	Chinese naval vessels operate near the Kashi oil fields in order to demonstrate capability and protect maritime rights and interests in the disputed East China Sea ³⁹⁶	P/E	-

³⁹¹ *JDW* 42, No 30 (2005): p11.

³⁹² *JDW* 42, No 29 (2005): p17.

³⁹³ *JDW* 42, No 33 (2005): p15.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p7.

³⁹⁵ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

September	Canada US	HMCS <i>Athabaskan</i> , <i>Ville de Quebec</i> and <i>Toronto</i> deploy to the Gulf coast of the US to help relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina ³⁹⁷	-	Assistance
September	India Sri Lanka LTTE	The first Indian-Sri Lankan naval special forces exercise takes place at Tangalle, Sri Lanka ³⁹⁸	-	Co-operation
September	India Indonesia	The Indian and Indonesian navies conduct Op <i>Indindo Corpat</i> , a co-ordinated patrol of the international maritime boundary in the Andaman Sea ³⁹⁹	P/E	Co-operation
October	India Russia	The Indian and Russian navies conduct a joint exercise which includes anti-submarine warfare, maritime interdiction and boarding ⁴⁰⁰	E	Co-operation
October	Singapore Malaysia	Singapore and Malaysia embark on their first joint military endeavour outside the FPDA (consists of Singapore and Malaysia, plus the UK, Australia and New Zealand). The first step is a joint submarine rescue capability ⁴⁰¹	E	Co-operation
November	Sweden Singapore	After a decade of relationship building (see Feb 96 onwards), Singapore decides to buy Swedish submarines ⁴⁰²	-	Attraction

³⁹⁶ Smith, Paul, J. "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed." *US Naval War College Review* 66, No 2 (2013): p39.

³⁹⁷ Canada, *Background Summaries*.

³⁹⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2005-2006*, p38.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p37.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p38.

⁴⁰¹ *JDW* 42, No 43 (2005): p14.

⁴⁰² *JDW* 42, No 46 (2005): p10.

November	Malaysia Int Community Dom Community	Following a rise in piracy in the Strait of Malacca, Malaysia establishes the Maritime Enforcement Agency as a symbol of its determination to focus on providing safe sea routes to international shipping ⁴⁰³	-	Deterrence/Reassurance
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⁴⁰³ *JDW* 42, No 50 (2005): p13.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2006				
January to March	India Seychelles	India conducts surveys of Seychelles waters. The completed charts are presented to the Vice President of Seychelles in a ceremony ⁴⁰⁴	E	Assistance/Attraction/Picture building
February	Israel Palestinian Auth Int Community	Israel declares exclusion zone around the Tetis natural gas installation, 13 miles from its coast, and steps up naval patrols; the installation is critical to the Israeli economy and seen as a soft target for terrorist attack ⁴⁰⁵	P/E	Deterrence
March	China US	The USN's Pacific Command proposes a series of officer exchanges between itself and the PLAN. If approved, it will be the first bilateral military contact between the two countries since a mid-air collision soured relations in 2001 ⁴⁰⁶	-	Co-operation
April	Nigeria Dom Community Int Community	Nigeria announces that it is developing an unmanned coastal surveillance capability; the move follows a series of attacks on Niger delta oil installations in the preceding months ⁴⁰⁷	-	Deterrence/Picture building
May	India Indonesia	The Indian warship <i>Rajput</i> becomes the first foreign warship on the scene after an	-	Assistance

⁴⁰⁴ India. *MOD Annual Report 2006-2007*, p30.

⁴⁰⁵ *JDW* 43, No 7 (2006): p20.

⁴⁰⁶ *JDW* 43, No 11 (2006): p7.

⁴⁰⁷ *JDW* 43, No 15 (2006): p17.

		earthquake in Indonesia; relief operations are conducted ⁴⁰⁸		
June	India Int Community	India demonstrates its Navy's global reach by deploying a four ship task group to the Mediterranean. It visits Israel, Egypt, Greece, Turkey and Libya ⁴⁰⁹	E	Prestige/Attraction
June	NATO Cape Verde Int Community	NATO conducts Exercise <i>Steadfast Jaguar</i> in Cape Verde. The exercise, which includes an amphibious assault and numerous aircraft carriers and other ships from member states is set to test NATO's Response Force in Africa. Cape Verde was keen to host the exercise and aspires to join the Alliance ⁴¹⁰	E	Reassurance/co-operation
July	India Int Community Dom Community	On its return from the Mediterranean the Indian naval task group is diverted to Lebanon and conducts a NEO from Beirut; 2280 Indian, Sri Lanka and Nepalese nationals are collected ⁴¹¹	D	Assistance
July	US China	The PLAN accepts an invitation to observe a major US exercise, <i>Valiant Shield</i> , in seas off Guam. It is the largest US exercise in the Western Pacific since the Vietnam War ⁴¹²	-	Co-operation

⁴⁰⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2006-2007*, p32.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p31.

⁴¹⁰ *JDW* 43, No 26 (2006): p18

⁴¹¹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2006-2007*, p32.

⁴¹² *JDW* 43, No 27 (2006): p18.

July	Russia Japan	A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing vessel, killing one crew member. Japan protests ⁴¹³	P	Deterrence
July	US NATO Ukraine Russia	Ex <i>Sea Breeze</i> 06, an attempt to improve NATO's relationship with Ukraine and encourage her to join the Alliance is a diplomatic failure; Russia objects, the local population protest against the US-led force and the exercise does not take place as planned. Ultimately, Ukraine announces its decision not to rush into NATO membership ⁴¹⁴	E	Co-operation/Attraction/ Coercion
July	Israel Hezbollah Lebanon Int Community	Israeli warship <i>Hanit</i> is sunk by an anti-ship missile fired by Hezbollah in Lebanon. The ship had been enforcing a blockade during the 2006 'war' ⁴¹⁵	D/P	Coercion
July to August	North Korea Japan US	North Korea conducts ballistic missile firing into Sea of Japan. US responds by deploying Aegis cruiser <i>Shiloh</i> to Yokosuka ⁴¹⁶	P	Coercion/Deterrence/Reassurance
July to August	UK Lebanon	UK conducts Op <i>Highbrow</i> , a NEO from Beirut, evacuating some 4,500 civilians including 1,300 in a single journey in HMS <i>Bulwark</i> ⁴¹⁷	D	Assistance

⁴¹³ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

⁴¹⁴ Sanders, Deborah. "US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages." *US Naval War College Review* 60, No 3 (2007): pp61-72.

⁴¹⁵ Cordesman, Anthony, Sullivan, George & Sullivan, William. *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*. Significant Issues Series Vol 29, No 4. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007), p131; *JDW* 43, No 30 (2006): p18.

⁴¹⁶ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011; *JDW* 43, No 28 (2006): p5.

⁴¹⁷ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p55.

August	Taiwan China	Taiwan completes the development of a supersonic anti-ship missile and overtly displays it on a <i>Cheng Kung</i> class frigate; local media reports that its purpose may be to strike at land targets in mainland China ⁴¹⁸	-	Deterrence
August	Russia Ukraine US NATO Int Community	The Russian-led BLACKSEAFOR conducts Ex <i>Black Sea Harmony</i> , just weeks after the failed US-led <i>Sea Breeze</i> exercise led by the US and NATO ⁴¹⁹	C/E	Attraction/Co-operation
September	US China	China and the US conduct joint SAR exercise off San Diego ⁴²⁰	E	Co-operation
October to November	UK Sierra Leone Int Community	The UK deploys an amphibious task group to West Africa in a show of support to the Sierra Leone government and to conduct capacity building and goodwill visits ⁴²¹	E	Reassurance/Attraction

⁴¹⁸ JDW 43, No 32 (2007): p5.

⁴¹⁹: Gorenburg, Dmitry. "Ten Years of BLACKSEAFOR: A Partial Assessment." <http://russiamil.wordpress.com/tag/black-sea-harmony/> (accessed 19 February 2013).

⁴²⁰ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

⁴²¹ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p56.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2007				
January	Nigeria Int Community Dom Community	The Nigerian Navy exercises its Eastern and Western Fleets, a total of four ships, in the strategically important Bight of Bonny; the exercise is believed to be a stepping stone to securing sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea for crude oil exports ⁴²²	E	Deterrence/Reassurance
March	Iran UK	Iran's Revolutionary Guard detain 15 UK naval personnel from HMS <i>Cornwall</i> in the Arabian Gulf; Iran claims that the boat carrying the British servicemen and women was in its territorial waters. The personnel are shown on Iranian television ⁴²³	P/E	Coercion
March to April	India Mauritius	INS <i>Sarvekshak</i> conducts surveys of Mauritius and presents the completed charts to the country's Prime Minister ⁴²⁴	E	Assistance/Attraction
April	US India Japan	The first US-Indo-Japanese naval exercise is conducted ⁴²⁵	E	Co-operation
April	China ASEAN	China publicly seeks a joint naval exercise with ASEAN. Previously, interaction between ASEAN states and China had been limited to bilateral naval	-	Attraction

⁴²² JDW 44, No 5 (2007): p16.

⁴²³ JDW 44, No 14 (2007): p13.

⁴²⁴ India. *MOD Annual Report 2007-2008*, p30.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., p32; Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

		exercises and port visits. The initiative is intended to help expand political and economic ties ⁴²⁶		
April	India China	The Indian and Chinese navies exercise together ⁴²⁷	E	Co-operation
April	India Russia	A joint Indian-Russian naval exercise takes place off Vladivostok ⁴²⁸	E	Co-operation
April to May	India Maldives	India conducts EEZ patrols on behalf of the Maldives ⁴²⁹	E	Assistance/Picture building
April to September	US Int Community	The US pilots its first Global Fleet Station deployment, using the high speed vessel <i>Swift</i> . It visits 7 Caribbean and Central American states and conducts training, exercises and seminars with target audiences ⁴³⁰	E	Attraction/Co- operation/Prestige
May	India Int Community	A 17 ship exercise takes place in the Singapore Strait and the disputed South China Sea, with participants from India, the US, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia and China ⁴³¹	E	Co- operation/Reassurance
May	India Pakistan Int Community	India test fires cruise missile from a <i>Kilo</i> -class submarine. It is deemed to be a 'watershed' moment in Indian military development, allowing the country to join an exclusive club of states with that capability ⁴³²	E	Prestige

⁴²⁶ JDW 44, No 17 (2007): p14.

⁴²⁷ JDW 44, No 23 (2007): p15.

⁴²⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2007-2008*, p33.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p31.

⁴³⁰ Sohn, Kathi, A. "The Global Fleet Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflicts." *US Naval War College Review* 62, No 1 (2009): p48.

⁴³¹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2007-2008*, p32.

⁴³² JDW 44, No 21 (2007): p15.

June	US Int Community	The USN announces plans to send an amphibious ship to the Gulf of Guinea to act as a 'school house' for regional navies and to provide a persistent presence in the troubled area ⁴³³	C/E	Attraction/Co-operation
July	Syria Iran Israel US Int Community	Syria and Iran equip their fast attack craft with anti-ship missiles of the type used by Hezbollah to attack INS <i>Hanit</i> in 2006. The countries are believed to be demonstrating their ability to disrupt maritime communications in the eastern Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf ⁴³⁴	E	Coercion/Deterrence
July	US Vietnam	USS <i>Peleliu</i> of the Pacific Partnership Station visits Danang, making a 'watershed' in post-war US-Vietnamese military relations ⁴³⁵	E	Attraction
August	US UK	The USMC embarks its largest ever detachment of AV8B Harriers on to HMS <i>Illustrious</i> . It demonstrates the two countries' interoperability for strike missions ⁴³⁶	E	Co-operation
August	Canada Int community	Canada deploys HMCS <i>Fredericton</i> (frigate), <i>Summerside</i> (patrol vessel) and <i>Corner Brook</i> (submarine) to the high north to exercise sovereignty of part of the Arctic Ocean (Operation <i>Nanook 07</i>) as climate change looks to open shipping routes ⁴³⁷	-	-
August to September	India Int Community	India conducts a month long series of bilateral exercises with Asian and Western navies in the Bay of Bengal and Gulf of Aden. They are aimed at	E	Co-operation/Attraction

⁴³³ JDW 44, No 24 (2007): p10.

⁴³⁴ JDW 44, No 30 (2007): p18.

⁴³⁵ Lucius, Robert, E. "Pacific Partnership Visits Vietnam." *US Naval War College Review* 60, No 4 (2007): p125.

⁴³⁶ JDW 44, No 32 (2007):p 5.

⁴³⁷ JDW 44, No 33 (2007): p8.

		'constructive engagement' and increased 'domain awareness'; however, Chinese officials visit New Delhi to discuss the exercises which they believe may be aimed at 'containment' of China ⁴³⁸		
September	Argentina Chile	Argentina pulls its Navy out of annual bilateral exercises with Chile due to financial constraints and the poor operational condition of its units. It brings into question the importance given to the Argentina-Chile relationship. The exercises had been held annually since 1998 ⁴³⁹	-	-
October	Sri Lanka LTTE	The Sri Lankan Navy claims success over the Tamil Tigers after destroying the 'final' rebel vessel being used to smuggle arms into the country ⁴⁴⁰	-	Coercion
October	US UK Iran	USN and RN conduct Ex <i>Sandstone</i> , a joint anti-submarine exercise in the Northern Arabian Sea; the exercise is designed to send a signal to Iran that its submarine force should not attempt to interfere with Western vessels in the event of a conflict ⁴⁴¹	E	Deterrence/Co-operation
November	UK Yemen	RN and Yemeni Navy and Coast Guard conduct joint operations in the Gulf of Aden as a deterrent to human trafficking between Somalia and Yemen ⁴⁴²	E	Co-operation/Deterrence
November	Malaysia Singapore Indonesia	Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia conduct joint naval patrols of the Strait of Malacca to help contain piracy in the region ⁴⁴³	P/E	Co-operation/Deterrence

⁴³⁸ *JDW* 44, No 32 (2007): p15; *JDW* 44, No 35 (2007): p14.

⁴³⁹ *JDW* 44, No 50 (2007): p31.

⁴⁴⁰ *JDW* 44, No 42 (2007): p14.

⁴⁴¹ *JDW* 44, No 47 (2007): p4.

⁴⁴² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

November	China Japan	The first post-WWII visit by a Chinese warship to Japan takes place ⁴⁴⁴	E	Attraction
November to December	UK Ireland	Op <i>Wasp</i> sees the UK and Republic of Ireland conduct joint fisheries patrols in the Irish Sea ⁴⁴⁵	E	Co-operation
December	UK US	HMS <i>Campbeltown</i> and USS <i>Gunston Hall</i> conduct joint counter-piracy patrol off the Somali coast ⁴⁴⁶	E	Co-operation/Deterrence
December	India Vietnam	India attempts to strengthen its relations with Vietnam by offering spares for its ageing fleet of Soviet-era warships ⁴⁴⁷	-	Attraction/Assistance
December	Russia Japan	Russia seizes six Japanese vessels found to be fishing off Kunashiri island ⁴⁴⁸	P	Deterrence
December to February	Russia Int Community	Russia publicly announces plans to revive its global maritime capability after years of atrophy. It deploys its aircraft carrier <i>Admiral Kuznetsov</i> and escorts to the Mediterranean ⁴⁴⁹	-	Prestige

⁴⁴³ *JDW* 47, No 50 (2007): p20.

⁴⁴⁴ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

⁴⁴⁵ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ *JDW* 45, No 1 (2008): p15.

⁴⁴⁸ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

⁴⁴⁹ Russia. "Chronology of the Russian Fleet."; *JDW* 44, No 50 (2007): p4.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2008				
January	UK US Yemen	RN, USN, Yemeni Navy and Yemeni Coast Guard conduct human trafficking deterrence patrols off the Yemeni coast under <i>Op Argo Idefix</i> ⁴⁵⁰	C/E	Co-operation/Deterrence
January	France UAE Iran	France plans to establish a naval base in the UAE by 2009 in an attempt to reassure Gulf allies of its commitment following growing threat from Iran ⁴⁵¹	-	Reassurance/Attraction
January	India Bangladesh	The Indian Landing Ship <i>Gharial</i> deploys to Bangladesh for relief operations following Cyclone Sidr ⁴⁵²	-	Assistance
January	Japan US Int Community	Japan takes the political decision to revive its refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean, in support of US warships in the war on terror ⁴⁵³	P/E	Co-operation
February	India Pakistan	India tests its first nuclear-capable submarine launched missile; Pakistan warns that a new nuclear arms race may result ⁴⁵⁴	E	Deterrence

⁴⁵⁰ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁵¹ *JDW* 45, No 4 (2008): p7.

⁴⁵² India. *MOD Annual Report 2008-2009*, p36.

⁴⁵³ *JDW* 45, No 3 (2008): p4.

⁴⁵⁴ *JDW* 45, No 10 (2008): p6.

February	US Int Community	USN demonstrates its ability to shoot down a satellite for the first time. USS <i>Lake Erie</i> engaged the 'out-of-control' satellite at an altitude of 153 miles above the Pacific ⁴⁵⁵	E	Coercion/Deterrence
March	US Lebanon Syria	USN deploys the USS <i>Nassau</i> expeditionary strike group to the eastern Mediterranean in the wake of increasing political tensions between Lebanon and Syria ⁴⁵⁶	P/C	Coercion
March	Sri Lanka LTTE	Sri Lankan Navy fast attack craft is sunk by Tamil Tigers following an engagement at sea ⁴⁵⁷	-	Coercion
March	North Korea South Korea	Tensions rise between the two Koreas after the North carries out a test firing of an anti-ship cruise missile in the Yellow Sea ⁴⁵⁸	E	Coercion
March to April	UK Dom Community	RFA <i>Lyme Bay</i> deploys to Tristan de Cunha to repair harbour wall at Calshot Harbour; without repairs the harbour would have become unusable ⁴⁵⁹	-	Assistance/Reassurance
April	Taiwan China	Taiwan conducts an amphibious exercises but decides not to sail its	P	Deterrence/Reassurance

⁴⁵⁵ JDW 45, No 13 (2008): p8.

⁴⁵⁶ JDW 45, No 11 (2008): p18.

⁴⁵⁷ JDW 45, No 14 (2008): p17.

⁴⁵⁸ JDW 45, No 15 (2008): p20.

⁴⁵⁹ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

		ships through the Taiwan Strait in order to avoid any 'misunderstanding' with China ⁴⁶⁰		
April	UK Bahrain	RN and RFA help to form 'ring of steel' around Bahrain during Bahraini Grand Prix ⁴⁶¹	P/E	Deterrence/Assistance
April to May	Spain UK Brazil El Salvador	RFA <i>Mounts Bay</i> joins Spanish amphibious task group, <i>Esparabas</i> , deploying to Brazil and El Salvador ⁴⁶²	E	Co-operation/Attraction
May	US Int Community	USN establishes the Africa Partnership Station and deploys it for naval diplomacy duties in the Gulf of Guinea ⁴⁶³	E	Attraction/Co-operation
May	UK India Myanmar Int Community	HMS <i>Westminster</i> and <i>Edinburgh</i> deploy to Burma to offer assistance following cyclone <i>Nargis</i> ; Burmese military government decline support and ships depart. However, two Indian warships provide relief ⁴⁶⁴	-	Assistance
May	UK Bangladesh	HMS <i>Echo</i> conducts collaborative surveying operations in Bangladeshi territorial waters ⁴⁶⁵	-	Co-operation/Assistance/Picture building

⁴⁶⁰ JDW 45, No 17 (2008): p20.

⁴⁶¹ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Ploch, *Africa Command*, p20.

⁴⁶⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

May	UK Iran Int Community	RN conducts an overt anti-submarine warfare exercise in the Indian Ocean (Ex <i>Phoenix</i>) to prove the capabilities of its helicopter-borne sonar, 2087; it demonstrates the UK's ability to counter submarines in demanding conditions at range from the UK ⁴⁶⁶	E	Prestige/Deterrence
May	India Brazil South Africa	In a sign that the relationship among some of the emerging powers is not confined to the economic, a tri-lateral Indian/Brazilian/South African naval exercise takes place off South Africa ⁴⁶⁷	E	Co-operation/Attraction
June	US Int Community	In BMD tests USS <i>Lake Erie</i> successfully performs a terminal phase intercept of a ballistic target; it marks a leap forward in capability ⁴⁶⁸	E	Deterrence
June	Japan China	JMSDF destroyer <i>Sazanami</i> becomes the first Japanese warship to visit a Chinese port since the end of the Second World War ⁴⁶⁹	E	Attraction
July	Russia Norway Int Community	The Russian Federation deploys Northern Fleet warships into the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War. They operate in the vicinity of Svalbard; Russia states that	C/E	Coercion/Prestige

⁴⁶⁶ JDW 45, No 19 (2008): p7.

⁴⁶⁷ India. *MOD Annual Report 2008-2009*, p37.

⁴⁶⁸ JDW 45, No 24 (2008): p8.

⁴⁶⁹ JDW 45, No 27 (2008): p14.

		it does not recognise Norway's claim of a 200 mile EEZ in Arctic ⁴⁷⁰		
July	US Int Community	The USN re-establishes its Fourth Fleet in order to operate in the Caribbean and the waters off Central and South America and build 'multi-national coalitions' ⁴⁷¹	E	Co-operation/Attraction
August	UK Netherlands France West Indies	UK, Dutch and French ships conduct joint counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean as part of Op <i>Carib Venture</i> ⁴⁷²	P/E	Deterrence/Picture building
August	India Int Community	Three Indian warships join the international counter-piracy effort off the Horn of Africa ⁴⁷³	P/E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance/Prestige
August	Russia Georgia Int Community	Russian ships of the Black Sea Fleet are involved in a 'skirmish' with Georgian vessels. Russia claims that the Georgian ships had violated their declared 'safety zone' off the coast of Abkhazia. One Georgian vessel is sunk and thirty sailors killed. ⁴⁷⁴	D	Coercion
August	Russia Ukraine	The Ukraine President issues a decree that Moscow must give three days warning if it wishes to sail the	-	Coercion

⁴⁷⁰ JDW 45, No 30 (2008): p12.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., p14.

⁴⁷² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁷³ India. *MOD Annual Report 2008-2009*, p33.

⁴⁷⁴ Russia. "Chronology of the Russian Fleet."

		Black Sea Fleet from Sebastopol through Ukrainian waters ⁴⁷⁵		
September	Malaysia Int Community	Malaysia deploys ships to join the anti-piracy effort off the Horn of Africa ⁴⁷⁶	P/E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance/Prestige
September	Russia Int Community	Russia deploys ships from the Baltic to the Gulf of Aden to join the international anti-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. ⁴⁷⁷	P/E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance/Prestige
October	India Indonesia Thailand	Indian, Indonesian and Thai warships conduct joint patrols ⁴⁷⁸	P/E	Co-operation
October	Japan Dom Community US	There are local protests in the port of Yokosuka after the arrival of the nuclear powered carrier USS <i>George Washington</i> ; the ship replaced the conventionally powered USS <i>Kitty Hawk</i> ⁴⁷⁹	E	Coercion
November	NATO UN Somalia	NATO provides naval escort for World Food Programme ships delivering aid to Somalia ⁴⁸⁰	D/E	Deterrence/Reassurance
November	India	A terrorist attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba	C/E	Coercion

⁴⁷⁵ JDW 45, No 35 (2008): p10.

⁴⁷⁶ JDW 45, No 37 (2008): p6.

⁴⁷⁷ Russia. "Chronology of the Russian Fleet."

⁴⁷⁸ India. *MOD Annual Report 2008-2009*, p38.

⁴⁷⁹ JDW 45, No 40 (2008): p20.

⁴⁸⁰ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

	Pakistan LeT	(LeT), launched from the sea, kills 140 people and injures over 300 others in Mumbai ⁴⁸¹		
November	Russia Venezuela	Russian Navy warships <i>Pyotr</i> and <i>Admiral Chabanenko</i> visit Venezuela, coincident with a visit to the country by President Medvedev; it is the first Russian Navy visit to the Caribbean since the end of the Cold War. The visit is also rumoured to be linked to a potential sale of submarines to Venezuela ⁴⁸²	E	Attraction
November	Iran Int Community	Iran projects its naval power in the Gulf, establishing an 'impenetrable defence line', with the launch of new fast attack craft and a midget submarine ⁴⁸³	E	Deterrence/Coercion
December	China Japan	Two Chinese oceanographic research ships enter Japanese territorial waters off Senkaku islands ⁴⁸⁴	E	Coercion/Picture building
December	China Int Community	China commences its counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden ⁴⁸⁵	E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance/Prestige

⁴⁸¹ JDW 45, No 49 (2008):p 5.

⁴⁸² Russia. "Chronology of the Russian Fleet"; JDW 45, No 49 (2008): p10.

⁴⁸³ JDW 45, No 49 (2008): p18.

⁴⁸⁴ Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

⁴⁸⁵ China. "China's National Defense in 2010." Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 31 March 2011. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-03/31/content_22263510.htm, (accessed 30 October 2012); JDW 46, No 1 (2009): p6.

December to January 2009	Israel Hamas Dom Community	The Israeli Navy conducts Operation <i>Cast Lead</i> , a campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, including support to ground troops and anti-smuggling patrols ⁴⁸⁶	-	Deterrence/Reassurance
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⁴⁸⁶ *JDW* 47, No 10 (2010): p23.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION
2009				
January	Japan Int Community	Japan considers sending a destroyer to join the international counter-piracy effort off the Horn of Africa ⁴⁸⁷	E	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance/Prestige
January	Russia Georgia Abkhazia Ukraine	The Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia announces a plan to allow Russia to establish a naval base and an airfield on its territory; this would provide Moscow with access to the Black Sea other than from its disputed Crimea base ⁴⁸⁸	-	Attraction/Reassurance Coercion
February	North Korea South Korea US	USN increases its number of sorties of intelligence gathering Aegis ships after satellite imagery shows North Korean missile sites preparing to launch missiles ⁴⁸⁹	-	Picture building
February to August	UK Int Community	RN deploys its largest deployment to the Far East in a decade. During <i>Taurus 09</i> the ships exercise with vessels of 13 states and visit numerous countries.	-	Prestige/Attraction/Co-operation
March	Japan North Korea South Korea	Japan deploys its Aegis destroyers <i>Kongou</i> and <i>Chokai</i> to the Sea of Japan in readiness for a North	P	Deterrence/Reassurance

⁴⁸⁷ JDW 46, No 4 (2009): p5.

⁴⁸⁸ JDW 46, No 5 (2009): p13.

⁴⁸⁹ JDW 46, No 8 (2009): p6.

		Korean missile launch. North Korea threatens war if its missiles are shot down. The missile launch takes place in April without incident ⁴⁹⁰		
March	US China	USNS <i>Impeccable</i> is challenged by PLAN warships and civilian vessels when operating in China's EEZ south of Hainan Island; <i>Impeccable</i> leaves the scene but returns within days in the company of USS <i>Chung Hoon</i> ⁴⁹¹	P	Deterrence
April	Nigeria MEND Dom Community	The Nigerian Navy is attacked by armed militants from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); two sailors are killed and at least one gunboat seized. MEND had previously attacked oil installations ⁴⁹²	-	Coercion
April	China Int Community	China holds an International Fleet Review at Qingdao and displays its nuclear powered submarines for the first time ⁴⁹³	E	Prestige
April	Seychelles Int Community	The Seychelles becomes the first East African state to contribute to the Horn of Africa counter-piracy	P	Co-operation/Deterrence/ Prestige

⁴⁹⁰ JDW 46, No 11 (2009): p17; JDW 46, No 16 (2009): p5.

⁴⁹¹ Dutton, Peter. "Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea." *US Naval War College Review* 64, No 4 (2011): p54.

⁴⁹² JDW 46, No 16 (2009): p19.

⁴⁹³ JDW 46, No 17 (2009): p15.

		effort; the Coast Guard assist in two operations with a patrol aircraft and patrol vessel, PW Andromache. The President applauds his country's ability to work with international navies ⁴⁹⁴		
May	MEND Nigeria Int Community	MEND warns oil companies to withdraw workers from the region or face 'imminent hurricane' ⁴⁹⁵	-	Coercion
May	Iran Int Community Dom Community	Iran deploys two naval ships, the frigate <i>Alborz</i> and the auxiliary <i>Bushehr</i> , to conduct anti-piracy operations off Somalia ⁴⁹⁶	P/E	Deterrence/Co-operation/Reassurance Attraction
June	NATO UN Somalia	NATO provides naval escort for World Food Programme ships delivering aid to Somalia ⁴⁹⁷	P/E	Reassurance/Deterrence
June	US Libya	A US Coast Guard vessel, <i>Boutwell</i> , becomes the first American 'military' ship to visit Libya since President Ghadaffi seized power in 1969 ⁴⁹⁸	E	Attraction
June	Malaysia Indonesia	An Indonesian patrol vessel 'almost' fires on a Malaysian patrol vessel which violated Indonesian territorial	D	Deterrence/Coercion

⁴⁹⁴ JDW 46, No 19 (2009): p19.

⁴⁹⁵ JDW 46, No 20 (2009): p17.

⁴⁹⁶ JDW 46, No 22 (2009): p18.

⁴⁹⁷ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁴⁹⁸ JDW 46, No 23 (2009): p39.

		waters in a disputed maritime zone to the east of Borneo ⁴⁹⁹		
July	GCC Int Community UN NATO	The Gulf Co-operation Council demand that the Red Sea be excluded from international arrangements on counter-piracy, stating instead that security there was 'the responsibility of the Arab countries overlooking it.' They determine to create an Arab naval force ⁵⁰⁰	-	Prestige/ Coercion/ Co-operation/Reassurance
July	Israel Iran Int Community	Israel deploys an attack submarine, <i>Leviathan</i> , and an accompanying corvette, <i>Hanit</i> , through the Suez Canal and into the Red Sea for the first time. It is believed to be a signal to Iran about regional intentions ⁵⁰¹	P/E	Deterrence
August	UK Somalia Puntland	During Op <i>Patch</i> HMS <i>Cornwall</i> facilitates engagement between Somali officials and representatives of Puntland ⁵⁰²	E	Assistance/Prestige
August	India Maldives China	The Indian Navy strengthens its ties with the Maldives, augmenting its co-operation and security initiatives. The move is believed to be a	-	Assistance/Attraction/Co-operation/Deterrence

⁴⁹⁹ JDW 46, No 27 (2009): p17.

⁵⁰⁰ JDW 46, No 27 (2009): p18.

⁵⁰¹ JDW 46, No 28 (2009): p16.

⁵⁰² UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

		counter to growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean ⁵⁰³		
August	China US	China asks the US to end its maritime surveillance activities within the Chinese-claimed EEZ; the request was ostensibly to reduce the risk of naval confrontation ⁵⁰⁴	-	Coercion/Picture building
October	Georgia Russia	Georgia deploys a coast guard vessel in territorial waters off the break-away region of Abkhazia in an attempt at a 'naval blockade'. Russia responds by stating that its Black Sea Fleet will ensure lines of communication remain open ⁵⁰⁵	D/P	Coercion
November	UK Commonwealth Trinidad & Tobago	HMS <i>Iron Duke</i> provides maritime security for Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Trinidad and Tobago ⁵⁰⁶	E	Assistance/Reassurance
November	North Korea South Korea	North and South Korean ships engage in 'firefight' in Yellow Sea off Daechung Island following the North's incursion into disputed waters ⁵⁰⁷	D	Coercion/Deterrence

⁵⁰³ JDW 46, No 34 (2009): p14.

⁵⁰⁴ JDW 46, No 36 (2009): p32.

⁵⁰⁵ JDW 46, No 41 (2009): p14.

⁵⁰⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁵⁰⁷ Foster, Peter. "North and South Korea Warships Exchange Fire." *Daily Telegraph*, 10 November 2009; Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
2010				
January	North Korea South Korea	In a supposed bid to strengthen its position ahead of talks with the South, North Korea fires artillery shells into its own territorial waters in the Yellow Sea near the disputed maritime Northern Limit Line. South Korea returned fire with 100 warning shots. The North then declared the area a 'no sail zone' ⁵⁰⁸	C	Coercion
February	Canada Haiti Int Community	Canada deploys HMCS <i>Halifax</i> and <i>Athabaskan</i> to provide support to Haiti following January earthquake ⁵⁰⁹	-	Assistance
February	India China	India increases its naval presence and surveillance activities around the Andaman and Nicobar islands in a counter to growing Chinese presence in the region ⁵¹⁰	E	Picture building/Deterrence
February to March	UK Haiti Int Community	RFA <i>Largs Bay</i> deploys to Haiti as part of Op <i>Panlake</i> relief effort ⁵¹¹	-	Assistance
March	North Korea South Korea	North Korea attacked and sank the South Korean warship <i>Cheonan</i> ; 46 lives are lost. North Korea denies responsibility ⁵¹²	D	Coercion

⁵⁰⁸ JDW 47, No 5 (2010): p5.

⁵⁰⁹ Canada, *Background Summaries*.

⁵¹⁰ JDW 47, No 7 (2010): p6.

⁵¹¹ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁵¹² Kim, Duk-Ki. "The Republic of Korea's Counter-Asymmetric Strategy." *US Naval War College Review* 65, No 1 (2012): p55.

April	China Japan	Ten Chinese warships pass between Okinawa's main island and Miyako island before heading into Pacific Ocean ⁵¹³	P	Coercion/Prestige
April	Ukraine Russia	Ukraine agrees to extend the lease allowing the Russian Navy to operate from Sevastopol; the announcement is met with violent clashes in Ukraine ⁵¹⁴	-	Attraction
April to May	Iran Int Community	Iran conducts a series of naval exercises around the Strait of Hormuz. The exercises were stated to be aimed at securing Iranian shipping routes, but have alienated many GCC countries who see them as a challenge to their power in the region ⁵¹⁵	E	Coercion/Deterrence
May	Israel Palestinian Authority Turkey Int Community	MV <i>Mari Marmara</i> , operated by a Turkey based pressure group, attempts to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza. The Israeli Navy intercept and board the vessel and violence ensues. Nine people are killed and there is worldwide condemnation of the Israeli heavy-handed tactics ⁵¹⁶	D/C	Coercion
June	Turkey Israel	Turkey cancels a planned naval exercise with Israel following the <i>Mari Marmara</i> incident ⁵¹⁷	-	-
July	China	China conducts an unprecedented military	E	Deterrence

⁵¹³ JDW 47, No 14 (2010): p6; Japan, Defense White Paper 2011.

⁵¹⁴ JDW 47, No 18 (2010): p5; Russia. Russia. "Chronology of the Russian Fleet."

⁵¹⁵ JDW 47, No 19 (2010): p18.

⁵¹⁶ US. Congressional Research Service. Migdalovitz, C. *Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath*. R41275. Washington DC: CRS, 2010; JDW 47, No 23 (2010): p11.

⁵¹⁷ JDW 47, No 24 (2010): p16.

	US ASEAN	exercise in the South China Sea, involving ships and aircraft from all three of its fleets. This came after the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated earlier that month at the ASEAN Regional Forum that “the US has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” ⁵¹⁸		
July	North Korea South Korea US	North Korea denounces a combined US-South Korean naval exercise, stating that it is a ‘major danger to the security of the region’ ⁵¹⁹	-	Coercion/Co-operation
August	Iran Int Community	Iran publicly unveils four new mini-submarines at Bandar Abbas ⁵²⁰	-	Prestige/Coercion
August	South Africa Mozambique	South African Navy ships exercise with Mozambique and conduct joint security patrols of territorial waters ⁵²¹	-	Co-operation
August to September	UK Argentina Brazil Int Community	Whilst the runway in the Falkland Islands is being resurfaced, HMS <i>Ocean</i> deploys to the South Atlantic and pays a visit to Brazil and West Africa. Though she does not physically reach the Falklands, she demonstrates British capability and commitment to Argentina	P	Deterrence/Attraction/Reassurance

⁵¹⁸ Pedrozo, Paul. “Beijing’s Coastal Real Estate: A History of Chinese Naval Aggression.” *Foreign Affairs*, 15 November 2010. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67007/raul-pedrozo/beijings-coastal-real-estate> (accessed 22 November 2010).

⁵¹⁹ *JDW* 47, No 30 (2010): p15.

⁵²⁰ *JDW* 47, No 33 (2010): p16.

⁵²¹ *JDW* 47, No 35 (2010): p17.

September	China Japan	A Chinese trawler is detained after it rammed into two Japanese coast guard vessels in a disputed area of the East China Sea ⁵²²	P	Deterrence
September to October	Malaysia China Int Community	Malaysia conducts a two week long 'maritime domain awareness' exercise in the Strait of Malacca and then declares the security of the South China Sea a 'top priority' ⁵²³	E	Deterrence/Picture building
November	UK West Indies	HMS <i>Manchester</i> conducts disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in St Lucia and Turks and Caicos in wake of Hurricane Tomas ⁵²⁴	-	Assistance
November	North Korea South Korea US	North Korea fires 170 artillery shells at the island of Yeonpyeong killing four people; the firing is believed to be in response to a South Korean navy live firing exercise in the nearby disputed region of the Yellow Sea; the USN deploys the aircraft carrier USS <i>George Washington</i> to the Yellow Sea in support of South Korea ⁵²⁵	D/P	Coercion/Deterrence/Reassurance
November to December	UK France	RN nuclear submarine HMS <i>Tireless</i> deploys to Indian Ocean with French carrier battle group (Op <i>Agapanthe</i>) ⁵²⁶	E	Co-operation

⁵²² Pedrozo, "Beijing's Coastal Real Estate."

⁵²³ JDW 47, No 42 (2010): p26.

⁵²⁴ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

⁵²⁵ JDW 47, No 48 (2010): 5, p11.

⁵²⁶ UK, *RN Operations 1970-2013*.

TABLE 3.2 CONTROL: CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY 1960-64 &1980-84

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1960				
January	US Int Community	The US bathyscope <i>Trieste</i> reaches a record breaking depth of 35,800 feet in the Marianas Trench. ⁵²⁷	-	Prestige
April to May	Netherlands Indonesia New Guinea	To deter attacks by Indonesia on New Guinea, the Netherlands government announce despatch of carrier <i>Karel Doorman</i> and two destroyers. No attacks are made, but reactions from Indonesia are damaging and those from third parties are adverse. ⁵²⁸	P	Deterrence
May	Cuba US	A Cuban cutter fires on the US submarine <i>Sea Poacher</i> in the San Nicholas Channel. ⁵²⁹	D	Deterrence
May	US Int Community	The nuclear powered US submarine <i>Triton</i> completes the first submerged circumnavigation of the globe; it takes 84 days. ⁵³⁰	-	Prestige
July	US Congo Reg Community	USN carrier <i>Wasp</i> arrives off coast to evacuate US citizens and, while there, delivers fuel to UN forces. ⁵³¹	P	Assistance
July	US USSR Int Community	US submarine <i>George Washington</i> conducts the first test firing of Polaris ballistic missiles from a submerged boat. It demonstrates American capability. ⁵³²	E	Prestige/Deterrence

⁵²⁷ Polmar, Norman. *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea, 1945-1991*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p66.

⁵²⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 3rd Ed, p188.

⁵²⁹ Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p67.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 3rd Ed, p188; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p9.

August	US USSR Int Community	US submarine <i>Seadragon</i> is the first ever to surface at the North Pole. The crew play baseball on the polar ice. ⁵³³	E	Prestige
November	US Cuba Guatemala	After armed uprisings allegedly inspired by Cuba against the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, the carrier USS <i>Shangri-La</i> and US destroyers patrolled the Caribbean coasts of these countries until December 'to prevent intervention on the part of Communist-directed elements.' ⁵³⁴	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
November	US USSR Int Community	US submarine <i>George Washington</i> , which had test fired Polaris missiles earlier in the year, sails for the first nuclear deterrent patrol. ⁵³⁵	P	Deterrence

⁵³² Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p67.

⁵³³ Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p67.

⁵³⁴ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, pp188-189.

⁵³⁵ Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p68.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1961				
April	US Cuba	Visible presence offshore of US fleet encourages a group of Cuban exiles organised by the CIA to attempt the overthrow of Castro. Receiving no actual naval support the bid fails. ⁵³⁶	C	-
June to July	UK Iraq Regional Comm	After Iraq claims sovereignty over Kuwait on 25 June and make menacing troop movements, Britain responds to Kuwaiti appeal for help by landing marines from HMS <i>Bulwark</i> . These are reinforced by tanks, troops and, ultimately, 45 warships (including two aircraft carriers). Ground forces replaced by Arab League troops in October and Iraq recognises Kuwaiti independence in October 1963. Iraqi aggression successfully deterred by quick British response. ⁵³⁷	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
July	France Tunisia	After initial bombardment by aircraft from the carrier <i>Arromanches</i> , the cruiser <i>Colbert</i> , <i>Bouvet</i> and <i>Chevalier-Paul</i> force the entrance to the Lake of Bizerta and, with the help of French troops, break the Tunisian blockade of the Bizerta naval base complex and re-establish French control. ⁵³⁸	P	Coercion?
November	US Dominican Republic	Visible presence offshore of US fleet (including carriers <i>Franklin D Roosevelt</i> and <i>Valley Forge</i> with 1800 marines on board) enable President Kennedy's representative to secure the expulsion of the Trujillos	P	Coercion

⁵³⁶ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p189; Ciment, J. & Hill, K. (Eds). *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II. Vol 1.* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999), pp507-512.

⁵³⁷ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p9. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.* p189,

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

		(the family of the late dictator) and the establishment of a government acceptable to the US. ⁵³⁹		
November	UK Kenya	HMS <i>Victorious</i> (later <i>Centaur</i>) and helicopters, plus amphibious ship Striker with Royal Marines embarked provide humanitarian assistance after severe flooding in Kenya. ⁵⁴⁰	-	Assistance

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p10.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1962				
January	Indonesia Netherlands	Indonesian motor torpedo boats try to land infiltrators into New Guinea but are caught by the Netherlands Navy, who sink one and put the rest to flight. ⁵⁴¹	C	-
January	UK Iraq Kuwait	HMS <i>Centaur</i> is deployed to Kuwait to act as a deterrent against Iraqi aggression. ⁵⁴²	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
May	US North Vietnam Laos Thailand	Carrier covers landing of US marines in Thailand, an operation intended to demonstrate US readiness to intervene if communists push their military success in Laos too far. ⁵⁴³	E/P	Deterrence/Reassurance
May	US USSR	US aircraft carrier <i>Wasp</i> leads a force of 8 ships into the Baltic. It is the largest American deployment into these waters since the end of World War II. ⁵⁴⁴	E/P	Deterrence/Coercion
July	US UK SEATO China	US, UK and SEATO naval forces exercise together and conduct a 'show of force' in the South China Sea. ⁵⁴⁵	E/P	Co-operation/Deterrence
August to May 1963	United Nations Pakistan	Pakistan operates nine vessels as part of the UN Temporary Executive Authority, one of the 'first	-	Deterrence/Reassurance

⁵⁴¹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p190.

⁵⁴² Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p10.

⁵⁴³ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p190; Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p73.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., p74.

⁵⁴⁵ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p10.

	Indonesia	generation' peacekeeping missions, following the Indonesian invasion of West New Guinea. ⁵⁴⁶		
October	US USSR Cuba	The US imposes an air and naval blockade on Cuba following the discovery of the construction of 'offensive military' facilities by the Soviet Union. The ensuing Cuban missile crisis becomes a defining moment of the Cold War. ⁵⁴⁷	D	Coercion

⁵⁴⁶ Ramsbotham, Oliver & Woodhouse, Tom. *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), p93 and pp172-173.

⁵⁴⁷ Gavin, Francis J (Ed). *The New York Times Twentieth Century in Review: The Cold War*. (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), pp388-399.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1963				
February	France Brazil	French destroyer <i>Tartu</i> sent to fishing grounds off north-east coast of Brazil after three French lobster boats had been seized by Brazilian warships 60 miles off the coast. Brazil countered with a cruiser, five destroyers and two corvettes, <i>Tartu</i> was soon withdrawn and the effect of these moves is open to question. ⁵⁴⁸	C/E	Coercion/Deterrence
February	US Dominican Republic	US aircraft carrier <i>Boxer</i> anchors off Santo Domingo ready to send helicopters to rescue Vice President Johnson in case of trouble during the latter's visit. Nothing happens. ⁵⁴⁹	P/D	Deterrence
April	US UK Haiti	US task force cruises off Haiti to protect US nationals in case of conflict between Haiti and Dominican Republic, perhaps also to intervene if government of Haiti is overthrown, but crisis blows over. A British destroyer and frigate also stand by US, but not British, nationals are subsequently evacuated. ⁵⁵⁰	C	Deterrence/Reassurance
August	Cuba UK	Two Cuban warships land a party on a British island in the Bahamas to seize 19 Cuban refugees and two fishing boats. Investigation by HMS <i>Londonderry</i> reveals that the normally uninhabited island had been used by Cuban exiles based in the US as a launching pad for their attacks on Cuba. Steps were taken to	D/P	-

⁵⁴⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, pp190-191.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

		discourage the use of British territory for this purpose. ⁵⁵¹		
October	US Haiti Cuba	USS <i>Lake Champlain</i> , <i>Liddle</i> and <i>Muliphen</i> undertake disaster relief operations in Haiti following Hurricane <i>Flora</i> . Cuba refuses an offer of US assistance. ⁵⁵²	-	Assistance
December	USSR Albania Regional Community	Following a deterioration in relations, Albania ejects Soviet Navy from its base in the country. Over the subsequent years the USSR then attempts to find a suitable alternative in the Mediterranean. ⁵⁵³	-	-
December	US Iran	The US destroyer <i>Strong</i> and Iranian ship <i>Babr</i> , with medical teams embarked, conduct a joint 17 day mission at three Iranian ports to provide medical support to local people. ⁵⁵⁴	-	Co-operation/Assistance

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p80.

⁵⁵³ Dismukes & McConnell, *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, p20; Miller, David. *The Cold War: A Military History*. (London: John Murray, 1998), p181.

⁵⁵⁴ Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p81.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1964				
January	UK US Zanzibar	After the Zanzibar government is overthrown by coup d'état, USS <i>Manley</i> , HMS <i>Owen</i> and <i>Rhyl</i> and RFA <i>Hebe</i> with one company of infantry evacuate US and some British nationals. ⁵⁵⁵	D	Assistance/Reassurance
January	UK Uganda Kenya Tanganyika	During mutinies in three former colonies in East Africa, the governments' request British help and three carriers (<i>Albion</i> , <i>Centaur</i> and <i>Victorious</i>) are deployed with other warships and RFAs as well as two Marine Commandos and army units. The incident ends swiftly with no British losses and two mutineers killed. Population reassured. ⁵⁵⁶	D	Assistance/Reassurance
January to March	UK Turkey Cyprus	To reinforce their threat of armed intervention, failing the adoption of satisfactory measures for the protection of Turkish minority in Cyprus, the Turkish fleet conducts overt manoeuvres. ⁵⁵⁷	P	Reassurance/Coercion
February	US Cuba	Four Cuban fishing vessels are seized off the coast of Florida by the US. In response, Cuba cuts off the water supply to the Guantanamo naval base. ⁵⁵⁸	P	Coercion
March	US Brazil	A USN task force prepares to deploy to Rio de Janeiro to offer support to the rebels during the Brazilian 'general's coup' against the President. It was not needed and stood down. ⁵⁵⁹	C	Coercion/Assistance

⁵⁵⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p192.

⁵⁵⁶ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p11; Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p192.

⁵⁵⁷ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p192.

⁵⁵⁸ Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p82.

⁵⁵⁹ Ciment & Hill, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II. Vol 1*, p334.

April	US USSR	The Soviet oceanographic research ship <i>Sergei Vavilov</i> visits Boston. It is the first Soviet ship to visit since the end of World War II. ⁵⁶⁰	E	Co-operation
April to May	US Int Community Regional Community	USN deploys the 'Concord Squadron' to the Indian Ocean to conduct a six week goodwill tour of Africa and the Middle East. ⁵⁶¹	E	Attraction
August	US North Vietnam	US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin are attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. ⁵⁶²	P	Coercion/Deterrence
September	UK Indonesia	Indonesian threats result in a British naval task group exercising freedom of the seas in the Lombok Strait. ⁵⁶³	E	Deterrence/Reassurance

⁵⁶⁰ Polmar, *Chronology of the Cold War at Sea*, p83.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, pp192-193; Gavin, *The New York Times Twentieth Century in Review: The Cold War*, p431.

⁵⁶³ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p11.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1980				
February	UK St Kitts	HMS <i>Rhyl</i> stands by the island of St Kitts, to be on hand during an election. ⁵⁶⁴	C	Reassurance/Deterrence
April	US Iran	Helicopters from USS <i>Nimitz</i> in Arabian Sea attempt to rescue US hostages from the Embassy in Tehran. Mechanical failures force the operation to be abandoned. ⁵⁶⁵	D	-
May	Bahamas Cuba UK	The Bahamian Defence Force Ship <i>Flamingo</i> is sunk by Cuban aircraft whilst taking a Cuban fishing vessel into custody for illegal fishing. HMS <i>Eskimo</i> and support ship are sailed from St Vincent in case of escalation. ⁵⁶⁶	D/P	Coercion/Reassurance
August	Libya Italy	A Libyan submarine and frigate drive the Italian floating oil rig <i>Saipen II</i> from disputed waters of Medina Bank. ⁵⁶⁷	P	Coercion
August	UK St Lucia Cayman Islands	HMS <i>Glasgow</i> administers disaster relief in St Lucia and HMS <i>Scylla</i> assists in the Cayman Islands after Hurricane <i>Allen</i> . ⁵⁶⁸	-	Assistance
October	UK Iran Iraq	British warships are diverted to the Gulf to start the <i>Armillar</i> Patrol for the protection of merchant shipping during war between Iran and Iraq. ⁵⁶⁹	P	Reassurance/Deterrence

⁵⁶⁴ UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

⁵⁶⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 3rd Ed.*, p206.

⁵⁶⁶ UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

⁵⁶⁷ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 3rd Ed.*, p206.

⁵⁶⁸ UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

November	UK Turks and Caicos	HMS <i>Active</i> remains in the vicinity of the Turks and Caicos Islands following civil unrest. ⁵⁷⁰	C/E	Reassurance/Deterrence
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⁵⁶⁹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p206; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p17.

⁵⁷⁰ UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1981				
May	UK Bermuda	HMS <i>Cardiff</i> stands by to assist in Bermuda following civil unrest and a general strike. ⁵⁷¹	C/E	Reassurance/Assistance
April	USSR Cuba	A squadron of five Soviet ships pays an official good will visit to Cuba. ⁵⁷²	E	Attraction/Reassurance
June	UK Algeria	A merchant tanker (Shell) is stopped and diverted by Algerian gunboats; HMS <i>Dido</i> is sent to assist but the incident ends without intervention. ⁵⁷³	P/E	Coercion/Reassurance
August	US Libya	Aircraft from carrier USS <i>Nimitz</i> shoot down two oncoming Libyan aircraft while task force is in Gulf of Sirte to emphasise US rejection of Libyan claim that Gulf is their territorial waters. The dispute persists. ⁵⁷⁴	P	Coercion
August	Iran Denmark	The Iranian Navy seize Danish ship carrying explosives to Iraq. The start of a long campaign against neutral shipping in the Gulf. ⁵⁷⁵	D	-
August	USSR Int Community	The new Soviet aircraft carrier, <i>Kiev</i> , makes its maiden voyage to the Baltic. ⁵⁷⁶	E	Prestige
August	US Int Community	USN leads Exercise <i>Ocean Venture</i> in the Atlantic. It involves 250 ships from the US, UK, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Netherlands, Canada, West Germany, Portugal, France, Denmark	-	Co-operation/Deterrence

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² RUSI News Sheet 3 (1981), p6.

⁵⁷³ UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

⁵⁷⁴ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p206; Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p17.

⁵⁷⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p207.

⁵⁷⁶ Jane's Defence Review 2, No 6 (1981), p499.

		and Spain. Norway refuses to join the exercise because it involves so many non-NATO members. The USSR denounces the exercise as 'sabre rattling'. ⁵⁷⁷		
September	USSR Poland	During a period of political disaffection in Poland, the Soviet naval exercise <i>Zapad</i> culminates in the landing of 6000 troops and marines on the Baltic coast close to the Polish border. ⁵⁷⁸	E	Coercion

⁵⁷⁷ RUSI News Sheet 7 (1981), p2; RUSI News Sheet 6 (1983), p6.

⁵⁷⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p207; RUSI News Sheet 8 (1981), p5.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1982				
April	Argentina UK	After an initial foray into South Georgia by an Argentinean scrap merchant, an Argentine naval task force lands troops to seize Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands. Initially successful, but leads to war and defeat for Argentina. ⁵⁷⁹	D	Coercion
	Italy Egypt Israel	Italian warships patrol the Strait of Tiran as part of the Multinational Force and Observers monitoring military disengagement in Sinai. ⁵⁸⁰	-	Co-operation/Deterrence/Reassurance
February	USSR Italy	The Italian submarine <i>Leonardo da Vinci</i> detects a Soviet <i>Victor I</i> Class submarine in Italian waters off the naval base at Taranto. The submarine was tracked for 18 hours before it left Italian territorial waters. ⁵⁸¹	-	Picture building
May	US Cuba	In Exercise <i>Ocean Ventura</i> , US Navy lands 400 marines at their enclave in Guantanamo Bay and evacuates 300 Americans. Cubans call it an 'intimidating show of strength'. ⁵⁸²	E	Deterrence
September	USSR USA Japan China	Soviet Backfire bomber aircraft are detected over the Sea of Japan and Soviet air and naval forces surge in the area when aircraft carrier USS <i>Enterprise</i> transits North Pacific. The action is seen to be a sign of Soviet	C/E	Deterrence/Reassurance

⁵⁷⁹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p207; UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

⁵⁸⁰ Ramsbotham, Oliver & Woodhouse, Tom. *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), p173.

⁵⁸¹ Jane's Defence Review 3, No 3 (1982), p231.

⁵⁸² Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p207.

		concern over US carrier-based air power in the Far East. ⁵⁸³		
December	US USSR Lebanon Regional Comm	Fourteen US warships are deployed off the Lebanese coast and carry out exercises to demonstrate US resolve. ⁵⁸⁴	E	Coercion

⁵⁸³ Jane's Defence Review 4, No 2 (1983), p131.

⁵⁸⁴ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p207.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1983				
January	Argentina Brazil	Argentine patrol boat turns back a Brazilian naval survey vessel from the Beagle Channel in assertion of a disputed territorial claim. ⁵⁸⁵	P	Coercion
February	US Libya Sudan Egypt	Following a request by the Egyptian presence for a show of force, the USN aircraft carrier <i>Nimitz</i> poises just outside Libyan waters. Egypt accuses Libya of planning to invade Sudan; Libya denies the accusation. ⁵⁸⁶	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
February to April	UK Int Community	The <i>Caribtrain 83</i> deployment led by HMS <i>Invincible</i> visits and conducts exercises with Portugal, the US, Bahamas and Belize, including exercises designed to demonstrate British ability to reinforce in a crisis. ⁵⁸⁷	E	Co-operation/Prestige
March	USSR India	Soviet aircraft carrier <i>Minsk</i> visits India to reinforce the bilateral 'security alliance'. ⁵⁸⁸	E	Attraction
April	Norway USSR	An unknown submarine, believed to be Soviet, is detected in Hardanger fjord in Norway. The Norwegian Navy fires on the submarine and the Defence Minister states that it will be destroyed if it fails to surface. ⁵⁸⁹	-	Picture building/Deterrence

⁵⁸⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p207.

⁵⁸⁶ RUSI News Sheet 25 (1983), p2.

⁵⁸⁷ Benbow, *British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships*, p18.

⁵⁸⁸ Jane's Defence Review 4, No 6 (1983), p557.

⁵⁸⁹ RUSI News Sheet 27 (1983), p1.

April	Spain UK	Three Spanish warships arrive in Algeciras Bay to express indignation of visit of HMS <i>Invincible</i> (with HRH the Duke of York on board) to Gibraltar. ⁵⁹⁰	E	-
August	South Korea North Korea	South Korean warships sink a North Korean ship allegedly engaged in spying. ⁵⁹¹	D	Deterrence
August	UK New Zealand Mauritius	One British and one New Zealand frigate with supporting auxiliary are diverted to the British Indian Ocean Territory after incursions by Mauritian vessels. ⁵⁹²	P	Deterrence/Reassurance
August	US USSR Nicaragua	A US destroyer stops a Soviet flagged freighter in international waters; the vessel was bound for Nicaragua. The action was an attempt to demonstrate US intent to prevent the shipment of arms to the Communist government in Nicaragua. ⁵⁹³	D	Coercion
August	US Chad Libya	The US State Department accuse Libya of 'blatant intervention' in the civil war/insurgency in Chad. USS <i>Eisenhower</i> is dispatched and anchors close to Libyan waters as a visible symbol of American intent. ⁵⁹⁴	P/E	Deterrence/Reassurance
September to December	US UK Grenada	In Operation <i>Urgent Fury</i> a US naval task force lands troops, in spite of indignant protest by the British Prime Minister, to occupy the island of Grenada and replace a left wing government by one more acceptable to the US. ⁵⁹⁵	D	Coercion

⁵⁹⁰ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., pp207-208.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., p208.

⁵⁹² UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

⁵⁹³ RUSI News Sheet 31 (1983), p4.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid., p3.

⁵⁹⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p208; UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

November	UK Egypt	HMS <i>Hermes</i> , with 40 Cdo embarked, pays a good will visit to Alexandria and exercises with Egyptian forces. ⁵⁹⁶	E	Co-operation/Attraction
December	US Lebanon Syria	Syrian forces in Lebanon fire on US aircraft, provoking an air strike on Syrian positions near Beirut from the carriers USS <i>Independence</i> and <i>John F Kennedy</i> . Two US aircraft are lost in the operation. In turn, Lebanese Druze and Shia militias attack US Marine positions in the city. ⁵⁹⁷	P	Deterrence

⁵⁹⁶ RUSI News Sheet 34 (1983), p3.

⁵⁹⁷ RUSI News Sheet 35 (1983), p1.

DATE	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	DESCRIPTION	CABLE CLASSIFICATION	COMPOSITE CLASSIFICATION
1984				
January	UK Australia	HMS <i>Invincible</i> is refused permission to visit Sydney after the British government refused to comment on whether or not she was carrying nuclear weapons. ⁵⁹⁸	E	-
January	USSR Cuba Int Community	Soviet warships visit Havana. ⁵⁹⁹	E	Attraction/Reassurance
February	NATO USSR	NATO conducts its largest amphibious exercise in the Norwegian Arctic, involving 150 ships, 300 aircraft and 25000 personnel. ⁶⁰⁰	E	Prestige/Deterrence/Co-operation
February	USSR Sweden NATO	Soviet submarine activity is detected operating close to the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. ⁶⁰¹	-	Picture building
February	UK Lebanon	During unrest and civil war 5000 civilians are evacuated to Cyprus from Lebanon by British ships. ⁶⁰²	P	Reassurance
February	US Italy Lebanon	US and Italian ground forces are evacuated from Lebanon. Seven warships led by the Italian <i>Vittorio Veneto</i> escort the withdrawing	D	Reassurance/Deterrence

⁵⁹⁸ JDW 1, No 1 (1984): p15.

⁵⁹⁹ JDW 1, No 2 (1984): p61

⁶⁰⁰ JDW 1, No 7 (1984): p267.

⁶⁰¹ JDW 1, No 19 (1984): p765.

⁶⁰² UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

		forces. USN warships provide naval gunfire support to the Army in southern Beirut. ⁶⁰³		
March	USSR US	The USSR deploys an additional aircraft carrier, <i>Novorossiysk</i> , to its Pacific Fleet in response to the USN's deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles in the region. ⁶⁰⁴	E	Deterrence
March	US Japan	USN and JMSDF conduct their first joint mine counter measures exercise in 13 years. The exercise takes place between Honshyu and Sikoku islands. ⁶⁰⁵	E	Co-operation
March	US South Korea North Korea	The annual US-South Korean <i>Team Spirit</i> exercise takes place. ⁶⁰⁶	P/E	Co-operation/Deterrence
March	USSR Vietnam US	The Soviet Navy operates a sizeable force of 20 surface ships and 4 submarines from Cam Ranh Bay. It is judged to be an attempt to gain influence in the region to the detriment of the US. ⁶⁰⁷	C/E	Attraction
March	France Spain	French patrol boats attack and capture two Spanish trawlers in the Bay of Biscay. ⁶⁰⁸	D	Deterrence
March to May	US Nicaragua	The US conducts covert mining of Nicaraguan harbours during the peak coffee exporting season. ⁶⁰⁹	-	Coercion

⁶⁰³ RUSI News Sheet 37 (1984), p1.

⁶⁰⁴ JDW 1, No 8 (1984): p307.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., p311.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., p313.

⁶⁰⁷ JDW1, No 10 (1984): 389.

⁶⁰⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p208.

April	USSR US	Soviet carrier <i>Minsk</i> fires flares at the US destroyer (<i>Harold Holt</i>) trailing her in the South China Sea. ⁶¹⁰	E	Deterrence/Coercion
April	USSR Int Community	The USSR stages a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea; it is seen as a show of strength. ⁶¹¹	E	Prestige/Deterrence
May	Japan US Australia New Zealand Canada	Japan joins the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercise for the first time. ⁶¹²	E	Co-operation
May	Iran Iraq GCC	Iran attacks Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf in order to force GCC states to pressure Iraq into ending its attacks on Iranian oil exports. ⁶¹³	P	Coercion
June	US USSR UK France Iran Iraq Regional Community	Combined east-west naval powers manifest their concern at the maritime repercussions of the Iran-Iraq war by keeping warships in the Persian Gulf. ⁶¹⁴	C	Deterrence/Coercion/Reassurance

⁶⁰⁹ RUSI News Sheet 39 (1984), p1.

⁶¹⁰ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p208; JDW 1, No 14 (1984): p547.

⁶¹¹ RUSI News Sheet 39 (1984), p2.

⁶¹² JDW 1, No 17 (1984): p677.

⁶¹³ JDW 1, No 20 (1984): p811.

⁶¹⁴ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p206.

June	Australia US Int Community	Australia sends destroyer <i>Brisbane</i> to work with USN in the North West Indian Ocean; it is seen as a response to the Iran-Iraq war spilling over into the maritime domain. ⁶¹⁵	E	Co-operation
June	East Germany USSR Bulgaria Romania	The East German training ship <i>Wilhelm Pieck</i> makes goodwill visits to Romanian, Bulgarian and Soviet Black Sea ports. ⁶¹⁶	E	Attraction
June	Egypt USSR	The Egyptian destroyer <i>El Fateh</i> pays a four day goodwill visit to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. There were Egyptian, Iraqi and UAE cadets on board. ⁶¹⁷	E	Attraction
July	China Vietnam Reg Community	PLAN reinforces Paracel Island garrison and conducts naval exercises in the area. The sovereignty of the South China Sea islands are disputed by Vietnam. ⁶¹⁸	P	Deterrence/Coercion
July	US Libya	The US 6 th Fleet enters the Gulf of Sirte in order to exercise freedom of navigation; Libya, which claims the Gulf to be part of its territorial waters calls the US action 'provocative'. ⁶¹⁹	P/E	Deterrence/Coercion
August	Egypt Kuwait	Four Kuwaiti gunboats visit Egypt. It is the first military contact between the two countries since, like most Arab states, Kuwait	E	Attraction

⁶¹⁵ JDW 1, No 22 (1984): p901.

⁶¹⁶ JDW 1, No 24 (1984): p1013.

⁶¹⁷ JDW 1, No 25 (1984): p1059.

⁶¹⁸ JDW 2, No 1 (1984): p7.

⁶¹⁹ JDW 2, No 5 (1984): p176.

		broke diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Camp David Treaty with Israel. ⁶²⁰		
August	UK US France Egypt	An international effort commences to clear the Gulf of Suez and southern Red Sea of mines from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt had asked the UK, US and France for assistance in the matter. ⁶²¹	P	Assistance/Reassurance/Co-operation
August	US Colombia Ecuador Peru Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela	The US conducts naval training with South American counterparts in the latest in the <i>Unitas</i> series of exercises. ⁶²²	E	Co-operation/Attraction
September	UK Iran	The UK releases three Iranian auxiliary ships from British shipbuilding yards, embargoed since 1980. ⁶²³	-	Attraction
September	Japan USSR	Following discovery of sea bed tracks, Japan claims that USSR has been operating mini-submarines in its territorial waters. The area is in one of the Straits through which the Soviet Pacific Fleet must pass to reach open ocean. ⁶²⁴	-	Picture building

⁶²⁰ Ibid., p177.

⁶²¹ JDW 2, No 6 (1984): p211; UK. UK, RN Operations 1970-2013.

⁶²² JDW 2, No 7 (1984): p268.

⁶²³ JDW 2, No 8 (1984): p307.

⁶²⁴ JDW 2, No 10 (1984): p435.

September	US Libya	Libyan armed forces are placed on alert as US 6 th Fleet continues to operate in the Gulf of Sirte. ⁶²⁵	P/E	Deterrence
October	Canada Thailand	Canadian warships visit Bangkok in an attempt to strengthen ties between the two countries. ⁶²⁶	E	Attraction
November	Sri Lanka India LTTE	Sri Lanka increases naval patrols of the strait between India and Sri Lanka in order to prevent shipment of arms to Tamil separatists. ⁶²⁷	-	Deterrence
November	US Reg Community	USN deploys three ships to West Africa to build relationships with littoral states. ⁶²⁸	E	Attraction
December	Australia Indonesia	Australia and Indonesia conduct a joint naval exercise, <i>New Horizon</i> , off Darwin. ⁶²⁹	E	Attraction/Co-operation
December	US Israel	USS <i>Dwight D Eisenhower</i> leads US and Israeli naval exercises; they are a sign of relaxation in the strained relations between the two countries following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. ⁶³⁰	E	Co-operation/Attraction

⁶²⁵ JDW 2, No 11 (1984): p483.

⁶²⁶ JDW 2, No 16 (1984): p723.

⁶²⁷ JDW 2, No 17 (1984): p760.

⁶²⁸ JDW 2, No 19 (1984): p870.

⁶²⁹ JDW 2, No 22 (1984): p1015.

⁶³⁰ Ibid., p1095.

CHAPTER 4

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: SELECTED CASE STUDIES

Situating naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War era is a complex business. As has already been discussed, the fall of communism and the end of a half century of superpower stand-off left the world an uncertain place, and one that has been the subject of much deliberation:

The legacy of colonialism, resurgent nationalism and now non-state actors has given rise to a period of complexity and rapid change in international relations. The academic debate reflects this uncertainty with contending theories about what constitutes ... the post-Cold War environment.¹

The views at the extremes of this debate could not be more stark. On the one hand, as Richard Crockatt has written, 'the end of the Cold War removed more or less at a stroke the structural and ideological conditions which underlay superpower conflict over the previous forty years.'² On the other hand, John Ikenberry spoke for many when he stated the contrary position, that 'a great deal of ink has been shed in recent years describing the various versions of the post-Cold War world order. These attempts have

¹ Mazzucelli, Colette. 'International Relations in the Post Cold War Era.'
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/classroom/bulletin-board/international-relations-in-the-post-cold-war-era-professor-colette-mazzucelli>
(accessed 19 September 2012).

² Crockatt, Richard. 'The End of the Cold War.' In Baylis *et al.*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 3rd Ed, p126.

failed, because there is no such creature. The world order created in the 1940s is still with us, and in many ways stronger than ever.³

These differences of opinion are an interesting distraction, but each represents an avenue of research which is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of this research, and as reasoned in Chapter 1, the majority view will be taken; the Cold War will be assumed to have ended in or around 1991 and Ikenberry's 'myth of chaos' argument,⁴ therefore, will not be followed. Instead, this thesis contends that with the end of the Cold War there was indeed a sea change in societal, economic, political and military norms, readily identifiable from those which went immediately before and which had the potential to influence the theory and practice of naval diplomacy.

Chapter 2 described various models of naval diplomacy, deriving them from, and categorising them by, the period in which their underpinning rationale was shaped. The classical naval scholars wrote around themes of deterrence, national status and amity; later commentators wrote of coercive and non-coercive influence and alliance building. Post-modernists centred their arguments on the gathering of information and understanding in the maritime domain, the soft power of attraction and the need for bespoke coalitions. Enduring themes were identified, common to all periods, which led to the conclusion that up until the end of the Cold War naval diplomacy was a state-centric, realist endeavour and that it assumed binary relationships between the two principal actors involved. It also concluded that the practice of naval diplomacy relied on the assumption of rational, cognitive decision making on the part of the target or

³ Ikenberry, G. John. 'The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos.' *Foreign Affairs* 75, No 3 (1996): p79.

⁴ An argument expanded upon in Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos", pp79-92.

'victim' government. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether those conclusions still apply in the new global order, especially in light of the incidents catalogued in Chapter 3.

To make sense of the new global order it would be judicious to attempt to identify the macro trends which characterise it. Many commentators have tried to describe post-1991 global trends and a short examination of a representative section of this body of work uncovers a significant degree of concurrence. Michael Cox, for instance, pointed to an era defined by the globalisation of capitalism, US hegemony, Russian reform, the rise of China, European integration and the rise of radical Islam.⁵ John Young and John Kent identified a very similar set of trends, albeit by other names: German reunification, the break-up of the USSR and the subsequent 'wars of succession', the Yugoslav break-up, US predominance, a willingness to engage in humanitarian intervention and a changing balance in the developing world.⁶ As examples of the latter Young and Kent cite the ending of apartheid in South Africa, progress toward a peaceful settlement in Palestine, central African conflict in Rwanda and Zaire, and the economic rise of the east Asian 'Tigers'.⁷ The themes are, simultaneously and intuitively, recognisable and right.

⁵ Cox, Michael. 'From the Cold War to the War on Terror.' In Baylis, John, Smith, Steve (Eds). *Globalization of World Politics*, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp139-153.

⁶ Young and Kent describe how the 'wars of succession' took various forms from ethnic tensions and border disputes to ideological conflict. They cite as examples the attempts to establish the Transdniester Republic in Moldova (1990-94), the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-97) and the ongoing troubles in the Caucasus: Ngorno Karabakh (1992-93, 1999), Abkhazi revolt against Georgia (1992-93) and Chechnya from 1994 onwards. See Young, John W. & Kent, John. *International Relations Since 1945: A Global History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p631.

⁷ Ibid., pp623-688.

The themes may be recognisable and right, but in list form they can appear disparate and unrelated. Some commentators have sought to find an even broader overview by which to simplify the period. Amund Lundesgaard, for instance, divided the post-Cold War era into three 'distinct periods': the rapidly changing and unpredictable security environment of the 1990s; the global war on terror after the al Qaeda attack on the United States on 11 September 2001; and the re-emergence of great power rivalry.⁸ Though precisely where and when the last 'period' began is unclear. The renowned Cold War historian John Gaddis simplified matters further, seeing just two stimuli at work after 1991, the dual forces of 'integration and fragmentation',⁹ but that argument was, perhaps, made a little prematurely.

Some have described the post-Cold War world not as a series of geopolitical 'happenings' but in terms of societal or conceptual changes. For instance, when debating the assertion that 'the post-Cold War era is over' Stephanie Hoffman and Kenneth Weisbrode discussed a number of post-1991 trends, including the emergence of the 'comprehensive' or 'whole of government' approach to foreign and defence policies which call for closer and better aligned civil-military partnerships.¹⁰ The approach is perhaps reminiscent of Joseph Nye's 'smart power' thesis described in Chapter 2 and may explain a commonly held perception that there was an increased acceptance of the use of militaries in operations other than war from the 1990s onwards.

⁸ Lundesgaard, Amund. *US Navy Strategy and Force Structure after the Cold War*. IFS Insight 4/2011. (Oslo: Institutt For Forsvarsstudier (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies), 2011), p5.

⁹ Gaddis, John L. 'Toward the Post-Cold War World.' *Foreign Affairs* 70, No 2 (1991): p102.

¹⁰ Hofmann, Stephanie & Weisbrode, Kenneth. 'Will the Post-Cold War Era Ever End?' <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/will-%E2%80%9Cpost-cold-war-period%E2%80%9D-ever-end> (accessed 16 January 2013).

The change in emphasis in military employment may be more than a subtle improvement in joined-up government; it could be symptomatic of a re-evaluation of the whole role of military forces. Rob de Wijk, writing about coercion, captured the post-Cold War concept: 'Traditionally, states use force to protect territory and to conquer land. Today, liberal democracies use force mainly as a foreign policy instrument to influence the strategic choices of their opponent or target.'¹¹ Whether this view is applicable after the liberal democracy led regime-changing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is questionable. Christopher Coker went straight to the core of the issue; the West, he argued, had changed from being a 'threat community' to being a 'risk community' in its attitude to security.¹² Military forces, it would follow, would necessarily change from countering the threat posed by a potential 'enemy' to assisting in the management of generic 'risks' to national interests – not necessarily the same things.

All of these themes offer potential frameworks for this Chapter. In order to shape the thesis an amalgam is used through which to view naval diplomacy, describing a simplified geopolitical post-Cold War structure. It begins with fragmentation and the uncertain security situation after the collapse of communism, looks in turn at the resultant nationalism and opportunism which followed, the assumption of, and then challenge to, US hegemony and finishes with the supposed return to great power rivalry. Throughout, the role of non-state actors, the diffusion of influence to regional powers and, arguably, increasing constraints on the use of force by and between states, are considered. Though the themes chosen may logically appear to be

¹¹ Wijk, Rob de. *The Art of Military Coercion*. (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2005), p11.

¹² Coker, Christopher. *Rebooting the West*. Whitehall Paper 72. (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2009), p60.

chronological and exhibit a causal relationship, in reality that is not always the case. It quickly becomes apparent that throughout much of the twenty years after 1991, the trends and themes identified co-existed.

To explore these issues further this Chapter will look at a selection of examples of naval diplomacy drawn from the period 1991 to 2010. They are chosen from those identified in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 and are illustrative, not exhaustive; however, they do represent a range of actors and methods which are, perhaps, characteristic of the period and macro-trend which they represent. The majority of the examples, particularly those used to highlight fragmentation, nationalism and American hegemony may be considered discrete and many others could have been selected in their place. Those used toward the end of the Chapter to help describe the naval diplomacy wielded to support the rise of the emerging Asia-Pacific powers are more thematic in nature. Nonetheless, the whole picture is one of a twenty year period in which naval diplomacy has been far from absent in global affairs.

CASE STUDIES IN NAVAL DIPLOMACY

Fragmentation and the Uncertain Security Situation

The decline of communism and the rapidly changing map of central and eastern Europe led to a particularly uncertain security situation in the early 1990s. The victors were quick to reap the supposed 'peace dividend,' the savings to be made against military expenditures which had become almost prohibitively expensive in the final years of the Cold War. As one commentator later put it, 'the reduction in East-West tension also resulted in a great decrease in inter-state conflicts.... Defence budgets in many parts of the world radically decreased.'¹³ However, as the same commentator went on to say, it would be 'unwise' to argue that the world was at peace, as it began to see the emergence, or re-emergence, of many serious armed conflicts in areas that had been 'relatively quiescent' during the Cold War.¹⁴ From a Western perspective, and consistent with Coker's 'risk' hypothesis, a great number of dangers such as 'regional rivalry, terrorism, transnational crime, nationalism, and ethnic and religious conflicts' rose to prominence in the 1990s, 'replacing the Soviet Union as the main concern.'¹⁵

Two examples of naval diplomacy have been selected which typify this bout of fragmentation and the subsequent vying for influence in the former eastern bloc.

Though the examples are a decade apart in time, both involved the West, both involved

¹³ Yilmaz, Muzafer Ercan. 'The New World Order: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era.' *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 7, No 4 (2008): p44.

¹⁴ Ibid., p45.

¹⁵ Lundesgaard, *US Navy Strategy and Force Structure after the Cold War*, p4.

former communist states and both were closely scrutinised by a non-independent third party, namely Russia. Arguably, they represent *prima facie* attempts to exercise hard and soft power respectively.

The first example, the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia, was not an obvious candidate for the application of seapower. In fact, Tim Benbow stated that, 'there was little apparent role for maritime forces in an intra-state campaign taking place on land, in which neither side has a significant navy or a grave vulnerability to the interdiction of its maritime trade. In practice, however, the naval contribution was both substantial and significant.'¹⁶ What became apparent in the crowded waters of the Adriatic in the 1990s was an age-old truth: the purpose of a navy is not only to fight an opposing navy.¹⁷

Though the conflict in Yugoslavia and subsequently in the newly independent states of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo ultimately saw the employment of ground troops and a substantial application of air power, both from land and sea, in the maritime environment a steady trickle soon became of flood of actors appearing on the Balkan stage. The central issue in this example is perhaps the number, range and differing objectives of those actors.

As the situation deteriorated in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security Council passed a series of increasingly aggressive Resolutions to quell the turmoil,¹⁸ including UNSCR 787 in November 1992 which authorised the enforcement of

¹⁶ Benbow, Tim. 'Maritime Power in the 1990-91 Gulf War and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia.' In Dorman, Andrew, M., Smith, Mike Lawrence & Uttley, Matthew R.H. (Eds). *The Changing Face of Maritime Power*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p117.

¹⁷ Ibid., p107.

¹⁸ Resolutions 713 in 1991, 757 in 1992, 787 in 1992 and 820 in 1993.

sanctions.¹⁹ This Resolution had the effect of giving Western action ‘some degree of bite’ but the sanctions were ‘inevitably slow to have an effect, and that effect was modest.’²⁰ However modest that effect might be, the Western powers were keen to act and be seen to do so. Early in 1993 the North Atlantic Council offered to police the Adriatic using its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). It was, Fabian Hiscock asserted in *The Naval Review*, the first live operation ever conducted by NATO,²¹ and, as Eric Grove added, a ‘notable first in international naval co-operation – support of UN resolutions.’²² These claims, though appealing, are not strictly accurate. M.D. Fink, in a 2013 analysis of naval support of UN resolutions identifies seven to date, including two (Southern Rhodesia in 1965 (UNSCR 217) and Iraq in 1990 (UNSCR 665)) which pre-date Yugoslavia.²³ Nonetheless, after the quarter century hiatus between the naval enforcement of sanctions of Southern Rhodesia and those authorising action against Iraq, there was a flood of UN mandated maritime activity in Haiti (1993), Sierra Leone (1997), Lebanon (2006) and Libya (2011).²⁴

¹⁹ For a detailed chronology of events in the Former Yugoslavia see: Allcock, John, Milivojevic, Marko & Horton, John (Eds). *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: An Encyclopaedia*. (Santa Barbara, Ca: ABC-Clio, 1998), pp351-388.

²⁰ Benbow, ‘Maritime Power in the 1990-91 Gulf War and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia’, p114.

²¹ Hiscock, Fabian. ‘Operation Sharp Guard.’ *The Naval Review* 82, no 3 (1994): p224.

²² Grove, Eric. ‘Navies in Peacekeeping and Enforcement: The British Experience in the Adriatic Sea.’ *International Peacekeeping* 1, no 4 (1994): p468.

²³ Fink, M.D. ‘Maritime Embargo Operations: Naval Implementation of UN Sanctions at Sea Under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.’ *Netherlands International Law Review* 60, no 1 (2013): p74. Of note, UNSCR 83, which authorised military assistance (including naval) to South Korea following the North’s attack in 1950, was a response to aggression, not an enforcement of sanctions. See: United Nations. Security Council. *Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950*. S/RES/83 (1950). New York. UN Security Council, 1950.

²⁴ Fink, ‘Maritime Embargo Operations’, pp73-92.

However, according to NATO, in the three years that the naval operations took place in the Adriatic, fourteen countries contributed forces.²⁵ France, outside the NATO military structure at the time, felt able to become involved through the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), which also committed forces.²⁶ The British formed a national task group in January 1993 based around the aircraft carrier HMS *Ark Royal* under the command of Jeremy Blackham, and a Dutch frigate joined it in February.²⁷

Notwithstanding the practical issue of sanction enforcement, it is clear that the Adriatic of the early to mid-1990s provided an opportunity for states to publically demonstrate their willingness to participate in coalition and alliance action in order to help shape the changing world order. There was, in effect, a scramble for a piece of the Adriatic. Additionally, the multi-national response to support UN Resolutions was arguably a strengthening, if not practical legitimising, of the role of international organisations in the post-Cold War world. In International Relations terms, it spoke to the liberal agenda.

Blackham stated that his immediate priority was to 'familiarise ourselves with the geography, oceanography and pattern of activity in the Adriatic' and that his mission was to 'poise.' The same mission, he stated, 'similarly drove the thinking of the US and French commanders' and are 'the most classic, most ancient, and in the future, probably most likely form of naval operations.'²⁸ However, that assessment is perhaps

²⁵ The contributors were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. See: NATO. 'NATO/WEU IFOR Final Fact Sheet.' 2 October 1996. <http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm> (accessed 21 February 2013).

²⁶ Hiscock, 'Operation Sharp Guard', p224.

²⁷ Grove, 'Navies in Peacekeeping and Enforcement', pp462-3.

²⁸ Blackham, Jeremy. 'Maritime Peacekeeping.' *RUSI Journal* 138, no 4 (1993): p19.

an oversimplification, as each of the contributing parties had their own objectives. From the start of the conflict until 1995 American policy had been based around its refusal to deploy ground troops,²⁹ and thus it relied heavily on its aircraft carrier contribution to Operation *Deny Flight* against the Serbian air force to communicate intent. Meanwhile, French warships were primarily supporting troops ashore, whilst standing NATO naval forces, from both the Mediterranean and later from the Atlantic, and the WEU, were conducting embargo operations.³⁰ By the time operations completed in 1996 over 74,000 ships had been challenged by navies maintaining a continuous vigil at sea and although the Yugoslav Navy attempted to interfere and assist an oil tanker to break the embargo in 1994, the enforcement was deemed completely successful.³¹ Ships were also used as neutral meeting grounds for negotiations between the Yugoslav constituent states and parties. Dr David Owen, the Co-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 was aware of the symbolism of holding a peace conference on board a third party warship and acknowledged that the 'union of the three republics' plan was 'finalised on HMS *Invincible*' in 1993.³²

In his analysis of the Adriatic operations from a British perspective, Eric Grove highlighted the complexities of integrating into an 'environment with two other national carrier groups, American and French, two multi-national forces, NATO and WEU, not to

²⁹ Latawski, Paul & Smith, Martin. *The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p161.

³⁰ Grove, 'Navies in Peacekeeping and Enforcement', pp466-7.

³¹ NATO. 'NATO/WEU IFOR Final Fact Sheet.' 2 October 1996.
<http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm>
(accessed 21 February 2013).

³² Owen, David. *Balkan Odyssey*. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), p190.

mention Italian and NATO command structures.³³ Richard Sargent similarly commented on the challenges of having 'as many as four aircraft carriers in the Adriatic at any one time.'³⁴

The achievement of the 1990s naval diplomacy in the Adriatic was not just its obvious impact on its 'victim', the disintegrating Yugoslavia, but its realization of coalition building, its visible signals to the international community, and its reassurance to a myriad of domestic audiences that action was being taken in support of a popular humanitarian cause. According to the US special envoy Richard Holbrooke it gave the US Navy a platform of success from which to lobby Congress,³⁵ and it also sent a message to Russia that the West was still a force to be reckoned with at sea, despite the cuts made to defence spending since the end of the Cold War. That message, however, did have an adverse impact on relations between the two former superpowers.³⁶

The second example of naval diplomacy from the fragmented, former eastern bloc is perhaps an example of when naval diplomacy fails. In the Adriatic the contributing states may have had dissimilar aims, but they were at least aware of the environment in which they operated. In the summer of 2006 the United States led an initiative aimed at enhancing the interoperability and maritime capabilities of the Black Sea states and

³³ Grove, 'Navies in Peacekeeping and Enforcement', p463.

³⁴ Sargent, Richard. 'Deliberate Force Combat Air Assessments.' In Owen, Robert, C. *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*. (Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 2000), p349.

³⁵ Holbrooke, Richard. *To End A War*. (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), p145.

³⁶ Carpenter, Ted (Ed). *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*. (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2000), p86.

supporting its own foreign policy objectives of securing the region from terrorism, promoting democracy and ensuring the free flow of goods. The US was absolutely clear in its aim but, arguably, it was not cognisant of the context. Since 1992 Russia, still the dominant power in the region, had viewed Yugoslavia as a distraction to its main naval aim, resolution of the 'problem' of Ukraine and the future of its Black Sea Fleet.³⁷

The US-led *Sea Breeze* series of exercises had begun in 1997 and were seen as an important vehicle for coalition building.³⁸ The 2006 exercise was to be held off the Crimean peninsula, co-hosted by Ukraine, and involved participating forces from seventeen countries, all belonging to either NATO or the Partnership for Peace (PfP). For its part Ukraine saw *Sea Breeze* as an aid to its own longer term objectives of NATO membership, progressing military modernization and increasing interoperability with other countries' forces.³⁹

Though the exercise was actually a US-Ukrainian bilateral enterprise with a number of other invited states, it was seen by many, and particularly by Russia, as a *de facto* NATO endeavour and part of its attempt to expand to the east. At the end of May 2006 the US-flagged merchant ship *Advantage* arrived as planned at the Ukrainian port of Feodosiya with a number of military reservists and five hundred tonnes of construction material for use in *Sea Breeze*. The Russian Duma, sending a clear warning to its neighbour, voted on 6 June by 435 to 0 for a resolution expressing 'serious concern' over Ukrainian plans to join the NATO Alliance. Pro-Russian demonstrators then began

³⁷ Edemskii, Andrei. 'Russian Perspectives.' In Danchev, Alex & Halverson, Thomas (Eds). *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), p33.

³⁸ Sanders, Deborah. 'US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages.' *US Naval War College Review* 60, No 3 (2007): p62.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p63.

to 'picket' the American 'warship'.⁴⁰ The Russian vote had been timed to pre-empt a Ukrainian parliamentary motion to allow foreign troops into the country for the exercise.⁴¹ Since an earlier Ukrainian election there had been a political impasse, with no party enjoying a clear majority, which made it difficult to achieve 'the constitutionally required parliamentary authorisation of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil.'⁴² However, it was subsequently and successfully argued within Ukraine that since *Advantage* was not a 'warship' and that since its cargo was not ammunition, the port had every right to admit it without reference to parliament.⁴³ That point notwithstanding, the political turmoil and anti-NATO sentiment in the predominantly ethnically Russian Crimea was such that it could be exploited for political gain.⁴⁴ The definitive article on the incident, written by Deborah Sanders in 2007, stated that:

The offloading of *Advantage* became a lightning rod for a widespread campaign against the government's proposed foreign policy in general. Residents of Feodosiya blockaded the city's port, protesting what they saw as an attempt by NATO to establish a presence in the Black Sea..... The day after the arrival of *Advantage* the Feodosiya town council

⁴⁰ BBC. 'Russia Warns Kiev Over NATO Plans' dated 7 June 2006.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5054506.stm>
(accessed 19 February 2013).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Sanders, 'US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages', p65.

⁴³ International Centre for Policy Studies. 'Sea Breeze 2006: The Campaign to Promote NATO is Being Lost.'
<http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/comment/1994.html>
(accessed 19 February 2013).

⁴⁴ Perepelytsia, Grigory. 'NATO and Ukraine: At the Crossroads.' *NATO Review* (2007).
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/aert2.html>
(accessed 19 February 2013).

declared the town a 'NATO-free area'; a week later the Crimean parliament declared the peninsula a 'NATO-free territory'.⁴⁵

Within two weeks the ship would be forced out of port, its equipment and cargo impounded by Ukrainian customs and the reservists forced to fly home, their mission unachieved.⁴⁶

By early August when the Ukrainian parliament did vote to allow the foreign troops into the country to exercise, it was too late.⁴⁷ The external pressure from Moscow and the internal demands within the Crimea were so great that the Ukrainian government was forced to alter course. In a visit to Brussels in September 2006 Viktor Yanukovich, the Prime Minister, stated that Ukraine was 'not ready' to join NATO.⁴⁸

Sanders used the *Sea Breeze* incident as a case study through which to question the 'generally accepted' view of the diplomatic utility of naval power. Naval diplomacy, which she defined as the use of naval power in peacetime to secure influence,⁴⁹ could be counterproductive. In this case of an American attempt to influence Ukraine through simple naval exercising, it failed to produce the desired effects for either side and could,

⁴⁵ Sanders, 'US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages', p66.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p65.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ BBC. 'Ukraine 'not ready' to join NATO' dated 14 September 2006.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5345406.stm>
(accessed 19 February 2013).

⁴⁹ Sanders, 'US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages', p61.

she argued, have caused unforeseen damage.⁵⁰ Sanders combined elements of the works of Ken Booth and Edward Luttwak when reaching her conclusion:

The relationship between naval diplomacy and domestic factors is complex. It has been argued that success is in the eyes of the 'locals', that the psychological environment of a 'target' state affects its decision makers and 'internal opinion forming groups.' Naval diplomacy, then, must take account of a state's political, historical, economic and military worldview; domestic politics – the policy environment, the decision-making arena, and internal pressures - shape the parameters and likelihood of what can be achieved.⁵¹

Military personnel engaged in planning for and participating in future coalition building exercises will clearly need to understand the culture, history and sensitivities of host states as well as of their neighbours.⁵²

The success of this example of naval (and wider) diplomacy, if there was any, belonged to Russia, a state which had been neither a direct participant nor a deliberate 'target' of the planners. Moscow's own counter to American and NATO naval presence in the region was its encouragement for and joining of the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) in 2001. In common with the aims of *Sea Breeze*, BLACKSEAFOR was established to enhance peace and stability among the region's six littoral states, which it did through biannual naval exercises under the banner of Operation *Black Sea Harmony*.⁵³ As *Sea Breeze 2006* was unravelling a *Black Sea Harmony* exercise was underway.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Ibid., p62.

⁵¹ Ibid., p63.

⁵² Ibid., p69.

⁵³ The Black Sea Force members are Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania. See: Gorenburg, Dmitry. 'Ten Years of BlackSeaFor: A Partial Assessment.'

Nationalism and Opportunism

Though the island of Taiwan is ethnically Chinese, it has had an ambiguous relationship with the mainland for centuries. Incorporated into the Qing Dynasty in the seventeenth century, it had subsequently been ruled in part or whole by the Dutch, Spanish and French. From 1895 until 1945 it was a Japanese colony and legally recognised as such by all of the major powers. Only at the end of the Second World War did the Nationalist government in Nanking gain sovereignty.⁵⁵ Within four years, however, the Chinese communists under Mao had wrested control of the mainland in a civil war and the Nationalist Kuomintang, under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to the island and established the Republic of China (RoC) there. The RoC was not generally recognised by the international community and Taiwan remained officially at war with the People's Republic of China (PRC) until 1991. 'Terminating that "war" at the same time as the Cold War ended should have given Taiwan greater security. It did just the opposite.'⁵⁶

Trade grew rapidly between China and Taiwan after 1987, when the Taiwanese authorised travel to the mainland,⁵⁷ but a sense of economic optimism on the island

<http://russiamil.wordpress.com/tag/black-sea-harmony/>
(accessed 19 February 2013).

⁵⁴ Sanders, 'US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages', p68.

⁵⁵ Copper, John F. *Taiwan: Nations State or Province?* 4th Edition. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2003), p186.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p185.

⁵⁷ Clough, Ralph. *Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait*. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pix.

gave sustenance to a growing movement for true Taiwanese independence.⁵⁸ To the PRC the developments on the island were unwelcome:

From Beijing's perspective, Taiwan has developed into a hotbed of secessionist sentiment, guided by a confederacy of island born leaders determined to evolve a political culture, economic infrastructure, and foreign policy that defines a destiny for their island distinct from that of the mainland..... The Republic of China quickly shed its image as a reliquary of Nationalist 'bitter-enders' dedicated to a *reconquista* of the mainland.... PRC leaders became incensed as Taipei picked apart the Beijing-constructed arms embargo to purchase modern frigates and aircraft from France and the United States.⁵⁹

Taiwan had fewer than thirty diplomatic allies in the world at the end of the Cold War and it thus developed a 'calculated strategy' to keep itself at 'the forefront of international attention' and remind the world of its plight.⁶⁰ China-watchers believe that threatening gestures against Taiwan can be traced to the emergence of a new leadership in China as early as 1992,⁶¹ but it was not until 1995-6 that tensions came to a head. Taiwan embarked on its own naval diplomacy aimed at building prestige and amity; in 1995 the Taiwanese President launched his country's fifth *Oliver Hazard Perry* class guided missile frigate and 'dispatched a "friendship fleet" to Singapore, to the

⁵⁸ Porch, Douglas. 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy.' *US Naval War College Review* 52, no 3 (1999): p16.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p17.

⁶⁰ Lijun, Sheng. *China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue*. (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2001), p2.

⁶¹ Porch, 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996', p16.

delight of the Chinese community there.⁶² At around the same time there were moves in Taipei to achieve another diplomatic coup and get the President, Lee Teng-hui, to visit America.

Since 1949 the United States had followed a 'one-China' policy, recognising only the Beijing government as the legitimate representatives of the whole Chinese people, and no Taiwanese leader had been granted permission to travel to the United States. The long-established political stance was subtly changed by President Clinton in 1995 when he decided to grant a visa to Lee, not in an official capacity but as a private citizen. The decision to grant the visa was greatly influenced by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, which was susceptible to the Taiwan lobby.⁶³ After repeatedly declining his previous requests, the US allowed President Lee to make an unofficial visit to his *alma mater* (Cornell University) in 1995, to which the PRC objected.⁶⁴ The subsequent crisis could, therefore, be said to have been precipitated by Lee's political and diplomatic posturing.⁶⁵

Interestingly, Beijing's decision to respond to the Taiwan issue through military demonstration could have been as a result of its assessment of Western military-diplomatic methodology. Douglas Porch, writing about the Taiwan Strait Crisis three years after the event, judged that 'on the basis of Chinese analysis of the Gulf War, advocates [...] preached that a display of the PLA's capabilities during a crisis would

⁶² Ibid., p18.

⁶³ Lijun, *China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue*, p25.

⁶⁴ Clough, *Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait*, p2.

⁶⁵ Bush, Richard. *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2005).

deter an enemy.⁶⁶ The 'enemy' to whom he is referring was both the RoC and the United States. Chinese missile 'tests' were consequently conducted from July 1995 until March 1996. In August and October 1995 air and maritime exercises were held in the East China Sea involving the firing of anti-ship missiles,⁶⁷ and in November an amphibious exercise took place around Dungshan Island, south of the Strait and similar to Taiwan in geography, terrain and weather; it made a 'good rehearsal ground.'⁶⁸ The PRC's message to intimidate, coerce and deter was clear. The November exercises were well timed to coincide with approaching Taiwanese parliamentary elections; the tactics seemed to bear fruit as candidates favourable to reconciliation with China were returned.⁶⁹ 'For China, then, coercion and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are as much a matter of communication and diplomatic signalling as of putting to sea potent ships, aircraft and missiles.'⁷⁰ Deterring the US from intervening in some future 'showdown' in the Strait assumed top priority for Beijing.⁷¹

The United States, however, was not deterred, and thus China's attempt at naval diplomacy did not succeed. On 19 December 1995 following continuing tensions, the United States responded by sending the USS *Nimitz* battle group through the Taiwan Strait, the first carrier to make that passage since 1979.⁷² The mission for the carrier

⁶⁶ Porch, 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996', p18.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p19.

⁶⁸ Lijun, *China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue*, p28.

⁶⁹ Porch, 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996', p19.

⁷⁰ Holmes, James. 'Schelling Goes to Sea: Managing Perceptions in China's Contested Zone.' *Defence Studies* 9, no 2 (2009): p189.

⁷¹ Ibid., p191.

⁷² Porch, 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996', p19.

group was not to fight, but to be a highly visible and symbolic demonstration of interest. James Holmes, writing in 2009, saw the US action as entirely consistent with the Schelling's conceptual theory of coercive diplomacy discussed earlier. Carriers were sent, he reasoned, to 'protect and deter.'⁷³

Taiwanese presidential elections were scheduled to take place in March 1996 and Beijing, mindful of its earlier successes in the 1995 vote, employed a similar strategy of military coercion in order to 'intimidate' Taiwan and influence the results.⁷⁴ The PRC announced that it would hold further live firing exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The United States responded in kind and directed the USS *Independence* battle group toward Taiwan, shifted the USS *George Washington* from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf and ordered the USS *Nimitz* battle group from the Gulf to Taiwan.⁷⁵

There is some speculation over the true target audience for the US action. It has been suggested that President Clinton dispatched the two carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait to constrain Beijing and demonstrate US naval power, but also to circumvent intense pressure from the US Congress if he failed to act.⁷⁶ The deployment became the most significant naval display in the East China Sea since the 1950s.⁷⁷

⁷³ Holmes, 'Schelling Goes to Sea', p190.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Porch, 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996', p20.

⁷⁶ Copper, John F. *Taiwan: Nations State or Province?* 4th Edition. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2003), p206.

⁷⁷ Porch, 'The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996', p15.

Douglas Porch argued that the 'conventional wisdom, especially in US government and naval circles, may be wrong. It holds that the arrival of two carriers effectively deterred Beijing's intimidation of Taiwan. Unfortunately, a close analysis of the crisis yields little evidence to support this thesis.'⁷⁸ Porch's point is that although the deployment of the American ships may have given the Chinese leadership 'pause', it did not alter their plans at all. The missile firings continued.⁷⁹ However, President Lee turned the missile firings to his own advantage in his political campaign and denied Beijing the successes they had enjoyed in 1995. In the March 1996 election he won handsomely with a popular vote of 54 per cent.⁸⁰ A reassessment of Porch's assertion may in fact result in a different conclusion; the conventional wisdom may be partly right. Beijing may not have been deterred but US action did reassure nationalist Taiwanese and give them the courage to side with Lee in the knowledge that they were being backed by the world's superpower.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis is interesting because it shows naval diplomacy being used to counter naval diplomacy, with interlocking activities by three parties and multiple audiences. Who the ultimate victor was, however, is not clear. Sheng Lijun, for instance, argued that the crisis demonstrated that the PRC was still far from possessing the hard and soft power it needed to become a global leader.⁸¹ Porch, on the other hand, acknowledged that the subsequent PRC investment in anti-access missile technology could work to minimise any potential US participation in a future crisis, by effectively keeping its naval forces at bay. Missiles, he stated, 'remain the near term

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp15-16.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p21.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p22.

⁸¹ Lijun, *China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue*, p56.

PLA trump card.’⁸² Lijun did recognise, however, that ‘China’s response to the United States was mostly symbolic and stopped short of blatant retaliation. Beijing remained clear headed enough not to jeopardise its overall interests by sidelining China-US relations.’⁸³ The PRC’s rise to power will be discussed further later in the Chapter.

One of the longest running political and military operations of the post-Cold War era involved ground and air participants, but also included a significant naval diplomatic element. Following the first Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq ‘problem’ was, in effect, ‘contained’ until the second Gulf War of 2003. Containment, of course, had been the strategy applied by the West to hold communism in check during the Cold War.⁸⁴ Western naval forces had been present in the Arabian / Persian Gulf before 1991 and remained so throughout the containment period and beyond. They were tasked with presence through routine patrols, reassurance of partner states through bilateral and multi-national exercises and operations, interdiction of vessels attempting to breach the UN sanctions which had been applied against Iraq and clearance of the residual mine threat from both 1991 and, more likely, the earlier Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.⁸⁵ A long standing ‘general’ regional role for extra-regional forces, mainly Western, became more focused in the 1990s. In many ways the Gulf mirrored the Adriatic Sea in the same period. It was crowded with the warships of interested parties, their roles were various and their underlying rationale for being there wide-ranging. To classical naval

⁸² Porch, ‘The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996’, p30.

⁸³ Lijun, *China’s Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue*, p68.

⁸⁴ For the classic text on containment, see George Kennan’s ‘long telegram’: Kennan, George. Telegram to George Marshall, 22 February 1946. Available at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf (accessed 15 February 2013).

⁸⁵ Davis, Steven, J., Murphy, Kevin, M., & Topel, Robert. *War in Iraq Versus Containment*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006), p1.

strategists such as Corbett, the naval action in the Gulf would have looked remarkably familiar: it would undoubtedly have been described as a *blockade*. An Australian naval officer and commentator agreed; James Goldrick, writing about the containment strategy stated that 'it stretched over 13 years and was one of the longest blockade operations in history.'⁸⁶

Unlike in East Asia, where the US had long attempted to deter regional conflict by applying a balance of power strategy against China, in the Middle East the global superpower approached matters in a different way. Steve Yetiv, discussing an apparent lack of coherence in the American approach to foreign policy and geopolitics at the time, argued that the US did not attempt to balance *power* in the Gulf, but rather it adopted a 'balance-of-threat' approach. That is, it positioned itself and its allies not against the most powerful state but rather against one it perceived as the greatest threat.⁸⁷ Iraq's influence and power beyond military adventurism was limited in comparison to wealthier states like Saudi Arabia or culturally persuasive states such as Iran, but nonetheless it did become the main target of the West's naval diplomacy.

However, the containment strategy did not just apply to Iraq. The Clinton administration from 1993 onwards shifted to a policy of 'dual containment' of both Iraq and Iran.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Goldrick, James. 'Maritime Sanctions Enforcement Against Iraq 1990-2003'. In Elleman, Bruce & Paine, S.C.M. (Eds). *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies 1805-2005*. (London: Routledge, 2006), p201.

⁸⁷ Yetiv, Steve, A. *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p4. For 'balance of threat' see: Walt, Stephen M. 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.' *International Security* 9, no 4 (1985): pp3-43.

⁸⁸ Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy*, p91.

Dual containment had several goals. First, it aimed not only to impede the ability of Iran and Iraq to threaten neighbors [sic] but also to undermine their ability to build conventional and unconventional military capabilities. This approach, unlike deterrence, would cripple their ability to be aggressive in the first place rather than deterring already capable states from being aggressive.⁸⁹

Iraqi containment was more militarily aggressive than that targeted at Iran. There were substantial numbers of ground troops stationed in the region and airpower was used extensively. The containment of Iran was more subtle in its military dimension. It would have been politically unacceptable to use land and air power in the same way and the particular advantages of sea power in this regard, discussed in Chapter 2, meant that the burden of responsibility to demonstrate political intent fell to naval forces.

According to James Goldrick, eighteen countries contributed to the naval effort in the Gulf at some stage. The UK was the 'most consistent' usually providing a single destroyer or frigate, but due to other tasks it was not always on station.⁹⁰ The building of coalitions, which were such a factor in the wars of both 1991 and 2003, also became a distinguishing trait of the intervening period. Interestingly, the mine counter measures effort in particular became home to those who were politically unwilling or unable to become involved in more direct forms of warfighting; in addition to the US and UK six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands) contributed.⁹¹ As well as being a visible signal of support to Gulf region states, this naval diplomacy was used to demonstrate commitment to the US and European allies. The coalition

⁸⁹ Ibid., p92.

⁹⁰ Goldrick, 'Maritime Sanctions Enforcement Against Iraq 1990-2003', p209.

⁹¹ Pokrant, Marvin. *Desert Storm at Sea*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), p193.

building element of the mission was important but there were also tangible, physical results to their efforts which could be used as demonstrable evidence of success to domestic audiences. For instance, hundreds of bottom, moored and floating mines were located and appropriately dealt with.⁹²

Whenever Iraq failed to act in accordance with the desires of the international community, the rheostat of coercion was turned up. At these times, those less-willing contributing states maintained their lower level constabulary and diplomatic action, leaving the projection of harder military power to others. For instance, in December 1998 following the Iraqi refusal to allow access to UN authorised weapons inspectors, the United States and United Kingdom responded with Operation *Desert Fox*, an intense four day bombing campaign against Iraq's security infrastructure. Some of the ordnance used was land based, but much came from missile firing warships and submarines and from aircraft carriers at sea. It caused a series of uprisings within Iraq against the regime and, possibly, a coup attempt.⁹³

Containment of Saddam Hussein's Iraq lasted for thirteen years but the political mood changed in the early 2000s following the al Qaida attacks on the US and the Western response, much of it from sea, in Afghanistan in late 2001. It became apparent that containment had run its course and that greater military action was likely. Even at that stage, however, naval diplomacy continued to play a role. William Langenheimer, writing in late 2002, immediately before the US-led invasion of Iraq, discussed the ongoing coercive diplomacy in the Gulf as a means both to garner support for war and to provide

⁹² Ibid., p196.

⁹³ Langenheimer, William, S. 'Give Peace a Chance: First, Try Coercive Diplomacy.' *US Naval War College Review* 55, No 4 (2002): p65.

an exit strategy for Iraq. It was about giving the 'enemy' a final chance.⁹⁴ The assumption that rational actors would undertake rational, cognitive decision-making was alive and well. Indeed, playing out such arguments in the specialist naval media could be seen as a political act in itself.

The use of the sea for political gain is not limited to states. Hezbollah, for example, 'scored a major strategic coup' in July 2006 when it attacked the Israeli corvette *Hanit* with anti-ship missiles.⁹⁵ The Israeli Navy had been operating in the eastern Mediterranean, engaging land targets in Lebanon and enforcing a blockade during its small 'war'.⁹⁶ Israel was, in effect, exercising its continued sea control in its locality, which had gone unchallenged since the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. According to Israeli figures, the operation had been successful with its ships spending some 8000 hours at sea and firing their weapons over 2500 times.⁹⁷ On 14 July 2006, however, Hezbollah fired two missiles from the shore; one hit and sank a Cambodian registered cargo ship 60 km offshore whilst the other hit *Hanit* and killed 4 sailors.⁹⁸ The attack was proof that 'insurgent groups... do use the sea'.⁹⁹ The attack did not alter the military power dynamics of the region but perceptions were changed. The lasting 'memory' of the 2006 naval campaign is not the myriad Israeli successes, but one Hezbollah action.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p50.

⁹⁵ Hilburn, Matt. 'Hezbollah's Surprise.' *Sea Power* 49, No 9 (2006): p10.

⁹⁶ Polmar, Norman. 'Hezbollah Attack: Lesson's for the LCS.' *USNI Proceedings* 132, No 9 (2006): p88.

⁹⁷ Cordesman, Anthony, Sullivan, George & Sullivan, William. *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*. Significant Issues Series Vol 29, No 4. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007), p133.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p131.

⁹⁹ Murphy, Martin. 'The Unwanted Challenge.' *USNI Proceedings* 134, No 12 (2008): p46.

The ability of Hezbollah to launch such an attack came as a surprise both to Israel and to the international community. Martin Murphy explains why terrorism and insurgency are more likely to be experienced on land:

The reason for the low incidence of maritime terrorism is that the risk-reward ratio rarely computes. The resources groups need to undertake acts of violence at sea tend to be specialised and therefore cost more than the resources needed to mount equivalent attacks on land. More important, the rewards terrorists look for, publicity in particular, are hard to achieve at sea.¹⁰⁰

However, publicity can be achieved by the unusual. Within minutes of the *Hanit* attack Hezbollah had used its own TV station, *Al Manar*, to broadcast the news and reach some 200 million viewers; it also posted a film on YouTube.¹⁰¹ It is also believed that Hezbollah had acquired the missiles (understood to be the Chinese C802) from Iran, its state sponsor, and that Iran was operating by proxy.¹⁰² Extrapolating, the Hezbollah attack on Israel was an indirect, or proxy, Iranian attack on the United States.

In another instance of a non-state actor using the sea to challenge Israel, the so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla achieved enormous publicity in 2010. As part of the ongoing middle-east peace process, Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained control of its borders. Hamas, a U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, subsequently won the Palestinian election and took

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Caldwell, William, Murphy, Dennis & Menning, Anton. 'Learning to Leverage New Media: The Israeli Defence Forces in Recent Conflicts.' *Military Review* 89, No 3 (2009): p4.

¹⁰² Hilburn, 'Hezbollah's Surprise', p10.

control of the territory in 2007. Israel imposed a blockade of Gaza in response to Hamas's takeover and restricted the flow of goods.¹⁰³ Israel and the international community differed about the severity of the blockade's effects on the humanitarian situation on Palestinian residents of Gaza, but it was clear that the territory's economy and people were affected.¹⁰⁴

On 22 May 2010, the MV *Mavi Marmara*, a former Istanbul passenger ferry owned by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation, rendezvoused with five other ships and the flotilla headed for Gaza in an attempt to break the blockade and deliver 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid. In addition to the material cargo, the ships carried about 700 activists from 38 countries. On 30 May, the ships refused Israel's offer to unload at the port of Ashdod so that their cargoes could be inspected before delivery.¹⁰⁵

The next day, when the ships were in international waters between 80 and 100 miles from the Israeli coast, the Israeli Navy intercepted and boarded them. Some activists on board the *Mavi Marmara* resisted and a violent clash ensued; nine passengers were killed.¹⁰⁶ The ships were diverted to Ashdod, the remaining passengers were detained,

¹⁰³ United States. Congressional Research Service. Migdalovitz, C. *Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath*. R41275. (Washington DC: CRS, 2010), p1.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *Between the Fence and a Hard Place*. OCHA Special Focus Report August 2010. New York: OCHA, 2010. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_focus_2010_08_19_english.pdf (Accessed 7 March 2013).

¹⁰⁵ United States. CRS. *Israel's Blockade of Gaza*, pp2-3.

¹⁰⁶ Israel. 'Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010.' (The Turkel Commission). <http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/wordocs/7896summary-eng.PDF> (Accessed 7 March 2013).

the cargo was unloaded and eventually it was delivered to Gaza and distributed under the auspices of the UN.¹⁰⁷

Though the subsequent UN investigation into the incident, chaired by the former New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer, determined that the blockade had been 'legitimate' and that the flotilla had acted 'recklessly',¹⁰⁸ there was near-universal condemnation of Israel's actions. Nicaragua broke off diplomatic relations, while Ecuador and South Africa recalled their ambassadors and many other governments summoned Israeli ambassadors and *chargés d'affair* to register their protests. The European Union, Russia and China urged Israel to open the borders to Gaza.¹⁰⁹ The action of the 'Gaza Freedom Flotilla' had an impact on the international community out of all proportion to that which might have initially been expected by a relative small-scale humanitarian delivery. It showed that diplomacy at sea is not the sole preserve of state navies.

Pax Americana and Resistance to US Hegemony

The examples of naval diplomacy cited thus far involve, at least in part, the seapower of the United States. There is a privileged discourse in international relations which supports the premise that the end of the Cold War left the US, at least for a period of

¹⁰⁷ United States. CRS. *Israel's Blockade of Gaza*, pp2-3.

¹⁰⁸ United Nations. 'Report of the Secretary General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident.' (The Palmer Commission). (New York: UN, 2011), 4.
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf
(Accessed 7 Mar 2013).

¹⁰⁹ United States. CRS. *Israel's Blockade of Gaza*, p6.

time, as the sole superpower; it might therefore be expected that the US Navy would play a significant role in consolidating American hegemony. Indeed:

With the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the bipolar international system dominating the Cold War period disappeared, leaving its place to basically a unipolar system under the leadership of the United States, speaking especially from a military/political point of view.¹¹⁰

A Congressional Research Service Report of 2009 explained that ‘although US forces have traditionally focussed on fighting and winning wars, defense [sic] strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero”, addressing threats at their inception through increased emphasis on theater [sic] security cooperation and capacity building of allies.’¹¹¹ As has already been discussed, navies, particularly leading navies, have always acted to further national and political interests by active and latent suasion and building partnerships. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, the US Navy re-evaluated its basic functions,¹¹² and developed the idea of the Global Fleet Station which, whilst not a new concept, did much to formalise a longstanding *informal* role.

Global Fleet Stations (GFS) were an attempt to put ‘presence’ missions on a more permanent footing. By continuously deploying to areas of interest, it was envisaged

¹¹⁰ Yilmaz, ‘The New World Order’, p45.

¹¹¹ United States. Congressional Research Service. Ploch, L. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. RL34003. (Washington DC: CRS, 2010), p4.

¹¹² As discussed in Chapter 2, in the first ten years after the end of the Cold War the US Navy subjected itself to almost continuous reassessment. Its outlook and vision was published in ‘The Way Ahead’ (1991), ‘The Naval Policy Book’ (1992), ‘...From The Sea’ (1992), ‘Naval Warfare’ (1994), ‘Forward...from the Sea’ (1994), ‘The Navy Operational Concept’ (1997), ‘Anytime, Anywhere’ (1997), and ‘Navy Strategic Planning Guidance’ (2000). For a precis and critical evaluation of each see Hattendorf, *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s*.

that the GFS could exert leverage to strengthen relationships and build capacity within the targeted countries and regions. In addition, they could also be used to indirectly counter the attempts by other 'forward leaning' states, such as China, to garner influence of their own. They are perhaps a maritime, twenty-first century manifestation of the nineteenth century's 'Great Game' or the late twentieth century's Cold War by proxy. Often working in parts of the world not subject to general public or mainstream media attention, the GFS had little in the way of a domestic agenda within the US and their political and diplomatic utility was therefore almost entirely concentrated on the area with which they were engaged. With GFS, the US was effectively reasserting its place as a naval superpower and putting naval diplomacy at the centre of its strategy.

The US Southern Command sponsored the first pilot GFS mission from April to September 2007, using the high speed vessel (HSV 2) *Swift*. During the course of its deployment *Swift* visited seven Caribbean and Central American countries and its ship's company conducted 39,890 hours of 'subject matter expert' exchanges with partners in topics such as leadership, small boat operations, port security and small unit tactics.¹¹³

The pilot was deemed to be a success with commentators writing such positive reviews as, 'the GFS represents a great opportunity to build civil-military communication and coordination practices that can be leveraged in any theater [sic] in the event of war.'¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Sohn, Kathi, A. 'The Global Fleet Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflicts.' *US Naval War College Review* 62, No 1 (2009): p50.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p48.

Buoyed by the initial experience of Southern Command, the newly formed Africa Command developed its own GFS and concentrated its efforts along the Atlantic coastline of West Africa. Jonathan Stevenson, commenting on the initiative, stated that 'it is salutary that the US Navy, rather than the Army, is taking the lead in a new strategic effort in Africa.'¹¹⁵ Salutary it may be, but based on historical precedent, it should be no surprise.

The Africa Command GFS was named the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and consisted of a small and varied group of warships and completed its first six month deployment in the Gulf of Guinea in 2008.¹¹⁶ The APS was designed to assist the regional maritime community to develop better maritime governance and to serve as a base from which to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief if required.¹¹⁷ Stevenson, again:

The African Partnership Station has already earned the confidence and enthusiastic participation of most littoral West African states, and it remains at once the most operationally effective and politically agreeable component of the military engagement of the United States with sub-Saharan Africa. In that light it may well prove Africa Command's most politically valuable strategic asset.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Stevenson, Jonathan. 'The US Navy Into Africa.' *US Naval War College Review* 62, No 1 (2009): p61.

¹¹⁶ United States. Congressional Research Service. Ploch, L. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. RL34003. (Washington DC: CRS, 2010), p20.

¹¹⁷ Sohn, 'The Global Fleet Station', p45.

¹¹⁸ Stevenson, 'The US Navy Into Africa', p64.

How the APS went about its business, however, was not necessarily original. As with countless flag-flying or ambassadorial deployments before it, the ships of the APS relied on manipulating the basic building blocks of human nature: 'In addition to providing relief assistance during the visit, sailors from *Swift* will conduct a community relations project, meet with local officials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and support a diplomatic reception aboard the ship.'¹¹⁹ In 2013 the US Africa Command was still employing the APS in support of its primary naval mission, 'to improve the maritime security capability and capacity of African partners.'¹²⁰ There is much to be said about learning from the lessons of history, however trivial they might initially appear.

The US Navy engaged in similar ventures in other parts of the world. A former US naval and marine attaché to Vietnam described a visit to Danang in July 2007 by the Pacific Partnership, a humanitarian assistance mission conducted in several southeast Asian ports by USS *Peleliu*, an amphibious assault ship, and its embarked medical, dental and engineering teams. Though it was not the first US ship visit since the end of the Vietnam War, it was characterised as a 'watershed in the development of the bilateral military relationship.'¹²¹

If the early post-Cold War era was a time of *Pax Americana*, it was not made so by the US alone. Its closest allies and partners adopted much the same methodologies, either

¹¹⁹ Sohn, 'The Global Fleet Station', p51.

¹²⁰ United States. Africa Command. *US Naval Forces Africa*. <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/subordinate-commands/navaf.htm> (accessed 17 June 2013).

¹²¹ Lucius, Robert, E. 'Pacific Partnership Visits Vietnam.' *US Naval War College Review* 60, No 4 (2007): p125.

by design or dint of circumstance. Australia's experiences in East Timor are perhaps a good example. After the withdrawal of the colonial power, Portugal, East Timor's larger neighbour Indonesia overran the state in 1975. After the invasion the local population had an uncomfortable relationship with their new overlords and never accepted Indonesian sovereignty.¹²² Violence periodically erupted and came to a head in 1999. In September of that year the United Nations created the International Force East Timor (INTERFRET) and it deployed under Australian leadership. The violent conflict was quelled and the operation ended on 23 February 2000 when INTERFRET handed over to the UN Transitional Administration East Timor.¹²³ Subsequently, Indonesia accepted East Timorese independence.

Like many peace missions, the ultimate success or failure of INTERFRET was determined on the ground, amongst the people. However, the commander of the operation, Major General P J Cosgrove, was in no doubt about the contribution that the coercive power of navies made:

Another military blinding glimpse of the obvious... the persuasive, intimidating or deterrent nature of major warships was not to me as the combined joint force commander an incidental, nice to have 'add on' but an important indicator of national and international resolve and most reassuring to all of us who relied on the sea lifelines. It was a classic case of the 'presence' pillar of sea power.¹²⁴

¹²² Australia. Alan Ryan. *From desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and the New Age Coalition Operations*. Study Paper 37. (Duntroon, ACT: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), p10.

¹²³ Ibid. p135.

¹²⁴ Stevens, *The Royal Australian Navy, Vol III*, pp292-3.

There may be consequences to intervention, however, and East Timor was no exception. Challenges to US-led Western hegemony come in various forms and it has been suggested that the bombing of a Bali disco popular with Australian tourists in 2004 may have been a direct result of Australia's involvement four years earlier.¹²⁵

A particular challenge to US and Western hegemony came from a one notoriously opportunistic quarter, and one not reluctant to use its own military and naval forces for political advantage: North Korea. As the Taiwanese commentator To-hai Liou has written:

There is a Chinese saying that weak countries have no diplomacy at all. Realists in the West, particularly neo-realists, also believe that international engagement is largely shaped by major powers. Minor and middle powers have no choice but to follow the rules of the game as constructed by major powers, but not without exception. North Korea's diplomacy in the post-cold war era is the best example of a minor power making a difference in world politics.¹²⁶

To-hai Liou went on to explain that because of its extremely limited economic capacity, North Korea had no choice but to focus on strengthening its military capabilities in an attempt to negotiate from a position of relative strength.¹²⁷ Despite being mired in economic woes, North Korea has a track record of threatening its more powerful rivals with military action. It has 'deliberately and repeatedly' resorted to brinkmanship in an

¹²⁵ Cotton, James. *East Timor, Australia and Regional Order*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p141.

¹²⁶ To-hai Liou. 'North Korea's Diplomatic Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era: Fishing in Troubled Waters'. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 10, No 2 (2001): p79.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p82.

attempt to benefit from the crises it creates. For example, during a 1993-94 crisis surrounding North Korea's attempts to develop a nuclear capability, it overtly threatened to wage all out war with the South if the United States dared to initiate any military action against it. It is an approach with historical precedent on the Korean peninsula and is perhaps another example of Schelling's classic game theory being put to practical use. Its strategy could be considered successful because, in the end, Pyongyang obtained two light water nuclear reactors from the United States along with an annual supply of 500,000 tons of heavy oil.¹²⁸ In these stark terms brinkmanship worked.

North Korea's strategy often relied on playing one adversary off against another, particularly South Korea and the United States, and it has been applied at sea. Its use of naval diplomacy is an interesting variation on what might be described as 'standard' practice. A notable example took place in September 1996 when a North Korean submarine was discovered in South Korean territorial waters. South Korea regarded the incursion as an attempted 'spying' mission whilst, at least publicly, the US had to be convinced that it was anything more than a navigational error. Similar incursions by Soviet submarines had, of course, been relatively commonplace in European waters during the Cold War. Notwithstanding the fact that Washington acknowledged the necessity of a diplomatic apology from North Korea and Pyongyang's promise not to commit the same mistake again, the US did not agree with Seoul's more aggressive approach of attempting to use to the incident as leverage against the construction of the North Korean nuclear reactors. North Korea's *mea culpa* effectively allowed it to be portrayed as the reasonable party, the victim of South Korea's disproportionate

¹²⁸ Ibid.

response. However, the Clinton administration did not want to see its previously agreed and hard won framework damaged by South Korea's tough stance toward Pyongyang.¹²⁹ North Korea had, quite simply, applied a simple tactic of submarine naval diplomacy to stoke disagreement over response between its two major critics.

A more aggressive application of submarine naval diplomacy by North Korea took place some years later in March 2010. Considered by some in the South to be the severest military provocation since the Korean War armistice, the North attacked and sank the Southern warship *Cheonan*.¹³⁰ Previous conventional naval skirmishes between the two Koreas, such as an exchange of fire in the Yellow Sea off Daechung in November 2009 when warships from the North entered disputed territorial waters,¹³¹ had tended to end in greater military success for the South. The North's solution to its comparable naval disadvantage was to turn to asymmetric tactics,¹³² particularly those which could carry a degree of plausible deniability.

Accusations of responsibility for the sinking of *Cheonan* with the loss of 46 lives were rejected by Pyongyang, though there was little doubt amongst the international community that the North Korean regime were to blame. What is interesting about the *Cheonan* incident is why North Korea took the seemingly irrational action that it did, and the reaction to it by other parties. Mikyoung Kim, a South Korean academic working at the Hiroshima Peace Institute in Japan, wrote that neither Seoul nor Tokyo could

¹²⁹ Ibid., p92.

¹³⁰ Kim, Duk-Ki. 'The Republic of Korea's Counter-Asymmetric Strategy.' *US Naval War College Review* 65, No 1 (2012): p55.

¹³¹ Foster, Peter. 'North and South Korea Warships Exchange Fire.' *Daily Telegraph*, 10 November 2009.

¹³² Kim, 'The Republic of Korea's Counter-Asymmetric Strategy', p55.

provide a convincing motive for the attack. This perhaps underlines an unchanging truth about the efficacy of naval diplomacy: outcomes will be limited if the intended audience cannot understand the policy which form its context. However, Kim does proffer the opinion that Pyongyang's behaviour could have its genesis in its exaggeration of external threats, which it used to consolidate its power with its domestic audience. Influence over the succession of leader and forcing the US to the negotiating table in order to secure other benefits could also have been factors in its political calculations.¹³³ Such an exaggeration of threat in order to legitimize subsequent actions is classic 'securitization,' the constructivist hypothesis put forward by Waever, Buzan and the Copenhagen School of IR. Should the Pyongyang's actions indeed be the product of a securitization agenda, it is perhaps a new outlet for naval diplomacy.

Though the UN Security Council condemned the sinking,¹³⁴ and the United States claimed that the incident had 'strengthened' its alliance with the South,¹³⁵ it could be argued that North Korea achieved its aim. The East Asia region was 'rattled' by the unprovoked action,¹³⁶ yet there was no immediate decisive response from China, North Korea's only ally, to either condemn or restrain its behaviour.¹³⁷ Indeed, one leading Chinese commentator went so far as to state that since the incident Beijing's assistance

¹³³ Kim, Mikyoung. 'The Cheonan Incident and East Asian Community Debate: North Korea's Place in the Region.' *East Asia* 28, No 4 (2011): p285.

¹³⁴ United Nations. Security Council. *Security Council Condemns Attack on Republic of Korea Naval Ship 'Cheonan', Stresses Need to Prevent Further Attacks, Other Hostilities in Region*. SC/9975. New York: UN Security Council, 2010.

¹³⁵ Garamone, J. 'Cheonan Tragedy Strengthens US-South Korea Alliance.' Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, 21 July 2010.

¹³⁶ Kim, 'The Cheonan Incident and East Asian Community Debate', p276.

¹³⁷ Zhu, Feng. 'Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea.' *East Asia* 28, No 3 (2011): p203.

to and investment in North Korea had increased. From the viewpoint of the Chinese leadership the survival of the Pyongyang regime worked to its advantage because it forced Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to co-operate on building regional security, rather than focus on Chinese military expansion as a source of regional instability in itself.¹³⁸ China's role in the aftermath of the *Cheonan* affair is not dissimilar to its stance after the *Pueblo* incident of four decades earlier, and discussed in Chapter 5. As an exercise in naval diplomacy, then, the *Cheonan* incident might be regarded as achieving successful outcomes for its instigator, but also indirectly benefiting another, larger neighbour.

The Return of Great Power Rivalry

If the immediate post-Cold War period was a moment of superpower victory for the United States and its supporting allies, then the newly unipolar world view did not go unchallenged for long. The opportunist and nationalist agendas of some actors have already been discussed, but it was the relentless economic rise of the BRICS, but perhaps of China and India in particular, which did most to bring about a new global multi-polarity. As the former Prime Minister of India, I K Gujral, wrote: 'we are [...] witnessing the emergence of multiple economic power centres that are beginning to assert themselves with different perceptions and different goals.'¹³⁹ Indeed, as another

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp195-6.

¹³⁹ Gujral, I.K. 'The Post-Cold War Era: An Indian Perspective.' *World Affairs* 1 No 1 (1997): 44-55.
<http://www.ipcs.org/article/india-tje-world/the-post-cold-war-era-an-indian-perspective-1.html>
(accessed 16 January 2013).

commentator suggested, 'from an economic/political point of view [...] the international system can be said to be multipolar, rather than unipolar.'¹⁴⁰

This Indian and Chinese economic ascendancy, however, differed significantly from that of the late twentieth century powerhouses of Germany and Japan, limited as they were from a simultaneous military expansion by post-World War II settlements. Despite the fact that in his influential text on China's 'peaceful rise' Zheng Bijiang claimed that his country would not pursue hegemony,¹⁴¹ increased Indian and Chinese economic power was accompanied by military growth and both countries have recognised the importance of the maritime domain when determining their futures.

Indian and Chinese maritime ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions can be understood in starkly realist, geopolitical terms; according to one analysis, the assumptions and arguments of the ascendants are unmistakably Mahanian.¹⁴²

Commenting specifically on Chinese military diplomacy, the US Center for Naval Analyses offered that 'since the 1990s the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become a ubiquitous presence on the world stage.'¹⁴³ Similarly, speaking at the US Naval War College in November 2007, Rear Admiral Chopra of the Indian Navy declared that his country should 'emulate America's nineteenth century rise to sea

¹⁴⁰ Yilmaz, 'The New World Order', p46.

¹⁴¹ Bijiang, Zheng. 'China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status.' *Foreign Affairs* 84, No 5 (2005): p22.

¹⁴² Holmes, James & Yoshihara, Toshi. 'China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic Triangle.' *US Naval War College Review* 61, No 3 (2008): p51.

¹⁴³ United States. Center for Naval Analyses. Gunness, Kristen. *China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change*. Conference Paper. (Arlington, Va: CAN, 2006), p1.

power' as it made its way in the world.¹⁴⁴ The two countries are, then, suitable candidates for a deeper investigation of naval diplomatic activities in support of national power.

Of the two rising Asian powers, India's naval expansion has arguably received less attention in the West, but there has been a definite shift in focus toward the maritime domain, as Waheguru Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan noted in 2003, when writing a comparative analysis of India and China:

Since the late 1970s, India has shifted its emphasis from the army to the navy..... Strategic intentions are to establish predominance in the Indian Ocean.... and prevent other powers, such as China and Japan, from making inroads in the area.¹⁴⁵

Indeed, this assertion seems to have been upheld in a 2007 speech by the Indian Defence Secretary, Shri Shekhar Dutt, to a New Delhi seminar on Defence, Security and Diplomacy. Dutt stated that although securing his country's borders remained the first priority, India's area of interest now extended far beyond the confines of the subcontinent. India's security environment, he argued, 'extends from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean'.¹⁴⁶ The environment he was referring

¹⁴⁴ Holmes & Yoshihara, 'China and the United States in the Indian Ocean', p48.

¹⁴⁵ Singh Sidhu, Waheguru Pal & Yuan, Jing-dong (Eds). *China and India: Co-operation or Conflict?* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p60.

¹⁴⁶ Dutt, Shri Shekhar. 'Seminar on Defence, Security, Diplomacy: India's National Interests.' Inaugural speech by the Indian Defence Secretary at the India International Centre, New Delhi, 24 February 2007.
<http://www.associationdiplomats.org/specialevents/AnnualSeminars/200607/20070224DefenceSecurityDiplomacy/20070224DefenceSecspeech.htm>
(accessed 10 June 2013).

to, India's self-declared 'extended neighbourhood',¹⁴⁷ was clearly maritime in character and geography. To exert influence over such vast swathes of the globe, by what Dutt termed 'promoting co-operation and understanding',¹⁴⁸ would require a sizeable navy capable of deliberate diplomatic missions in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.¹⁴⁹

During the Cold War and into the 1990s the Indian Navy's activities tended to sit at the 'hard' end of the power spectrum, with deployments centred on support of the Sri Lankan government's fight against the Tamil Tigers or, more commonly, on deterrence missions against Pakistan. As an example, in the wake of the Kargil crisis of 1999, when Pakistani forces crossed the Line of Control into the disputed territory, India put its navy on alert and altered the deployment plans for its Eastern and Western Fleets. This overt manoeuvring sent a signal that any 'misadventure' by Pakistan would be firmly dealt with and India later claimed that its naval response had had a definitive effect on the outcome of the crisis.¹⁵⁰

However, from around the turn of the twenty-first century India increasingly used its navy for soft power purposes. The Indian Navy declared that its theme for 2000 would be 'Building Bridges of Friendship'.¹⁵¹ Since then it has regularly dispatched its aircraft

¹⁴⁷ Scott, David. 'India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power.' *India Review* 8, no 2 (2009): p107.

¹⁴⁸ Dutt, 'Seminar on Defence, Security, Diplomacy: India's National Interests.' Inaugural speech.

¹⁴⁹ Scott, 'India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept', p113.

¹⁵⁰ Global Security. '1999 Kargil Conflict.' Global Security. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm> (accessed 14 June 2013).

¹⁵¹ India. Ministry of Defence. *MOD Annual Report 2000-2001*: p33. <http://www.mod.nic.in/reports> (accessed 10 June 2013).

carrier, INS *Viraat*, into the Gulf and during one twenty-four month period between 2005 and 2007 'around 40' Indian warships were deployed either into the Gulf or to Oman for diplomatic purposes.¹⁵² It commenced the *Varuna* series of bilateral naval exercises with France in 2001, resumed the *Malabar* exercises with the United States in 2002, the *Indra* exercises with Russia in 2003, and *Konkan* with the United Kingdom in 2004.¹⁵³ After its non-alignment stance during the Cold War, India was using every opportunity to build amity, and not only with those states physically bordering its 'security environment'.

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and the subsequent Western-led war on terror, the Indian Navy was used to signal a small but important message. Though it did not contribute directly to the war on terror, under the banner of Operation *Sagittarius* the Indian Navy escorted High Value Vessels through the Strait of Malacca choke point *en route* to the Middle East.¹⁵⁴ At Mexican request, the Indian Navy also escorted a sail training ship through the Strait in early 2002.¹⁵⁵ After the Cold War, during which India was viewed with semi-suspicion by the Western bloc, its navy was in the forefront of a rehabilitation with the (Western) international community.

Concurrently, India developed its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities, attributes which were particularly key in its maritime area of interest. The

¹⁵² Scott, David. 'NATO and India: The Politics of Strategic Convergence.' *International Politics* 49, no 1 (2012): p105.

¹⁵³ Scott, 'India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept', p115. The *Malabar* exercises with the United States had begun in 1992 but were suspended in 1998 following India's nuclear weapon testing programme.

¹⁵⁴ India. *MOD Annual Report 2002-2003*: p26.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p27.

Indian Navy played a part in the aftermath of the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami of Boxing Day 2004,¹⁵⁶ a role closely watched and later emulated by China, and in 2006 INS *Rajput* became the first foreign warship on the scene to conduct relief operations after another earthquake in Indonesia.¹⁵⁷ On its return from the Mediterranean in 2006, a long range sortie which show-cased its expeditionary capabilities to watching parties, an Indian naval task group diverted to Lebanon to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation from Beirut; 2280 Indian, Sri Lanka and Nepalese nationals were collected and taken to a place of safety.¹⁵⁸

In a novel method of winning friends, from the mid-2000s the Indian Navy conducted a number of hydrographic surveys of other states' exclusive economic zones. One such deployment occurred in March and April 2007 when INS *Sarvekshak* surveyed Mauritius and then presented the completed charts to the country's Prime Minister in a special ceremony.¹⁵⁹ Of course, such activity may not be entirely altruistic and India could be set to profit from the knowledge gained. Nonetheless, both parties were content with the arrangement and similar activities have since taken place in co-operation with the Maldives and Seychelles.

It is possible that India's non-threatening and 'independent' status is in itself an attractive proposition to the lesser-developed countries in its 'extended neighbourhood', making India a partner of choice for those states lacking a national naval capability. For

¹⁵⁶ Jane's Defence Weekly. 'In Brief.' Jane's Defence Weekly 42, No 2 (2005): pp3-4.

¹⁵⁷ India. *MOD Annual Report 2006-2007*: p32.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2007-2008*: p30.

instance, Mozambique, on the far African shores of the Indian Ocean, requested and was afforded maritime security by the Indian Navy for a series of major events. In July 2003 INS *Ranjit* and *Suvarna* deployed there to provide seaward protection during an African Union summit in Maputo,¹⁶⁰ and the following year INS *Savitri* and *Sujata* did the same, first during a World Economic Forum meeting and later a Afro-Pacific-Caribbean Heads of State meeting. On those occasions the Indian Navy took the opportunity to extend Indian influence further by giving medical treatment to 450 patients and training to the Mozambique Navy.¹⁶¹

India's interest in furthering its position in Africa did not end there and in 2008 its ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy patrols in parallel with the NATO deployment Operation *Ocean Shield* and, importantly, in close proximity to Chinese missions in the same region.¹⁶²

What these examples help to show is that with the end of the Cold War, New Delhi's world view changed. No longer was the Indian Navy a 'Cinderella Service', destined for marginalisation in comparison to the other armed forces,¹⁶³ but a major weapon in its government's diplomatic arsenal. Becoming a global actor required India to have a global navy and it got one.

¹⁶⁰ India. *MOD Annual Report 2003-2004*: p40.

¹⁶¹ India. *MOD Annual Report 2004-2005*: p46.

¹⁶² Scott, 'NATO and India: The Politics of Strategic Convergence', p105.

¹⁶³ Rai, Ranjit. 'Indian Navy in the 21st Century.' *Naval Forces* 24, no 6 (2003): p33.

When China is considered in greater detail, it becomes apparent that it too required a significant naval element in its 'pursuit of greatness'. A noted East Asia specialist, Leszek Buszynski, suggested that:

Over the past two decades, China has been steadily developing naval power, which it has regarded as a necessary attribute of great power status. As China rises in economic power, its maritime interests similarly expand (and with it its naval power).¹⁶⁴

Of course, twenty-first century China differs from the contemporary, post-Westphalian West and from India in the way that its military establishment relates to other elements of government. Consequently, it differs in the way that its political establishment can be manifestly influenced by military considerations. The result is perhaps a politico-military construct reminiscent of the Cold War, authoritarian East, though the PRC may be cognisant of this and slowly changing. Indeed, 'strength of numbers and the PLA's historical legacy under Mao have ensured that the Chinese military has retained a role in shaping foreign policy but its degree of influence has waxed and waned in the decades after Mao's passing.'¹⁶⁵ As the US Center for Naval Analyses points out:

The most fundamental point to make is that the PLA's conduct of foreign military relations is considered to be a strategic level activity by the Chinese leadership.... In this regard the 'political' and the 'military' are inseparable. The PLA's military activities are viewed by both the PLA and China's civilian leadership as a political undertaking using

¹⁶⁴ Buszynski, Leszek. 'The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry.' *Washington Quarterly* 35, No 2 (2012): p145.

¹⁶⁵ Marc Lanteigne dedicates a chapter of his book to 'strategic thinking and the roles of the military.' See: Lanteigne, Marc. *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*. 2nd Edition. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp80-101.

military means for strategic reasons, not as a freestanding set of military initiatives by military professionals for explicitly military reasons.¹⁶⁶

China's own 2010 White Paper on national defence describes the (at least outwardly) social and developmental roles of its armed forces, roles which would be purely political activity in the West. Amongst its strategic objectives it lists the maintenance of social harmony, world peace and stability. Within the last point it specifically discusses its cooperative military relations, relations that are 'non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed at any third party.'¹⁶⁷

Yoshihara and Holmes have argued that by depicting itself in this way, as an 'inherently defensive power, China has set a standard for its behaviour at sea.'¹⁶⁸ It might therefore be deduced that the PLAN is being optimised for the exercise of soft, or at least smart, power in its growing role on the world stage.

In a 2007 assessment, the US Office of Naval Intelligence stated that the Chinese Navy's interaction with foreign countries had four major components: high level exchanges, ship visits, functional exchanges and arms sales and purchases.¹⁶⁹ Of note, the assessment made no mention of either bilateral or multilateral exercises, a strategy which China had been already pursuing for a number of years. The Chinese themselves have described how:

¹⁶⁶ United States. CNA. *China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change*, p2.

¹⁶⁷ China. 'China's National Defense in 2010.'

¹⁶⁸ Yoshihara, Toshi & Holmes, James. *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p150.

¹⁶⁹ United States. Office of Naval Intelligence. *China's Navy 2007*. (Washington, DC: ONI, 2007), p112.

Maritime joint exercises have been held on a regular basis. In 2003 China ran a joint maritime search and rescue exercise with Pakistan, the first ever between China and a foreign country. During mutual port calls and other activities the PLAN has run bilateral or multilateral joint maritime exercises with the navies of India, France, the UK, Australia, Thailand, the US, Russia, Japan, New Zealand and Vietnam.... In 2007 and 2009 the PLAN participated in multilateral joint maritime exercises organised by the Pakistan Navy. In 2007 the PLAN took part in the joint maritime exercise held in Singaporean waters within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. In 2010 China held a joint maritime training [sic] with Thailand, the first ever between China and a foreign country.¹⁷⁰

As American forays into Africa had been led by its Navy so to, as China began to exercise its military forces with foreign states, did the PLAN take the van. Chapter 1 discussed the relative ease with which naval forces can be turned to low level, symbolic engagement; to achieve the same results with their air and land counterparts requires a far greater expression of political will by government. As the Chinese Information Office stated above, the PLAN first exercised with Pakistan in 2003, but it was not until 2007 that the first joint military training on land was carried out.¹⁷¹

The PLAN's sudden appearance on the world stage after decades of virtual introversion did not go unnoticed and, indeed, it triggered some concerns amongst other regional actors. Yoshihara and Holmes have suggested that it made India 'alarmist, at times

¹⁷⁰ China. 'China's National Defense in 2010.' Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 31 March 2011. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-03/31/content_22263510.htm (accessed 30 October 2012).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

almost panicky.¹⁷² How China then adjusted its strategy to meet regional concerns is worthy of analysis. It is interesting to note how the type of bilateral exercise conducted could in itself indicate the relative warmth of any particular relationship. Geoffrey Till points out that, 'in contrast to its exercises with other navies, Sino-Indian exercises have so far been largely limited to search and rescue operations.'¹⁷³ SAR, of course, is a low rung on the naval co-operation ladder, but a rung nonetheless.

A similarly low rung, but one which has historically been an effective means of gaining and exerting influence, is the port visit. During the Cold War and in the early 1990s, Chinese ships rarely visited foreign ports and when they did, the visits were exclusively confined to the Asia-Pacific region. In the period 1985-97 the PLAN made just fourteen foreign visits. In contrast, in the decade after 1997 the rate of ceremonial visits increased three-fold and 46 were made, including six to North America, five to South America, eight to Europe and three to African ports.¹⁷⁴ It was the beginning of an unprecedented outreach strategy.

In its analysis, the US Office of Naval Intelligence identified 1997 as the watershed for the Chinese Navy. Its increased activity starting that year and its use as a means of furthering national interests abroad was part of a deliberate attempt to underline the PRC's rise to greatness:

The first year China dispatched two task forces in a single year was 1997. It was also the first time a PLAN vessel visited South America. Indeed, this was the first time a

¹⁷² Yoshihara & Holmes, *Red Star over the Pacific*, p173.

¹⁷³ Till, *Asia's Naval Expansion*, p150.

¹⁷⁴ United States. ONI. *China's Navy 2007*, p117.

PLAN vessel visited anywhere outside the Asia-Pacific region. The growing quantity and scope of PLAN voyages beginning in 1997 illustrates the increased foreign-policy role China assigns to its naval fleet. During those 1997 voyages, the PLAN assigned precedence to showing the Chinese flag abroad at the expense of Chinese military readiness. The overriding goal was to illustrate to the people of those countries, including overseas Chinese who visited the ships in huge numbers during port calls, that China and the PLAN were both open to the outside world and no longer just a backward coastal navy. Significantly, China simultaneously deployed its only two relatively capable, reasonably modern warships, the two new *Luhu*-class guided-missile destroyers, away from Chinese waters. The readiness of these ships to participate in some potential crisis, such as in the Taiwan Strait, was effectively subordinated to the value of sending these ships to North and South America and to three ASEAN countries.¹⁷⁵

Ken Booth's prestige thesis, discussed in Chapter 2, had found a ready home in modern China.

The People's Republic of China may have been relatively late in coming to a realisation of the value of diplomatic port visits by its ships, but it did learn from the practice of others. Its broad objectives for ship visits (reported as being improving political and military relations between China and host country, learning lessons that may prove useful in the PLAN's modernization, and improving relations at the person to person level¹⁷⁶) may again differ from the West's, but the format for a visit is remarkably similar to those made by the more experienced world navies:

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp116-117.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p116.

The Navy has also drawn the attention of local Chinese, such as during their visit to Seattle in 2000 where hundreds of overseas Chinese adults and students, as well as 100 children from a local Chinese-language school, participated in the open house. PLAN sailors have engaged in soccer and basketball competition with the host country's sailors. Meanwhile, the host country usually provides some type of honor ceremony and provides local entertainment for the crew, such as when Malaysian native tribes performed traditional singing and dance. During the training ship *Zhenghe's* visit to Hawaii in 1989, the local Chinese-American community in Honolulu held several special events for and in honor of the crew.¹⁷⁷

Indian analysts were amongst the first to perceive a change of tack in China's use of the PLAN. A New Delhi analysis from 2001 noted that 'port calls to various countries signified the active role of the PLAN in the making of China's foreign policy.'¹⁷⁸ It also noted that when compared to earlier periods when the Chinese Navy was effectively a coastal defence force rather than an outward-looking blue-water navy, its visits had become showcases for China's long reach. In particular, it asserted that China was exhibiting the 'political and strategic resolve to contain its adversaries',¹⁷⁹ through its deployments. Given that India had been at war with China as recently as 1962 and the two countries had been regional competitors since, it might consider itself one of the 'adversaries' to be contained.

Beyond ship visits and the occasional exercise, China also began to develop strategic dialogues with other actors that it perceived to be important in shaping the international

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p117.

¹⁷⁸ Kondapalli, Srikanth. *China's Naval Power*. (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, 2001), p185.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

security situation, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and Japan.¹⁸⁰

The PLAN conducted joint patrols of the Beibu Gulf / Gulf of Tonkin with the Vietnamese Navy and, of course, it contributed to the multi-national counter-piracy effort off the Horn of Africa. China itself claimed to take 'a proactive and open attitude to international escort cooperation' and by 2010 had established mechanisms for regular intelligence sharing with several countries and international organisations, including the EU, NATO, Russia, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and Japan.¹⁸¹ As the US Center for Naval Analyses pointed out, 'China's footprint is no longer confined to the Asia Pacific region.'¹⁸²

The PLAN foray into Horn of Africa counter-piracy operations, commencing in 2008, is perhaps the best example of this extended footprint. The destroyers *Wuhan* and *Haikou*, accompanied by their replenishment vessel *Weishan Hu*, were their country's first extra-regional deploying vessels and were able to remain on task for three months; many more similar deployments followed.¹⁸³ As well as according the PLAN an opportunity to challenge itself at range from its home bases and to operate alongside other navies, the counter-piracy effort significantly altered how other powers viewed China. As one Indian commentator wrote, 'the Chinese Navy is here to stay for a long time to come – piracy or no piracy.'¹⁸⁴ A deeper, more insightful analysis, which

¹⁸⁰ United States. CNA. *China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change*, p4.

¹⁸¹ China. 'China's National Defense in 2010.'

¹⁸² United States. CNA. *China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change*, p1.

¹⁸³ Agnihotri, Kamlesh. 'Four Years of Anti-Piracy Mission: Chinese Navy's Showcase Achievement.'
<http://www.maritimeindia.org/four-years-anti-piracy-mission-chinese-navy%E2%80%99s-showcase-achievement#>
(accessed 17 June 2013).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

identified a number of domestic, regional and international stakeholders in China's naval counter-piracy strategy, was offered by the Dutch academics Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul van der Putten:

The Chinese government has multiple interests at stake when it comes to addressing Somali piracy.

1. The presence of the Chinese navy signals to the rest of the world that China is among the leading actors regarding maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
2. It contributes to Beijing's ability to protect its interests in a region of great economic importance. Both shipping lanes and the countries of the Middle East and Africa play a major part in China's external economic relations.
3. Beijing has shown its own population that it is capable of protecting Chinese property and lives from piracy attacks, and that the Chinese vessels need not rely on foreign navies for their protection. In other words, this shows that China is a great power and the leadership of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is taking up this responsibility.
4. The counter-piracy mission serves to underscore the fact that China – not the Taiwanese government – protects Taiwan's shipping interests. Thus the Chinese claim that Taiwan is part of China is bolstered.¹⁸⁵

China appears to be self-satisfied with its naval outreach strategy, openly lauding its own achievements. Its 2010 Defence White Paper declared that 'the Chinese Navy has

¹⁸⁵ Kamerling, Susanne & van der Putten, Frans-Paul. 'An Overseas Naval Presence Without Overseas Bases: China's Counter-Piracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden.' *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 40, no 4 (2011): p138.

dispatched, in seven sorties, 18 ship deployments, 16 helicopters, and 490 Special Operation Force (SOF) soldiers on escort missions. Through accompanying escort, area patrol, and onboard escort, the Chinese Navy has provided protection for 3139 ships sailing under Chinese and foreign flags, rescued 29 ships from pirate attacks, and recovered nine ships released from captivity.¹⁸⁶ It was telling its own people and the world of its contribution to the international community.

China had also taken note of the reputational gains to be made by fielding a credible ability to contribute to humanitarian operations. Following the West's, and India's, response to the 2006 Asian tsunami, which the PLAN had been largely powerless to mirror, it launched a new hospital ship called the *Peace Ark*.¹⁸⁷ Entry into the humanitarian assistance 'club' was a shrewd move for a country with a rather dubious record of human rights. As Holmes and Yoshihara have written:

China's soft power strategy seems based on the premise that a nation can store up international good will by supplying 'international public goods' like maritime security, which benefit all nations with a stake in the international order.¹⁸⁸

Though the PLAN may have been optimised for soft power in pursuit of its diplomatic role, it did not ignore the harder end of the spectrum. The PRC's troubled relationship with Taiwan has already been discussed and one commentator, unconvinced by

¹⁸⁶ China. 'China's National Defense in 2010.

¹⁸⁷ Su Hao. 'China's Humanitarian Operations Policy.' In Erickson, Andrew & Goldstein, Lyle, & Li, Nan (Eds). *China, The United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p243.

¹⁸⁸ Holmes, James & Yoshihara, Toshi. 'Is China a 'Soft' Naval Power?' *Jamestown Foundation China Brief* 9, no 7 (2009): p5.

China's new 'soft' approach, went so far as to suggest that the PLAN 'now seems almost wholly, even obsessively, focussed on the Taiwan problem... These factors already seem to be seriously intruding into Chinese strategic thinking.'¹⁸⁹ However, an effective combination of soft and hard power is not impossible to achieve and the PRC was either potentially very adept at balancing both, or content to permit constructive debate over the future direction of its sea power.

Leszek Buszynski expanded on that hypothesis, identifying causal relationships between the American support for Taiwan, and China's handling of its territorial disputes in the South China Sea:

From a Chinese perspective, the US naval presence in the western Pacific prevents the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland and emboldens the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea to oppose Chinese claims.¹⁹⁰

The South China, East China and Yellow Seas are rife with maritime territorial disputes involving the PRC, the Republic of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. Over the past several decades China has been accused of bullying behaviour in the region,¹⁹¹ and it has been suggested that it has also attempted to 'alter international norms concerning freedom of navigation for military purposes and to roll

¹⁸⁹ McVadon, Eric A. 'China's Navy Today: Looking Toward Blue Water.' In Erickson, Andrew & Goldstein, Lyle, & Lord, Charles (Eds). *China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), p388.

¹⁹⁰ Buszynski, Leszek. 'The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry.' *Washington Quarterly* 35, No 2 (2012): p147.

¹⁹¹ Pedrozo, Paul. 'Beijing's Coastal Real Estate: A History of Chinese Naval Aggression.' *Foreign Affairs*, 15 November 2010.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67007/raul-pedrozo/beijings-coastal-real-estate> (accessed 22 November 2010).

back the balance of coastal state and international rights in coastal zones that were negotiated in the development of UNCLOS.¹⁹² However, Lyle Goldstein of the US Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute suggested that there had been much rhetoric or 'bluster' about the seas from the PRC:

A stereotypical view of the Chinese Navy in the West and especially in the United States is that of a group inclined, whether by professional disposition, nationalist inclination, or bureaucratic self interest to favour aggressive naval expansion. However, the [Chinese language] sources illustrate a considerably more complex picture. There are hawkish views on the South China Sea, to be sure, but these views exist alongside more practical, cautious and even enlightened views as well.¹⁹³

That the disparate positions, the 'hawkish' and the 'enlightened' can exist concurrently is not necessarily an indication of weakness or uncertainty in the PLAN leadership's strategy; it may merely be an indication of ongoing refinement. Naval diplomacy can exist on many levels simultaneously and, by doing so, offers choice and flexibility to the wielder.

At the more aggressive end of the scale, China built quite a track record. In 1995, for example, it seized the appropriately named Mischief Reef, an islet located 130 miles from the Philippines' Palawan Island and adjacent to the Palawan Strait, one of the region's key sea-lanes. Despite repeated Filipino requests to withdraw, China continued its military build up in the reef and its naval forces there would be well positioned to be

¹⁹² Dutton, Peter. 'Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea.' *US Naval War College Review* 64, No 4 (2011): p53.

¹⁹³ Goldstein, Lyle. 'Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and Smoke, but Little Fire.' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, No 3 (2011): p328.

used to disrupt passing maritime traffic.¹⁹⁴ In 2004 there was posturing between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku (Japanese) / Diaoyu (Chinese) Islands in the East China Sea, including the deployment of a PLAN *Han* class nuclear submarine in the area.¹⁹⁵ In 2005 Vietnam claimed that China had started to seize its fishing boats in the South China Sea and detain their crews,¹⁹⁶ escalating to a total of 17 boats and 21 fishermen detained in 2009 alone.¹⁹⁷ Finally, in 2010, China objected to a planned U.S.-South Korean military exercise in the Yellow Sea, which had been organized as a response to North Korea's sinking of the South Korean *Cheonan*. Beijing criticized the participation of the USS *George Washington*, arguing that deploying an aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea would be provocative, even though the carrier had conducted operations in the Yellow Sea earlier in the year without incident.

The challenge turned out to be a significant diplomatic victory for China, because though the exercise went ahead *George Washington* did not participate.¹⁹⁸ This could be viewed as a failure of naval diplomacy by the US; it was later explained to the US Congress that the Navy, 'refrained from staging exercises in the Yellow Sea area,' because of Chinese 'sensitivity.'¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴ Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p136.

¹⁹⁵ Dutton, Peter. 'Carving Up the East China Sea.' *US Naval War College Review* 60, No 2 (2007): p63.

¹⁹⁶ Buszynski, 'The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry', p143.

¹⁹⁷ McVadon, 'China's Navy Today', p388.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ United States. Congressional Research Service. Manyin, M., Chanlett-Avery, E., Nikitin, M. & Taylor, M. *US-South Korea Relations*. R41481. Washington DC: CRS, 2010.

Without doubt, as the post-Cold War period progressed, the South China Sea became a 'focal point for US-China rivalry in the western Pacific',²⁰⁰ which the USNS *Impeccable* 'incident' of 2009 ably demonstrated. *Impeccable*, a tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance (TAGOS) vessel, was challenged by a PLAN warship and five Chinese 'civilian' ships approximately 120km south of Hainan Island, which housed a PLAN base.²⁰¹ China claimed that *Impeccable*'s presence in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) had been a violation of domestic and international law.²⁰² Though the surveillance of the sea area was galling to Beijing, its legal objection was weak, for 'in short, nothing in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) changes the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in the exclusive economic zone'.²⁰³ The Chinese ships (a government fisheries patrol vessel, a maritime surveillance service vessel of the State Oceanographic Administration, and two small fishing trawlers) attempted to stop *Impeccable*'s data gathering. The fishing vessels manoeuvred to within eight metres of *Impeccable* and people on board the trawlers used a grappling hook to try to snag *Impeccable*'s towed cable and its related acoustic equipment. The vessels involved show that naval diplomacy, even that by a state, need not be limited to naval forces. '*Impeccable* left the scene in order to reduce immediate tensions but returned to the exact location several days later in the company of an American warship, USS *Chung Hoon*'.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ Buszynski, 'The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry', p139.

²⁰¹ Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p88

²⁰² Pedrozo, Paul. 'Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS *Impeccable* Incident.' *US Naval War College Review* 62, no 3 (2009): p102.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Dutton, 'Three Disputes and Three Objectives', p54.

DEDUCTIONS

This chapter has pointed out that the early post-Cold War period was one of rapid change in the global order and the resultant security situation was far from stable. Whilst there was a notable decrease in inter-state conflict there was a corresponding increase in what Muzaffer Yilmaz described as non- or intra-state 'ethnopolitical conflict'.²⁰⁵ The Cold War victors were quick to reap the peace dividend, but '...by not paying sufficient attention to places most people would characterise as obscure – Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan – the local has turned global.'²⁰⁶ However, the most capable navies were well suited to respond to the emerging order for, as James George wrote, only they regularly operated throughout the world and 'thus could probably be the only force available for ongoing, sustained deterrence – as it has been for virtually all crises.'²⁰⁷

The specific examples of naval diplomacy cited have shown that there is little doubt that any or all of the models identified in Chapter 2 could be applied to the post-Cold War years. As the eastern bloc fragmented seapower was used to garner influence and build amity with new partners. As stringent nationalism took hold in some quarters, naval forces both coerced and deterred. Opportunists, state and non-state, made use of the sea for prestige and established powers, even the hegemonic, increased their efforts to convince and persuade. Coalition or alliance building was a feature throughout, as was the inescapable truth of the value of forward presence. Rising

²⁰⁵ Yilmaz, 'The New World Order', p45.

²⁰⁶ Simons, Anna, McGraw, Joe & Lauchengco, Duane. *The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense Approach to Global Security*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), p124.

²⁰⁷ George, *The US Navy in the 1990s*, p70.

powers, in particular India and China, have found naval expansion to be a necessary accompaniment to economic growth and global influence – ever was the case.

However, as has been alluded to, the existing models have not been sufficient to understand every nuance of naval diplomacy since 1991. Nor have the enduring themes, derived from the writing which provided the bedrock for the models, completely withstood scrutiny. The actions in the Adriatic and the containment of Iraq in the 1990s, for instance, were taken under mandate of the United Nations. Non-state actors such as the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah and the organisers of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla have challenged the assumption that naval diplomacy is purely a state-centric business. America's flexing of muscles in the Taiwan Strait was as much a message to its domestic audience and Taiwan as it was to mainland China; similarly, North Korea's securitization and Russia's gain from US miscalculation of Black Sea relationships undermine the existing models' dogma that naval diplomacy is an interaction between two actors, an assailant and a victim. Nonetheless, one enduring theme does hold true: at its core every conscious application of seapower to communicate political intent assumes rationality on the part of the audience at the receiving end.

This thesis contends that a brief qualitative analysis of post-Cold War naval diplomacy has uncovered some previously overlooked principles. Naval diplomacy can support an internationalist, liberal agenda; it can target multiple audiences simultaneously and it can be a tool for the non-state actor. Levels of naval co-operation and interoperability can indicate the health of an international relationship, yet even at its simplest level it can also provide a politically acceptable degree of diplomatic engagement. These principles can be taken forward into the development of a new, 21st century model for naval diplomacy.

CHAPTER 5

TOWARDS A FOUNDATIONAL MODEL FOR POST-COLD WAR NAVAL DIPLOMACY

This thesis has demonstrated that the existing understanding of naval diplomacy, derived from the writings of historians and strategists from the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, can be plainly expressed. To reiterate, the topic is generally seen from a realist international relations perspective, it tends to be state-centric and it assumes binary, mechanistic relationships which presuppose rational cognitive decision making processes on the parts of both instigator and recipient.

However, after building a compendium of over 500 examples of naval diplomacy in action, and by conducting a series of selected case studies, this thesis moves to challenge the accepted wisdom. Naval diplomacy can support either realist or liberal IR agendas; it is more often used by states than by non-state actors, but the latter are more active than might be supposed; and, it is rarely limited to just two parties but commonly involves multiple actors and stakeholders in the relationship. Of equal importance naval diplomacy is more likely to be conducted on a regional basis than on a global scale; the actors involved range from military navies and coast guards to commercial organisations, NGOs and terrorist or criminal groups of all sizes; quantitatively it is far more prevalent in the pursuit of amity than enmity; there are varying degrees of engagement and disengagement, and the act of not doing or stopping to do something that is expected (the null hypothesis), can be as important as its more visible opposite. In short, evidence has been gathered to show that there are sufficient differences between theory and reality, differences which continue to grow as

the international system evolves, to prompt the construction of a new model of naval diplomacy.

A Proposed Alternative

Before attempting to construct a new model from the qualitative and quantitative data presented in Chapters 3 and 4, it would be useful to briefly restate the role of models in political science. Models are simple ‘representations of reality’¹ which can be used to investigate causal mechanisms, to generate comparative statics and to understand the conditions under which certain outcomes might be expected.² Clarke and Primo identify four types of model which can serve different roles – foundational, organizational, exploratory and predictive.³ The basic models which have already been derived in Chapter 2 from the writings of naval historians and theorists are ‘foundational’; that is, they take disparate generalisations of known facts under a single framework and provide an overall insight into the topic.⁴ In order to maintain a consistent approach, the same foundational methodology is applied in this Chapter. The research can thus serve as a basis for further model building⁵ and provide a framework ‘flexible enough to be adapted to answer different kinds of questions’⁶ of naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War period and beyond.

¹ Clarke & Primo, “Modernizing Political Science”, p742.

² Ibid., p741.

³ Clarke & Primo, *A Model Discipline*, p83.

⁴ Clarke & Primo, “Modernizing Political Science”, pp742-743.

⁵ It is important to reiterate that the model proposed here has no claims on finality; it is merely another step in a constantly evolving process.

⁶ Clarke & Primo, *A Model Discipline*, pp83-84.

Why? – Purpose in Post-Cold War Naval Diplomacy

In its most straightforward form, an alternative model for twenty-first century naval diplomacy should begin by posing a fundamental question. What is the *purpose* behind any particular scenario, interaction or relationship being considered? In the realist tradition the purpose of diplomacy is to be a means by which to ‘act in accordance with the logic said to inhere in an anarchical system of power distributed between self-interested, self-helping, power-maximisers.’⁷ It could equally be applied to revisionist actors, determined to alter the balance of power, or to those more interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*.⁸ In short, it is about competitive advantage.

However, this thesis contends that diplomacy is more specific than simply being a means to further self-interest. It is a multi-directional communicative tool and naval diplomacy, a niche available to some, is the use of naval and maritime assets as communicative instruments in international power relationships to further the interests of one or more of the actors involved. The difference may be subtle, but it is there. The thesis also contends that a liberal interpretation can also be applied to naval diplomacy, taking into account the presence and influence of international institutions and law, alliances and coalitions, non-state actors and interdependent global trade – all of which shape and constrain world politics.

⁷ Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory*, p54.

⁸ Mearsheimer, John. “Structural Realism.” In Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (Eds). *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 3rd Edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p79.

Purpose in naval diplomacy, therefore, is always to communicate a message, whether that be explicitly or implicitly, to a single recipient or many. To understand purpose, the ‘why’ of a situation, an analyst must pose a simple triad of inter-relating questions: *What* is being communicated? *Who* is involved? And, *How* is it manifested? Each question depends on the others; for example, the message to be passed must surely depend on the motivations of the actors involved, and the method of delivery will depend on the means available – North Korea, for instance, will not attempt to coerce the South by positioning an aircraft carrier off its coast because it does not possess that capability. Similarly, when considering how to garner prestige with a potential ally, the United States may well determine to deploy an aircraft carrier on a goodwill visit because it does possess one.

Figure 5.1 below shows the basic elements of a foundational model of 21st century naval diplomacy. *Purpose* sits firmly at the centre with the triad of *What*, *Who* and *How* bounding it. Each question can be explored further according to its constituent parts to provide a framework for comprehension and a tool for analysis.




Figure 5.1. The Basic Elements of 21st Century Naval Diplomacy.

What? – Basic Communication Theory

In Chapter 1 a proposal was presented which argued that diplomacy was, in essence, a communications process which sought to further the interests of an international actor. Naval diplomacy was merely a subset of that construct and was likely to be used by maritime actors with the appropriate means at their disposal. To develop that argument further a brief detour into basic communication theory is required.

During the Cold War a model of communication was developed which became known as the 'message influence model'. The model was based on Shannon and Weaver's *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, published in 1949, and was originally devised to explain telephony. However, the model was found to be instructive in other fields and came to be developed and applied to describe all human communication.⁹ According to the message influence model, a source will transmit a message and the message will be subsequently received, understood and acted upon by its audience. Diagrammatically:




Figure 5.2. A Simplified Representation of the Message Influence Model (From Tatham¹⁰)

⁹ Tatham, Steve. *Strategic Communication in conflict and the concept of non-kinetic informational effect in military operations with special reference to the British experience in the historical context, its contemporary application in Afghanistan and in future*. (PhD Thesis. University of Southampton, 2011), p101.

¹⁰ Ibid., p100.

As can be seen from Figure 5.2, message influence is highly simplistic and has been criticised as ‘an outdated, twentieth century [...] model that is no longer effective in the complex global war of ideas.’¹¹ It assumes that there is no outside interference to the message being sent, that the audience is always a passive recipient and it offers no contextualisation. It also indirectly suggests that communication only occurs when a message is being deliberately transmitted; in reality, of course, communication is a constant and often subconscious process taking place through ongoing actions, deeds and words.¹² Nonetheless, the model does provide a useful introduction to the communications process and, this thesis argues, is remarkably consistent with the contemporaneously-produced concepts of naval diplomacy developed in the Cold War. That is, the ‘assailant’ (source) uses naval means (the message) to reach the ‘victim’ (the audience).

Writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, Paul Kecskemeti produced a significant article on communication and influence. Though admittedly writing about the experiences of totalitarian propaganda during the war, Kecskemeti’s work nevertheless is transferable to other spheres and ages and says much about the approach of ‘forcing’ a message to an audience through repetition:

Public opinion control is the suggestive effect of constantly repeated stimuli: what you say often enough will in the end come to be believed.¹³

¹¹ Corman, Steven, Trethewey, Angela, & Goodall, Bud. *A 21st Century Model for Communications in the Global War of Ideas*. (Phoenix, Arizona: Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, 2007), p2.

¹² Tatham, *Strategic Communication*, pp101-102.

¹³ Kecskemeti, Paul. “Totalitarian Communications as a Means of Control: A Note on the Sociology of Propaganda.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 14, No 2 (1950): p226.

The implication of this assertion for naval diplomacy is that a steady drumbeat of preventive deployments, presence in areas and regions deemed to be of national interest, and ongoing demonstrations of credibility and capability could lead to a general acceptance of the instigator's 'message.' The global activities of the world's most powerful navies, from persistent presence in the Arabian Gulf to the strategic deterrence posture suggested by the USN's *Project 60* in the early 1970s supports this premise – the world has come to believe that the Western naval powers dominate the seas because that is the image that has been presented to them over decades. To challenge that belief an actor is faced with a difficult task, having to overcome both reality and perception.

However, towards the end of the twentieth century the message influence model was overtaken in prominence as researchers developed alternative perspectives on complex, multiple audience communications which better reflected the 'real' world. In an influential work written in the 1990s, Niklas Luhmann described communication as a complex system requiring the interpretation of actions, thoughts, motivations and intentions.¹⁴ A decade later researchers at the Arizona State University Consortium for Strategic Communication built on Luhmann's work and introduced the 'pragmatic complexity' model. Pragmatic complexity adopted a systems approach, in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts, where it is not necessary to have an independent source or audience, and where actors are 'locked into a relationship of simultaneous, mutual interdependence.'¹⁵ In addition, it might be assumed to take into

¹⁴ Luhmann, Niklas. *Social Systems*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp137-143.

¹⁵ Corman *et al.*, *A 21st Century Model for Communications*, p10.

account the difficult question of who controls the medium being used: it is striking how the same event can be described very differently in different parts of the global media, and striking how much faith respective audiences put into their source of choice. There is no doubt, for example, that the 2006 sinking of the Israeli ship *Hanit* was portrayed very differently on Hezbollah's TV channel *Al Manar* than in the Israeli news media.

Pragmatic complexity therefore attempts to do something which message influence does not – it attempts to interpret reality. Clearly, in such a model uncertainty and ambiguity may develop which could either assist or hinder the parties involved in the messaging process. The pitfalls of uncertainty are self-evident, but Jonsson and Hall have commented on the potential benefits of ambiguity in diplomatic communication, ambiguity which may allow the originator to claim that the interpretation of a message was not that which was meant:¹⁶

Ambiguity is often prompted by the need to take multiple audiences into account.

Explicit and unambiguous signalling, while desirable vis-à-vis one category of receivers, might have disastrous effects on the sender's relations with another category of receivers. In diplomatic signalling the potential audiences may be both international and domestic.¹⁷

The lessons for naval diplomacy are worthy of consideration. The means in use may be ambiguous; a flotilla's deployment may be interpreted very differently in the minds of the parties involved. To the deployer it may be a message of friendship, to the

¹⁶ Jonsson, Christer & Hall, Martin. *Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy*. Paper prepared for the 43rd Annual ISA Convention, New Orleans, 23-27 March 2002: p5.

¹⁷ Ibid., p6.

neighbour it could be seen as a bid for prestige, to the primary target – or indeed to another state not intended as a target at all – it could be considered a threat. Similarly, any means of communication, including naval diplomacy, could be temporal. In a 2011 PhD thesis by Steve Tatham, the concept of the ‘communications moment’ was discussed and it was determined to be that point in time at which a message is exchanged. The central idea being proposed was that communication ‘is highly time and condition sensitive. Messages that work one week may not work the next.’¹⁸ The timing of naval deployments therefore, must be cognisant of other factors, as the case study of Exercise *Sea Breeze* in the Black Sea discussed in Chapter 4 demonstrated. In that example the purpose of the exercise was ambiguous – to the US it was a bilateral endeavour aimed at friendship, to Russia it was a NATO encroachment into its area of influence and interest, to Ukraine it was a stepping stone to potential membership of the Western Alliance. In addition its timing and location were ill-considered – Russo-Ukraine relations were at a low ebb, a BLACKSEAFOR exercise (involving Russia) was about to start, and *Sea Breeze* was centred on the ethnically Russian area of the Crimea, rather than on the less controversial port of Odessa as it had been in previous years.¹⁹

Finally, there is the prospect of deliberate disinformation in communication and messaging, in which one party’s intent is portrayed as something else to the target audience. This could be a tactic by the source of the message in order to hide its true intentions, or it could potentially be a calculated misportrayal by the media, the target audience itself or a third party. As Holmes, Winner and Toshihara noted when

¹⁸ Tatham, *Strategic Communication*, p106.

¹⁹ Global Security. “Sea Breeze.” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/sea-breeze.htm>, (accessed 14 December 2014).

discussing the challenges facing the ascendancy of the Indian Navy in the twenty-first century, India's well considered strategy of benign, non-intrusive outreach to fellow maritime nations in the Indian Ocean could be impeded by misperception or disinformation.²⁰ Who might be the instigator of such disinformation could be deduced by an appreciation of the winners and losers of the tactic; an analysis of all of the stakeholders involved and not just the primary participants would therefore be warranted.

When considering naval diplomacy, therefore, the question of 'what' relates directly to 'why', the purpose, and it proves to be neither straightforward nor consistent over time. When applying the findings of Chapters 3 and 4, naval diplomacy should be viewed as messaging either degrees of amity or enmity or both, and its purpose determined in terms of the effects that those chapters identified: coercion, deterrence, picture building, prestige, reassurance, co-operation, attraction or assistance – or a combination of any number of them. There might also be unintended consequences or systemic side effects of diplomatic activity at sea which could be visible to a participant or observer but, equally, might be hidden or unrecognised at the time.

Who? – Basic Stakeholder Theory

The next question in the simplified proposed model is 'who' is involved. Chapter 2 discussed how existing realist models assume the presence of a rational actor at the heart of the decision-making process. However, it also discussed how the reality is often more complex and that there will inevitably be a number of actors consciously or

²⁰ Holmes, James, R., Winner, Andrew, C. & Yoshihara, Toshi. *Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p72.

unconsciously party to any given situation. These stakeholders must be taken into account in any analysis; stakeholder theory, therefore, should be understood.

Stakeholder theory originated in the world of business studies. In what is commonly seen to be a landmark publication,²¹ R Edward Freeman challenged the accepted view of the commercial corporation. In his *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*, Freeman questioned the simplistic 'production view of the firm' which placed corporations in the centre of the process of turning raw resources from suppliers into products for customers:




Figure 5.3. The Production View of the Firm (From Freeman)²².

As can be seen, the production view of business is not dissimilar to the simple message influence model of basic communication theory, or the assailant-victim model of naval diplomacy, and many recognisable shortcomings are shared. However, the theory, though useful in forging understanding, simply does not reflect reality and Freeman proposed an alternative perspective which attempted to describe how businesses really work and the interconnections between the active and passive actors involved. He

²¹ Morphy, T. "Stakeholder Theory." <http://www.stakeholder.com/stakeholder-theory.html> (accessed 27 January 2014).

²² Freeman, R Edward. *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p5.

developed the concept of business ‘stakeholders’, whom he defined as the ‘wide range of groups who can affect or are affected by a corporation.’²³ Examples of such groups included owners, government, political groups, the financial community, suppliers, activists, customers, unions, employees, trade association and competitors.²⁴ They can be shown diagrammatically in a rudimentary ‘map’:



Figure 5.4. Stakeholder Mapping (From Freeman)²⁵.

It is clear that stakeholder theory has wider applicability than just the world of business, and since Freeman’s work first appeared in 1984 it has been used in economics, political science, education and the environmental sciences.²⁶ As the World Bank

²³ Ibid., p1.

²⁴ Ibid., p55.

²⁵ Ibid., p25.

²⁶ World Bank. “What is Stakeholder Analysis?” World Bank.
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/PoliticalEconomy/PDFVersion.pdf>
 (accessed 9 April 2014).

suggests, stakeholder theory has wide applicability and is relevant to not only to the subject for which it was derived, but also to international relations.²⁷ Brian Hocking has taken the IR point further, proposing that although the bilateral model of international discourse may still survive, it is increasingly challenged in the globalised world by the myriad of interconnected interests:

The older state-based form of diplomacy exists alongside emergent forms, one label for which might be multi-stakeholder diplomacy.²⁸

This is an argument that could be compared directly with that made in Chapter 2, which suggested that in the maritime domain modern, or industrial, naval forces might have to co-exist with and operate alongside the post-modern navies of states which fully embrace globalisation. It is another example of shifting emphasis in the post-Cold War global order; the changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Of course, stakeholder theory has not been without its critics. It has, variously, been accused of impracticality because of its excessively broad definition of stakeholders over whom an organisation may have little or no control,²⁹ and of undermining the basic principles of capitalism in favour of 'ethical values'.³⁰ Orts and Strudler argued that

²⁷ World Bank. "What is Stakeholder Analysis?"

²⁸ Hocking, Brian. "Multi-stakeholder Diplomacy: Forms, Functions and Frustrations." In Kurbalija, Jovan & Katrandjiev, Valentin (Eds). *Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities*. (Msida, Malta: Diplo Foundation, 2006), p14.

²⁹ Morphy, T. "Stakeholder Salience." <http://www.stakeholder.com/stakeholder-analysis/stakeholder-salience.html> (accessed 27 January 2014).

³⁰ Mansell, Samuel F. *Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract: A Critique of Stakeholder Theory*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p3.

though stakeholder theory might ‘prove useful in identifying interests’, for other purposes its claims were ‘overblown’.³¹ However, for the purposes of this research its strength, that of identifying interests, is the most important factor. As the analyses of actors in Chapter 3 showed, there are rarely (if ever) just two parties involved in naval diplomacy and a credible mechanism to understand the roles played by other direct or indirect participants would be useful. Adapting Freeman’s definition, one might assume the stakeholders in this context to be the wide range of actors who can affect or be affected by naval diplomacy. Self-evidently, not all stakeholders in any given situation carry equal weighting – there will inevitably be a hierarchy of influence and significance.

Building on Freeman’s map Lynda Bourne and David Walker devised what has become known as the ‘stakeholder circle’, showing not only the actors who affect or could be affected by a corporation but also their relative influence:




Figure 5.5 Stakeholder Circle (From Bourne and Weaver)³²

³¹ Orts, Eric, W. & Strudler, Alan. “Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory.” *Journal of Business Ethics* 88, No 4 (2009): p605.

³² Bourne, Lynda & Walker, David. “Project Management and the Stakeholder Circle.” *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business* 1, no 1 (2008): p126.

It is apparent from the diagram that Bourne and Walker continued to place the firm or corporation at the centre of their 'map' but they situated the other stakeholders in one of three expanding, concentric circles representing the firm's internal actors, external directly affected actors and then those who may be indirectly affected; influence was deemed to decrease as distance from the centre increased. Put another way, functional proximity to the rational decision-making body was deemed to be an indicator of influence over it. The three groups might also be called primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders.

Though the term had not been coined at the time, a form of stakeholder analysis was conducted in the classic 1969 article on the Cuban Missile Crisis by Graham Allison. Allison challenged the assumption of a single 'rational, unitary decision-maker' in government.³³ Instead he suggested alternatives to the rational actor model, which acknowledged 'the fact that a government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own.'³⁴ He also pointed out that even then leaders do not sit on top of 'monolithic groups' but are subject to bureaucratic politics and competitive bargaining.³⁵ These could be considered the internal stakeholders in Bourne and Walker's circle. Allison delved deeply into the make-up of government machinery to avoid oversimplification; the same level of analysis can, of course, be applied to non-government and non-state stakeholders in other conflict or diplomatic, communicative engagement scenarios.

³³ Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* 63, No 3 (1969): p694.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p698.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p707.

When stakeholder theory has been applied directly to a post-Cold War military context, however, it has predominantly been within a discussion of morality and ethics. For example, Geoffrey Murat, writing in a US Marine Corps Press publication in 2013, applied stakeholder theory to counter insurgency, identifying the local population, non-governmental organisations and the media as stakeholders in a conflict, and then encouraging active troops to display empathy the various audiences.³⁶

As with the application of basic communication theory, the general principle of determining the primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders in any given communications moment is reasonable and useful in the study of naval diplomacy. If, as has been claimed, power and influence can result from 'connectedness',³⁷ then analysis of connectivity must be able to provide a valuable insight into the nature and effectiveness of that power. In terms of naval diplomacy, understanding which actors are involved, their motivations and their relationship to each other can result in better application or, alternatively, circumvention of the means.

Chapter 4's study of naval activity in the Adriatic in the 1990s is an interesting case of multiple actors with various motivations operating singly, in concert or both at different times. Mapping their 'connectedness' could provide insight into purpose. In that case study it might be reasonably assumed that one of the primary stakeholders was the Serbian state – but who were the others? Though fourteen countries eventually

³⁶ Murat, Geoffrey. "Ethics and Irregular Warfare: The Role of Stakeholder Theory and Care Ethics." In Connelley, Carroll & Tripodi, Paolo (Eds). *Aspects of Leadership Ethics, Law and Spirituality*. (Quantico, Va: Marine Corps University Press, 2012) p39, p45, p54.

³⁷ Hafner-Burton, E., Kahler, M & Montgomery, A. "Network Analysis for International Relations." *International Organization* 63, Summer (2009): p559.

contributed maritime forces to the Adriatic, most did so intermittently as members of supra-state organisations such as NATO and the WEU who in turn were operating under the remit of the United Nations.³⁸ It could be argued, therefore, that international organisations, particularly multi-national military alliances, were the primary stakeholders facing Serbia and that their constituent members were influential but secondary stakeholders. Motivations varied but the contributing states were arguably participating as much to prove their commitment as trusted allies and partners (and, for their domestic audience's consumption, as responsible members of the international community) as they were to simply counter Serbian aggression in the Balkans and enforce UNSCRs. It was, in effect, a low risk strategy of demonstrating 'action'. Other former Yugoslavian states were also secondary or tertiary stakeholders affected by the activity at sea. Some other non-participating but interested third party states, such as Russia, were also tertiary stakeholders. Serb sponsored or affiliated groups in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, though not directly involved on the maritime front, were certainly affected by the blockade and should be considered. Domestic and international audiences were clearly also part of the mix, as were those commercial organisations with an interest in seaborne trade with the former Yugoslavia or in the Adriatic region more generally. Figure 5.6 below is a simple attempt to place these actors in a stakeholder circle.

³⁸ NATO. 'NATO/WEU IFOR Final Fact Sheet.' 2 October 1996.
<http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm>, (accessed 21 February 2013).




Figure 5.6 Adriatic 1990s Stakeholder Circle

In developing a twenty-first century model of naval diplomacy, therefore, primary, secondary and tertiary audiences and their interconnectedness should be included, acknowledging, however, that such mapping is always a subjective and inaccurate science. Actors may include the direct participants but also the international, regional or domestic communities, including alliances and international institutions, or even a different part of the initiator's own government, along with multi-national corporations and non-governmental organisations who may sit in one or more audience categories depending on the scenario.

Approached this way, it is apparent that the ability to contribute to, to affect or to be affected by naval diplomacy is not necessarily a function of either scale or type of actor involved. Naval diplomacy is not the sole preserve of the blue-water military navy, but

an opportunity (or threat) for regional, adjacent force projection, coastal or even token navies and coast guards, and a range of supra-state or non-state actors and audiences from NGOs to commercial corporations and local populations.

How? – Ways and Means

Finally, the third leg of the triad of the proposed model is ‘how’ naval diplomacy is manifested. Writing in 2011, J.J. Widen stated that ‘to categorise different kinds of operations in naval diplomacy, that is functional definitions, is not sufficient.’³⁹ The implication is that by describing naval diplomacy in terms of its ways, the context may be missed and the strategic argument consequently lost.⁴⁰ However, although categorisation by ways and means may not be ‘sufficient’, it is an essential part of the whole. Naval historians have produced volumes on the tactical employment of seapower; those tactical activities are indispensable pixels in the greater, strategic picture.

Christian Le Mièrè questioned whether maritime diplomatic events could ever be classified beyond groupings based on underlying purpose, as each incident appears unique. However, he did go on to categorise some tactical methods into the kinetic (ie., those involving physical force) and the non-kinetic, suggesting that the degree of force employed gave a useful guide to intentions;⁴¹ this approach is in keeping with Cable’s, whose definitive, purposeful, catalytic and expressive modes referred, of course, to the

³⁹ Widen, “Naval Diplomacy”, p717.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Le Mièrè, *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*, p50-51.

use or threat of force. From this perspective, therefore, explicitness of message would appear to be hinged in part on explicitness of method.

Le Mière's question of whether functional classification is possible can be addressed by the analysis of empirical evidence. It is true to state that of the examples of naval diplomacy cited in the survey in Chapter 3 few, if any, share identical tactics.

Nevertheless, they can be grouped by their general ways and means. One potential approach to do this could be to use the method of categorising activity according to the widely accepted (in official doctrine and academic literature) attributes which grant navies particular advantage. For instance, the British doctrinal attributes of access, mobility, lift, reach, versatility, poise, resilience and leverage are still lauded as the 'ways' in which the Royal Navy achieves its 'ends'.⁴²

However, as Chapter 1 stated, those attributes have largely gone unchallenged and may not be an appropriate prism through which to view the contemporary maritime operating environment. The trait of versatility, for example, arguably requires breadth of capability and is therefore questionable when applied to small and token navies or coast guards. The US Navy is certainly versatile but the navy of, say, the Republic of Ireland, with its rather limited focus on patrolling its territorial seas and immediate area of 'jurisdiction',⁴³ could not be viewed as particularly flexible in its offer of political choice to the Irish state. By comparison, the Irish Army, though small, has operated nationally and globally in peace support missions since 1958 and is therefore more of a

⁴² UK. *British Maritime Doctrine 4th Edition*, pp2-1 to 2-6.

⁴³ The Republic of Ireland currently has eight patrol vessels which operate predominantly 'through Ireland's jurisdiction.' See: Ireland. Defences Forces Ireland. <http://www.military.ie> (accessed 24 March 2015).

diplomatic tool.⁴⁴ Perhaps relative versatility amongst and between maritime, land and air armed forces is partly a function of scale, and therefore the assumption of particular advantage may only be valid for larger, multi-role navies with extra-regional reach.

Similarly, technological change could bring into doubt the longevity of other 'enduring' attributes. The development of anti-access, area-denial capabilities (A2AD),⁴⁵ for instance, might challenge the notion of poise, as Iran demonstrated in early 2015 with its very public demonstration of a missile attack against a mock-up of a US aircraft carrier.⁴⁶ This is perhaps an outlet for a different form of naval diplomacy, in which relatively weak naval powers can challenge the relatively strong by overtly targeting perceived 'strengths' and turning them into critical vulnerabilities.

Additionally, in the information age the high seas are rapidly losing their monopoly as the world's only global commons. The new global common of cyberspace is increasingly a manoeuvre environment of choice for state and non-state actors alike, with its advantages of reach and penetration, low cost and plausible deniability.⁴⁷

Similarly, unmanned aerial systems are increasingly persistent and resilient (though still significantly short of naval platforms) and thus picture building, the gathering of intelligence or generation of domain awareness, may perhaps be better conducted in future from the air or from space than from the sea. John Klein, for instance, has

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ For a fuller discussion of A2AD see, for example: Tangredi, Sam. *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

⁴⁶ Gady, Franz-Stefan. "In A2/AD Showcase, Iranian Navy Sinks *Nimitz* Carrier Mock-Up." *The Diplomat*. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/in-a2ad-showcase-iranian-navy-sinks-nimitz-carrier-mock-up/> (accessed 24 March 2015).

⁴⁷ United States. Department of Defense. *Cyberspace Operations*. Joint Publication 3-12(R). Washington DC: DoD, 2013.

applied some traditional maritime thinking to the military use of space and determines that it fits well.⁴⁸ There may be other comparable parallels to draw as technology advances.

There may also be legal, societal or ethical challenges to the naval attribute of access. As the example which follows later in this chapter shows, Greenpeace's presumption of an unfettered use of the high seas was not shared by Russia in 2013, when MY *Arctic Sunrise* became the subject of state-led duress. Nor was Israel's assumption of freedom of maritime manoeuvre shared by Hezbollah in 2006, as discussed in Chapter 4. As the boundaries between state and non-state, and between the functions of naval activity become ever more 'fuzzy',⁴⁹ long held beliefs about a rules based order and what can be done, by whom, to whom and where, may need to be recalibrated. The point is not merely the applicability to naval diplomacy, but the perception of the value of naval forces relative to other instruments of power.

There remain, however, many proponents of naval power and this thesis is not predicting its complete demise; Christopher Layne, for instance, suggested a change in American grand strategy after the Cold War. As the sole world power the United States, he argued, could afford to sharply reduce the size and role of its ground forces whilst simultaneously increasing 'overwhelming naval presence.' He called his strategy 'offshore balancing.'⁵⁰ Whether it could ever be a practical strategy for the United

⁴⁸ Klein, John, J. "Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory." *US Naval War College Review* 57, No 1 (2004): pp66-69.

⁴⁹ Till, *Seapower*, p225.

⁵⁰ Layne, Christopher. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing." In Art, Robert & Waltz, Kenneth (Eds). *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th Ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 292.

States or any other country is debateable, but the point is that it was suggested by a credible academic. There are at least some commentators who believe that naval power, if applied correctly, can be sufficiently robust to be the basis for contemporary strategy.

In discussing the 'how' of naval diplomacy, therefore, analysis through functional definitions of specific tactics or operations should not be attempted solely on the basis of debatably passé concepts. Though they have up until now stood the test of time, the attributes which gave advantage in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries might not remain such unique selling points in the twenty-first and thus complementary alternatives should be sought. This thesis returns to the quantitative and qualitative evidence provided in Chapters 3 and 4 to identify a number of methods, used by both state and non-state actors alike, by the relatively powerful and relatively weak, and applicable irrespective of scale. Rather than group them according to kinetic force as Le Mière contended (and thereby implicitly reinforcing the definition of naval diplomacy as an *act* as opposed to a means of *communication*), this thesis proposes the classification of tactics, of 'how', as movable points along Nye's spectrum soft and hard power.

At the soft end of the spectrum, for instance, actors might pay goodwill visits, gift or sell arms, or engage in simple, intermediate or complex capacity building exercises to forge amity; they may conduct basic operations together or, ultimately, work towards and achieve interoperability at the highest end of warfighting capabilities. To express enmity they may protest (as may a secondary or tertiary stakeholder), arrest, interdict or poise near an offending location; at the hardest end of the scale they could blockade, mount physical strikes or occupy sovereign seas, property or territories. Of course, at the

most aggressive end, where the distinction between the 'limited' force of naval diplomacy becomes blurred with the more fulsome version of major combat operations, the interpretation of tactics and functions requires even greater scrutiny; what may appear 'limited' to one actor may appear extreme to another. The mapping of the differences between limited force and physical conflict, if indeed they exist, is an area worthy of further research.

Clearly, there may be a close correlation between the 'how' and the 'what' of naval diplomacy. For example, if the message to be passed is one of enmity through coercion, then a credible and explicit tactic could be to mount a limited physical strike by naval air, surface or submarine capabilities. Likewise, communicating amity through assistance following a natural disaster might naturally mean the provision of help or aid. However, that correlation is not always the case. The tactics themselves are not necessarily exclusive and are often used in combination, supporting the hypothesis that naval diplomacy is not a binary endeavour. There are times when identical tactics could be used to express very different messages, resulting in very different effects. For example, exercises between actors might be an initial foray into friendship or co-existence, as many Arab-Israeli interactions are, or means to improve interoperability between close allies such as the United States and United Kingdom, or they might be a demonstration of capability targeted against a third party, as in the series of US-South Korean *Team Spirit* exercises aimed in significant part at the deterrence of North Korea.

This thesis proposes a series of eleven tactics, evident in and derived from the research, which together cover a broad spectrum of naval diplomacy from the hard to the soft. They range from the overtly hostile, the hard power tactic of occupying

territory or property which has been a rare occurrence in the immediate post-Cold War maritime environment (Chapters 3 and 4 explore China's occupation of Mischief Island in 1995 as an example), to the benign, such as the ages old goodwill visit, sitting at the soft end of the scale and very commonplace. But even these opposite-end tactics, perhaps instinctively associated with the military navies of recognised states, have potential for alternative manifestations. A form of dissent could see non-state groups attempting to occupy that which does not legally belong to them; the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), for example, seized Nigerian ships in 2009,⁵¹ and, as will be discussed later, Greenpeace have temporarily occupied (if not controlled) oil platforms. Similarly, port visits may be the stock-in-trade of warships but they are also conducted by Coast Guards⁵² and, of course, commercial companies. An interesting variation on the latter is the ongoing case of an attempt by campaigning groups and council members opposed to Arctic drilling to prevent the Royal Dutch Shell company from using and visiting the port of Seattle.⁵³

Between these tactics are others such as the use of physical strike to inflict punitive damage at or from the sea. As Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers and the Mumbai terrorist attackers of 2008 have shown, the use of strike is most definitely not the preserve of state actors. Nor, as New Zealand has shown in its anti-nuclear testing stance, is protest the preserve of the non-state actor. Similarly, the implementation of formal or informal blockades by state or non-state actors; the various modes of interdiction and

⁵¹ *JDW* 46, No 16 (2009): p19.

⁵² For example, the US Coast Guard visit to Libya in 2009. See Chapter 4 and *JDW* 46, No 23 (2009): p39.

⁵³ Beekman, Daniel & Bernton. "City To Study Whether It Can Block Base For Shell Drilling Fleet." *Seattle Times* 9 March 2015. <http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/city-to-study-whether-it-can-block-base-for-shell-drilling-fleet/>. (accessed 29 March 2015).

protection, which are vital policing components of maritime security; the provision of aid (itself very much a multi-stakeholder affair); and, the varying degrees of engagement and disengagement that are central to exercises and interoperability between actors, are all tactics employed in naval diplomacy.

The list is not exhaustive but it is representative. Though they are shown in Figure 5.6 below at intervals along the hard/soft spectrum, their relative place need not be permanently set. They are also portrayed as common verbs, non-unique expressions of definite actions; they are therefore independent of specific technological capabilities which will inevitably change over time, but they remain functions or roles which have been inherent, at least to some degree, in seapower historically. They also differ from Cable's descriptive approach, discussed in Chapter 2, which emphasised an assailant's intent as the referent object.




Figure 5.7 Tactics Employed in Naval Diplomacy

In sum, the 'how' of naval diplomacy, the actions or tactics employed by all of the actors involved, can be categorised and such categorisation, when considered alongside

stakeholder analysis and communicative aims, aids understanding. Together, 'what', 'who' and 'how' help to determine of purpose and are therefore an essential part of the development of a model or framework for the analysis of naval diplomacy.

A Foundational Model for Twenty-first Century Naval Diplomacy

Figure 5.1 above was a simplistic, diagrammatical representation of three points which might be considered in the contemporary study of naval diplomacy and its purpose: *what*, *who* and *how*. By expanding on those points, which can be taken in any order, and developing second and third order levels of analysis, a more comprehensive foundational model for twenty-first century naval diplomacy may be determined:




Figure 5.8 A foundational model of 21st century naval diplomacy.

Figure 5.7 shows a proposed model for naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War global order, but one which could arguably also be used to analyse historical scenarios from any period. The enduring *what*, *who* and *how* questions are given substance by subordinate questions of enmity and amity, of hard and soft power tactics and of target audience analysis. The suggested building blocks of those are effects, stakeholders and ways and means derived from both theory and evidence. Of course, they could be added to or removed as the analyst requires.

TESTING THE MODEL

As was stated in the Introduction, it is accepted that using the same evidence to both create and test a theory is an invalid approach in research design – it exacerbates the risk of confirmation bias.⁵⁴ Therefore, whereas the basis of the proposed model lies in the events which took place in the period 1991-2010, the cases chosen to test it are selected from outwith that period. The theoretical framework was tested against a renowned case study of naval diplomacy from the height of the Cold War and a further three examples from the period 2011-2015, representing state-on-state confrontation, the involvement of non-state actors, and trans-national concerns respectively. These cases were selected for their diversity rather than their resemblance to any ‘typical’ example of naval diplomacy of the past century. Each test case is divided into two brief sections: the first provides historical and geopolitical context by outlining key events; the second provides a short analysis based on the triad of questions described above. Of course, other cases could be chosen for examination and whilst the model takes into account new developments, the fact that it draws on ideas and literature from naval theory and other academic disciplines means that it could also be used to reconsider earlier periods.

A Re-evaluation of the USS *Pueblo* Incident

The USS *Pueblo* incident is one of the most oft-cited examples of Cold War naval diplomacy. Cable covers it extensively⁵⁵ and it has spawned a number of memoirs,

⁵⁴ George, Alexander, L. & Bennett, Andrew. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p111.

⁵⁵ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p15, pp25-32, p34, p63, p69, p75, p86, p119, pp195-196.

books and articles.⁵⁶ It is included here precisely because it is well known and has been exhaustively studied. Though there are many analyses, they habitually differ in detail and emphasis with few, if any, containing all aspects of the incident. The test in this example, therefore, is to determine whether the foundational model provides an adequate framework for comprehension, by organising a logical research agenda to capture pertinent details.

The widely accepted narrative of events describes how in early 1968 USS *Pueblo*, an intelligence gathering ship, was on patrol in the East Sea off the coast of North Korea. By 22 January of that year it had become clear that *Pueblo*'s presence was known to North Korea after it had been passed by a patrol craft and approached and then circled by two North Korean fishing vessels. *Pueblo* was unescorted, the US having made the assumption that she would be safe in international waters, an assumption which with hindsight turned out to be unwise.⁵⁷ A day later, on 23 January, another patrol boat approached *Pueblo* at high speed, ordered her to heave to and threatened to open fire if she did not comply. Within the hour a further three patrol vessels had joined the first and two North Korean MiG-21 fighter aircraft were overflying the area. *Pueblo* attempted to depart from the scene at her maximum speed but could not outrun the faster North Korean vessels. The North Korean craft fired on *Pueblo* and one of the

⁵⁶ See, for example: Lerner, Mitchell, B. *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002; and, more recently, Cheevers, Jack. *Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo*. New York: Penguin, 2013. Comments on the *Pueblo* Incident also appear in works discussing wider naval diplomacy such as Dismukes & McConnell (Eds). *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, pp119-123; and in books on Cold War sea power such as Winkler, David, F. *Cold War at Sea*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p37 & pp58-62.

⁵⁷ Till, *Seapower*, 3rd Ed., p232.

aircraft fired warning shots into the sea; left with little choice, *Pueblo's* commanding officer surrendered his ship and followed the patrol boats into the port of Wonsan.⁵⁸

During the intense diplomatic negotiations which followed the capture of USS *Pueblo*, confessions of spying were obtained and the ship's crew were regularly photographed and appeared in the domestic press. Eventually, in December 1968, in exchange for a US acknowledgement of the validity of the confessions and an admission that the ship had been seized in North Korean territorial waters, the crew were released.⁵⁹

Taken as an isolated example of naval diplomacy, the *Pueblo* incident is ostensibly an altercation between North Korea and the United States. Indeed, Cable describes it as such in his analysis. However, to fully appreciate the situation the wider context must be understood. In this respect a 2009 PhD thesis by Giseong Lee on US coercive diplomacy against North Korea, gives a good background to the situation leading up to the capture of *Pueblo* and to the interwoven relationships involved. For instance, North Korea had attempted, and failed, to assassinate the South Korean President three days earlier, Pyongyang was experiencing difficult and complex relationships with both the USSR and China, and the United States was giving unquestioning support to South Korea. Similarly, in his classic Cold War work, John Lewis Gaddis (without reference to the *Pueblo* incident) discusses the Soviet-North Korean relationship and concludes that the former disliked the latter but could not let it fail for fear of a perceived American

⁵⁸ This short narrative of events is a précis of Lee, Giseong, *US Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea*. PhD Thesis. (University of Aberdeen, 2009), pp97-98 (itself a summary of primary and secondary sources) in addition to the works cited above.

⁵⁹ US House Armed Services Committee, Special Subcommittee on the USS *Pueblo*, *Inquiry into the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents*, HASC No. 91-92 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), p1628.

'victory' in the region.⁶⁰ For its part, China (North Korea's longstanding if, at times, reluctant ally) played no direct physical role but was mindful of its own influence within the communist world and provided tacit support to Pyongyang.⁶¹ Of no lesser importance, Lee situates the confrontation in the Cold War in Asia and, crucially, alongside the ongoing Vietnam War and approaching Tet Offensive.⁶² By the time of the *Pueblo* incident the Johnson White House was already under 'intense pressure' to unwind American commitments in South East Asia which the additional demands of an unfolding situation off the Korean coast can have done little to ease.⁶³

In the context of the time, it has been widely argued that there was an underlying assumption in Washington that all incidents, wherever they occurred, were connected with the broader Cold War and must, therefore, be orchestrated by Moscow; it would have been incomprehensible for US decision makers in Washington to think that North Korea could have acted alone against the United States and *Pueblo*.⁶⁴ Indeed, recently released contemporary testimony shows that the US House Armed Services Committee were briefed that it was 'reasonable to assume ... that the documentation captured from the *Pueblo* has been turned over to the Soviets and possibly the CHICOMS [Chinese

⁶⁰ Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Cold War*. (London: Penguin, 2005), pp130-131.

⁶¹ Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been strained for some years and Sino-Russian competition between 1965 and 1969 centred on their relative influence in communist countries. See Ball, S.J. *The Cold War: In International History 1947-1991*. (London: Arnold, 1998), p138.

⁶² Lee, *US Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea*, pp99-103.

⁶³ Caridi, Ronald, J. *20th Century American Foreign Policy: Security and Self-Interest*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p357.

⁶⁴ Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident*, pp99-100, p137; Lee, *US Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea*, p105; Dismukes & McConnell (Eds), *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, p119.

Communists].⁶⁵ Of course, the fact that documentation was turned over does not necessarily mean that North Korea acted at Moscow's behest when first seizing the ship.

Cable ignores these factors in his analysis, though he does discuss the American assumption that, despite Cold War rhetoric, surveillance vessels operating on the high seas would not be directly interfered with by the other side; a convention had evidently evolved between the US, the USSR and their allies, the violation of which would upset the strategic balance.⁶⁶ As with all communicative relationships there is inherent risk in assuming the norms and perceptions of one participant necessarily apply to the others. The US Navy reassessed its policy of sailing surveillance ships unescorted after the *Pueblo* incident but found the cost of providing protection prohibitively high. By mid-1969 the US Chief of Naval Operation, Admiral Thomas H Moorer, recommended decommissioning all 'spy' ships; within six months they had been removed from service.⁶⁷

Cable also chose not to mention the subsequent manoeuvring by the various stakeholders in his textual analysis; instead, he reports the late January 1968 USN deployment of three aircraft carriers into the Sea of Japan and the February 1968 Soviet deployment of cruisers and destroyers to the same area as entirely separate

⁶⁵ United States. US House Armed Services Committee. *Memorandum for the Record on the Secret Pueblo Hearings of the House Committee on Armed Services*, dated 15 January 1969. DOCID 4121701, Washington, DC. (Approved for release by NSA 27 May 2014. Transparency Case #63391).

⁶⁶ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p26.

⁶⁷ Winkler, David, F. *Cold War at Sea*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p37.

incidents in his chronological index.⁶⁸ As has been discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to Cable's analysis of the Falklands Conflict, in any analysis there will inevitably be a subjective assessment of the temporal boundaries of any incident. Timescales matter, particularly when considering the effectiveness of any action, and this can then skew subsequent statistical or comparative analysis.

In contrast, in their analysis of Soviet naval diplomacy, Dismukes and McConnell considered the *Pueblo* incident to be, in part, a message of support from North Korea to North Vietnam at a time when practical assistance to Hanoi from the USSR and China was all but absent.⁶⁹ In addition they describe how the Soviet Union was reluctant to jeopardize progress in its improving relationship with North Korea and thus responded negatively to a US request for assistance in negotiation. However, they also point out how the only overt Soviet display of support for North Korea, the deployment of ships to the area, occurred several weeks into the incident when it was apparent to all sides that US naval presence in the region was reducing.⁷⁰ This clearly suggests that the Soviet target audience was North Korea and, perhaps, its own domestic populace – though the time lag could also have been a carefully considered signal of reassurance to the US that no further confrontation was wanted. That account differs slightly from that given by David Winkler in his book *Cold War at Sea* which describes how the Soviet intelligence gathering ship *Gidrolog* attempted to physically block the passage of USS *Enterprise* in the Sea of Japan as the latter was making its way towards the stricken *Pueblo*.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p196.

⁶⁹ Dismukes & McConnell (Eds), *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, p119.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp119-121.

⁷¹ Winkler, *Cold War at Sea*, p58.

Nonetheless, returning to Lee's analysis of the incident, there is another strong argument which suggests that the primary political motive for the incident was domestic rather than international. Lee states that North Korea 'largely ignored the ship's intelligence value' and exploited the incident for domestic propaganda.⁷² The North Korean population needed a 'boost' and, he contends, the discovery of USS *Pueblo* presented a relatively easy target of opportunity for Pyongyang to portray the regime as heroically resisting a powerful external threat and that opportunity was grasped.⁷³ The actions which followed were then impulsive reactions to a developing international situation based on differing interpretations of events in different national capitals.

It is clear that there are many and varied interpretations of the *Pueblo* incident suggesting that there were a range of factors and motivations at play. Applying the foundational model to the incident may assist in providing retrospective understanding. Firstly, when attempting to establish 'what' communicative message was being conveyed, one might determine that there were many and that they changed in emphasis and priority as time went on. Initially, the United States was actively embarked on a process of picture building against North Korea – primarily indicative of a state of enmity between the two countries, but also a positive message of reassurance to the South. Subsequently, North Korea's interference with *Pueblo* on the high seas indicates enmity in a coercive, yet limited form.⁷⁴ Later, as the situation

⁷² Lee, *US Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea*, p101.

⁷³ Ibid., pp99-100.

⁷⁴ Interestingly, the limited coercion employed by North Korea stopped short of sinking USS *Pueblo*. It is reasonable to assume that Pyongyang was aware of the precedent set in the USS *Liberty* incident of the previous year (1967) in which that 'spy' ship was lost to Israeli torpedo and aircraft attack whilst monitoring radio transmissions in international waters during the Six Day War; the US did not retaliate. (See: Till, *Seapower*, 3rd Ed, p232 and Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed., p195.)

developed, both the United States and North Korea exploited the incident in order to boost their own credibility and 'masculinity' with their domestic audiences and the USSR gave half-hearted reassurance to its client state but was careful not to push its superpower rival too far when doing so.

The stakeholders in the *Pueblo* incident, of course, are numerous. The primary participants were clearly the governments, armed forces and in particular the navies of the United States and North Korea, and members of the civilian maritime community of the latter. Secondary state audiences included the Soviet Union and South Korea, but China, North Vietnam, Japan and the international community as a whole could be considered at the tertiary level. Linkages between each were not necessarily direct. Finally, as already stated, domestic constituencies and populations – in North Korea, the US and USSR – had to be satisfied and these may be placed in the secondary or tertiary fields with equal validity at different times during the crisis. Indeed, once the incident had transitioned from the high seas to the airwaves, domestic audiences arguably became the primary targets in the political manoeuvring taking place.

The 'how' of the incident is perhaps more apparent. In terms of Nye's spectrum of behaviour, the physical means employed by all players tended to the 'hard'. The United States poised with *Pueblo* and again with its aircraft carrier flotilla after the event, as did the USSR with their deployment of cruisers and destroyers. North Korea's action was one of interdiction whilst other regional actors watched with interest but did not take an active, physical role. The United States used the best capability it had for picture building, but due to resource constraints (particularly given its commitments to fighting the war in Vietnam) and erroneous assumptions based on an altogether different context (ie. the Cold War against the Soviet Union), it chose not to protect *Pueblo* with

other warships. North Korea's tapestry of fishing vessels to report and patrol boats to interdict, however, represent an impressive degree of co-ordination of the seapower available to the state, something which Gorshkov would have recognised.

The *Pueblo* incident has been much written about and few of the considerations raised above are new. However, as a vehicle for comprehension this thesis contends that the foundational model provides a viable framework for this Cold War *cause célèbre*.

Compared to the traditional, often narrow, approaches,⁷⁵ it provides a wider, more satisfactory explanation and analysis of the incident and opens up alternative avenues of research. Of course, the purpose of the foundational model is to assist in both comprehension and analysis of cases such as this, but it does not necessarily lead to one result – two analysts could quite conceivably use it to reflect on a particular incident and end up with two (or more) quite different accounts. In this case the model does aid comprehension but does not necessarily provide new insight into why the incident occurred.

The Case of the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai Islands

Japan, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan all lay claim to a grouping of uninhabited rocks and islands in the East China Sea. The Japanese name for the islands is Senkaku, China refers to them as Diaoyu and Taiwan calls them Diaoyutai.

⁷⁵ Cable described the incident as Definitive with North Korea as the 'assailant' and the United States as the 'victim'.

The three states competing for sovereignty all see military and economic advantages to the resolution of the dispute in their favour.⁷⁶

Historically, following annexation by the Ming dynasty in the sixteenth century, the islands had been part of China but were largely considered unimportant by Peking / Beijing. They were annexed by Japan in 1885, with Tokyo claiming that they had effectively been ungoverned and not under the control of any state up until that point. Over half a century later, after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War, the islands were placed under US administration, and remained so until 1971.⁷⁷ Taiwan made a claim for the islands in 1959 but took no further action.

Alessio Patalano, commenting in 2013 on the main protagonists in the territorial dispute, wrote that the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai islands were not a significant issue throughout much of the Cold War, since China was attempting to consolidate its land borders and Japan was concentrating on its economic development.⁷⁸ To that analysis can perhaps be added Taiwan's pre-occupation with self preservation and quest for international acceptance. Throughout the Cold War and immediately afterwards, therefore, it was arguably domestic politics, rather than international or inter-regional relations, which periodically raised the profile of the East China Sea territorial disputes. In support of this argument Patalano contended that:

⁷⁶ European Union. Library of the European Parliament. Vutz, Cornelia. *The East China Sea Territorial Dispute: Senkaku, Diaoyu, or Tiaoyutai Islands?* Library Briefing, 29 July 2013: p1.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Patalano, Alessio. "Sea Power, Maritime Disputes, and the Evolving Security of the East and South China Seas." *RUSI Journal* 158, No 6 (2013): p51.

The impact of domestic politics on these [territorial] disputes derives from the import of sovereignty for national political authorities in terms of both domestic legitimacy and international status.⁷⁹

However, economic factors also added to the islands' strategic importance and provided considerable motivation for increased activity in support of the various claims which became apparent from the 1990s onwards. A 2013 report for the European Union Library discussed the economic importance of the East China Sea shipping lanes⁸⁰ and Patalano noted that the region is structurally a maritime system in which the sea is central to trade and commerce, military power and political influence.⁸¹ Some commentators have also questioned whether the East China Sea dispute is connected with the possibility of oil and gas deposits in the region,⁸² as it is estimated that mineral reserves in the disputed zone could be as much as 100 billion barrels of oil and two trillion cubic feet of gas;⁸³ a comparable quantity to the reserves already exploited and estimated to remain in the North Sea. Control of the islands, therefore, is an attractive proposition to each of the parties concerned over and above their traditional rhetoric and indulgence of popular domestic opinion.

As a series of entries in the survey in Chapter 3 shows, direct interaction over the islands took place periodically throughout the immediate post-Cold War period. In 1994,

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ EU, *The East China Sea Territorial Dispute*, Library Briefing, p2.

⁸¹ Patalano, "Sea Power, Maritime Disputes", p49.

⁸² Lanteigne, Marc. *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*. 2nd Edition. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p55.

⁸³ EU, *The East China Sea Territorial Dispute*, Library Briefing, p2

for instance, Hong Kong-registered vessels protested against Japanese sovereignty after Tokyo proclaimed an EEZ around the islands. Several Hong Kong vessels were blocked by Japanese patrol boats, some protesters jumped into the sea and one drowned.⁸⁴ In 1998 Chinese protesters landed on the islands and clashed with the Japanese Coast Guard; in 2000 Chinese People's Liberation Army (Navy) vessels exercised near the islands, and in 2004 Japanese patrol boats were again involved in an altercation with Chinese fishing vessels.⁸⁵ According to official Japanese sources two Chinese oceanographic research ships entered territorial waters off the islands in 2008,⁸⁶ and in September 2010 bilateral relations between China and Japan were exacerbated when a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately collided with a Japanese Coast Guard ship.⁸⁷

It is interesting to note that each of the claimants employed different maritime activity in connection with the disputed islands. Until 2012 China had sent naval vessels adjacent to Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai, but had never ventured into their territorial waters to 'avoid antagonising relations with Japan.'⁸⁸ However, throughout the 2000s China had increased its constabulary and maritime enforcement efforts in the region through the Coast Guard, Maritime Safety Administration, China Maritime Surveillance, the General

⁸⁴ Japan. "Defense of Japan." Japanese Defense White Paper 2011. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html (accessed 23 May 2013).

⁸⁵ Global Security. "Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm>, (accessed 17 June 2013).

⁸⁶ Japan. Defense White Paper 2011.

⁸⁷ Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, 2nd Ed., p3; also, Pedrozo, Paul. "Beijing's Coastal Real Estate: A History of Chinese Naval Aggression." Foreign Affairs, 15 November 2010. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67007/raul-pedrozo/beijings-coastal-real-estate> (accessed 22 November 2010).

⁸⁸ Patalano, "Sea Power, Maritime Disputes", p52. This does not include the claim that oceanographic research ships entered the territorial waters in 2008, discussed above.

Administration of Customs and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, each of which, along with commercial fishing vessels, effectively represented state interests.⁸⁹ It is clear China did not always rely on the 'official' PLA(N) for its at-sea diplomacy. Echoes of Gorshkov's multi-stranded approach to maritime and naval diplomacy, described in *Seapower of the State*, can perhaps again be heard.

Japanese maritime activity, on the other hand, centred almost exclusively on its Maritime Self Defence Force and Coast Guard which regularly patrolled the East China Sea but also undertook capacity building and assistance activities with regional neighbours.⁹⁰ These activities were designed to consolidate the Japanese position as a good neighbour and indirectly strengthened their customary sovereignty claim on the international stage.

However, the diplomatic dispute escalated significantly in 2012 when the Japanese government purchased the islands from their private owners. The move, ironically intended to be de-escalatory in Japan, was deemed provocative in China and resulted in mass protests in some Chinese cities.⁹¹ Such 'protests' under an authoritarian regime are potentially orchestrated centrally by the state and might, therefore, be seen as a carefully considered signal in their own right, rather than as a consequence of naturally occurring public opinion. Taiwan subsequently launched an East China Sea Peace Initiative and, though not withdrawing its own claim to the islands, resolved to seek a

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p53.

⁹¹ BBC. "China Establishes Air Defence Zone Over East China Sea." 23 November 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25062525> (accessed 31 March 2014).

diplomatic solution to the issue. In return Japan rewarded Taiwan with access to surrounding waters for its fishing vessels.⁹² China, in contrast, deployed 'paramilitary forces' to the area and in January 2013 the confrontation escalated further when a Chinese naval vessel locked its fire control radar, usually considered to be a highly aggressive act as it indicates preparations to opening fire, onto a Japanese destroyer.⁹³ The situation was such that some in the West thought that it 'could lead to conflict.'⁹⁴

In November 2013, China announced the creation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) above the islands, a move which Japan labelled 'unilateral escalation' of the dispute.⁹⁵ Taiwan expressed 'regret' at the creation of the ADIZ and promised that its military would take measures to protect Taiwanese national security if necessary. Following the declaration of the ADIZ, Chinese ships then repeatedly sailed into Japanese-claimed, and internationally recognised, territorial waters.⁹⁶ Japan's principal ally and security guarantor, the United States, publicly backed Tokyo, dispatching two B-52 bombers from Guam to overfly the ADIZ without notifying Beijing,⁹⁷ and promising

⁹² EU, *The East China Sea Territorial Dispute*, Library Briefing, p5.

⁹³ Patalano, "Sea Power, Maritime Disputes", p48.

⁹⁴ Till, Geoffrey. *Asia's Naval Expansion: An Arms race in the Making*. (London: Routledge, 2012), p149.

⁹⁵ BBC. "Q&A: China-Japan Islands Row." 27 November 2013.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>
(accessed 31 March 2014).

⁹⁶ BBC. "China Establishes Air Defence Zone Over East China Sea." 23 November 2013.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25062525>
(accessed 31 March 2014).

⁹⁷ USA Today. "US sends B-52s over Chinese claimed water." 26 November 2013.
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/26/japan-china-senkaku-islands/3746771/>
(accessed 24 July 2014).

support should conflict occur while at the same time stressing that it had no position on the specific boundary / sovereignty issue.⁹⁸

Applying the foundational model to the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai dispute, and beginning with a stakeholder analysis, it can be seen that there are two primary state actors involved, China and Japan. Alongside these, the United States and Taiwan may be considered secondary players, as could the domestic audiences of each of the major protagonists. Tertiary actors include those east Asian regional states with their own maritime sovereignty disagreements with China, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. The plethora of non-state actors concerned include fishermen and the commercial shipping corporations with an interest in maritime security in the East China Sea.

Tactics used range from the employment of maritime soft power by Japan to support their own claim, including port visits, exercises and capacity building, to China's hard power approach through orchestrated civil and naval protest, poise and temporary occupation. The declaration of the ADIZ could be considered a limited form of blockade,⁹⁹ and also suggests that further, more aggressive action could follow. The US Navy's Seventh Fleet, effectively a permanently deployed fleet-in-being poised in Japan, can also be factored into the equation.

⁹⁸ The Guardian. "Obama says US will defend Japan in island dispute with China." <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china> (accessed 27 June 2014).

⁹⁹ Though the Air Defence Identification Zone may not constitute a legal blockade under Article 42 of the UN Charter, it has been discussed in those terms in the popular media. See, for example: BBC. "Why China Air Zone Raises Risk." 26 November 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25086345>. (accessed 31 March 2014).

The resultant messaging between the stakeholders, therefore, exhibits the characteristics of every trait identified in earlier chapters. There is coercion (by China and Japan, of each other), deterrence and reassurance (by the physical presence of Japanese naval and Coast Guard vessels, by the US Seventh Fleet and by the Chinese ADIZ), picture building and the pursuit of prestige by all parties, and co-operation, attraction and assistance (particularly on the part of Japan and Taiwan). Whether in that respect the foundational model offers a useful framework for analysis or a mere itemised checklist is perhaps debateable. However, in conjunction with the stakeholder analysis and tactical appreciation, it can be argued that the model as a whole is applicable to this example and can be used to help determine purpose. The purpose for China and Japan was sovereignty; for the US, Taiwan and the tertiary stakeholders it was the maintenance of the *status quo* and maritime security in the region.

Greenpeace, Russia and the Arctic

In 2010 Greenpeace commenced its 'Save the Arctic' campaign. Its objectives were to secure international agreement to create a global sanctuary in the uninhabited and sparsely habited areas around the North Pole and to ban offshore oil drilling and industrial-scale fishing in Arctic waters.¹⁰⁰ The physical manifestations of the campaign were often in the form of at-sea protests against energy exploration companies. Amongst their protests Greenpeace list action against Cairn Energy off Greenland, against Royal Dutch Shell in the Beaufort Sea, and against Rosneft and its

¹⁰⁰ Greenpeace. "Save The Arctic."
<http://www.savethearctic.org/>
(accessed 24 March 2014).

concessions, Statoil, ExxonMobil and ENI in the Barents and Kara Seas. For each, Greenpeace claim the protests had been conducted peacefully and safely.¹⁰¹

In August 2012 Greenpeace began protesting against the *Prirazlomnaya* oil platform operated in the Pechora Sea by the Russian state-controlled energy company Gazprom. The platform was situated on the Russian continental shelf and within the Russian Federation's Exclusive Economic Zone and, since 2011, Russian authorities had declared a three nautical mile 'safety zone' around it. The first protest involved several activists suspending themselves from the sides of the platform in order to draw public attention to the dangers *Prirazlomnaya* posed to the environment, particularly if it suffered an oil spill.¹⁰² Later, in August 2013, Greenpeace had an altercation with Russian authorities after attempting to sail its ship, MY *Arctic Sunrise*, into the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic without permission.¹⁰³

However, it was in September 2013 that Greenpeace again mounted a protest against Gazprom and the *Prirazlomnaya* platform with the intention of scaling the structure and unfurling a banner below its main deck.¹⁰⁴ Greenpeace launched inflatable boats from *Arctic Sunrise* to carry activists to the platform and they were intercepted by inflatable

¹⁰¹ Greenpeace. "Statement of Facts Concerning the Boarding and Detention of the MY Arctic Sunrise and the Judicial Proceedings Against All 30 Persons On Board." (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 19 October 2013), p2.

¹⁰² Kramer, Andrew E. "Greenpeace Activists Climb Russian Oil Rig." *New York Times*. 24 August 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/europe/greenpeace-activists-climb-russian-oil-rig-in-arctic-ocean.html?_r=1&
(accessed 24 March 2014).

¹⁰³ Depledge, Duncan & Dodds, Klaus. "No 'Strategy' Please, We're British." *RUSI Journal* 159, no 1 (2014): p29.

¹⁰⁴ Greenpeace, "Statement of Facts Concerning MY Arctic Sunrise", p4.

craft from the Russian Coast Guard vessel *Ladoga*. Collisions between the inflatables and violence ensued, including, Greenpeace claimed, the firing of weapons from the Coast Guard boats.¹⁰⁵ The crew of *Prirazlomnaya* also intervened, using water hoses to stop activists climbing the rig. Two Greenpeace members were arrested and taken on board *Ladoga*.¹⁰⁶ The following day *Arctic Sunrise* was boarded by Russian Coast Guard personnel via helicopter whilst outside Russian territorial waters and outside the three mile rig safety zone, but inside the Russian EEZ. The ship, and 30 crew members of 19 different nationalities, were detained and taken to the port of Murmansk with accusations ranging from piracy to hooliganism to terrorism levelled at the protesters.¹⁰⁷ Much of the action was then replayed in the world's media;¹⁰⁸ by mid-October an estimated one and a half million emails had been sent to Russian Embassies worldwide, demanding the release of the 'Arctic 30'.¹⁰⁹

Perhaps inevitably given the human interest story unfolding between Greenpeace and the Russian state, some commentators argue that much of the media coverage at the time focused on the welfare of those individuals arrested and not on the potentially

¹⁰⁵ It is worthy of note that different states employ different types of Coast Guard. In the UK, for example, the Maritime Coastguard Agency's role is predominantly limited to marine safety and search and rescue. At the other end of the scale the US Coast Guard has a military role in war time. (See: Till, *Seapower*, 3rd Ed., pp314-316 and Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, pp153-154. The Russian Coast Guard could be described as tending towards the paramilitary in its execution of constabulary tasks.

¹⁰⁶ Greenpeace, "Statement of Facts Concerning MY Arctic Sunrise", pp4-9.

¹⁰⁷ ITAR-TASS. "Greenpeace Case: 30 Arctic Sunrise Crewmembers Detained." 25 September 2013. <http://en.itar-tass.com/greenpeace-ship-arctic-sunrise-case/701253> (accessed 24 March 2014); and, Zylstra, Ashton. "Piracy or Hooliganism: Detention of the Arctic Sunrise." *Matters of Russian and International Law* 9, No 10 (2013): p10.

¹⁰⁸ See, for instance: Rosenberg, Steve. "Russia 'seizes' Greenpeace ship after Arctic rig protest." BBC. 23 September 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24170129> (accessed 24 March 2014).

¹⁰⁹ Greenpeace, "Statement of Facts Concerning MY Arctic Sunrise", p14.

more important matters of the legal and institutional frameworks governing the Arctic.¹¹⁰

The UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea heard the case of the arrest of *Arctic Sunrise* and, in November 2013, ordered its release.¹¹¹ The Netherlands, as the flag state of the ship, provided a surety of 3.6 million Euros and by early December all activists had been freed.¹¹² Nonetheless, *Prirazlomnaya* remained active in the Arctic and mineral exploitation continued.

This example of diplomatic play at sea is important because the principal protagonists were, initially, non-state actors, albeit on the Russian side much more closely connected to the state than oil companies in the West. Very rapidly however both state support and international opinion was brought to bear to affect both sides in the dispute. Applying the foundational model here it is perhaps best to again start with an attempt to identify stakeholders. Greenpeace was certainly a primary actor, but it is a non-governmental organisation which derives its 'power' from its global mass membership, who might then be considered an important, though nebulous, secondary audience. Moreover, Greenpeace does have a headquarters in the Netherlands and its maritime asset, MV *Arctic Sunrise*, was also registered there. In the days and weeks following the arrest of MV *Arctic Sunrise* and the 'Arctic 30', the Netherlands became Greenpeace's *de facto* sponsor.

¹¹⁰ Depledge & Dodds, "No 'Strategy' Please, We're British", p29.

¹¹¹ United Nations. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. "Case No 22. The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures." <http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=264> (accessed 24 March 2014).

¹¹² Zylstra, "Piracy or Hooliganism", p15.

In the opposing camp the Gazprom was, superficially at least, a multinational corporation with business interests worldwide and its own economic network of suppliers and customers, many of them states. Nonetheless, its origin lay within the USSR Gas Industry Ministry and the Russian state remains its majority shareholder.¹¹³ Russia, therefore, with a navy and coast guard at its disposal, was a key interlocutor and the source of Gazprom's authority and power at sea. As the situation developed it became no simple task to differentiate the actions and tactics of Gazprom from those of the Russian government. Russia should thus be considered a primary stakeholder and Greenpeace would have been keenly aware of this when they began their campaign.

Greenpeace's aims were clearly stated. At the strategic level they wished to see an end to drilling in the Arctic and their communicated objective in 2012-13 was to raise global awareness. To do so they balanced an amity agenda of appealing to popular environmentalism through non-violent but 'risky' action against an adversarial posture toward their target for change. Both were necessary if they were to achieve their goal. Their tactics, then, were similarly a combination of hard and soft techniques, from physical protest and coercive behaviour, to picture building (gathering evidence and publicising Gazprom's activities and their inherent dangers) and attraction to their cause. Throughout, the prestige associated with Greenpeace as a respected campaigning NGO was critical.

Gazprom and Russia had a different challenge. Their commercial activities were not illegal and when confronted by Greenpeace they attempted to achieve their aim of continuing mineral exploitation through visible law-enforcement means. The Coast

¹¹³ Gazprom. "About Gazprom." <http://www.gazprom.com/about/history/chronicle/1989-1995/> (accessed 27 June 2014).

Guard initially poised in the vicinity of *Prirazlomnaya* to act as a deterrent to MY *Arctic Sunrise*. Once deterrence failed Russia turned to interdiction and arrest, both to deal with the immediate situation and, perhaps, to send a message about any future attempt by Greenpeace or another organisation intent on preventing drilling. Russia's actions were undoubtedly at the hard end of the spectrum and they did little by way of public diplomacy to appease the international community. It is probable that the external, international audience was far less important to Moscow than its own domestic constituency. The Russian strategic narrative, consistent over centuries, is one of external plots, pressures and threats which need strong, centralised government to counter.

This example shows that diplomatic activity at sea is not always a zero-sum game. Both Greenpeace and Russia / Gazprom achieved their short term objective. Drilling was not stopped but global awareness was certainly raised and public sympathy undoubtedly lay with the protesters. This thesis argues that Cable would not have chosen to include this incident in his catalogue of naval diplomacy, as it would not fit his limited criteria of state actors, 'assailants', 'victims', winners and losers; but it can be analysed through the framework of the foundational model.

Trans-national Concerns and Ballistic Missile Defence

The final example to test the proposed model was selected because it did not fit the generally accepted mould of traditional naval diplomacy. The majority of case studies in the literature and, indeed, in the qualitative and quantitative analysis sections of this thesis, consist of discrete incidents with clear beginnings, middles and ends. The transnational concerns over ballistic missiles and the (primarily American) network of

defences around the globe, however, are different and reflect that much activity takes place in the grey area between overt war and supposed peace. They represent an ongoing diplomacy in which picture building, deterrence, coercion, reassurance, assistance, prestige and more can be readily identified. If the foundational model is able to provide an analytical framework for the naval element of such scenarios then it would prove to be a valuable methodological tool.

Ballistic missiles are not a new phenomenon. The Second World War German V2 rocket was a ballistic missile and the United Kingdom, United States, France, Russia and China all employ ballistic missiles as delivery mechanisms for their nuclear deterrents. Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Israel and North Korea can also be added to that list. The attractiveness and utility of ballistic missiles to those who have them rests on two factors – their ability to carry a high-effect payload (nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional) and, importantly, on the degree of difficulty in defending against them. Flight profiles make conventional air defence sensors and weapons systems unsuitable counters – conceptually, intercepting a ballistic missile at any stage of its trajectory is akin to “hitting a bullet with a bullet.”¹¹⁴

Ballistic missiles are often seen as symbols of national prestige and scientific competence and are thus a tempting investment for the ambitious power, whether that be a state or a non-state actor. Importantly, they have diplomatic value in terms of deterrence and coercion and military value because of their psychological, political and

¹¹⁴ United States. Congressional Research Service. Rinehart, Ian E., Hildreth, Steven A. & Lawrence, Susan V. *Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition..* R43116. (Washington DC: CRS, 2013), p8.

kinetic impact.¹¹⁵ Tactical and symbolic use of ballistic missiles is not uncommon: Iraq used them in the First Gulf War, North Korea has fired them into the Sea of Japan, Syria has seen them used extensively in its civil war,¹¹⁶ but to use them at the inter-regional or inter-continental strategic level, such as against centres of population or points of critical national infrastructure during a period of tension or confrontation has, to date, been held in reserve. For instance, during a potential turning point in the Syrian civil war in 2013 when it appeared that Western powers might resort to military intervention, the Assad regime did not use ballistic missiles against third parties, despite having the capability to do so.

It is in this context that ballistic missile defence (BMD) can become both a military and diplomatic tool. BMD is high on the US defence agenda and enjoys broad bi-partisan support in the US Congress.¹¹⁷ The US uses a series of bilateral arrangements with Turkey, Israel, Japan and the United Arab Emirates for mutual advantage and forms the bedrock of NATO BMD capability in Europe.¹¹⁸ The first level of NATO BMD, the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System (ALTBMD) was declared to be at 'interim capability' at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012.¹¹⁹ It consists of situational

¹¹⁵ Chaudhary, Upendra. "Why Countries Go For Ballistic Missiles?" *Indian Defence Review* 13, No 2 (1998). http://www.indiandefencereview.com/print/?print_post-id=5367 (accessed 20 February 2014).

¹¹⁶ United States. Department of Defense. *Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report*. (Washington DC: DoD, 2010), pp4-9.

¹¹⁷ Masters, Jonathan & Bruno, Greg. Council on Foreign Relations. "US Ballistic Missile Defence." <http://www.cfr.org/missile-defense/us-ballistic-missile-defense/p30607> (accessed 3 February 2014).

¹¹⁸ NATO. "Ballistic Missile Defence Brief." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm (accessed 15 March 2014)

¹¹⁹ Tigner, Brooks. "Nato Announces Interim BMD Capability But Still Faces Daunting Schedule." *Jane's International Defense Review* 45, No 6 (2012): p6.

awareness systems in Germany, a mobile radar site in Turkey and a naval element, a US Navy Aegis warship (the weapon 'shooter' in the architecture) stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean. ALTBMD is synonymous with the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which contributes not only to European NATO but also to the protection of the continental USA from long range ballistic missiles.¹²⁰

Despite its role in underwriting ALTBMD, the US is keen for partner states to 'shoulder more of the burden' in European defence; BMD is a hugely expensive enterprise with all elements of an integrated system costing billions of dollars. The Netherlands has plans to upgrade four of its air defence frigates with long range early warning radars as its contribution¹²¹ and Spain has agreed to permit the basing of four US Aegis ships at Rota on its southern coast.¹²² There is thus a complex mix of international interests incorporating elements on land and at sea, operational contributions, logistic support and forward presence by allies. In addition, there is the message to potential belligerents with ballistic missiles that such an attack would be fruitless and, by inference, result in a costly retaliation to no useful end. BMD, in essence, provides deterrence by denial and assumes rationality on the part of the actors involved.

One pillar of the foundational model's triad has already been discussed. The '*what?*', those communicative messages associated with ballistic missiles and the defence against them, are complex but largely unambiguous. The international actors fielding

¹²⁰ United States. "Missile Defence Agency." <http://www.mda.mil/>. (accessed 14 March 2014).

¹²¹ van der Graaff, Bart. "Ballistic Missile Defence Early Capability." Royal United Services Institute. *Missile Defence Conference 2014*. RUSI, London, 18-19 March 2014.

¹²² United States. United States Navy. "Navy Names Forward Deployed Ships to Rota, Spain)." http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=65393. (accessed 28 June 2014).

the weapons do so for reasons of prestige, reassurance, deterrence and coercion.

Those involved in BMD likewise pursue deterrence, coercion and, perhaps, an element of prestige, but they also aim to build alliances, assist and co-operate with their backers and reassure junior partners.

It is probable that BMD also carries with it a degree of securitization.¹²³ The financial cost of defensive systems can be of such magnitude that investment in them becomes attractive only when a very real ballistic missile threat is perceived. The Japanese investment in direct (Aegis warships) and indirect (permitting US basing) BMD in the face of North Korean unpredictability perhaps exemplifies this approach.

The *'who'* and *'how'* are equally apparent. Though weapon proliferation cannot be dismissed, those state and non-state actors in possession of ballistic missiles are believed to be known,¹²⁴ and those involved in countering them are, at present, limited to state actors who are identifiable through their association with the network of the BMD 'shield'. Secondary and tertiary stakeholders include those states and organisations which feel disadvantaged by the presence of offensive or defensive systems in their own areas of concern or interest (examples here could include Russian concern at American BMD systems in eastern Europe) and those who wish for a role but who have not yet been able to obtain systems (such as South East Asian states within range of North Korean missiles). Forward presence, co-operative agreements, logistical support, procurement of interoperable systems, protest, and demonstrations of

¹²³ As previously stated, 'securitization' is a hypothesis which suggests that a state might exaggerate the threat against it in order to legitimize its subsequent actions. See: Waever, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In Lipschutz, Ronnie (Ed). *On Security*. (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995), pp46-86.

¹²⁴ United States. White House. *National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet*. National Security Presidential Directive 23, 20 May 2003. Washington, DC: White House, 2003.

capability are commonly used tactics amongst both offensive and defensive ballistic missile actors.¹²⁵ In many cases, consistent with the particular advantages of naval forces in diplomatic activity outlined in Chapter 1, participating in the maritime component of BMD may be more politically acceptable to the states involved than fully committing to its land-based element. The framework developed in the proposed foundational model enables both comprehension of such factors and analysis of motives; by doing so it is a useful tool for the study of twenty-first century naval diplomacy.

¹²⁵ United States. Congressional Research Service. O'Rourke, R. *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*. RL33745. (Washington DC: CRS, 2010) p3, p7, p9.

AN ALTERNATIVE PRISM

‘Assailant-victim’ models of naval diplomacy are not appropriate in the twenty-first century. The centrality of the nation state, of mechanistic relationships and the focus on coercive rather than cooperative action that are common in many texts on the subject are only just beginning to be challenged by naval commentators in the globalised, post-modern era.

Of course, there is a large literature re-examining the importance of the nation state in the post-Cold War world, and of the place of force. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, for example, predict a coming system which they call a ‘great power society’, comprised not of states but of ‘non-unitary actors’ focused on maximising wealth. Such a system would not settle conflict through force or threats, but through negotiation and compromise.¹²⁶ Terrorism, environmental politics, the globalisation of trade,¹²⁷ the significance of inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations and the importance of international law,¹²⁸ are more issues set to challenge ‘traditional’ concepts of naval diplomacy. This thesis does not argue that these assertions of global transformation must be accepted in their entirety – we have not yet seen the predicted ‘end of history’¹²⁹ – but it does support the idea that the global order has evolved over

¹²⁶ Goldreiger, James & McFaul, Michael. ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the post-Cold War Era.’ In Buzan, Barry & Hansen, Lene (Eds). *International Security Volume II: The Transition to the Post-Cold War Security Agenda*. (London: Sage, 2007), p284.

¹²⁷ Issues discussed at length in Baylis, *et al.*, *Globalization of World Politics*, 5th Ed.

¹²⁸ Issues discussed at length in Mansbach & Rhodes, *Global Politics in a Changing World*. 2nd Ed.

¹²⁹ Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).

the last quarter of a century, is continuing to evolve, and that these changes will affect seapower.

Consequently, this chapter has attempted to scrutinise naval diplomacy through a new prism. Building on the earlier conclusion that existing frameworks were inadequate means of capturing the realities of post-Cold War activity at sea, it adopted an interdisciplinary approach involving basic communication and stakeholder theories, to construct an alternative, foundational model from the qualitative and quantitative analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. Using its definition of naval diplomacy as a communicative endeavour, it has derived a new framework in which the questions of *what* is being communicated, *who* is involved and *how* it is being done can be posed. It has suggested themes by which amity and enmity may be expressed, it has demonstrated how actors affecting and affected by naval diplomacy may be identified and their connectedness and relative influence plotted, and it has outlined a series of non-unique tactics or means which may be available to maritime stakeholders to achieve their aim.

However, the thesis does not claim that the model that it proposes is the only viable approach to the study of contemporary naval diplomacy. Indeed, history is replete with attempts to construct generalisations and 'law-like principles' about international politics and relations from the detection of patterns.¹³⁰ Different approaches are equally valid but this thesis does contend that the foundational model developed here is the first

¹³⁰ Graham, Cheryl, M. "Deterrence Revalidated: An Investigation of the Practice and Application of Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World." PhD Thesis. (University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, 2010), p23.

attempt since the end of the Cold War to articulate a practical representation of naval diplomacy based not only in theory but also in the reality of events in recent history.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Though not the *raison d'être* of navies, naval diplomacy does have an enduring role to play in the exercise of seapower. From Thucydides' accounts of the coercive power of the Athenian Fleet to the hegemonic stability delivered by the Royal Navy in nineteenth century *Pax Britannica*, great powers have used their naval forces to shape the world according to their vision. Rising powers have followed suit; Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and India all staked their claim for global status, in part, through their fleets and their activities at sea. The Cold War may have seen a different pattern of naval diplomacy from that which went before, primarily based on the might of the Eastern and Western blocs, but it was all, in the main, a state-centric understanding of effect.

But what of now? Is coercive diplomacy involving the threat and actual use of naval force alive and well? The two Koreas or China and Japan might believe that it is. Are alliances and coalitions built at sea? It is certainly an expectation, because states invest substantial amounts of time, effort and money pursuing them. Does naval diplomacy even have to be carried out by the uniformed forces of a recognised state? The Gaza Freedom Flotilla's interaction with Israel in 2010 certainly made news and grabbed the attention of powerful states, as did Greenpeace's 2013 attempts to stop resource exploitation in Russian seas. Perhaps getting the message across is a good enough outcome in this essentially communicative process.

Is it merely a subset of coercive diplomacy? Not necessarily, because there are a myriad of 'soft' power initiatives from capacity building to the cultivation of friendships, the reassurance of allies, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 'being there' for nationals abroad and providing venues for defence sales. To return to the comment made by one former practitioner, naval diplomacy is about what navies actually do, rather than what they train for. One might add to that statement that it is certainly what navies do, but what naval theorists tend not to write about.

Mahan in America and Corbett in England – the writers with perhaps the greatest lasting impact on naval strategy – had much to say about seapower but a reader must look hard at their work to find anything more than an oblique reference to the utility of navies in the pursuit of national political goals when not fighting wars. In the Cold War Thomas Schelling, the economist, game theorist and Nobel laureate published *Arms and Influence* which set out the principles of a coercive strategy and its effect on decision makers. Much of his work informed that which was to come later. Only in the 1970s did naval diplomacy begin to be studied as a subject in its own right. In the East Sergei Gorshkov, the man who shaped the Soviet Navy, wrote about it in his classic work, *The Sea Power of the State*. Simultaneously, in the West naval presence became a core mission of the US Navy and the American Edward Luttwak wrote of 'naval suasion', but scratch the surface and the political motivations of those works quickly become apparent.

Ken Booth set out what navies were for (the trinity of military, constabulary and diplomatic roles) and his thoughts were subsumed into the official doctrine of numerous western powers, but it was the seminal study by Sir James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, first published in the 1970s and running to three editions, which most influenced the

understanding of the topic for the rest of the century. However, post-Cold War commentators such as Joseph Nye provided a fresh understanding of power, and naval practitioners and academics such as Mike Mullen and Geoffrey Till looked at old ideas through a new, 'post-modern' lens.

But what were the ideas? If the body of work by the various theorists, practitioners and commentators is combined, it can be seen that both qualitative and quantitative approaches were put to use. Mahan never used the term naval diplomacy but he did describe various acts which might be classified as such today. Cable took a dataset of over 100 naval incidents over seven decades of the twentieth century and analysed them to support of his hypothesis. Those writings can be used to construct models which can then aid the analysis of particular scenarios. A principal objective of this research has been to determine if those models or frameworks remain valid and fit for purpose in the post-Cold War global order.

FINDINGS

In the Introduction a series of research questions and hypotheses identified were posed which, when answered, would address the place and utility of naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War global order. Returning to these:

- (1) *What is naval diplomacy? How does it differ from or build upon other forms of military / defence diplomacy?*

It was determined in Chapter 1 that diplomacy is a communicative process that seeks to further the interests of an international actor, and not just through codified discourse.

Bargaining, lobbying and non-verbal communication are the norms of human interaction and an integral part of diplomatic practice. The process need not be limited to recognised states and there are numerous examples of international institutions, multi-national corporations, non-governmental organisations and *de facto* territorial administrations which partake in diplomatic dialogue.

The concept of niche diplomacy was then introduced, which refers to actors in possession of particular strengths, relative to other actors, bringing them to bear in their power relationships. The employment of military forces in pursuit of political advantage short of war would therefore be a form of niche diplomacy by those with appropriate capabilities, particularly the militarily strong, which could be applied along a spectrum of behaviour from the 'hard' (deterrence and coercion, up to and including kinetic force) to the 'soft' (the range of outreach and engagement now commonly referred to as defence diplomacy). From time to time weaker actors might also resort to the employment of military forces to communicate their messages either through choice, including at times when the stronger actor is politically more constrained in its use of the military instrument, or because they believe they have no better alternative at their disposal. The subtle or limited use of military force could even enhance its effectiveness over an overt threat or ultimatum as a policy instrument for both the strong and the weak. Paul Sharp, the diplomacy theorist, acknowledged this line of reasoning and suggested that it was on the increase in international relations:

... the trend in the last half century has been towards wars of both a limited and unofficial character. Limiting wars has underlined their communicative significance while keeping them unofficial has made communications between belligerents easier.¹

¹ Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, p186.

Land and air forces can be, and of course are, used as diplomatic instruments at specific points along the sliding scale of operations but it is naval forces which offer the greatest choice to those wielding them. The particular advantages of flexibility, presence without commitment, political leverage, reach and sustainability make naval forces ideally suited to the task of international communication. These attributes may not necessarily endure forever but they have stood the test of time until now. Naval forces are not the hammers of the tool box, able to bang home a nail; they are the spanners, able to tighten or loosen as the situation dictates.² Instinctively, navies and their people know this; as Roger Barnett wrote in his book with the intriguing subtitle *Why Navies Think Differently*, 'whereas controls over visitors from other countries are imposed on land and permission must be obtained for overflight of another international state, the open seas are available for use by all. This near absence of political control means that the legal regimen for the high seas tends to be modest in scope. The politically uncontrolled nature of the oceans [...] makes the maritime environment unique.'³

The terms 'naval' and 'maritime' are used variously by commentators to describe at-sea activity, including diplomatic, communicative engagements. Etymologically, 'maritime' has its roots in 'of the sea', whereas the meaning of 'naval' is found in 'of ships' or 'of navies', ie fleets of ships. This thesis contends that though the activities under investigation take place in the maritime environment, they are characterised by the tools

² The hammer and spanner analogy was first used by Sir James Cable. See: Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, p147.

³ Barnett, Roger. *Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), p32.

of their delivery – the fleets of ships, submarines and, at times, aircraft which actors employ. Therefore, although both terms are acceptable, ‘naval’ is arguably more accurate when applied to the diplomatic use of seapower.

The research, therefore, supports the first hypothesis described in the Introduction. Naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and will be used as a means of communication by maritime states in pursuit of their national interest. More specifically, it can be defined as the use of naval assets as communicative instruments in international power relationships to further the interests of the actors involved.

(2) *What are the traditional models of naval diplomacy? Who conducts it, how, with what aim and against whom?*

The temporal classification of naval diplomacy into pre-, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods is purely a construct of this research. It was done because the accepted theories largely emanated from the bipolar geopolitical world of the Cold War and thus did not necessarily fully account for that which went before or that which would come afterwards.

Reviewing other periods revealed different interpretations of the utility of naval forces in peacetime or, at least, when not engaged in total war. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the writers focussed on the deterrent effect of navies, on the ‘status’ that they could embody, and on their usefulness in building international relationships and alliances.

Cable's hierarchy of *definitive, purposeful, catalytic* and *expressive* modes, which ranged from hard to soft power and from the highly effective to the token, became the standard in the Cold War. However, other Cold War commentators returned to familiar themes of coercion, non-coercive influence and alliance building, always with one eye on the prestige value of naval power. It was the post-Cold War, post-modern commentators who widened the debate, bringing into focus a continuum of hard to soft power effects through coercion, protection, persuasion and assistance.

Nonetheless, whether 'classical', Cold War or 'post-modern', the models or frameworks for naval diplomacy derived from the writing of the major theorists explored in Chapter 2, display a number of enduring themes.

Firstly, the earliest models are based in the *realist* or *liberal realist* theoretical traditions of international relations. Classical naval writers such as Mahan and Corbett saw their advocacy of seapower, including the use of force in peacetime, as a means to further the interests of the user at the expense of the recipient. Similarly, observers of the Cold War protagonists, including Sir James Cable with his 'strong and weak', 'assailant and victim' themes, speak directly to realism.

Secondly, and closely linked to the realist tradition, each model is essentially *state-centric*. Though the post-Cold War, 'post-modern' commentators place less overt emphasis on the state, couching their words in terms such as 'globalism' and acknowledging the importance of institutions, international law and coalitions, the state remains the basic unit of discourse. Mike Mullen, for instance, did not propose his vision of a thousand ship navy or global maritime partnership for altruistic reasons. He wanted the United States, his country, to be at the heart of it and to lead it.

Thirdly, each model is based on a mechanistic methodology in which one 'side' does something and the 'other side' reacts. That the models rely on this action-reaction process between the (primarily) state actors involved means that they are essentially *binary* in nature.

Fourthly, and following on from the previous three observations, the realist, state-centric, binary models of naval diplomacy are all outcome based and they thus demand that decisions be made. In Schelling's theory of arms and influence, success depends on the individual's assumption of rationality and on the individual's accuracy of prediction of outcomes. In other words, the models are based on attempts to manipulate the *cognitive* process: 'actions are chosen for both their immediate effect and for the effect they have on the other player's choice.'⁴

Existing models, then, can be described as event-based approximations of state actors' use of the 'spare capacity' inherent in military navies when not at war to influence other state actors. The hypotheses that existing models were conceived in the Cold War and are products of their time, and that they assume a binary, mechanistic relationship between the actors involved, are supported by the research.

- (3) *What, if anything, is new in the post-Cold War era? Have 'globalisation' and the perceived increasing importance of non-state actors affected naval diplomacy? Has the incidence of naval diplomacy changed over time?*

⁴ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp3-5.

To understand what is new in the post-Cold War world, one must understand that which went before. Chapters 1 and 2 largely explored the past but it is Chapters 3 and 4 which delve in greater detail on more contemporary scenarios in order to determine the degrees of continuity and change in naval diplomacy over time.

Globalisation did not begin with the fall of the Soviet Union, but the cross-border flow of goods and services, the transnational nature of political decision making, the interdependence between states and the proliferation of problems requiring global rather than local solutions, all increased apace after 1991.⁵ Both the quantitative survey and the selected case studies provide useful but inevitably incomplete overviews of naval diplomacy in this context, and show that it was the most capable navies which were best suited to respond to the emerging global order. However, opportunists, both state and non-state, also made use of the sea to further their aims and rising powers, in particular India and China, found naval expansion to be a necessary accompaniment to economic growth and global influence. As Simon Serfaty stated when introducing the idea of a post-western world, it is 'not about the decline of the West, but the ascendancy of everyone else.'⁶

The survey also shows that naval diplomacy is primarily but not exclusively carried out by states and that the appetite of non-state actors to become involved in international communication on the global seas appears to be increasing. As a 2009 US Naval Institute *Proceedings* article which discussed the 'contested commons' stated:

⁵ Hay, Colin. "International Relations Theory and Globalization." In Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (Eds) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 3rd Edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p 294.

⁶ Serfaty, Simon. "Moving into a Post-Western World." *Washington Quarterly* 34, No 2 (2011): p8.

There is a consensus that rising state and non-state powers, combined with continued globalisation, will put great pressure on the international system as a whole.⁷

That pressure will inevitably need to be managed, but not necessarily through force. The survey shows that the instruments of seapower are used numerically more for purposes of amity than for enmity; however, at the 'harder' end of the spectrum of operations there is little discernible difference in the desired outcomes of incidents before, during or after the Cold War. At the 'softer' end of the scale there are degrees of engagement which, when considered objectively, can be used to judge the health of any particular international relationship. However, the impact of disengagement, or proactively *not* doing something, should not be underestimated. Navies are, and have always been, used for symbolic purposes and that symbolism perhaps approached a new zenith in the post-Cold War era with an international doctrine of humanitarianism and friendly co-operation, fuelled by public opinion informed in turn by global media coverage.

In sum, the principles of naval diplomacy have in all probability changed little over time but, as hypothesised, its use is more prevalent than the literature suggests, and if we look to the future we may start to see new aspects of an old role; ballistic missile defence at sea, theatre security co-operation, the enforcement of no-fly zones, forward presence and global fleet stations are already forms of naval diplomacy. Others may follow. The hypothesis that naval diplomacy spans a broad spectrum from hard to soft power can certainly be supported but, as the strategies of the sea powers testify, there

⁷ Flournoy, Michele & Brimley, Shawn. "The Contested Commons." *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 137, no 7 (2009): p18.

is always advantage to be had from a 'decided preponderance at sea' – a Mahanian phrase which is every bit as valuable in peacetime as it is in war, now as a century ago.⁸

(4) *Are the existing models for naval diplomacy still valid? To what extent do they require revision? Do they appropriately encompass likely target audiences (potential adversaries, potential allies and domestic audiences)?*

The existing models of naval diplomacy, due to their limited scope, particularly their state-centrism and relative focus of hard power effects, are not sufficient to understand every nuance of the naval diplomacy practiced either at their time of conception nor since 1991. Indeed, many of the examples of cited in this research would not have qualified for inclusion in Cable, Luttwak or Booth's frameworks, but they are nonetheless valid uses of seapower.

In addition, the enduring themes outlined above have not completely withstood scrutiny through the quantitative and qualitative analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The actions in the Adriatic and the containment of Iraq in the 1990s, for instance, were taken under the mandate of the United Nations and not by states acting in isolation. Non-state actors such as the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, the organisers of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and Greenpeace have challenged the assumption that naval diplomacy is purely a state-centric business. Indeed, as Yezid Sayigh wrote in 1998, 'strategic coercion involving non-state actors is likely to be part of inseparable, continuous adversary

⁸ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, p82.

relationships rather than one-off episodes.⁹ The United States' flexing of muscles in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s was as much a message to its own domestic audience and to Taiwan as it was to mainland China. Similarly, North Korea's securitization and Russia's gain from US miscalculation of Black Sea relationships in the mid-2000s undermine the existing models' doctrine that naval diplomacy is a binary, mechanistic interaction between an assailant and a victim. Nonetheless, one enduring theme does hold true: at its core every conscious application of seapower to communicate political intent assumes rationality on the part of the audience at the receiving end; the difficulty can be identifying that audience.

The empirical survey and the case studies show that incidents of naval diplomacy are seldom limited to just two parties. In a significant number of cases three or more actors are involved and, often, there is also a plain intent to send a message to the domestic, regional or international community. A case in point could be the Persian or Arabian Gulf at any time in the last few decades. Are Western powers there to contain? To reassure? To build relationships? To protect oil supplies? Is it true to assert that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend?' Who is doing what, to whom or with whom is not necessarily a straight forward question to answer. There are numerous examples described in this research which show the complexity of international relations and the corresponding intricacy of naval diplomacy. Any attempt to describe the incident in bilateral terms between any of the actors would be unsophisticated and erroneous.

This thesis contends that its brief qualitative analysis of post-Cold War naval diplomacy has uncovered some simple yet previously overlooked principles. Naval diplomacy can

⁹ Sayigh, "A Non-State Actor as Coercer and Coerced," p212.

support an internationalist, liberal agenda; it can target multiple audiences simultaneously and it can be a tool for the non-state actor. Size may permit versatility and flexibility of means, but in essence scale is not a pre-determinant of naval diplomatic success. Levels of co-operation and interoperability at sea can indicate the health of an international relationship, but even at its most basic level it can also provide a politically acceptable degree of diplomatic engagement.

From these findings it is concluded that the existing understanding of naval diplomacy is insufficient. As the hypothesis in Chapter 1 stated, an alternative foundational model, not based solely on events, but drawing on basic communication and stakeholder theories, is therefore required.

(5) *Can a new model be constructed? If so, what should be its key tenets? What perspectives or bodies of literature should be used?*

This thesis proposes a new foundational model for naval diplomacy which takes into account the strengths and shortcomings of previous frameworks and the realities of contemporary seapower. To provide a framework for comprehension and a vehicle for determining purpose, the *why?* of naval diplomacy, the model asks three basic and inter-dependent questions – *who? what?* and *how?* – before expanding to second and third order levels of analysis through the application of basic communication theory, basic stakeholder theory and the common understanding of naval roles and methods, particularly those ‘composite’ missions and tactics derived from the research. Different approaches are equally valid but this thesis does contend that the foundational model developed here is the first attempt since the end of the Cold War to construct a practical

framework based not only in theory but also in the reality of events in recent history. It is not presented as *the* model for naval diplomacy in the twenty-first century, but as a model which may complement those which have gone before in order to provide a useful, alternative tool for analysis in future.

The model, as a culmination of the work, is worth showing again in its entirety:




Figure 6.1: The Foundational Model.

As the implications below explain, the final hypothesis posed in the Introduction, that understanding of contemporary naval diplomacy can aid the development of appropriate force structures and capabilities of maritime states, can be supported; however, the research also points to more. Though developed for the study of naval diplomacy, the simple inter-disciplinary approach taken in the construction of the proposed model may make it useful for other purposes. It could certainly be applied in the study of other 'niche' areas of military, defence or diplomatic activity such as peacekeeping operations, international development and the provision of foreign aid. It may assist in the understanding of conflict resolution by unpicking the constituent parts of any dispute. It may also be pertinent to trading relationships, particularly technology proliferation, and their impact on security. Analysis of non-international relations fields such as business, education and environmental studies could also be potentially conducted through the model, subject to its appropriate adjustment for specialisation. The list is not exhaustive, merely illustrative of the range of possible applications.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

It would reveal a certain degree of hubris for this thesis to make extravagant or excessive claims for the implications of its research. Conversely, it would be remarkable if the research had yielded none at all. Through the scrutiny of existing literature on naval diplomacy, the qualitative and quantitative analysis of examples from the immediate post-Cold War era and the construction of a new analytical model, an alternative perspective has been developed which could aid future understanding. The claim made by Christian Le Miere in his Conclusion to *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century* applies equally here:

For maritime diplomacy is useful not only to those actors who use it, but also to analysts seeking to interpret the wider implications of the use of maritime diplomacy. It is a predictive tool and an analytical one that can reveal tensions, allude to current frictions, underline shifts in the international order and balance of power, identify changing diplomatic strategies and more clearly identify alliances and relationships.¹⁰

To add to Le Miere's assessment, the implications of this research may also relate directly to national and international security. For instance, naval deployments could be more effectively targeted; foreign activity at sea could be better understood and, if necessary, countered; and the ability of non-state actors to further their own interests, or to support national or even supra-national interests, from the sea could, potentially, be better harnessed. The implications of this research can be addressed in three broad and overlapping categories: its contribution to theoretical debate, its meaning for policy makers and, finally, its utility for practitioners.

The research has contributed what are, in essence, incremental developments to the theoretical understanding of naval diplomacy in three principal ways. Firstly, it has examined the existing literature on seapower in a manner that had not previously been attempted at this scale. From that textual analysis various models for naval diplomacy were derived, models which are, in most cases, constructs based on subjective interpretations of the writing of renowned maritime theorists. However, though subjective, they do provide a fresh, alternative perspective on an important, yet largely marginalised, aspect of naval business.

¹⁰ Miere, *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*, p123.

In the course of the research the thesis has acknowledged *Gunboat Diplomacy* to be an accepted, standard discourse on the topic, particularly its treatment of the coercive element of naval diplomacy. The second contribution to theoretical development, therefore, has been to take Sir James Cable's framework forward into the post-Cold War global order. No other known work has applied Cable's methodology and categorisation to post-1991 events, and certainly not for the number and range of examples (over 500 from all parts of the world) examined in Chapter 3. The dataset that has been produced will be a useful practical resource to other researchers and analysts in future.

Thirdly, whilst providing a continuation of Cable's work into the twenty-first century, the thesis has also challenged its validity, especially its widely accepted notions of state centrality, 'action-reaction' processes and ready dismissal of 'soft' power methods. Instead, it has amassed sufficient evidence to suggest a different reality, open to either realist or liberal interpretations, state or non-state actors, both large and small, and which speaks to communicators not assailants, to audiences not victims. It is the culmination of these findings that led to the development of the new foundational model.

Other novel contributions to theoretical development include the challenge to the widely accepted series of 'enduring' naval attributes, the association of securitization with naval diplomacy, and the application of multi-disciplinary concepts such as basic communication and basic stakeholder theories to its core principles. These may spark further debate.

Sir James Cable announced in his final edition of *Gunboat Diplomacy* that ‘coercive diplomacy will be less costly and less of a risk than war’.¹¹ This thesis supports that assertion and extends it to include the range of other possible activities beyond hard power effects carried out by state actors. Naval diplomacy is, and will continue to be, a cost effective use of seapower in peacetime and is not merely ‘less risky’ than war, but could actually reduce the risk of war. This is a point that policy makers should be cognizant of and the research’s massing of data could contribute to understanding and, consequently, facilitate evidence based decision making for those in the policy arena.

By using practical evidence to inform decisions rather than relying on potentially skewed, politically motivated assessments, policy makers should be better able to make logical choices which will in turn lead to better value for money and, eventually, more successful pursuit of their interests at and from the sea. The research assists in this by its layered *what?*, *who?* and *how?* framework, connecting message with audience, tactic with platform and, ultimately, purpose with outcome.

For states, the research could be used to help inform investment decisions which will inevitably be made according to scale of national ambition. For instance, the quantitative survey could be used to support a proposition that a state with limited military capability or resource should invest in, say, hydrographic survey ships to provide a niche service in its region, if such a thing were lacking. Alternatively, it may be determined that a state with global aspirations should invest in hospital ships or disaster relief capabilities if it sought to extend its international influence through non-coercive means and shed any legacy image of a poor human rights record. Of course,

¹¹ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, p146.

the diplomatic role is not necessarily the defining mission of navies and these insights must be assessed alongside other requirements, particularly the military ‘war-fighting’ and constabulary roles of naval forces.

Similarly, the evidence base could be used to suggest procurement of multi-purpose rather than single role platforms, given the range of tasks and the unpredictability of employment which navies commonly face. Paradoxically, greater specialisation has historically meant higher unit costs, therefore fewer hulls and consequently fewer opportunities to demonstrate forward presence. The quantity versus quality debate, prevalent in much contemporary naval commentary, could be fed from the examples cited in the research.

Persistent forward presence, such as the UK’s decades-long mission in the Arabian Gulf, or infrequent, targeted deployments, such as the UK’s engagement in the Far Eastern Five Power Defence Arrangement,¹² both have purpose and reason, but which works better? How to employ a navy is undoubtedly a question which has vexed policy makers for generations, and there are no straight forward answers. However, subject to a more refined determination of ‘success’ criteria, the research may provide some data on the relative merits of deployment type when considering diplomatic messaging and assist in planning based on outcome, rather than simply founded on ease of delivery. In short, there is a rich seam of evidence to assist decision making on acquisition, force structures and deployment priorities.

¹² The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) is a sub-Treaty level multinational security arrangement between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.

For non-state actors the research may be similarly enlightening. The research captures numerous cases of non-state actors attempting to communicate enmity and amity through various means, but their incidence is still not as ubiquitous as states.

Understanding the nature of the maritime 'global commons' and the possibilities inherent in its use as a communication medium, could fuel growth in this area of activity.

Finally, all decision makers could call on the evidence and the proposed model to better understand the actions of others. Is another actor's deployment a signal of amity or enmity, is it aiming its message at its competitors or its own population, and is the demonstration of high levels of interoperability with a third party a thing of concern? Again, the research may not directly provide the answer, but it could provide a framework within which to logically ask the questions.

For practitioners, the research and its findings might be used in a number of ways. Firstly, the sheer scale of naval diplomatic activity could be acknowledged and its principles incorporated into future doctrine, education and training. For too long the ability to engage in naval diplomacy has been seen as a 'free good' born of military seapower.¹³ This need not necessarily be the case. Appreciating, for instance, that the strategic purpose of a bilateral exercise is at least in part the existence of the exercise itself and not just the quality of the tactical training it affords, could be a valuable insight to those involved, and ultimately lead to improved outcomes. Arab-Israeli exercises, for example, fall into this category, as do US-South Korean exercises undertaken in full

¹³ There was an erroneous assumption in many Western post-Cold War navies that preparation for 'high end' war fighting meant that 'lesser' roles such as peace support, humanitarian assistance and diplomacy could be automatically achieved. Costly experience showed that this was not the case and each required doctrine, planning, training and refinement.

view of Pyongyang, and US-Japanese shows of strength in the vicinity of the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai islands.

Secondly, practitioners will continue to question whether post-modern navies can sustain the full spectrum of operations that they took for granted in the past. The diplomatic utility of military forces does depend on credibility and capability,¹⁴ but as force structures change and navies, certainly in the West, reduce in size, the necessary combination of credibility and capability may well be achieved through partnerships, coalitions and alliances. In the future there could be a real need for closer co-operation and greater collaboration to further self interest – the ‘thousand ship navy’ aspiration offers one such vision. This research can be used to identify those actors already embarked on this process of global or regional maritime partnership and, importantly, to ascertain which rung they occupy on the engagement ‘ladder’. Likewise, it could indicate where comparable opportunities lie for other actors considering similar moves. By understanding intent, practitioners can more effectively acknowledge their own strengths and vulnerabilities and spot those of competitors.

Thirdly, harnessing the communicative element of the political war for ideas will play an increasing part in conflict in future. This is a point articulated in the comments of David Ayalon, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister during the Gaza Freedom Flotilla encounter in 2010, who said:

¹⁴ Newton, Richard. “Air Power, Coercion, and ... Irregular Warfare?” *Air Power Review* 13, No 2 (2010): p5.

As you know, today the war is in the screens. This is a political war, a PR war and also a legal warfare.¹⁵

In practical terms this means that practitioners should incorporate their strategic communication messages into each stage of the planning process for routine and bespoke deployments and determine the best means to deliver them. The use of the media, including new or social media channels, to maximise and target the communicative element of naval diplomatic activity employment, would be a logical progression of business, and this research could, through its incorporation of basic communication theory and espousal of target audience analysis, prompt such considerations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK

This thesis has uncovered much but it has also raised a number of secondary and tertiary questions worthy of further research. Though broad issues pertaining to the place of seapower in defence and security arise throughout the thesis, they are there to provide context and related questions are subject to regular commentary by naval specialists; therefore, they are not considered further here. Instead, the recommendations for further work are those which result from the tackling of the principal research questions and relate to the detail of post-Cold War naval diplomacy.

As outlined in Chapter 1, this research has largely concentrated on the diplomatic activities of the seven or eight most capable ‘military’ navies of the day. The more

¹⁵ Tatham, *Strategic Communication*, p178. The quote is attributed to David Ayalon in “Reactions to Raid on Flotilla”, by Gal Beckerman. *New York Jewish Daily*, 2 June 2010.

detailed study of smaller, coastal navies and coast guards may reveal different patterns; conversely, it might confirm the series of enduring principles and deem them applicable to all shapes and sizes of force and in all corners of the globe. Such research would be a logical extension to this thesis.

Similarly, the principles and methodology employed in this research could be applied to different periods. It could certainly be taken forward and used as a framework for the analysis of future events but, equally, it could provide alternative insights to the past. Extending it to cover the whole of the Cold War, for example, rather than just the two control periods in Chapter 3, would be an interesting challenge, as would its application to earlier times, such as the nineteenth century *Pax Britannica*.

The empirical survey and selected case studies revealed a trend of increasing activity at sea by non- and semi-state actors. Greater analysis of the range of actors engaged and the type of activity they practice would be valuable. This could include, but should not be limited to, study of semi-governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations, multi-national corporations, independent research authorities, fishing communities, criminal organisations, terrorist or paramilitary groups and those who use the sea for leisure purposes. As an example, a future research question could ask whether there is a communicative, environmental campaigning element to the activities of the latter group when they mount 'expeditions' to the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. If so, how does it work and how well is it received? If such expeditions grew in size and number how would the international community react? This would not be a study of tourism, but a study of messaging at sea.

Multi-national acquisition projects and the 'gifting' of naval platforms have been briefly discussed and they may also offer a rich vein for further analysis. If, as this thesis contends, the type of exercise or activity practiced is an indicator of the health of the relationship between the actors involved, then the same would almost certainly apply to the degree of collaborative procurement and joint technological development carried out between actors. Highly technical and specialist industries such as aerospace, weaponry and advanced warship design and construction are commonly developed by multi-national consortia, suggesting close, trusting relationships. Is there evidence that these politico-industrial partnerships translate into politico-military alliances? What of defence sales to potentially hostile competitors? France's 2014 decision to put on hold the export of amphibious shipping to Russia after the latter's perceived adventurism in Ukraine is an interesting diversion. Research into major military and naval acquisition decisions and an assessment of their diplomatic implications would be beneficial.

The foundational model developed in Chapter 5 should be subjected to further refinement and testing. Utility has been drawn from the application of rudimentary communication and stakeholder theories; it would be interesting to explore the literature on these topics further to determine if a more in-depth, systematic use could provide greater understanding of naval diplomacy.

Finally, deeper analysis of the survey itself could, and should, be conducted to determine what else there is to be revealed. There is a tendency in the existing literature to equate naval diplomacy with the overt presence of surface warships, typified by Edward Luttwak's advocacy of 'visibility' over 'viability' and Sir James

Cable's repeated dismissal of submarines as useful diplomatic instruments.¹⁶ The reality, as this thesis has shown, is different. To achieve a greater fidelity in understanding this difference the type of platform (submarine, aircraft carrier, frigate or patrol vessel) used could be mapped against the type of activity practiced to determine whether or not there is an optimum configuration to express amity or enmity, soft or hard power, or to reach the desired target audience. The impact of technology could also be better understood as it pertains to naval diplomacy; was Robert Gates wrong? Do you actually need 'a billion dollar warship' if you are to impress, educate and attract another actor to your cause?

The common denominator of all these things is, of course, the measure of effectiveness of any particular example. Perhaps the most difficult question which needs to be addressed is that of the definition of success and failure in naval diplomacy. Frustratingly it has been, and remains, intangible.

¹⁶ Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, p39; Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3rd Ed, p71. See also Widen, "Naval Diplomacy." pp728, which describes naval platforms, 'large surface warships especially', as the 'perfect' vehicles for representing their country.

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